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Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

James Andreoni  and
Emily Blanchard
James Andreoni*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, CA 92093
Emily Blanchard
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament game with two control treatments affords us a clean test of subgame perfection as well as a measure fairness-induced play. We find after 10 iterations of play that about half of all non-subgame-perfect demands are due to fairness, and the rest to imperfect learning. However, as suggested by models of learning, we also confirm that the ultimatum game presents an especially difficult environment for learning subgame perfection.

Keywords

Utimatum gameSubgame perfectionFairnessLearning

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers J52: Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation • Collective Bargaining C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , December 2006 , pp. 307 - 321
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-0064-7.

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