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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Emmanuel Dechenaux ,
Dan Kovenock  and
Roman M. Sheremeta
Emmanuel Dechenaux
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Kent State University, Kent, OH 44242, USA
Dan Kovenock
Affiliation:
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, 92866 Orange, CA, USA
Roman M. Sheremeta*
Affiliation:
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, 92866 Orange, CA, USA Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 11119 Bellflower Road, 44106 Cleveland, OH, USA
*
[email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest directions for future research.

Keywords

ContestsAll-pay auctionsTournamentsExperimentsC7C9D7H4J4J7K4L2M5
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 609 - 669
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 Economic Science Association

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