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Shifting the blame to a powerless intermediary

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Regine Oexl  and
Zachary J. Grossman
Regine Oexl*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria
Zachary J. Grossman
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2127 North Hall, 93106 Santa Barbara, CA, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We extend the results of Bartling and Fischbacher (Rev. Econ. Stud. 79(1):67–87, 2012) by showing that, by delegating to an intermediary, a dictator facing an allocation decision can effectively shift blame onto the delegee even when doing so necessarily eliminates the possibility of a fair outcome. Dictators choosing selfishly via an intermediary are punished less and earn greater profits than those who do so directly. Despite being powerless to influence the fairness of the outcome, an intermediary given the choice between two unfair outcomes is punished more than when the dictator chooses one directly. This is not the case when the intermediary merely can initiate the random selection of one of the outcomes. Our findings reinforce and clarify the usefulness of agency as a tool to evade perceived culpability.

Keywords

IntermediationPunishmentDelegationBlame shifting
Type
Manuscript
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 306 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9335-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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