Hostname: page-component-7b9c58cd5d-f9bf7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-16T08:16:13.043Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Repetition, Communication, and Coordination Failure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Gregory M. Parkhurst ,
Jason F. Shogren  and
Chris Bastian
Gregory M. Parkhurst*
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Mississipi State University, Mississippi State, MS, 39762-5187, USA
Jason F. Shogren
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, 82071-3985, USA
Chris Bastian
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 80271-3354, USA
*
email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We examine repetition as an institution that affects coordination failure in a game with and without pre-play communication. We use probit regression with random effects to test hypotheses regarding the frequency and form of coordination failure in the presence of repeated play versus one-shot games. Our results indicate that repetition without pre-play communication results in a lower frequency of coordination failure relative to one-shot game outcomes. This result is reversed when pre-play communication is allowed. Our evidence also suggests that repeated play coordination failures tend to be suboptimal Nash equilibria, whereas one-shot game coordination failures are disequilibria regardless of the presence of pre-play communication.

Keywords

coordination failurecommunicationrepetitioncoordination games

JEL classification

C71: Cooperative Games C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2004 , pp. 141 - 152
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Arrow, K.J. (1987). “Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System.” In Hogarth, R. and Reder, M. (eds.), Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 201–216.Google Scholar
Ashenfelter, O., Currie, J., Farber, H.S., and Spiegel, M. (1992). “An Experiemntal Investigation of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems.” Econometrica 60, 1407–1433.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berninghaus, S.K. and Ehrhart, K.M. (1998). “Time Horizon and Equilibrium Selection in Tacit Coordination Games: Experimental Results.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 37, 231–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berninghaus, S.K. and Ehrhart, K.M. (1998). “Coordination and Information: Recent Experimental Evidence.” Economics Letters. 73, 345–351.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broseta, B. (2000). “Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach.” Games and Economic Behavior. 32, 25–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C.F., Ho, T., and Chong, J. (2002). “Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games.” Journal of Economic Theory. 104, 137–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cheung, Y and Friedman, D. (1997). “Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results.” Games and Economic Behavior. 19, 46–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, R.W., DeJong, D.V., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T.W. (1990). “Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results.” American Economic Review. 80, 218–233.Google Scholar
Cooper, R.W., DeJong, D.V., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T.W. (1992a). “Communication in Coordination Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 107, 739–771.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, R.W., DeJong, D.V., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T.W. (1992b). “Forward Induction in Coordination Games.” Economics Letter. 40, 167–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, V.P. (1995). “Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games.” Econometrica. 63, 103–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, V.P. (1998). “A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk.” Journal of Economic Theory. 78, 286–298.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, V.P. and Haller, H. (1990). “Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal plays in Repeated Coordination Games.” Econometrica. 58, 571–595.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Erev, I. and Roth, A.E. (1998). “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning In Experimental Games, With Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria.” American Economic Review. 88, 848–881.Google Scholar
Farrell, J. (1987). “Cheap talk, Coordination, and Entry.” Rand Journal of Economics. 18, 34–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, J. (1988). “Communication, Coordination, and Nash Equilibrium.” Economics Letters. 27, 209–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Green, W.H. (1993). Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed. NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Noussair, C.N., Plott, C.R., and Reizman, R.G. (1995). “An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade.” American Economic Review. 85, 462–491.Google Scholar
Ochs, J. (1995). “Coordination Problems,” In Kagel, J. and Roth, A. (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 195–251.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Palfrey, T. R. and Rosenthal, H. (1994). “Repeated Play, Cooperation, and Coordination: An Experimental Study.” Review of Economic Studies. 61, 545–565.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parks, R.W. (1967). “Efficient Estimation of a System of Regression Equations When Disturbances are Both Serially and Contemporaneously Correlated.” Journal of American Statistical Association. 62, 500–509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, O.R., Menkhaus, D.J., and Krogmeier, J.L. (2001). “Laboratory Behavior in Spot and Forward Auction Markets.” Experimental Economics. 4, 243–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schelling, T.C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, pp. 3–303.Google Scholar
Sefton, M. (1999). “A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments.” Experimental Economics. 2, 151–164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., and Beil, R. (1990). “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure.” American Economic Review. 80, 234–248.Google Scholar
Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., and Beil, R.O. (1991). “Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 106, 885–911.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., and Beil, R.O. (1992). “Credible Assignments in Coordination Games.” Games and Economic Behavior. 4, 606–626.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., and Beil, R.O. (1993). “Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication.” Games and Economic Behavior. 5, 485–504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar