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Fairness is intuitive

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Alexander W. Cappelen ,
Ulrik H. Nielsen ,
Bertil Tungodden ,
Jean-Robert Tyran  and
Erik Wengström
Alexander W. Cappelen
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway
Ulrik H. Nielsen
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, 1353 København K, Denmark
Bertil Tungodden
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, Norway
Jean-Robert Tyran
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, 1353 København K, Denmark Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna, Austria
Erik Wengström*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, building 26, 1353 København K, Denmark Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, 220 07 Lund, Sweden
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

In this paper we provide new evidence showing that fair behavior is intuitive to most people. We find a strong association between a short response time and fair behavior in the dictator game. This association is robust to controls that take account of the fact that response time might be affected by the decision-maker’s cognitive ability and swiftness. The experiment was conducted with a large and heterogeneous sample recruited from the general population in Denmark. We find a striking similarity in the association between response time and fair behavior across groups in the society, which suggests that the predisposition to act fairly is a general human trait.

Keywords

Response timeDictator gameExperimentFairness

JEL classification

C90: General D60: General
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 727 - 740
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9463-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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