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Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ralph-C. Bayer ,
Elke Renner  and
Rupert Sausgruber
Ralph-C. Bayer*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Adelaide, Nexus 10, SA 5005 Adelaide, Australia
Elke Renner*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
Rupert Sausgruber*
Affiliation:
University of Innsbruck, Department of Economics & Statistics, Universitätsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.

Keywords

Voluntary contribution mechanismPublic goods experimentsLearningLimited informationConfusionConditional cooperation

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods C90: General D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 478 - 496
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9348-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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