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Assignment feedback in school choice mechanisms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the provision of real-time feedback about school assignments during the preference reporting period in three widely employed mechanisms: deferred acceptance, top trading cycles, and the Boston mechanism. Adaptive models predict that greater sensitivity to tentative assignments during the reporting period will produce more equilibrium assignments in all three mechanisms. Consistent with adaptive predictions, real-time assignment feedback consistently increased equilibrium assignments but did not increase truthful reporting. These findings suggest that providing feedback about assignments during the preference reporting period could help student assignment mechanisms more reliably achieve policy goals.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2022.
Footnotes
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09767-6.
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