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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 November 2024
Peace operations are often deployed to countries where conflicts are effectively ongoing, with mandates to protect civilians and provide security. With the authorisation to use force beyond self-defence, peacekeepers are expected to exert military pressure on armed groups to induce them to abandon violence and join peace processes. Such an approach falls in the domain of compellence. Given that peace operations struggle to adapt to this new expectation, it is imperative to find effective ways of compelling armed groups. While studies on compellence agree on the effectiveness of denial-type pressure, its specific forms are highly context-dependent. What is the most effective way to achieve denial against armed groups in the context of peace operations? There are four such approaches: attrition, stronghold neutralisation, decapitation, and counter-coercion negation. A case study of peacekeeping by the United Nation in Ituri reveals that stronghold neutralisation and counter-coercion negation were especially important for compelling rebels to disarm. As existing studies have not examined the effectiveness of specific forms of denial in peace operations, the finding contributes significantly to the literature on compellence and peace operations.
1 Alex Bellamy and Charles T. Hunt, ‘Using force to protect civilians in UN peacekeeping’, Survival, 63:3 (2021), pp. 143–70.
2 E.g. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, ‘Tackling the anarchy within: The role of deterrence and great power intervention in peace operations’, in Stephen M. Saideman and Marie-Joëlle Zahar (eds), Intra-state Conflict, Governments and Security: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Assurance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 182–204; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, ‘United Nations peacekeeping operations: Principles and guidelines’ (2008); Andrea Ruggeri, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, and Han Dorussen, ‘Managing mistrust: An analysis of cooperation with UN peacekeeping in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 57:3 (2012), pp. 387–409; Vanessa F. Newby, ‘Offering the carrot and hiding the stick? Conceptualizing credibility in UN peacekeeping’, Global Governance, 28:3 (2022), pp. 303–29.
3 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69–73, 79–80.
4 E.g. Donald C. F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999); David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller, and William H. Taft V, Conventional Coercion across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002); Wallace J. Thies, ‘Compellence failure or coercive success? The case of NATO and Yugoslavia’, Comparative Strategy, 22:3 (2003), pp. 243–67; Kersti Larsdotter, ‘Military strategy and peacekeeping: An unholy alliance?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:2 (2019), pp. 191–211.
5 E.g. Fred Tanner, ‘Weapons control in semi-permissive environments: A case for compellence’, International Peacekeeping, 3:4 (1996), pp. 126–45; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Reinterpreting Western use of coercion in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Assurances and carrots were crucial’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 23:2 (2000), pp. 1–22; David Carment and Frank Harvey, Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
6 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 18–19.
7 Karl Mueller, ‘Strategies of coercion: Denial, punishment, and the future of air power’, Security Studies, 7:3 (1998), pp. 182–228(pp. 214-15).
8 E.g. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (eds), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998); Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, ‘Defining moment: The threat and use of force in American foreign policy’, Political Science Quarterly, 114:1 (1999), pp. 1–30; Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (eds), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003); Todd S. Sechser, ‘Militarized compellent threats, 1918–2001’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28:4 (2011), pp. 377–401; Phil Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015); Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016); Robin Markwica, Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
9 E.g. Kofi Nsia-Pepra, UN Robust Peacekeeping: Civilian Protection in Violent Civil Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Lisa Hultman, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon, Peacekeeping in the Midst of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Allison Carnegie and Christoph Mikulaschek, ‘The promise of peacekeeping: Protecting civilians in civil wars’, International Organization, 74:4 (2020), pp. 810–32; Anup Phayal and Brandon C. Prins, ‘Deploying to protect: The effect of military peacekeeping deployments on violence against civilians’, International Peacekeeping, 27:2 (2020), pp. 311–36; Barbara F. Walter, Lise Morje Howard, and V. Page Fortna, ‘The extraordinary relationship between peacekeeping and peace’, British Journal of Political Science, 51:4 (2021), pp. 1705–22.
10 Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Lise Morjé Howard, Power in Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
11 Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, pp. 129–30, 199. For more details on the three principles, see UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, ‘Principles and guidelines’, pp. 31–5.
12 Ken Ohnishi, ‘Analysing the use of compellence during peace operations’, PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 2020, p. 109.
13 Alexander L. George, ‘Coercive diplomacy: Definition and characteristics’, in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (eds), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 7–11(p. 9).
14 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Strategic coercion’, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 15–36 (p. 30); Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 37–8.
15 Peter Nadin, Patrick Cammaert, and Vesselin Popovski, Spoiler Groups and UN Peacekeeping (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p. 109.
16 E.g. James Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 294–5; Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, pp. 194–6.
17 Charles T. Hunt, ‘All necessary means to what ends? The unintended consequences of the “robust turn” in UN peace operations’, International Peacekeeping, 24:1 (2017), pp. 108–31(p. 114).
18 Chiyuki Aoi and Cedric de Coning, ‘Conclusion: Towards a United Nations stabilization doctrine: Stabilization as an emerging UN practice’, in Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud (eds), UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), pp. 288–310(p. 302).
19 Seun Abiola, Cedric de Coning, Eduarda Hamann, and Chander Prakash, ‘The large contributors and UN peacekeeping doctrine’, in Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud (eds), UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), pp. 152–85 (pp. 159–60, 167–8); John Karlsrud, The UN at War: Peace Operations in a New Era (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 123–4, 129–30.
20 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, ‘Principles and guidelines’, p. 34.
21 UN, ‘Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strength for peace: Politics, partnership and people’, A/70/95-S/2015/446, para. 128.
22 Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, William R. Phillips, and Salvator Cusimano, ‘Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business’, UN, 2017, available at: {https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf}, accessed 12 June 2024.
23 E.g. Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, ‘The perils of profiling: Civil war spoilers and the collapse of intrastate peace accords’, International Security, 31:3 (2006/7), pp. 7–40.
24 E.g. George and Simons (eds), Limits of Coercive Diplomacy; Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy; Blechman and Wittes, ‘Defining moment’; Art and Cronin (eds), United States and Coercive Diplomacy; Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War; Chamberlain, Cheap Threats; Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (eds), Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Melanie W. Sisson, James A. Siebens, and Barry M. Blechman (eds), Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).
25 Pape, Bombing to Win; Art and Cronin (eds), United States and Coercive Diplomacy; Rob de Wijk, The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West’s Military Superiority Scarcely Matters, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014).
26 Freedman, ‘Strategic coercion’, pp. 29–30.
27 Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, pp. 4–5, 78.
28 Barry R. Posen, ‘Military responses to refugee disasters’, International Security, 21:1 (1996), pp. 72–111.
29 Mueller, ‘Strategies of coercion’, pp. 214–15.
30 Pape, Bombing to Win, pp. 69–79.
31 Samuel Zilincik and Tim Sweijs, ‘Beyond deterrence: Reconceptualizing denial strategies and rethinking their emotional effects’, Contemporary Security Policy, 44:2 (2023), pp. 248–75.
32 E.g. Wyn Q. Bowen, ‘Deterrence and asymmetry: Non-state actors and mass casualty terrorism’, Contemporary Security Policy, 25:1 (2004), pp. 54–70 (pp. 61–2); James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 162–7; James M. Smith and Brent J. Talbot, ‘Terrorism and deterrence by denial’, in Paul R. Viotti, Michael A. Opheim, and Nicholas Bowen (eds), Terrorism and Homeland Security: Thinking Strategically about Policy (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), pp. 53–68 (pp. 56–9); Alex S. Wilner, ‘Deterring the undeterrable: Coercion, denial, and delegitimization in counterterrorism’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 34:1 (2011), pp. 3–37 (pp. 22–4); Alex S. Wilner, Deterring Rational Fanatics (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), pp. 61–6.
33 Ohnishi, ‘Analysing the use of compellence’, pp. 89–92.
34 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), pp. 7–8.
35 J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr, ‘The issue of attrition’, Parameters, 40:1 (2010), pp. 5–19 (pp. 9–10, 16).
36 Cameron I. Crouch, Managing Terrorism and Insurgency: Regeneration, Recruitment and Attrition (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).
37 Avi Kober, Israel’s Wars of Attrition: Attrition Challenges to Democratic States (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 163.
38 V. K. Jetley, ‘“Op Khukri”: The United Nations operation fought in Sierra Leone part-II’, USI Journal, 137:568 (2007).
39 International Crisis Group (hereafter ICG), ‘Congo: Bringing peace to North Kivu’, Africa Report 133, 2007, p. 8; Jason Stearns, From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012), p. 29; Nadin, Cammaert, and Popovski, Spoiler Groups and UN Peacekeeping, p. 75.
40 Keith B. Payne, Shmuel Bar, Patrick Garrity et al., Deterrence and Coercion of Non-state Actors: Analysis of Case Studies (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2008); Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), pp. 34–49; Jeffrey Treistman, ‘Home away from home: Dynamics of counterinsurgency warfare’, Comparative Strategy, 31:3 (2012), pp. 235–52.
41 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1990), pp. 55–6; Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, ‘How armed groups fight: Territorial control and violent tactics’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38:10 (2015), pp. 795–813.
42 ICG, ‘Iraq after the surge I: The new Nunni landscape’, Middle East Report 74, 2008; Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, pp. 41–3; Stephen Biddle, Jefferey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, ‘Testing the surge: Why did violence decline in Iraq in 2007?’, International Security, 37:1 (2012), pp. 7–40; Lawrence E. Cline, ‘The two surges: Iraq and Afghanistan in comparison’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 33:7 (2022), pp. 1152–76.
43 Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations against Enemy Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 3–4; Wilner, ‘Deterring the undeterrable’, p. 20.
44 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 18–20; Stewart J. D’Alessio, Lisa Stolzenberg, and Dustin Dariano, ‘Does targeted capture reduce terrorism?’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37:10 (2014), pp. 881–94; David Scott Palmer, ‘Revolutionary leadership as necessary element in people’s war: Shining Path of Peru’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28:3 (2017), pp. 426–50.
45 E.g. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends; Jenna Jordan, ‘When heads roll: Assessing the effectiveness of leadership decapitation’, Security Studies, 18:4 (2009), pp. 719–55; Patrick B. Johnston, ‘Does decapitation work? Assessing the effectiveness of leadership targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns’, International Security, 36:4 (2012), pp. 47–79; Alex S. Wilner, Deterring Rational Fanatics (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Yasutaka Tominaga, ‘Organizational context matters: Explaining different responses to militant leadership targeting’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 38:3 (2021), pp. 270–91.
46 E.g. UN, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic’, S/2017/473, para. 11; UN, ‘Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2020/545, para. 31.
47 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, ‘Defeating US coercion’, Survival, 41:2 (1999), pp. 107–20(p. 111).
48 Byman and Waxman, ‘Defeating US coercion’; Willem Martijn Dekker, ‘What the bombing of Hanoi tells us about compellence theory’, EUI Working Paper 2011/28, European University Institute, 2011; Frank Harvey and Alex Wilner, ‘Counter-coercion, the power of failure, and the practical limits of deterring terrorism’, in Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner (eds), Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 95–114.
49 UN peace operations in cooperation with the DRC government employed compellence on at least three occasions in Kivus. MONUC tried to compel the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) to disarm but failed. MONUC also tried to compel the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) to end violence and join the national army. The compellence was a partial success, because an agreement was reached with a major compromise on the compeller’s side. MONUSCO tried to compel the M23 to end rebellion, but the compellence was nearly a failure, as the rebel group was almost defeated and the objective was almost forcibly achieved. Ohnishi, ‘Analysing the use of compellence’, pp. 105–7.
50 Arend Lijphart, ‘Comparative politics and the comparative method’, American Political Science Review, 65:3 (1971), pp. 682–93 (p. 689); Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 82–3; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 166–7.
51 ICG, ‘Congo crisis: Military intervention in Ituri’, Africa Report 64, 2003, pp. 7–10.
52 UN, ‘Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2003/566, para. 10.
53 Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit, ‘Operation Artemis: The lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force’, Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit, UN, 2004.
54 UNSC, ‘Resolution 1493 (2003)’, S/RES/1493.
55 Jim Terrie, ‘The use of force in UN peacekeeping: The experience of MONUC’, African Security Review, 18:1 (2009), pp. 21–34 (pp. 23–4, 30–1); Alan Doss, ‘In the footsteps of Dr Bunche: The Congo, UN peacekeeping and the use of force’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 37:5 (2014), pp. 703–35(pp. 716–17).
56 UN, ‘Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2003/1098, para. 8; Jan-Gunnar Isberg and Lotta Victor Tillberg, By All Necessary Means: Brigadier General Jan-Gunnar Isberg’s Experiences from Service in the Congo 2003–2005 (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2012), pp. 49–50, 58, 78.
57 E.g. Eddy Isango, ‘UN promises final crackdown on militias in Congo’s northeast’, Associated Press International (hereafter API) (21 January 2004); Integrated Regional Information Networks (hereafter IRIN), ‘Fighting between UN troops, militias leaves 50 dead’, Africa News (2 March 2005).
58 IRIN, ‘UN envoy gives militiamen ultimatum to disarm’, Africa News (14 March 2005).
59 ICG, ‘Maintaining momentum in the Congo: The Ituri problem’, Africa Report 84, 2004, pp. 9–10.
60 UN, ‘Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2005/167, para. 13; ICG, ‘Congo: Four priorities for sustainable peace in Ituri’, Africa Report 140, 2008, p. 30.
61 Tsjeard Bouta, ‘Assessment of the Ituri disarmament and community reinsertion program (DCR)’, Netherland Institute of International Relations, 2005, p. 14.
62 UN News Service (hereafter UNNS), ‘Disarmament in Ituri progresses, but other steps needed – UN official’, Africa News (8 November 2007).
63 Radio Okapi, ‘UN commander warns militias in northeastern region’, BBC Monitoring Africa (1 April 2006); IRIN, ‘New disarmament deadline, amnesty offer for militiamen’, Africa News (15 June 2006); IRIN, ‘Deadline for militias to disarm extended to 15 July’, Africa News (6 July 2006).
64 IRIN, ‘New disarmament deadline’; IRIN, ‘Militiamen disarm ahead of deadline’, Africa News (29 June 2006); IRIN, ‘Two militia leaders appointed army colonels’, Africa News (11 October 2006).
65 ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 34.
66 Crispin Nlanda, ‘Close to 6,000 militiamen to surrender their weapons in Ituri’, AllAfrica (1 December 2006).
67 ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 3.
68 Radio Okapi, ‘Calm restored in northeast DRCongo village after army, militia clash’, BBC Monitoring Africa (2 February 2007); ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 3.
69 Eoin Young, ‘Peter Karim surrenders 170 men’, AllAfrica (28 February 2007); UN, ‘Twenty-third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2007/156, para. 19.
70 UNNS, ‘Disarmament in Ituri progresses’; UNNS, ‘Transfer of ex-combatants major step for peace in northeast DR Congo – UN’, Africa News (5 November 2007).
71 E.g. ‘UN troops kill 10 militiamen in eastern Congo’, Reuters News (8 May 2004); Bryan Mealer, ‘U.N. peacekeepers kill nearly 60 militia in battle in northeastern Congo’, API (2 March 2005); Radio Okapi, ‘Army kills four militiamen, arrests 30 in retaliation operation’, BBC Monitoring Africa (24 March 2005); David Lewis, ‘U.N. troops kill 38 militiamen in Congo raid’, Reuters News (3 April 2005).
72 Isberg and Tillberg, By All Necessary Means, pp. 91–103.
73 IRIN, ‘MONUC helps free sex slaves, civilian prisoners held by militiamen’, Africa News (4 December 2003); ICG, ‘Maintaining momentum’, p. 9; Bouta, ‘Assessment of the Ituri DCR’, p. 13; Kristof Titeca, ‘Access to resources and predictability in armed rebellion: The FAPC’s short-lived “Monaco” in eastern Congo’, Africa Spectrum, 46:2 (2011), pp. 43–70(p. 50); Isberg and Tillberg, By All Necessary Means, p. 21.
74 E.g. Anjan Sundaram, ‘Deadly military operation in East’, AP Worldstream (16 November 2005); David Lewis, ‘Congo army attacks militia to help 50,000 displaced’, Reuters News (23 November 2005); UNNS, ‘UN peacekeeper, DR of Congo troops and scores of Ugandan rebels killed in sweep’, Africa News (27 December 2005); Radio Okapi, ‘Thirty-eight killed in fighting in Ituri’, BBC Monitoring Africa (27 April 2006); Anjan Sundaram, ‘Hundreds of militia fighters raid army base in eastern Congo; 53 dead’, The Associated Press (14 May 2006); Radio France Internationale, ‘Eighty six said killed in recent offensive against rebels in northeast’, BBC Monitoring Africa (2 June 2006).
75 IRIN, ‘Aid arrives for displaced thousands but fears over safety persist’, Africa News (16 February 2006); IRIN, ‘Two militia leaders appointed army colonels’.
76 IRIN, ‘Voluntary militia disarmament ends’, Africa News (26 July 2006); Edward Harris, ‘Three militia groups in eastern Congo to lay down arms ahead of elections’, API (27 July 2006).
77 If a media report raises two names of armed groups that the killed or wounded rebels belonged to, the reported casualty figure is halved between the groups.
78 E.g. IRIN, ‘12 militias killed in clashes with army in Ituri’, Africa News (9 October 2006); Henning Tamm, FNI and FRPI: Local Resistance and Regional Alliances in North-Eastern Congo (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), pp. 38–42.
79 IRIN, ‘Recently demobilised militiamen re-arming in volatile Ituri district’, Africa News (17 September 2006).
80 Ibid.; ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 34; Alex Veit, Intervention as Indirect Rule: Civil War and Statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010), pp. 177–8.
81 E.g. David Lewis, ‘Militia, UN clash in north Congo as peace stalls’, Reuters News (7 December 2004); Radio Okapi, ‘Militia attack convoy of UN peacekeepers in northeastern district’, BBC Monitoring Africa (22 April 2005); UN, S/2005/167, para. 19; Isberg and Tillberg, By All Necessary Means, pp. 91–103, 150–2.
82 Veit, Intervention as Indirect Rule, pp. 171, 222; Tamm, FNI and FRPI, p. 31.
83 UN, ‘Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2005/506, para. 25; UN, ‘Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2005/832, para. 22.
84 UN, ‘Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2006/390, para. 33; UN, ‘Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2006/759, para. 42; ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 33.
85 UN, S/2006/390, para. 33; ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 34.
86 Patrick C. Cammaert, ‘Learning to use force on the hoof in peacekeeping: Reflections on the experience of MONUC’s eastern division’, Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, 2007, p. 7.
87 IRIN, ‘Displaced civilians desperate for help’, Africa News (4 January 2007); Radio Okapi, ‘Army clashes with rebels in northwest’, BBC Monitoring Africa (1 February 2007).
88 Eoin Young, ‘Gen. Mayala – The only obstacle that remains is Peter Karim’, AllAfrica (24 February 2007); MONUC, ‘Monthly human rights assessment – February 2007ʹ, AllAfrica (20 March 2007); UNNS, ‘Notorious militia leader disarms, demands amnesty’, Africa News (28 February 2007); UN, S/2007/156, para. 19.
89 IRIN, ‘Voluntary militia disarmament ends’; IRIN, ‘Recently demobilised militiamen re-arming’.
90 Isberg and Tillberg, By All Necessary Means, pp. 51, 63.
91 Henning Tamm, UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-Eastern Congo (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), p. 32.
92 IRIN, ‘UN arrests political leaders in Ituri’, Africa News (29 June 2004); Eddy Isango, ‘United Nations brokers Congo peace talks after fighting kills at least 19’, API (6 July 2004).
93 IRIN, ‘Another key Ituri leader arrested’, Africa News (22 March 2005); ‘Militia leader arrested in eastern Congo’, Reuters News (9 April 2005); Eddy Isango, ‘Peacekeepers and police arrest another warlord in eastern Congo’, API (15 April 2005); ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 31.
94 IRIN, ‘Army captures militia commander’, Africa News (17 May 2006); ‘Militia leader captured in eastern Congo – U.N.’, Reuters News (17 May 2006).
95 IRIN, ‘Ituri militias take war to civilians’, Africa News (23 March 2005).
96 Tamm, FNI and FRPI, p. 35.
97 E.g. Bryan Mealer, ‘Officials: U.N. peacekeepers in northeastern Congo clash with militia fighters’, AP Worldstream (27 June 2005); David Lewis, ‘Congo militia use civilians as human shields – UN’, Reuters News (1 March 2006); Isberg and Tillberg, By All Necessary Means, p. 58.
98 Cammaert, ‘Learning to use force’, p. 7; Rajesh Isser, Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians: The Indian Air Force in the Congo (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2012), pp. 50–2.
99 Isberg and Tillberg, By All Necessary Means, p. 181.
100 Veit, Intervention as Indirect Rule, pp. 150, 177.
101 Ibid., pp. 156, 161, 177; ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 3.
102 Radio Okapi, ‘UN blames east DRCongo armed groups for deaths of “blue helmets”, urges arrests’, BBC Monitoring Africa (26 February 2005); Isberg and Tillberg, By All Necessary Means, pp. 49, 57.
103 E.g. Radio Okapi, ‘UN blames east DRCongo armed groups’; IRIN, ‘Peacekeeper dies, six others wounded in ambush’, Africa News (13 May 2005); ‘U.N. peacekeeper killed in Congo attack’, Reuters News (3 June 2005); David Lewis, ‘Congo militia holds 7 Nepali UN soldiers – sources’, Reuters News (29 May 2006).
104 Isberg and Tillberg, By All Necessary Means, p. 189.
105 United States Department of State, ‘Aviation essential for Democratic Republic of Congo security’, Africa News (9 June 2006); Isser, Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians, pp. 93, 104–11, 129.
106 Philipp Münch and Alex Veit, ‘Intermediaries of intervention: How local power brokers shape external peace- and state-building in Afghanistan and Congo’, International Peacekeeping, 25:2 (2018), pp. 266–92(pp. 282–4).
107 David Lewis, ‘Congo militia holds 7 Nepali UN soldiers’.
108 David Lewis, ‘Congo militia threaten to execute UN peacekeepers’, Reuters News (26 June 2006); IRIN, ‘Interview with Brig-Gen Mahboob, commander of Monuc’s Ituri brigade’, Africa News (11 July 2006).
109 API, ‘5 remaining U.N. peacekeepers taken hostage in Congo are freed’, API (8 July 2006); MONUC, ‘Captured UN peacekeepers released’, Africa News (8 July 2006).
110 E.g. Stephanie Wolters, ‘Is Ituri on the road to stability? An update on the current security situation in the district’, Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, 2005; Veit, Intervention as Indirect Rule, p. 158; Emizet Fançois Kisangani, Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960–2010 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), p. 205.
111 Radio Okapi, ‘Militiamen reportedly swamp disarmament sites ahead of deadline’, BBC Monitoring Africa (31 March 2005).
112 ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 34.
113 E.g. George and Simons (eds), Limits of Coercive Diplomacy; Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion; Art and Cronin (eds), United States and Coercive Diplomacy.
114 ICG, ‘Four priorities’, p. 34; IRIN, ‘Militiamen still taxing civilians despite leader joining army’, Africa News (27 October 2006).