The Lambeth Commission (2004) proposed a number of short-term and long-term solutions to issues raised by recent and highly controversial developments in the Episcopal Church (USA) and the diocese of New Westminster (Canada). From these events have emerged important questions about the nature of communion between, and the autonomy of, each of the forty-four member churches of the Anglican Communion, and the way in which decisions of common concern are made. In order to consolidate this communion, as a long-term project, the Commission proposes the adoption of an Anglican Covenant by all forty-four churches of the Communion. This article describes the terms of the proposed Covenant and identifies their provenance, in order to establish that the proposal is for the most part a restatement of classical Anglicanism. Only in serious cases of disagreement which substantially risk the unity of the Communion is the proposal innovative. The article also describes briefly reactions to and possible implementation of the proposed Covenant.

It has become almost a commonplace of textbooks that English public ecclesiastical law has no application to the colonies. Halsbury states this baldly and without qualification, relying chiefly on the judgment of the Privy Council in Re Lord Bishop of Natal, a case of unquestioned significance for the development of the family of churches in the English Prayer Book tradition. But both from historical interest and with an eye to those colonies still in being, the issue is one which deserves a second glance. This article will argue that whether or not the Natal decision was right on its facts, the Judicial Committee in that case made an important distinction which later textbook generalisations—and indeed the Crown's advisers at the time—appear to have overlooked; and that other decisions, relied upon in support of such generalisations, can be supported neither from principle nor from earlier practice.

The Terrorism Act 2000 recognises that religion may be a force for bad in its definition of ‘terrorism’: ‘The use or threat of action … designed to influence a government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.’ ‘Radicalisation’ is the process by which an individual becomes involved in terrorism, and it is the statutory Prevent Duty, introduced under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, that is the UK's current means of tackling radicalisation. Under the duty, specified authorities (such as schools, police, etc) must have due regard to preventing people from being ‘drawn into terrorism’. This article addresses an often-neglected area in the ongoing legal debate surrounding the statutory Prevent Duty: the religious dimension. It suggests that religion is at the centre of the Prevent Duty and that the formulation of the duty was stimulated by religion – namely, Islamist extremism and radicalisation. It will discuss the ways in which the Prevent Duty can be criticised; that it has an impact on human rights that it is potentially discriminatory towards Muslims; and that it does not clearly distinguish between permissible radical religion and impermissible harmful religion. The article concludes by suggesting that religion plays an important part in the understanding of extremism and radicalisation.

During the earlier part of 1993 a paper of mine was published in the Ecclesiastical Law Journal. Entitled ‘What of the Church in Wales?’, it endeavoured to suggest why the disestablished Church in Wales still maintained the characteristics of an established Church. The paper seems to have aroused much interest within certain circles of the Church of England, especially among synod members, at a time when the question of disestablishment was once more being publicly aired. The point was made to me repeatedly that disestablishment would need to be accompanied by dis-endowment, although the only reason for this assertion appears to have been the historical precedents of the Irish and Welsh disestablishments. I am not competent to write about the former, but with regard to the latter I feel that a historical examination of the events which led to the disestablishment of the Church in Wales might raise some question marks against this assertion.

When it was being introduced, there was a concern that the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 would be a ‘complainant's charter’. While there was a marked increase in complaints after it came into force, this article argues that this concern was on the whole unfounded and as a result complainants have benefited. However, the Measure has had a damaging effect on respondents to the extent that reforming or replacing it is inevitable. It is argued that the current regime is potentially unfair in terms of common law and ECHR requirements to a fair trial. Therefore, any reform or replacement of the current regime must both be legally fair and also address its negative pastoral impact on respondents.

In recent years, those involved in regulating, forming or advising faith communities have had much to contend with: the expansion of the vicarious liability doctrine, the status of ministers of religion and the decision in Shergill v Khaira, not to mention the General Data Protection Regulation. These issues share a common denominator: they require faith communities to give close consideration to the values which they seek to articulate and foster in the expression of their own autonomy and right of self-determination. That is, they serve as a prompt to reconnect with the intellectus and vinculo iuris of their own ecclesial norms. This article is intended to encourage such an exercise and to contribute to a discussion of the potential points of collaboration between the civil law and faith communities in securing dispute resolution by which ecclesial values may be accommodated.

A peculiar or exempt jurisdiction is, broadly speaking, one which does not fit into the general scheme of jurisdiction within the Church. It is “exempt” from the “normal” structures, its jurisdiction is “peculiar” to itself. It is important at this stage to note that peculiars are jurisdictions, not places, still less buildings. A jurisdiction can be personal, territorial, or a mixture of the two. However, since the reformation, most jurisdictions in the Church of England have been largely territorial, hence the convention of referring to them as places.

This study explores juridical aspects of the ecclesiology presented in the World Council of Churches' Faith and Order Commission Paper, The Church: Towards a Common Vision (2013). It does so in the context of systems of church law, order and polity in eight church families worldwide: Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican, Lutheran, Methodist, Reformed, Presbyterian and Baptist. Common Vision does not explicitly consider church law, order and polity or its role in ecumenism. However, many themes treated in Common Vision surface in church regulatory systems. This study examines how these instruments articulate the ecclesiology found in Common Vision (which as such, de facto, offers juridical as well as theological principles), translate these into norms of conduct and, in turn, generate unity in common action across the church families. Juridical similarities indicate that the churches share common principles and that their existence suggests the category ‘Christian law’. While dogmas may divide the churches of global Christianity, the profound similarities between their norms of conduct reveal that the laws of the faithful, whatever their various denominational affiliations, link Christians through common forms of action. For this reason, comparative church law should have a greater profile in ecumenism today.1

This article presents an anthropological account of the European Court of Human Rights' approach to material religion. Focusing on a range of cases involving an alleged violation of Article 9 – the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion – in relation to such diverse religious objects as cassette players, incense, crucifixes, photographs and cross necklaces, it draws on ethnographic studies of material culture to suggest a disconnect between the Court's emphasis on religion as belief and the lived experience of embodied, sensual and object-oriented religious practice. It concludes that Article 9's privileging of the forum internum over material practice has contributed to an immaterial view of religion and religious life. Such an understanding ultimately fails to appreciate the importance of objects in the creation, expression and maintenance of religious worlds.