The supermodel Naomi Campbell told journalists that she shunned illegal drugs. Unfortunately, those statements were untrue. A newspaper discovered that she attended Narcotics Anonymous. It published a sympathetic story saying that she was fighting addiction. But when she threatened legal action, the newspaper responded with articles ridiculing her.

Suppose that an employee has some personal idiosyncrasy that puts him at risk while performing work that can be safely performed by virtually all his colleagues? If the employer simply has no alternative work reasonably available, what is he to do if the employee, with full understanding of the situation, nevertheless prefers to run those risks rather than have no job at all? Coxall v. Goodyear Great Britain Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 1010 suggests that the employer may be under a common law duty to dismiss the employee for his own good so as to protect his health.

In Dennis v. Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 793, Buckley J. dealt with three points of principle relating to the law of nuisance. First, are some activities so vital to the interests of the State that their public benefit can act as a defence to a claim in nuisance no matter how intolerable they might be to neighbours, providing reasonable efforts are made to keep local annoyance to a minimum? Second, if a nuisance is established, can the public interest outweigh individual rights to the extent that a court can decline to make a declaration under section 21 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 even if the nuisance is something that no one should be called upon to endure in any location? Third, what is the significance, if any, of the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to nuisance?

In Redwood Master Fund Ltd. v. TD Bank Europe Ltd. [2002] EWHC 2703(Ch), [2002] All E.R. (D) 141 (Chancery Division, Rimer J.) the court upheld a clause in a syndicated bank credit agreement empowering a majority to bind a dissentient minority even though the minority were placed in a worse position than the majority.

The effect in summary of the case law on creditor voting clauses—mainly in the context of bond issues—when combined with the case law on shareholder voting, voting on corporate schemes of arrangement and the like, is that the clauses are valid provided that (1) the decision was clearly within the terms of the power, (2) the majority were in good faith, i.e. not motivated solely by malice or vindictiveness, (3) there were no secret advantages to some creditors to procure their votes, e.g. bribes, and (4) most difficult of all, there was no unjust oppression of the minority so as to constitute a fraud on the minority, e.g. by a discriminatory decision denying the minority an advantage granted to the majority.

Where the Animals Act 1971 applies, keepers of animals are strictly liable for damage caused by their animals. Where it does not apply, liability is negligence-based. As a matter of fairness, one might expect strict liability when keepers are in a much better position to control the relevant risks than potential victimswhen, for example, the animals concerned are exotic creatures about which the general public can be expected to know little. As an economic matter, one might expect strict liability when the degree of harm flowing from the relevant accidents is more sensitive to the number of animals kept than to the level of activity of whatever the victim was doing. The Act, however, is only distantly built on these principles.

It is often stated that equity will not perfect an imperfect gift: failed donative intent will not be construed as a declaration of trust (Milroy v. Lord (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 264). The justification, as recognised by Maitland ﹛Lectures on Equity, p. 74), arises from the fundamental difference between donors and trustees. The donor divests himself of all responsibility regarding the property he gives whilst the trustee often assumes onerous fiduciary duties over property. Thus to impose trusteeship upon a would-be donor is to impose an outcome that results in far greater responsibility than the donor anticipated. Re Rose [1952] Ch. 499 recognises an exception to this rule, namely that when a donor has done all that only he was able to do to effect a gift at law so that the donee is able to complete the legal transfer by himself, the donor will hold the property on trust for the donee and the gift, although imperfect at law, is effective in equity.

In 1987, Mr. Primavera, a restaurant owner, was approached by the defendant, who offered him a loan for the development of a second restaurant, linked to an Executive Retirement Plan (ERP) for Mr. Primavera himself. The ERP promised a tax-free lump sum payment of £500,000 after seven years. However, the defendant neglected to tell Mr. Primavera that in order to qualify for the lump sum, he would have to draw a salary of not less than £334,000 per annum for at least three of the seven years. Unaware of this, Mr. Primavera paid himself a smaller salary. When he came to claim his lump sum in 1995, he found that the maximum that he could draw tax-free was £125,875. A claim form was issued against the defendant in respect of, amongst other things, £101,000 representing the tax payable on the rest of the lump sum. In the meantime, Mr. Primavera chose to continue with the ERP, paid himself a larger salary and, in 2000, qualified for the full £500,000 tax-free.

Actionstrength Ltd. v. International Glass Engineering In.Gl.En. SpA and others [2003] UKHL 17, [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1060 raised two issues of law: the nature of a guarantee caught by section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677, and the question whether one may be estopped from claiming that such a guarantee is unenforceable for want of formalities.

The first defendant (“Inglen) and the claimant (“Actionstrength) were contractor and sub-contractor, respectively, in the construction of a factory for the second defendant, Saint-Gobain Glass UK Ltd. (“St-Gobain”). In February 2000 Inglen owed Actionstrength 197,000, so that Actionstrength was contractually entitled to withdraw its labour. St-Gobain's representative promised (or so Actionstrength alleged) that if Actionstrength would continue to supply labour to Inglen, St-Gobain would do its best to ensure that Inglen paid Actionstrength and, if Inglen did not do so, that St-Gobain would itself pay Actionstrength, if necessary using monies due from St-Gobain to Inglen.

The case of Carlton Communications plc and Granada Media plc v. The Football League [2002] EWHC 1650 should serve as a cautionary tale for contract scholars seeking to promote a socio-legal approach to the development of contract law at the expense of the classical model. For such scholars, the development of an alternative to the classical law is thought necessary given “the devastating empirical finding of non-use” of contract law in sociological studies of contracting behaviour (D. Campbell, “Reflexivity and Welfarism in the Modern Law of Contract” (2000) 20 O.J.L.S. 477, 480). In parts of his recent work Regulating Contracts (Oxford, 1999) Hugh Collins argues that the legal rules frequently undermine the parties’ agreement because, at least in the commercial context, “considerations of the long term business relation, the customs of the trade, and the success of the deal” (ibid. p. 271) are more important than the contractual planning documents in regulating the relationship. Quite simply, contracting parties do not start from the rules and doctrines of contract law in constructing their agreement—they start from the deal. While cases like Williams v. Roffey [1991] 1 Q.B. 1 demonstrate some judicial appreciation of this fact, Baird Textile Holdings v. Marks and Spencer plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274, [2000] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 737 reminds us that agreements (in that case lasting some thirty years) may still falter for want of a (legal) contract. Carlton Communications is another reminder of what the socio-legal vision is up against.

Section 151 of the Companies Act 1985 prohibits the giving by a company of financial assistance for the purpose of the acquisition of its shares or for the purpose of reducing any liability incurred for the purpose of the acquisition. This penal section is notoriously broad and uncertain in its application. Judges may therefore be tempted to accept constructions which narrow its application at the expense of straining the statutory words. The Court of Appeal's recent decision in Chaston v. SWP Group plc [2002] EWCA Civ 1999, [2003] B.C.C. 140 has reaffirmed the importance of adherence to the statutory wording.

A Dickensian law dating back to the dire days where women were driven, by poverty and stigmatization of single motherhood, to give birth in secret and abandon their newborn children outside nursing homes, allows women in France to give birth anonymously, which means that the child will never know the identity of its natural mother, nor—in practice—that of its father or any siblings, who in turn will never learn of the existence of the child. This legislative regime, originally introduced to encourage women to give birth to unwanted children in the safety of a hospital, is still invoked by roughly 600 women every year. Its compatibility with the European Convention of Human Rights was challenged unsuccessfully in a recent case before the European Court of Human Rights: Odièvre v. France, judgment of 13 February 2003 (Grand Chamber).

One could be forgiven for not predicting that a soldier from the army's elite SAS regiment, trained to withstand brutal torture and appalling interrogation techniques, would crop up in the law reports seeking relief from a contract on the grounds of duress and undue influence, but such was the unlikely basis of R v. Her Majesty's Attorney General for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22 (17 March 2003). During the 1991 Gulf War, R was a member of the famous SAS Bravo Two Zero patrol, dropped behind enemy lines but captured by Iraqi forces. After the war, former patrol members published books about the mission, which were also made into films. These publications were regarded by the regiment as inaccurate, distasteful and contrary to the SAS's traditional ethos of secrecy. The regiment (backed, in a poll, by over 96% of its members, including R) urged the MOD to adopt binding confidentiality contracts, to prevent any future disclosures, and it agreed to do so.

In Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd. [2002] 3 W.L.R. 1617 the Court of Appeal considered the circumstances in which a contract, entered into as a result of a mistaken assumption shared by the parties, would be invalidated. In that case, the defendant, a salvage operator, agreed to provide its services to the owners of The Cape Providence, which had suffered severe structural damage. Unfortunately, the only tug that the defendant could find to perform these services was six days away from the vessel. This gave rise to concerns over crew safety if the vessel sank whilst awaiting the tug. The defendant’s brokers, therefore, sought to hire a vessel which was sufficiently close to be able to evacuate the crew if necessary. The brokers were informed by a well-respected information agency that The Great Peace, a vessel owned by the claimant, was “in close proximity” to the stricken vessel, approximately 35 miles away. As a result, the defendant’s brokers negotiated with the claimant for the hire of The Great Peace for a period of five days, both parties assuming that the information as to The Great Peace’s location was correct. On discovering that the vessels were in fact some 410 miles apart, the defendant hired an alternative vessel and sought to cancel the contract with the claimant. Proceedings were commenced to recover the full amount of the hire, or alternatively damages for breach of contract. The defendant resisted the claim on the ground that the contract was either void at common law or voidable in equity, as both parties had laboured under a fundamental mistake at the time of contracting. Both arguments were rejected by Toulson J., at first instance, and by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers M.R. delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Tax lawyers have to apply the concepts contained in the tax legislation to facts created by taxpayers; this is not easy. In Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd. v. Mawson (Inspector of Taxes) [2002] EWCA Civ 1853, [2003] S.T.C. 66, the Special Commissioners agreed with the Revenue; Park J. [2002] EWHC 1527 (Ch), [2002] S.T.C. 1068, agreed with the Special Commissioners but for rather deeper reasons. Now the Court of Appeal has accepted the taxpayer's characterisation, making some very critical remarks about both lower level decisions. Normally, that would be the end of the matter, but the members of the Court of Appeal went out of their way to say, as closely as judges can do, that the recent decision of the House of Lords in MacNiven v. Westmoreland Investments Ltd. [2001] 2 W.L.R. 377, the case which rewrote the still emerging rules about when composite transactions are treated as one single transaction for tax purposes, had left the courts with a test which is unworkable (e.g. para. [69]).

Students of the law of contract know that, because insurance contracts are contracts of “utmost good faith”, applicants for insurance must disclose “material facts” to the insurer concerned. Students may not know what the law says is material and might be surprised if they did. General contract law distinguishes a misrepresentation of fact from one of opinion. If facts are untrue, the contract may be rescinded, but unfounded opinions have no such effect. The prudent contractor must ignore mere gossip but not so, it seems, when contracting insurance.

Clearly, a medical opinion that an applicant for life or health insurance has cancer has to be disclosed: British Equitable Ins. Co. v. Great Western Ry. (1869) 20 L.T. 422. The opinion of Aunt Jane that the applicant looks peaky does not. Again, if the applicant has been charged with a criminal offence, he remains “innocent until proved guilty.

The topic of exemplary damages has often been shrouded in controversy. Indeed, in some jurisdictions (such as England), the very award of such damages is confined to an extremely narrow compass (though cf. the recent House of Lords decision in Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 A.C. 122). Although the jurisdiction to award such damages is broader in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, difficult issues remain, two of which were recently explored by the highest appellate courts in New Zealand and Canada, respectively.

The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines heresy as an opinion or doctrine contrary to the accepted doctrine of any subject. In Pye v. Graham [2002] 3 W.L.R. 221 the House of Lords robustly confirmed the orthodoxy relating to adverse possession and discounted discordant voices as heretical. There is probably general relief that no fireworks have disturbed the established law in its twilight years, but for this writer there is some regret over a wasted opportunity. Yet again in an adverse possession case, a result has been reached that caused some of the judges misgivings about the fairness of the outcome, but there was no serious attempt to try to address this by subjecting the whole area to a fresh scrutiny and considering whether there was any merit in heretical views.

When the Queen visited Cambridge to open the new Law Faculty building in 1996, an exhibition concerning the law relating to horses was devised for Her Majesty's entertainment. A revised edition of the exhibition might cover two contributions made by horses to the development of the law in 2003: Mirvahedy v. Henley [2003] UKHL 16, [2003] 2 W.L.R. 882 on liability under section 2(2) of the Animals Act 1971 (noted above) and Habton Farms Ltd. v. Nimmo [2003] EWCA Civ 68, [2003] 3 W.L.R. 633 on the measure of damages for breach of warranty of authority by an agent.

Nimmo, a bloodstock agent, sometimes helped Williamson, a racehorse owner, to find horses, but he had no authority to buy on Williamson's behalf. On 12 October 1998 he agreed to buy a racehorse, High Spirits, from Habton Farms for 70,000, making it clear that he was acting as an agent.

In Ennstone Building Products Ltd. v. Stranger Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 916, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 3059 the claimant, who had supplied sandstone for a building in Edinburgh, retained the defendant to investigate and report when the stone developed unsightly staining. The contract was concluded at the defendant's Scottish office and provided that research and testing were to be carried out in both England and Scotland, but predominantly in Scotland. Both parties were English companies.

The defendant reported, recommending that the sandstone be treated with oxalic acid, and this treatment was duly carried out. A few months later, however, the stone had again become disfigured. When independent consultants advised that oxalic acid was likely to have exacerbated the staining problem, the claimant sued the defendant for negligence and/or breach of contract.

In Rowe v. Vale of White Horse District Council [2003] EWHC 388 (Admin), [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 418 Lightman J. held that the defendant Council could not succeed in a claim for restitution in respect of unpaid sewage services provided to Mr. Rowe, a successor in title to a former tenant of the Council. The former tenant had bought the house from the Council in 1982 and Mr. Rowe had bought the house in 1988. When the Council claimed payment for the services, Mr. Rowe brought proceedings for judicial review of the Council's decision. The Council's defence was based on a claim to restitution for services rendered. From 1982 to March 2001, the Council gave no intimation that it was entitled to charge for the sewage services and Mr. Rowe had no reason to believe that his payments to the Council and to the Thames Water Authority were anything other than all that was demanded of him.