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Cyber-insurance pricing models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2025

James Bardopoulos*
Affiliation:
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, London, UK Science Faculty, University of Cape Town, Western Cape, South Africa
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Abstract

In the present technological age, where cyber-risk ranks alongside natural and man-made disasters and catastrophes – in terms of global economic loss – businesses and insurers alike are grappling with fundamental risk management issues concerning the quantification of cyber-risk, and the dilemma as to how best to mitigate this risk. To this end, the present research deals with data, analysis, and models with the aim of quantifying and understanding cyber-risk – often described as “holy grail” territory in the realm of cyber-insurance and IT security. Nonparametric severity models associated with cyber-related loss data – identified from several competing sources – and accompanying parametric large-loss components, are determined, and examined. Ultimately, in the context of analogous cyber-coverage, cyber-risk is quantified through various types and levels of risk adjustment for (pure-risk) increased limit factors, based on applications of actuarially founded aggregate loss models in the presence of various forms of correlation. By doing so, insight is gained into the nature and distribution of volatile severity risk, correlated aggregate loss, and associated pure-risk limit factors.

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Contributed Paper
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries

1. Introduction

Cyber-risk, an umbrella term for risks associated with technology and information (CRO Forum, 2014), is a significant threat with an estimated annual cost to the worldwide economy of over $600bn (McAfee & Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018). It encompasses a wide host of events caused by inadvertent activities (e.g. loss of data) and criminal threats (e.g. phishing) that can lead to various types of loss (e.g. remediation costs) damage and liability.

Uncertainty in the realm of a nascent insurance market has led to conservative underwriting; premiums are perceived to be large in relation to the level of cover – and thus low product penetration (UK Government and Industry, 2015) and restricted coverage (high deductibles, low policy limits) that fails to protect firms against low frequency events with volatile severity. Many of these obstacles have been attributed to the following characteristics associated with cyber-risk:

  1. 1. Lack of reliable (frequency, but mainly severity) data for modelling and quantifying cyber-risk in an “actuarial pricing” context (Cashell et al., Reference Cashell, Jackson, Jickling and Webel2004; Böhme & Schwartz, Reference Böhme and Schwartz2010)

  2. 2. The correlated nature of cyber-risk (Baldwin et al., Reference Baldwin, Gheyas, Ioannidis, Pym and Williams2012) and interdependence (i.e. degree of “interconnectedness” between networks and systems) – (Ogut et al., Reference Ogut, Raghunathan and Menon2005) – precipitated by widespread use of the internet, relatively few Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and reliance upon common IT software (Böhme, Reference Böhme2005; Laszka et al., Reference Laszka, Felegyhazi and Buttyan2014)

  3. 3. Information asymmetry (Bandyopadhyay et al., Reference Bandyopadhyay, Mookerjee and Rao2010)

In academic circles, these factors have evidently influenced the development of cyber-risk models in several ways. Due to data related issues, frequency models appear to be more prevalent than severity (i.e. cost) models; aggregate loss models often assume constant severity leading to (possibly mixed) binomial distributions. Overall, the level of empirical support is egregiously low. Correlation and interdependence have led to the consideration of copula (Herath & Herath, Reference Herath and Herath2011), Markov processes (Barracchini & Addessi, Reference Barracchini and Addessi2014), and Bayesian belief nets (Mukhopadhyay et al., Reference Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti and Sadhukhan2013). Many of these models, having been developed beyond the framework of economics and computer science, are abstracted from several peculiarities associated with aggregate cyber-risk – especially in the context of cyber-insurance and risk quantification:

  • Aggregate loss distributions, risk measures (e.g. variance and value at risk), tail dependence, and the effects of correlation and interdependence in terms of different sections of insurance cover (e.g. business interruption, data breach remediation, etc.) have received little attention

  • Loss models are generally underdeveloped in the field of cyber-science – applications concerning (much required) risk theory and aggregate loss modelling techniques have been largely neglected in this domain

  • There is very little evidence in academic cyber-related research of Increased limit factors (ILFs: multiples of premiums for different cover limits), which are highly relevant given concerns regarding “low policy limits” and “accurate pricing”

This work contributes to each of these areas. To begin with, Section 2 summarises implemented cyber-risk models (and accompanying data, if utilised), in the context of a model taxonomy by field of study and design. Several sources of data are evaluated, and a primary source is identified for constructing ILFs – this source is described in Section 3. Section 4 derives several models in the context of Individual and Collective Risk frameworks. These reflect different types of correlation and risk adjustments and are used to model ALDs and ILF curves. Section 5 considers various severity and aggregate loss distributions and explores the impact of correlation and risk adjustments at the aggregate level. Section 6 closes with conclusions and recommendations.

2. Review of Models

Taxonomy

A chronological taxonomy that depicts cyber-risk models under the following four broad headings can be found in Appendix A.2:

  • Economic – models that consider the decisions and behaviours of individuals and organisations in the context of IT security and cyber-insurance. These typically focus on the “demand-side” (Böhme & Schwartz, Reference Böhme and Schwartz2010) of trade-off decisions (e.g. for allocating resources between insurance and IT security) using Utility or Decision theory.

  • Correlation based – models that include copula and regression techniques, with some models that straddle the economic sphere (Liu et al., Reference Liu, Semenciw, Ugnat and Mao2001; Böhme, Reference Böhme2005).

  • Operational Risk (OR) – models that stem from OR quantification techniques such as those used to determine regulatory capital requirements, (European Commission, 2017). These encompass Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and risk theory (Section 4.1).

  • Epidemic (and related) – models that utilise Markov processes and regression techniques, and are analogous to epidemiological compartmental (van Mieghem et al., Reference van Mieghem, Omic and Kooij2009; Parker & Farkas, Reference Parker and Farkas2011) or health insurance (Barracchini & Addessi, Reference Barracchini and Addessi2014) models.

The search strategy underpinning this literary review of models is described in Appendix A.1.

Summary of models

Counting processes and related distributions

As Table 1 shows, a variety of stochastic processes have been considered for count (e.g. number of cyber-related incidents, losses, etc.) and associated interarrival times. The homogeneous Poisson process (i.e. constant rate of arrival; independent, exponentially distributed interarrival times) is one common example (Van Mieghem et al., Reference van Mieghem, Omic and Kooij2009; Herath & Herath, Reference Herath and Herath2011). Variations (e.g. Pareto) have also been proffered in the context of privacy incidents (Yannacopoulos et al., Reference Yannacopoulos, Lambrinoudakis, Gritzalis, Xanthopoulos, Katsikas, Jajodia and López2008). The Bernoulli process is another example (Gordon & Loeb, Reference Gordon and Loeb2002; Böhme, Reference Böhme2005; Böhme & Kataria, Reference Böhme and Kataria2006). Non-homogeneous processes have also been utilised (Edwards et al., Reference Edwards, Hofmeyr and Forrest2016).

Table 1. Extant cyber-risk models. Distributions, models – green (recognised or plausible in the context of general insurance), orange (data dependent), red (unrealistic, misrepresentative), grey (out-of-scope, not applicable, unspecified)

Notes: (1) only moments considered. (2a) Homogeneous; non-homogeneous: lognormal, log-Weibull based functions; (b) exponential, lognormal, Weibull, log-Weibull, Pareto αStable (log, symmetric); (c) compound processes (e.g. Poisson, Cox) described but not applied. (3) EM – Expectation Maximisation. (4a–c) Per simulation example, RUM (utility – Pareto, random term – Normal). (5) GPD – Generalised Pareto Distribution. (6) Per simulation example (single claim per period, with certainty). (7) SEIR – Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered. (8) Spliced (exponential, GPD), Weibull, gamma, lognormal. (9a) With parameters for interdependence, disseminated information; (b) direct and disclosure costs, security investment. 10a) “Daily” and “large” respectively; (b) log-log (Jacobs, Reference Jacobs2014). Outputs: non-exhaustive examples. Exposure (*): conditional (e.g. given breach). Features: Π (considered) ⊆ (otherwise)

Severity and aggregate loss distributions

Constant severity has often been assumed (Böhme, Reference Böhme2005; Böhme & Kataria, Reference Böhme and Kataria2006; Mukhopadhyay et al., Reference Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti and Sadhukhan2013, Section 5.2), which has resulted in several impractical aggregate loss models (characterised by binomial distributions). In the case of Edwards et al. (Reference Edwards, Hofmeyr and Forrest2016), aggregate loss was estimated using an independent regression model (Jacobs (Reference Jacobs2014), log skew-normal breach size) and a negative binomial distributed breach count variable. Indeed, few severity models have been based on genuine cyber-related loss data – in the case of (Biener et al., Reference Biener, Eling and Wirfs2015), this entailed an extensive classification exercise in respect of OR data SAS (2015).

3. Data

Data is drawn from Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015) global and country-level cost of data breach survey reports (hereafter, 2012–2015 years respectively) which form part of the PON (2019) data source. These reports feature estimated organisational costs in respect of publicly disclosed data breaches (loss or theft of personally identifiable records such as names and account numbers). Relevant information and basic preparation for subsequent analysis includes:

  • Costs are subdivided into four “cost centres” – A: detection and escalation; B: notification; C: ex-post response; and D: lost business (hereafter, classes A–D respectively, with class E being the total)

  • Years 2012–2014 (country-reports) – organisation-level costs, by class, are collated and US-dollar converted at prevailing exchange rates

  • Year 2015 (global) – class E costs (in US dollars) are depicted in various “one-way” graphs (e.g. by rank of mean time to discover a breach); R-based image-scraping software, Webplotdigitiser (Rohatgi, Reference Rohatgi2013), is used to obtain this data from Ponemon Institute (2015, Figure 20), before further scrutiny and adjustments (as described shortly)

  • Mean and extrema (with respect to costs) are given, by class and year

  • In terms of the 2015 year, extracted costs appear to resemble the corresponding data points reasonably well (partly due to the ordering represented, which results in volatile and easily identifiable costs). A graphical comparison reveals 8 discrepancies (<2.5% of the data points)

These are manually corrected; after doing so, the mean cost falls within 0.2% of the given value and extrema are exact. Table 2 summarises classes A–D in terms of underlying activities and reputational damage associated with breaches, alongside examples of first-party coverage (i.e. which protect the insured’s assets).

Table 2. Costs (classes A–E) and possible coverage. Descriptions for classes A–E are based on “global” cost of data breach reports (Ponemon Institute, 2012i, 2013j, 2014f, 2013j); specimen products are purely illustrative examples of first-party coverage in respect of associated costs: AIG – Illinois (Murphy, Reference Murphy2013); ACE –(Cresenzi & Alibrio, Reference Cresenzi and Alibrio2016); Federal Insurance – (Daigle & Cresenzi, Reference Daigle and Cresenzi2018)

Costs, by class, are inflation-adjusted to make them comparable for analysis, whilst ensuring associated distributions are not overly distorted as a result. It is worth noting, that, despite having the most desirable characteristics out of 19 other potentially useful sources, the data in hand is arguably of questionable veracity as far as an accurate, representative, experienced-based actuarial pricing exercise is concerned.

4. Loss Models

This section develops six variants (Models 4.1–4.6) to explore the impact of correlation and risk at the aggregate level. Variants of the theory is well-founded – only key definitions and equations shall be provided here – references are provided for the interested reader. Figure 1 illustrates how this theory relates to the each of the six models.

Figure 1. Outline of theory and model links. Theory 1–4 (blue, in addition to risk theory which introduces 1 and 3); Models 4.1–4.6 (green; all models rely upon 1 and 2; 3 and 4 are only utilised in support of Models 4.3–4.6). Generated using Freemind (Müller et al., Reference Müller, Polansky, Novak, Polivaev, Foltin and Lavarde2004).

4.1. Risk Theory

Aggregate loss, S, represents the total amount for a given period and group of risks,

(1) $$S = {X_1} + {X_2} +, \ldots, + {X_N},$$

where N and $ {X}_{i}$ can be defined from two perspectives of risk theory, namely:

  • Collective Risk (CR): loss count, $N$ , and (non-negative) severities, ${X_1}, \ldots, {X_N}$ , are random variables with independence assumptions as follows: N does not depend on the severity of loss; given $N$ , ${X_i}{\rm{s}}$ are i.i.d., independently with respect to count

  • Individual Risk (IR): here, N denotes a fixed number of risks with respective losses, ${X_i}{\rm{s}}$ that are independently distributed (as opposed to i.i.d.) random variables with mixed CDFs that may have mass at point zero (i.e. for the probability of no loss)

In terms of (1) – IR, CR models – determining the ALD is one of the classical problems in the realm of risk theory. As there is generally no closed-form solution (Shevchenko, Reference Shevchenko2010, Section 1) various techniques have been deployed: Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) can be used to reconstruct the density with the aid of the transforms (e.g. characteristic function, CF; moment or probability generating functions, MGF, PGF respectively – provided these exist) – (Kaas et al., Reference Kaas, Goovaerts, Dhaene and Denuit2008, Section 2.1).

4.2. Increased Limit Factors

An ILF is a multiplicative factor that is applied to the premium at a basic limit to determine the premium at an increased limit. Basic limits typically refer to the lowest levels of coverage provided, (Werner & Modlin, Reference Werner and Modlin2010). However, in principle, any non-negative limit can be contemplated for this purpose (hereafter, the term base limit is used instead of basic limit).

Limit definitions

A policy limit refers to the maximum amount payable under an insurance policy, either overall, or in respect of a particular section of a policy (Lloyd’s, 2019), hereafter, known as “coverage section.” This may be expressed on several bases; for demonstrative purposes, the following are assumed applicable for losses associated with classes A–E:

  • Per-loss: applies to individual costs (i.e. classes A–D)

  • Per-occurrence: applies to total cost (i.e. class E)

The limited random variable ${X^{(b)}}$ is defined as follows:

(2) $${X^{(b)}} = \min\, \left( {X,b} \right),$$

where $X$ is a random variable and $\{ b:b \gt 0\} $ is some limit. More generally, consider the limited variable ${X^{(b)}}$ (2), and suppose $X$ has a CDF and PDF denoted by $F$ and $f$ respectively; the limited kth-order moment of $X$ , when limit $b$ applies, can then be expressed in terms of the Riemann-Stieltjes integral:

(3) $${\rm{E}}\left( {{X^{(b)k}}} \right) = {\rm{E}}\left( {\min {{(X,b)}^k}} \right) = \int\limits_0^b {{x^k}dF{{(x)}}} dx + {b^k}(1 - F(b)) = \int\limits_0^b {k{x^{k - 1}}{S_X}{{(x)}}} dx,$$

where ${S_X} = 1 - F$ and ( $k = 1$ yields the LEV). Refer to Lee (Reference Lee1988) for a graphical illustration and Klugman et al. (Reference Klugman, Panjer and Willmot2004) for a mathematical proof. Now let the aggregate loss in respect of limited severities (hereafter, Limited Aggregate Severity, LAS) be $S(b)$ defined by:

(4) $$S(b) = \sum\limits_{i = 1}^N {X_i^{(b)}}, $$

where $b \gt 0$ is a given limit, and ${X_i}$ s are severities, and $N$ is the loss count, as for the aggregate loss in (2). This gives rise to the following definition: let limit factor, $\gamma, $ for a given base limit, $a,$ be defined by:

(5) $$\gamma (b): = \gamma (b;a) = {{{\rm{E}}\left( {S(b)} \right)} \over {{\rm{E}}\left( {S(a)} \right)}},{\rm{E}}\left( {S(a)} \right),{\rm{E}}\left( {S(b)} \right) \gt 0,$$

where $a,b \gt 0$ . The term limit factor, for the purpose of the present research, refers to both discount factors and ILFs, defined as follows:

  • Discount factor: $(a \gt b \gt 0) \Rightarrow \gamma (b;a) \in (0,1)$ ; in this case, $a$ could represent the highest limit of coverage, or, in the context of coverage without-limits, $a \to \infty $

  • ILF: $(0 \lt a \le b) \Rightarrow \gamma (b;a) \ge 1$ ; the conventional definition of an $ILF$ , where $a$ and $b$ represent “basic” and increased limits respectively

In terms of (5), CR independence assumptions lead to the following expression for limit factors:

(6) $$\gamma (b) = {{{\rm{E}}\left( {{X^{(b)}}} \right)} \over {{\rm{E}}\left( {{X^{(a)}}} \right)}}.$$

Consistency properties

Limit factors satisfy consistency properties if they are asymptotically constant, have a monotonically decreasing and positive gradient, and are concave down.

4.3. Risk Adjustments

Process risk refers to the inherent variability associated with the stochastic nature of frequency and severity of losses. To allow for this, actuaries may incorporate a risk adjustment into ILF calculations to achieve a certain risk margin (percentage increase in LAS).

Example 4.1 Variance principle risk adjustment

Let ${\pi _{{\mathop{\rm var}} }}(S;w)$ denote the variance-adjusted (pure-risk) premium with respect to the aggregate loss amount, $S,$ and a risk parameter, $w \gt 0,$ be defined by:

(7) $${\pi _{{\mathop{\rm var}} }}\left( {S;w} \right) = {\rm{E}}\left( S \right) + w{\rm{Var}}\left( S \right),$$

then the variance-adjusted limit factor, ${\gamma _S}$ , can be defined as:

(8) $${\gamma _S}(b;a,w) = {{{\pi _{{\rm{var}}}}(S(b);w)} \over {{\pi _{{\rm{var}}}}(S(a);w)}},$$

where $S(a)$ and $S(b)$ are LASs (4) with limits $a,b \gt 0$ respectively. Independence assumptions (1) concerning loss count and i.i.d. severity (i.e. $N$ , $Y$ respectively), with Poisson $N,$ simplify the risk-adjusted limit factor, ${\gamma _S}$ (8) to the following:

(9) $${\gamma _Y}(b;a,w) = {{\pi _{{\rm{var}}}^*({Y^{(b)}};w)} \over {\pi _{{\rm{var}}}^*({Y^{(a)}};w)}},\pi _{{\rm{var}}}^*({Y^{(b)}};w) = {\pi _{{\rm{var}}}}({Y^{(b)}};w) + w{\left( {{\rm{E}}\left( {{Y^{(b)}}} \right)} \right)^2}.$$

Example 4.2 Excess losses with inflation and variance principle risk adjustment

For a compound Poisson “excess” LAS, $S = \sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^N {{Y_i}} $ , where ${Y_i} = \max (0,v{X_i}^{({\textstyle{b \over v}})} - d)$ , $i = 1,2, \ldots, N$ (i.e. $N\sim Poisson)$ , under CR independence assumptions (1), limits $a,b \gt 0;$ deductible $d,$ s.t. $0 \le d \lt \min (a,b)$ , and constant inflation $v \gt 1$ , the variance-adjusted limit factor, ${\gamma _Y}$ (9), with parameter $w$ (as before), becomes:

(10) $${\gamma _Y}(b;a,d,w,v) = {{\pi _{{\rm{var}}}^*\left( {{X^{\left( {{b \over v}} \right)}},vw} \right) - \pi _{{\rm{var}}}^*\left( {{X^{\left( {{d \over v}} \right)}},vw} \right) - 2dw\left[ {{\rm{E}}\left( {{X^{\left( {{b \over v}} \right)}}} \right) - {\rm{E}}\left( {{X^{\left( {{d \over v}} \right)}}} \right)} \right]} \over {\pi _{{\rm{var}}}^*\left( {{X^{\left( {{a \over v}} \right)}},vw} \right) - \pi _{{\rm{var}}}^*\left( {{X^{\left( {{d \over v}} \right)}},vw} \right) - 2dw\left[ {{\rm{E}}\left( {{X^{\left( {{a \over v}} \right)}}} \right) - {\rm{E}}\left( {{X^{\left( {{d \over v}} \right)}}} \right)} \right]}},$$

where $\pi _{{\mathop{\rm var}} }^*$ is defined as previously. This can be shown through substitution $x = y{v^{ - 1}}$ .

Example 4.3 Proportional-Hazard (PH) transform

Let ${\pi _{PH}}$ be the mean in respect of the PH transform defined by:

(11) $${\pi _{PH}}({Y^{(b)}};b,w) = \int_0^b {{S_Y}{{(x)}^{{\textstyle{1 \over w}}}}dx}, $$

where $b$ is a given non-negative limit, and, and $w \ge 1$ (Wang, Reference Wang1995, Reference Wang, Connell, Crifo, Dove, Edlefson, Gardiner, Golz, Josephson, Kufera, Lewis, Moody, Schwab and Turnacioglu1999a).

Example 4.4 Riebesell curves (power transform)

Let $\gamma ({2^k}a,a) = {(1 + r)^k}$ , where $\gamma $ is the ILF in respect of an increased limit and base limit, in this case, ${2^k}a$ and $a$ respectively, with $a \gt 0,$ $r \in (0,1),$ and $k \gt 1$ . It follows that:

(12) $$\gamma (b;a,w) = {(1 + r)^{{{\log }_2}(b{a^{ - 1}})}} = {(b{a^{ - 1}})^{{{\log }_2}(1 + r)}} = {(b{a^{ - 1}})^w},$$

where $w = {\log _2}(1 + r).$ Refer to Mack and Fackler (Reference Mack and Fackler2003) for details including origin.

4.4. Correlated ALDs

This section describes CFs for correlated aggregate loss and count, based on pioneering contributions by Wang (Reference Wang1998, Reference Wang, Connell, Crifo, Dove, Edlefson, Gardiner, Golz, Josephson, Kufera, Lewis, Moody, Schwab and Turnacioglu1999a) and conventional techniques for mixture models (Klugman et al., Reference Klugman, Panjer and Willmot2004; Mildenhall, Reference Mildenhall2005).

Definition 4.1 Covariance coefficient

For random variables ${X_i}$ and ${X_j}$ , with Pearson correlation coefficient ${\rho _{ij}}$ , means $ {\mu }_{i}$ and standard deviations, $ {\sigma }_{i}$ , the covariance coefficient ${\kappa _{ij}}$ is given by:

(13) $${\kappa _{ij}} = {{{\rm{Cov}}({X_i},{X_j})} \over {{\mu _i}{\mu _j}}} = {{{\rho _{ij}}{\sigma _i}{\sigma _j}} \over {{\mu _i}{\mu _j}}}.$$

The range of ${\kappa _{ij}}$ (13) depends on the shape of marginal distributions for ${X_i}$ and ${X_j}$ .

CFs for correlated aggregate loss

Define the joint CF, ${C_{\bf{S}}}: = {C_{{S_1}, \ldots, {S_m}}}$ , for $m \in {{\bf Z}^ + }$ random variables, ${\bf{S}} = \left[ {{S_1}, \ldots, {S_m}} \right],$ by:

(14) $${C_{\bf{S}}}[{\bf{t}}] = \left( {1 + \sum\nolimits_{i \lt j}^{} {{\kappa _{ij}}\left( {1 - {C_i}[{t_i}]} \right)\left( {1 - {C_j}[{t_j}]} \right)} } \right)\prod\nolimits_{i = 1}^m {{C_i}[{t_i}]}, $$

where ${S_i},{S_j} \in {\bf{S}}$ have respective CFs ${C_i},{C_j},$ and covariance coefficient ${\kappa _{ij}},$ $1 \le i \lt j \le m;$ and $ t=[{t}_{1}, \ldots, {t}_{m}]$ , Wang (Reference Wang1998, pt. IV). Following (14), let the univariate CF of

$S = {S_1} +, \ldots, {S_m}$ be ${C_{S}}$ , then:

(15) $${C_S}[t] = \left( {1 + \sum\nolimits_{i \lt j}^{} {{\kappa _{ij}}\left( {1 - {C_i}[t]} \right)\left( {1 - {C_j}[t]} \right)} } \right)\prod\nolimits_{k = 1}^m {{C_k}[t]}, $$

where ${\kappa _{ij}}{\rm{s}}$ and ${C_i}{\rm{s}}$ are defined as previously. The mean and variance of aggregate loss, $S,$ is:

(16) $$\eqalign{ & \mu : = {\rm{E}}\left( S \right) = {\rm{E}}\left( {{S_1} +, \ldots, + {S_m}} \right), \cr & {\rm{Var}}\left( S \right) = {\sigma ^2} + 2\sum\nolimits_{i \lt j}^{} {{\kappa _{ij}}{\rm{E}}\left( {{S_i}} \right){\rm{E}}\left( {{S_j}} \right)} \cr} $$

where ${\sigma ^2} = \sum\nolimits_{j = 1}^m {{\rm{Var}}\left( {{S_j}} \right)} $ , Wang (Reference Wang1998). The univariate CF (15) is apparently less restrictive, in terms of covariance coefficients (for valid PDF), than is the case for the joint CF (16).

CFs for correlated loss count

Often, there is an exogenous cause for uncertainty regarding the extent or number of losses. This is referred to as parameter risk in the context of stochastic models (Freifelder, Reference Freifelder1979, cited by Miccolis (Reference Miccolis1978). To reflect such uncertainty, a secondary mixture CDF can be incorporated within the model. In this section, a joint PGF for correlated aggregate loss count variables is built up using Poisson mixtures. Refer to Klugman et al. (Reference Klugman, Panjer and Willmot2004, Section 4.6.10) for examples of various other mixtures with theoretical underpinnings.

Poisson mixture models

Let ${\bf{N}} = [{N_1}, \ldots, {N_m}]$ be a vector of $m$ discrete random variables with joint PGF given by ${P_{\bf{N}}}: = {P_{{N_1}, \ldots, {N_n}}}$ and assume there exists a random variable $\theta $ with MGF ${M_\theta }$ such that $({N_j}|\theta = \omega )\sim Poisson({\lambda _j}\omega )$ (B.3) where ${\rm{E}}{N_j}\left( {\theta = \omega } \right) = \omega {\lambda _j}$ , $j = 1, \ldots, m.$ The marginal PGF of ${N_j}|(\theta = \omega )$ is then ${P_{{N_j}|\theta = \omega }}[{t_j}] = {e^{w{\lambda _j}({t_j} - 1)}}$ , which leads to the following joint PGF for ${\bf{N}}$ :

(17) $${P_{\bf{N}}}[{\bf{t}}] = {{\rm{E}}_\theta }\left( {{\rm{E}}\left( {{t_1}^{{N_1}} \ldots {t_m}^{{N_m}}|\theta } \right)} \right) = {{\rm{E}}_\theta }\left( {\exp (\theta {\bf{\lambda }} \cdot ({\bf{t'}} - {{{\bf{1'}}}_m}))} \right) = {M_\theta }[{\bf{\lambda }} \cdot ({\bf{t'}} - {{\bf{1'}}_m})],$$

where ${\bf{\lambda }} = [{\lambda _1}, \ldots, {\lambda _m}],{\rm{ }}{\bf{t}} = [{t_1}, \ldots, {t_m}],$ and ${{\bf{1}}_m}$ is a (row) vector with $m$ ones.

Example 4.5 Gamma-mixed Poisson model

Suppose $\theta \sim Gamma(\alpha, 1),$ for some $a \gt 0$ , has MGF ${M_\theta }[t] = {(1 - t)^{ - \alpha }},$ then the joint PGF in (17) becomes ${P_{\bf{N}}}[{\bf{t}}] = {(1 - {\bf{\lambda }} \cdot ({\bf{t'}} - {{\bf{1'}}_m}))^{ - \alpha }}$ . This specifies a form of multivariate negative binomial CDF

where marginals, ${N_j}\sim NB(\alpha, {\lambda _j})$ (B.4), have respective PGFs, ${P_{{N_j}}},\, j = 1, \ldots, m{\rm{ }},$ defined by:

(18) $${P_{{N_j}}}[{t_j}] = {(1 - {\lambda _j}({t_j} - 1))^{ - \alpha }},$$

(Wang, Reference Wang, Connell, Crifo, Dove, Edlefson, Gardiner, Golz, Josephson, Kufera, Lewis, Moody, Schwab and Turnacioglu1999b). Refer to Mildenhall (Reference Mildenhall2005) for MGFs with alternative parameterisations, and Reshetar (Reference Reshetar2008) for practical application in the context of OR.

Example 4.6 Multivariate Negative Binomial (MNB) distribution

From Example 4.5, let ${N_j}\sim NB({a_j},{\lambda _j})$ – the joint PGF, ${P_{\bf{N}}}$ , is now:

(19) $${P_{\bf{N}}}[{\bf{t}}] = {({{\bf{1}}_m}{ \cdot }{\bf{k'}} - m + 1)^{ - {\rm{ }}{1 \over w}}},$$

where ${\bf{t}} = \left[ {{t_1}, \ldots, {t_m}} \right],${{\bf{1}}_m}$ is a row vector of $m$ ones; ${\bf{k}} = [{k_1}, \ldots, {k_m}]$ with ${k_j} = {(1 - {\lambda _j}({t_j} - 1))^{{\alpha _j}w}},\,j = 1, \ldots, m$ ; and $w \ne 0.$ This specifies a family of MNB CDFs, with marginals ${N_j}\sim NB({\alpha _j},{\lambda _j}),$ in either of the following cases:

  1. 1. $0 \lt w \lt \mathop {\min }\limits_{j \in [1,m]} \{ {\alpha _j}^{ - 1}\} $

  2. 2. $w \lt 0$ s.t. ${P_{\bf{N}}}[{{\bf{0}}_m}] \gt 0$ and $ - {\textstyle{1 \over w}} \in {{\bf Z}^ + }$

where ${{\bf{0}}_m}$ is a row vector of $m$ zeros, (Wang, Reference Wang1998).

Here, the random vector ${\bf{N}}$ follows an MNB distribution, denoted by ${\bf{N}}\sim {\rm{MNB(}}{\bf{\alpha }},\,{\bf{\lambda }},\,w)$ with vector parameters $\alpha = \left[ {{\alpha _1}, \ldots, {\alpha _m}} \right]$ and ${\bf{\lambda }} = [{\lambda _1}, \ldots, {\lambda _m}].$ Suppose ${S_1}, \ldots, {S_m}$ represent $m \in {{\bf Z}^ + }$ CR loss models (1) that are specified by their severities and loss count variables, $({X_i},{N_i}),$ $i = 1, \ldots, m,$ and only correlated through ${\bf{N}} = [{N_1}, \ldots, {N_m}]\sim {\rm{MNB \,(}}{\bf{\alpha }},{\bf{\lambda }},w)$ (Example 4.6). Accordingly, the CF for the overall aggregate loss, ${C_S}: = {C_{{S_1} +, \ldots, + {S_m}}}$ , is defined by:

(20) $${C_S}[t] = {({{\bf{1}}_m}{ \cdot}{\bf{y'}} - m + 1)^{ - {\rm{ }}{1 \over w}}},$$

where ${{\bf{1}}_m}$ is a row vector of $m$ ones, ${\bf{y}} = [{y_1}, \ldots, {y_m}]$ with ${y_j} = {(1 - {\lambda _j}({C_j} - 1))^{{\alpha _j}w}}$ , ${C_j}$ is the CF of ${X_j}$ $j = 1, \ldots, m$ (Meyers & Heckman, Reference Meyers and Heckman1984; Wang, Reference Wang1998). As such, FFT reconstructs the CDF of $S = {S_1} +, \ldots, + {S_m}$ , from transforms ${C_S}$ (20). The mean and variance of $S$ can be determined using (16) – substituting ${\kappa _{ij}}$ with $w$ , the correlation parameter in (20).

4.5. Severity Model

Define a two component spliced model in terms of $n$ observed severities, ordered as ${x_1} \lt {x_2} \lt, \ldots, \lt {x_n}.$ Losses in the interval $[0,\tau ]$ , for a given non-negative threshold, $\tau $ (i.e. “splicing point”), are assumed to follow a small loss CDF (in this case, estimated by the empirical CDF, ${F_n}$ ). To cover the interval $(\tau, \infty )$ , a parametric distribution G is estimated using (observed) losses greater than $\tau $ . Now let $H$ be the spliced distribution in question:

(21) $$\eqalign{ 1 - H(x) & = \left\{ {\matrix{ {1 - {F_n}(x)} \hfill & { x \le \tau } \hfill \cr {\left( {1 - {F_n}(\tau )} \right)\left( {1 - {{G(x) - G(\tau )} \over {1 - G(\tau )}}} \right)} \hfill & { x \gt \tau } \hfill \cr } } \right. \cr & = \left\{ {\matrix{ {1 - {F_n}(x)} \hfill & { x \le \tau } \hfill \cr {\left( {1 - {F_n}(\tau )} \right)\left( {{{1 - G(x)} \over {1 - G(\tau )}}} \right)} \hfill & { x \gt \tau } \hfill \cr } } \right.{\rm{ }} \cr} $$

where the first component CDF, ${F_n}\left( x \right)/{F_n}\left( \tau \right)$ (for $x \le \tau $ ) and second component CDF, $\left( {G\left( x \right) - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)/\left( {1 - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)$ , for $x \gt \tau, $ are spliced with weights ${F_n}(\tau )$ and $1 - {F_n}(\tau )$ respectively (Klugman et al., Reference Klugman, Panjer and Willmot2004).

Selection (large-loss model)

The following steps are used to select a large-loss CDF, from a set of $k \in {{\bf Z}^ + }$ candidate models (e.g. Burr, Weibull, Pareto, etc.) and identify a suitable threshold for application of the spliced model in (21) (i.e. given ${{\bf{x}}_n} = [{x_1}, \ldots, {x_n}]$ ):

Step 1 Fit $m \gt 1$ CDFs, $G_{i1}^{}, \ldots, {G_{im}},$ to the largest $n - i + 1$ severities, for some $i = 2,3, \ldots, n - k - 1,$ where $k \le n - 2$ is the minimum number parameter estimates for each CDF (e.g. based on Maximum Likelihood Estimation, MLE).

Step 2 Let $G_i^* = \mathop {\min }\limits_j \{ {c_j}\} $ , where ${c_j}$ is the AICc for ${G_{ij}}$ , $j = 1, \ldots, m$ .

Step 3 Calculate $B_i^*$ , the KS-ratio (ratio of the Kolmogorov Smirnov test statistic (Glivenko-Cantelli – van der Vaart (Reference van der Vaart1998)) to the critical value at the specified level) for $G_i^*$ .

Steps 1–3 have the following outputs: the large-loss distribution, $G_i^*,$ empirical threshold, ${x_i}$ , and KS-ratio, $B_i^*$ (valid scores require $i = 2, \ldots, n - k - 1$ , as in step 1). In terms of the spliced model, $H$ (21), $G_i^*\left( {\rm{x}} \right) = {{\left( {G\left( x \right) - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)} \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{\left( {G\left( x \right) - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)} {\left( {1 - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)}}} \right. } {\left( {1 - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)}},x \gt \tau $ and ${x_i} \le \tau \lt {x_{i + 1}}$ – if $\tau \lt {x_2}$ or $\tau \gt {x_{n - k - 1}}$ , then the unconditional CDFs, $G$ and ${F_n}$ respectively, might be used. The threshold itself can be expressed in terms of the empirical rank as follows:

(22) $$j = n{F_n}(\tau ),$$

where $j = 1, \ldots, n$ ; ${F_n}$ , $\tau, $ and ${x_1}$ are defined as previously (21).

Threshold determination

A score-based approach (Klugman et al., Reference Klugman, Panjer and Willmot2004, Section 13.5.3) is adopted using a similar set-up adopted for Maximum Likelihood by Ralucavernic (Reference Ralucavernic2009), but with greater emphasis being placed on tail fit and limit-factor consistency. Differentiability and continuity requirements (Cerchiara & Acri, Reference Cerchiara and Acri2016) are not explicitly allowed for, however, model selection incorporates the corrected Akaike Information Criteria (AICC); refer to Akaike (Reference Akaike, Parzen, Tanabe and Kitagawa1998) and Burnham and Anderson (Reference Burnham and Anderson2002) for details. This provides a practical and simplified means to identify both parametric CDF and threshold – additional considerations pertain to limit-factor consistency and mean excess (ME) plots.

Criteria 4.1 Splicing point

The following criteria are contemplated for determining threshold, $\tau $ , in terms of output from steps 1–3:

  1. 1. $\tau, $ with the greatest rank, $i$ .

  2. 2. $\tau, $ with the lowest KS-ratio, $B_i^*$ .

In this way, larger thresholds are favoured through the first criterion, whilst the second attempts to optimise tail fit. Upper bounds are established subjectively by considering ME plots.

Normalising scores

According to the set of Criteria 4.1, preference is given to higher and lower values of ${x_i}{\rm{s}}$ and $B_i^*{\rm{s}}$ respectively (i.e. steps 1–3). Equivalently, higher values of ${\alpha _i}$ and ${\beta _i},$ defined as follows, are favoured over lower values:

(23) $${\alpha _i} = {{{x_i}} \over {{x_{n - k - 1}}}}{\rm{, }}{\beta _i} = {{\mathop {\min }\limits_{i \in [1,n]} \{ B_i^*\} } \over {B_i^*}}{\rm{ }}\forall {\rm{ }}B_i^* \gt 0$$

The weighted average score, ${z_i},$ with respect to measures ${\alpha _i}$ and ${\beta _i}$ (23), is determined by:

(24) $${z_i} = {w_i}{\alpha _i} + (1 - {w_i}){\beta _i},$$

With $i$ defined as previously in step 1; thus ${\alpha _i},{\beta _i} \in (0,1]$ are on the same scale. $w_i^{(2)}$ , which reduces as $\tau $ increases, can be defined as follows:

(25) $$w_i^{(2)} = {{n - i} \over n}$$

Algorithm 1 Optimal threshold and large-loss CDF

For a given group (i.e. class) of $n$ ordered, homogeneous, and independent severities, ${x_1}, \ldots, {x_n}$ , with empirical CDF ${F_n} = {1 \over n}\sum\limits_{i = 1}^n {{1_{\{ {x_i} \le x\} }}} $ ; steps 1-3 (p. 14) are run for each $i \in [2,n]$ to produce the following input vectors for this algorithm:

  • ${\bf{G}} = [G_2^*,G_3^*, \ldots, G_{n - k - 1}^*]$ (i.e. selected large-loss distributions from step 3).

  • ${\bf{x}} = [x_2^*, \ldots, x_{n - k - 1}^*]$ (i.e. vector of “thresholds”).

  • ${\bf{B}} = [B_2^*,B_3^*, \ldots, B_{n - k - 1}^*]$ (i.e. associated vector of KS-ratios).

Next, (23) is applied to ${\bf{x}}$ and ${\bf{B}}$ (element by element) to obtain the vector of scores ${\bf{\alpha }} = [{\alpha _2}, \ldots, {\alpha _n}]$ and ${\bf{\beta }} = [{\beta _2}, \ldots, \beta _n^{}]$ respectively. For a given vector of weights ${\bf{w}} = [{w_2}, \ldots, {w_n}],$ where ${w_i} \in (0,1){\rm{ }}\forall {\rm{ }}i = 2,3, \ldots, n$ , the vector of (calculated) weighted scores, ${\bf{z}} = [{z_2}, \ldots, {z_n}]$ , is determined using (24). The optimal threshold, ${\tau ^*}$ , is ${x_{i*}}$ , where ${i^*} \in \{ 2,3, \ldots, n\} $ is the optimal index value that yields the solution to the following:

(26) $${z_{i*}} = \max \{ {z_i}:i = 2,3, \ldots, n\}.$$

The corresponding (parameterised) optimal distribution is then $G_{n{F_n}(\tau *)}^* = G_{i*}^*$ (which follows from (22) with $j: = {i^*}).$ Thus, the outputs of this algorithm are the optimal threshold, optimal index value, and optimal distribution (i.e. ${\tau ^*}$ , ${i^*}$ , and $G_{i*}^*$ respectively).

Algorithm 2 Model confidence sets – Kullback-Leibler

This algorithm follows the bootstrap approach of Burnham & Anderson Reference Burnham and Anderson2002 (Section 4.5), which is based on essential Kullback & Leibler (Reference Kullback and Leibler1951) theory associated with AIC and other such information criteria. For each candidate CDF (i.e. parametric family), $G_i^{},$ and bootstrap sample indexed $i = 1, \ldots, m$ and $j = 1, \ldots, M$ respectively, $m,{\rm{ }}M \gt 2,$ determine Akaike differences, ${\delta _{ij}}$ , in relation to the minimum AICC, $A_j^* = \mathop {\min }\limits_{i = 1,..,m} \{ {A_{ij}}\} $ , and associated Akaike weights, ${w_{ij}}$ (that sum to one for each sample) as follows:

(27) $${\delta _{ij}} = {A_{ij}} - A_j^*\,\,\,\,\,\,{w_{ij}} = {{\exp ( - 0.5{\delta _{ij}})} \over {\sum\nolimits_{u = 1}^m {\exp ( - 0.5{\delta _{ij}})} }}$$

where ${A_{ij}}$ is the AICC score for CDF ${G_i}$ , parameterised (e.g. using MLE) in respect of data for sample $j \in \{ 1, \ldots, M\} $ . Differences and weights accompanying the $M$ samples can provide insight into model (in this case, CDF) selection uncertainty. For instance, in terms of the following “model confidence set” and selection probability estimates:

  • The 100 $\alpha {\rm{\% }}$ “Kullback-Leibler” (KB) confidence set, for specified CDF with (common) index $s \in \{ 1, \ldots, m\}, $ comprises the set of candidate CDFs with corresponding Akaike differences below the $100\alpha {\rm{\% }}$ empirical quantile, ${q^{(\alpha )}},$ of Akaike differences for the specified CDF; the probability that CDF indexed $i = 1, \ldots, m$ is in such a confidence set, $c_i^{(\alpha )},$ can be estimated from the samples as follows: $\hat c_i^{(\alpha )} = {M^{ - 1}}\sum\nolimits_{j = 1}^M {{1_{\{ {A_{ij}} - A_j^* \le {q^{(\alpha )}}\} }}} $ (where, in general, indicator ${1_{\{ A\} }} = 1$ if a given event $A$ occurs – failing which, ${1_{\{ A\} }} = 0$ ).

  • Correspondence between the average weight, ${\hat w_i} = {M^{ - 1}}\sum\nolimits_{j = 1}^M {{w_{ij}}} $ , for a given CDF with index $i = 1, \ldots, m$ , and the proportion of $(M)$ minimum Akaike scores that correspond to the CDF in question, ${\hat \pi _i} = {M^{ - 1}}\sum\nolimits_{j = 1}^M {{1_{\{ {\delta _{ij}} = 0\} }}}, $ attests to the veracity of the (aforementioned) KL confidence set, and associated model inference uncertainty.

4.6. Limit Factor and Aggregate Loss Models

This section describes and formulates various models, which are grouped in Figure 2 according to whether correlation is recognised, and how loss count, $N$ , is modelled:

  • IR framework: $N{\rm{ }} = n$ is given.

  • CR framework: $N$ is a random variable with a given PDF.

Figure 2. Flow chart for Models 4.1–4.6. Models 4.4–4.5 and Model 4.6 assume correlated aggregate loss amounts and counts (classes A–D) respectively. Adjustments (e.g. inflation, risk) may apply to limit factors based on any of these models.

In this way, IR represents a special type of CR, where $N$ has a degenerate distribution such that $Pr\left( {N = n} \right) = 1$ , as contemplated by Klugman, Panjer & Willmot (Reference Klugman, Panjer and Willmot2004, Section 6.1).

Models 4.1 and 4.2 Limit factors for independent, individual classes (IR model)

The following is an overview of Models 4.1–4.6, as depicted in Figure 2:

  • Models 4.1–4.2 model aggregate losses in respect of small and large severities, using empirical CDFs and the spliced-severity model (Section 4.5); relevant limited moments (3) are used to determine the risk-adjusted LAS (7) and limit factors (8) in an IR framework with consideration for possible application in a CR framework.

  • Model 4.3 (IR and CR) derives ALDs in respect of classes A–D (subject to per-loss limits), and class E (subject to a per-occurrence limit) from which limit factors are determined in respect of ground-up or excess losses; inflation and risk adjustments (10).

  • Models 4.4 and 4.5 rely on given covariance coefficients between aggregate losses in classes A–D (15).

  • Model 4.6 applies (20) with relevant parameters for the (correlated) marginal loss count CDFs (NB, Table B.2: B.4).

Models 4.1 and 4.2 are formerly defined in this section; Models 4.3–4.6 are more descriptive in nature and are framed in the context of tailored FFT steps, with compound Poisson and negative binomial applications for Models 4.5–4.6.

Assumptions for ILFs

The “top-slicing” method is used to determine ILFs; in respect of the risk premium. This assumes that severities, by class, are homogenous, independent, and independent of loss count; non-risk elements (e.g. expenses) are negligible (or proportional); and there is no anti-selection (e.g. by size of limit).

Variables and definitions

Define the following for a given class with $n$ observed severities:

  • ${F_n}$ and $\tau $ : empirical CDF and splicing point respectively.

  • ${x_1} \le, \ldots, \le {x_u} \le \tau $ : the smallest, ordered, $u$ (i.i.d.) severities with LAS, LEV, and “limited” variance denoted by ${Z_S}(b) = \sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^u {x_i^{(b)}}, {\mu _{S;b}} = {\rm{E}}\left( {X_S^{(b)}} \right) = {\textstyle{1 \over u}}\sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^u {x_i^{(b)}}, $ and $\sigma _{S;b}^2 = {\rm{Var}}\left( {X_S^{(b)}} \right) = {\textstyle{1 \over u}}\sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^u {{{(x_i^{(b)} - {\mu _{S;b}})}^2}} $ respectively, where $b \gt 0$ is a single limit that applies to severity (maximum payable in respect of individual claims); $u = n{F_n}(\tau ) \in \{ 0,1, \ldots, n\} $ ; ${X_S} \in \{ {x_1}, \ldots, {x_u}\} $ is the small severity random variable: ${x_i}{\sim ^d}{X_S},i = 1, \ldots, u$ , ${X_S}\sim {F_n}$ .

  • ${X_1}, \ldots, {X_{n - u}}$ : $n - u$ random variable “large” severities with LAS, LEV, and limited variance ${Z_L}(b) = \sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^u {X_i^{(b)}}, $ ${\mu _{L;b}} = {\rm{E}}\left( {X_L^{(b)}} \right)$ , and $\sigma _{L;b}^2 = {\rm{Var}}\left( {X_L^{(b)}} \right)$ respectively, where ${X_i}$ are i.i.d. such that ${X_i}{\sim ^d}{X_L},i = 1, \ldots, n - u$ ; ${X_L}\sim G$ , where ${X_L}$ and $G$ are large severity and its CDF (unconditional with respect to $\tau ),$ respectively; ${X_L} \bot {X_S};$ $b$ is the limit as before.

Thus, ${\mu _{L;b}} = \int_0^b {{S_X}(x)dx} $ and $\sigma _{L;b}^2 = 2\int_0^b {x{S_X}(x)dx} - {\mu _{L;b}}^2$ , which follows from Equation (3) with $k = 1,2$ respectively, and ${S_X} = 1 - {F_X}$ where $F_X^{}\left( {\rm{x}} \right) = {{\left( {G\left( x \right) - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)} \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{\left( {G\left( x \right) - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)} {\left( {1 - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)}}} \right. } {\left( {1 - G\left( \tau \right)} \right)}},$ $x \gt \tau $ $\left( {{F_X}(x) = 0,{\rm{ }}x \le \tau } \right)$ . The overall aggregate loss, $Z$ , its mean, ${\mu _Z}$ , variance, $\sigma _Z^2$ , and associated (variance principle) risk-adjusted LAS, ${\pi _Z}: = {\pi _{{\mathop{\rm var}} }}$ ((7), $S = Z$ ), and limit factor, ${\gamma _Z}: = {\gamma _S}$ ((8), $S = Z$ ), are defined by Models 4.1–4.2, in an IR framework, as follows:

(28) $$\eqalign{ Z(b) & = {Z_S}(b) + {Z_L}(b) = \sum\limits_{i = 1}^u {x_i^{(b)}} + \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{n - u} {X_i^{(b)}} \cr {\rm{E}}\left( {Z(b)} \right) & = {\mu _{Z;b}} = u{\mu _{S;b}} + (n - u){\mu _{L;b}}{\rm{ }};{\rm{ Var}}\left( {Z(b)} \right) = \sigma _{Z;b}^2 = u\sigma _{S;b}^2 + (n - u)\sigma _{L;b}^2 \cr {\pi _{Z;b}} & = {\mu _{Z;b}} + w\sigma _{Z;b}^2{\rm{ }};{\rm{ }}{\gamma _{Z;a,b}} = {{{\pi _{Z;b}}} \over {{\pi _{Z;a}}}} \cr} $$

where $a,b \gt 0$ ; ( $u,$ $n,$ $b,$ ${Z_S}$ , ${Z_L},$ ${\mu _{S;b}},$ ${\mu _{L;b}},$ $\sigma _{L;b}^2$ ) as before; and ${\rm{Cov}}{\left( {{X_S}X} \right)_L} = 0.$ Models 4.1–4.2 can now be distinguished from one another as follows:

  • Model 4.1 – by setting $u = n$ (or equivalently, $\tau \ge {x_n}$ , the maximum observed severity), ${X_L}$ and associated terms in Equation (28) become redundant and $Z$ , ${\mu _Z}$ , $\sigma _Z^2$ ,. ${\pi _Z},$ . and ${\gamma _Z}$ are expressed solely in terms of ${x_i}$ , $i = 1, \ldots, n$ ) and calculated numerically.

  • Model 4.2 – this relies on the spliced-severity model (and associated algorithms) developed in Section 4.5, by setting $\tau $ , $u$ , and $G$ to the optimal outputs (i.e. threshold ${\tau ^*}$ , index ${i^*}$ , and large-loss CDF, $G_{i*}^*$ respectively); analytical solutions, are checked using Model Risk by Vose (2019), risk analysis software and simulation (e.g. Appendix C)

ILFs and associated measures for Models 4.1–4.2 can then be determined for a range of different splicing points and associated (small and large) severity CDFs. Model 4.2 can easily be amended to cater for the CR framework.

Attention is now turned to Models 4.3–4.6, which utilise FFT as summarised in Table 3.

Table 3. FFT steps for ALDs (Models 4.3–4.6) (✓) if step is relevant, (x) otherwise

Model 4.3 ALD for independent classes (IR, CR models)

Of Models 4.3–4.6, this model represents the most straightforward application of FFT. In terms of steps 1–4 (Table 3), consider a class with $n$ observed severities. Model 4.3 (IR) proceeds with step 1 by discretising the spliced-severity distribution (of limited severities) using the rounding method. The corresponding vector of CFs (determined in step 2) are raised to the power of $n$ (element by element) to obtain CFs in respect of ALDs (step 3a), which are yielded using the inverse Fourier transform (step 4). Model 4.3 (CR) is very similar except, instead of raising severity CFs to the power of $n$ (step 3a), the PGF of an assumed loss count CDF (in this case, Poisson) is incorporated (steps 1, 2, and 4 remain otherwise unchanged.

Model 4.4 ALD for correlated aggregate losses (IR model)

Step 3a is relevant for Model 4.4 as this is based on the IR framework which assumes each class has a (deterministic) loss count, $n$ . The CF for each of the classes A–D is thus raised to the power of $n$ (element by element) to obtain corresponding (class-level) CFs in respect of their marginal ALDs. Step 3b combines these using (15) (with $m = 4,$ and assumed covariance coefficients, ${\kappa _{ij}} = \kappa ),$ before taking the inverse Fourier transform in step 4 to yield the aggregate loss CDF (i.e. joint CDF for correlated marginal ALDs with respect to classes A–D).

Model 4.5 ALD for correlated aggregate losses (CR model)

Model 4.5 is the CR analogue to Model 4.4. Instead of raising the CFs in each of the classes A–D to the power of a deterministic count parameter, $n$ , as is the case for Model 4.4 in step 3a, the PGF of an assumed loss count variable is incorporated within the CF (element by element). This yields the CFs in respect of the (marginal) ALDs for each of the classes A–D. Step 3b (i.e. application of (15) with given marginals and covariance coefficients) and step 4 (i.e. inverse Fourier transform) used in this model are otherwise identical to those used for Model 4.4. For variance principle adjustments regarding limit factors, (16) is utilised.

Model 4.6 ALD for correlated loss count (CR model)

Model 4.6 utilises a (multivariate) mixture model, as considered for Example 4.6.

In particular, step 3a assumes that the class has random variable loss count, ${N_j}$ , with $NB({a_j},{\lambda _j})$ CDF and specified parameters ${a_j},{\lambda _j}$ , $j = 1,2,3,4$ (Table B.2: B.4). The associated PGF is thus incorporated (element by element) within CFs in step 2 to produce (class-level) vectors of CFs (step 3a) for respective ALDs. These are then combined using (15) (with $m = 4,$ and assumed correlation parameter, $w)$ in step 3b, before using the inverse Fourier transform to yield the aggregate loss CDF in step 4 (i.e. joint CDF in respect of classes with correlated aggregate NB loss count variables).

5. Results

Severity distributions are first identified; these are used to devise ALDs from which ILFs are determined to study the impact of risk adjustments in the presence of correlation.

5.1. Severity CDFs

Final selections (CDFs, thresholds), based on Algorithm 1 (Table B.1 ) are in Table 4.

Table 4. Selected large-loss CDFs and splicing points. Threshold: dollar value of splicing point; Burr represents inverse Burr (i.e. Dagum CDF); CDFs fit using MLE to severities from Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, inflated to end of 2016

Turning to model confidence sets (Algorithm 2), the first column of Table 5 show the top four models according to how frequently they were selected on the basis of AICC. Key observations include:

  • Selected % $(\hat \pi, $ following (27)), AIC weight $(\hat w)$ , KS and Anderson Darling (AD) ratios (i.e. test statistic to critical value) are in agreement; $\hat \pi $ and $\hat w$ are highest for selected CDFs, except for C (Weibull, the highest, fails the AD-test, 5% critical; also, the selected Burr CDF has a similar 90% confidence set success rate, $\hat c_{}^{(90\% )}$ ).

  • Light-tailed CDF selections are confirmed for D, E (with average shape $\alpha \gt 1)$ .

  • Lowest and highest $\hat c_{}^{(90\% )}$ can be seen for D (due to high, 92.5% truncation, Table 4) and E (due to additional 350 observations, year 2015) respectively.

Table 5. Bootstrap results. 10k samples; selected % achieving minimum AICC; 90% confidence sets based on Kullback-Leibler distance estimate for selected CDF (colour coded font, A–E – average shape parameter for Weibull CDF selections). Tail-fit ratios (KS, AD – 5% critical); consistent ILFs (rate per 100). Underlying costs based on Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015 inflated to 2016

5.2. ALDs

ALDs in Figures 3 and 4 are now considered in terms of underlying costs (Table 2):

  • B: this has the lowest mean (Figure 3) and largest kurtosis – in keeping with the fact that these costs are not significant drivers of overall loss (e.g. data recreation, expert engagement, possibly customer notification); and the element of “determining regulatory requirements,” suggesting a heavier tail than otherwise (i.e. in support of Burr, Table 4)

  • A, C: most similar in terms of ALDs and moments – this agrees with underlying cost types which appear to be overlapping in some respects (e.g. forensic, investigative, communication, assessment costs); however, the nature of other costs in C (legal, regulatory fines and penalties, product discounts, and credit monitoring) would explain its relatively larger moments and heavier tail.

  • D: the largest mean and, as implied by the lowest kurtosis and skewness (relative to mean), lightest tail (severity CDF and ALD) – this appears to reflect the nature of the underlying extrapolated cost estimate that has been derived from some other distribution. Further investigation shows that positive correlation with D is a key driver for the bimodal feature that can be seen in Figure 4 for scenario 3 (more prominent in Model 4.4 than 4.5).

Figure 3. ALDs: Model 4.3 Loss count: CRPoisson(10); IR – 10 (deterministic). Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015) costs inflated to end of 2016. Per-loss limit ($20m, A-D).

Figure 4. ALDs: Models 4.3–4.6 $m; Scenarios 1–3: constant covariance coefficients of 0%, 5%, 10% resp., for Models 4.4 (IR) and 4.5 (CR). Loss count: Poisson(10) (Models 4.3–4.5, CR); MNB(10,1,0.09) for Model 4.6; IR: 10 (deterministic). Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015) costs inflated to end of 2016. Per-occurrence limit (class E).

It is worth considering the point regarding class D and the bimodal formation in greater detail. The implications of a correlated class D (business interruption) may be exacerbated in the presence of interdependent organisational structures (processes, activities). For instance, vertically integrated businesses that suffer losses due to a common cause may find there is inadequate coverage (e.g. if such losses erode a common aggregate limit). Organising structures that avoid upstream (or downstream) dependences should assist in preserving coverage limits. However, this may not always be feasible (logistics, costs, etc.).

5.3. Risk-Adjusted ILFs

Table 6 compares ILFs for several major league insurers to those based on Models 4.5–4.6 (low–high risk), filed by Cresenzi and Alibrio (Reference Cresenzi and Alibrio2016) on behalf of ACE (Chubb, 2017). See Figure B.2 for a description of low-high-risk environments referenced in this table.

Table 6. Insurer ILF comparison (per-loss limits). Insurer comparison: 2016 ACE SERFF filing – Chubb Enterprise Risk Management Cyber and Digitech products (Cresenzi & Alibrio, Reference Cresenzi and Alibrio2016), with reference to (2015 year) SERFF filings by: AIG (Speciality Risk Protector) [AGNY-130104025], Travellers (Cyber-Essentials) [TRVD-130748646], Philadelphia (Cyber-Security Liability) [PHLX-G128091742], and ACE (MPL Advantage) [ACEH-125807939]. *$100m: ILFs estimated with Riebesell curve (implied at $10m limit). Base limit: $1m; retention: $10k. Shading: model range within insurer range (A:B)≔(min, max); partial if ranges overlap. “Median”: model ILF range. Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, inflated to end of 2016 (ILFs: adjusted to 2015)

Costs covered by the insurance products underlying Table 6 correspond with A–D categories (Table 2). Since insurer ILFs incorporate a base retention and base limit of $10k and $1m respectively, model ILFs are derived using Equation (10) with $v = 1.025$ (based on inflation used for E, year 2015), $d = \$ 10 \,{\rm{k,}}$ and $a = \$ 1\,{\rm{m}}{\rm{.}}$ Riebesell estimation ($100m) is based upon Equation (12) with $a = \$ 1\,{\rm{m, }}b = \$ 100\,{\rm{m,}}$ and an insurer-specific parameter $w$ that ranges from (0.34, 0.56). Overall, there appears to be reasonable correspondence between modelled and insurer ILFs. However, as might be expected, there is greater alignment with high-risk parameter as the limit increases.

6. Conclusions, recommendations

The model review (Section 2, Appendix A) found cyber-pricing models to be in need of further development and empirical support – particularly derelict aspects included severity and aggregate loss; there was no evidence of ILF related models. Empirical support, based on statistically viable severity data, featured only once (Biener et al. (Reference Biener, Eling and Wirfs2015) and included almost 1,000 cases. Key contributions made by the present research include:

  1. 1. Model confidence sets for various severity CDFs, derived in relation to key forms of first-party data breach coverage.

  2. 2. New insight into aspects associated with correlated ALDs and risk-adjusted ILFs.

This was done in terms of nonparametric models based on empirical data, extracted from data breach survey reports ( $4 \times 800$ : A–D; 1 150 : E). There was no evidence of such applications or findings in the model review (or, to the best knowledge of the author, elsewhere in cyber-related research).

6.1. Conclusions

Conclusions, some of which are data or model dependent (i.e. not necessarily applicable in every situation) include:

  • Severity distributions, based on data breach costs, were heavy tailed in the main, although D, representing business interruption, often affiliated with issues such as interdependence in the realm of insurance, was found to be light-tailed.

  • Correlation between D and other classes (i.e. A–C) was found to have the greatest impact on the ALD in its tail (in the case where the aggregate loss model was used, the peak of the second mode of a bimodal distribution was intensified). The Value at Risk, however, was less affected by this compared to other risk measures (e.g. standard deviation).

  • Empirical evidence suggests insurers are indeed avoiding volatile severity risk associated with increased cover limits, not only through low upper limits, but through increasing implied risk margins. Reducing Riebesell parameters support this view; in some (isolated) cases, this led to ILF consistency not being observed.

Enriched empirical data, as a basis for actuarial experience rating, may represent a source of value, despite the notion that it “quickly goes stale” due to the dynamic nature of the technological environment. This is demonstrated by reconciling modelled (i.e. “experience-based”) and insurer (exposure-based) ILFs, and introduces the recommendations made in Section 6.2.

6.2 Recommendations

Wider audience

Onus should be placed on all stakeholders concerned to establish a unified approach to deal with common cyber-risk management issues – whilst industry groups and international initiatives are reportedly underway; actions to “better” address basic data issues are still highly anticipated.

Developing an anonymised “community-wide” data base (with key elements for quantifying cyber-risk) may be fraught with wider issues concerning cooperation, funding, administration, and governance. However, there would appear to be some incentive to collaborate more effectively, given the $600bn (and growing) cyber-cost estimate previously mentioned (Section 1).

This would align with academic interests in support of such an initiative – although a unified approach may also be required here – possibly through a multidisciplinary academic interest group. Such cross-pollination would accelerate the development of cyber-risk and associated pricing models.

Specific directions – academia

There were only two “actuarial” contributions (according to title) that featured in the model review, neither of which appeared to have emerged from that domain. Given this, it is worth emphasising that further actuarial contribution to this specialised field of academia is essential.

Specific areas that warrant greater input include the following:

  • Correlation and interdependence: risks within a class were assumed to be independent – simulation (e.g. common shock model) would be useful for understanding interdependence with respect to business interruption.

  • Information asymmetry: anti-selection (e.g. different limits attracting different types, levels of risk) could be explored using SERFF ILFs (e.g. Hanover, 2015) which differentiate by turnover; or considering class D divided by customer churn); empirical insight into the notion of secondary loss (Bandyopadhyay et al., Reference Bandyopadhyay, Mookerjee and Rao2010) and associated asymmetries (e.g. insureds’ claiming strategy) could be investigated in terms of “retention factors” (for pricing different deductibles).

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express gratitude to Professor Thiart for her dedication, guidance, and patience throughout this research. The support provided by Stephen Wheldon and associates of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, as well as the external and independent examiner(s) and Chris Olsen, the External Supervisor, was instrumental in making this research possible. Special thanks are extended to the author’s family members for their unwavering support and encouragement.

Appendix A. Literature review

A.1. Search Strategy

The search strategy used to identify studies in the model review (Section 2) is illustrated in Figure A.1. This incorporates various filters (e.g. language, content, etc.) and utilises the University of Cape Town [UCT] (2019) online search engine. Titles and keywords are searched using strings that are made up of one word from each of the following groups:

  • Group 1: “cyber,” “information,” and “interdependent”

  • Group 2: “risk management,” “insurance” (and derivatives, such as insurability), and “security”

The UCT (2019) online search, used to generate these results, accesses databases such as WorldCat (2019), which is self-proclaimed as “world’s largest network of libraries.” Incorporated in it are supplementary sources to compliment the search, such as Workshop on the Economics of Information Security [WEIS] (2019) – (archives of papers on information security and privacy), and Association for Computing Machinery [ACM] (2019) – (an international society for learned computing). The library catalogue of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2019) was also considered.

The 22 studies that are identified in Figure A.1 constitute studies in the taxonomy (Figure A.2) – this excludes the study Edwards et al. (Reference Edwards, Hofmeyr and Forrest2016), which fell outside the review period (2000–mid-2006).

Figure A.1. Identification of studies. Notes: (1) Search string: “ti:((cyber | information | interdependent) + (risk management | insur* | security)) kw: (model | empirical)” – which applies to titles (i.e. “ti”) and keywords (i.e. “kw”), through the UCT (n.d.) search engine; (2) English-only; identified Barracchini & Addessi (Reference Barracchini and Addessi2014) from a similar (but excluded) Italian manuscript, ; (3) Full-text, peer-reviewed (re-included Soo Hoo (Reference Soo Hoo2000), Liu et al. (Reference Liu, Tanaka and Matsuura2007) – not peer-reviewed); (4) Period: 2000 – mid 2016; (5) 52 studies identified for full-text review by scanning titles, then abstracts, and introduced 11 new studies from online searches; references; and archived libraries (e.g. WEIS (2019); (6) eliminated 41 studies based on full-text review, leaving 22 for the model review. Motivated by Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) – (Moher et al., Reference Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff and Altman2009), and Biener et al. (Reference Biener, Eling and Wirfs2015) search strategy for cyber-related losses.

A.2. Taxonomy

Figure A.2. Overview of cyber-risk models. Text colour: common model types. Abbreviations: Bank for International Settlements [BIS] (2013); Honeypot – Pouget et al. (Reference Pouget, Dacier and Pham2005); ICSA: International Computer Security Association – Bridwell (Reference Bridwell2004); Ministry of Economy Trade Industry [METI] (2004); Operational Riskdata eXchange Association [ORX] (2017); SysAdmin, Audit, Admin and Security [SANS] (2019); World Development Indicators Database (WDID): World Bank (2019). SEIR: Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered, SIS: Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible. Note (1): undisclosed source.

Appendix B. Results

B.1. Identifying Severity CDFs (Algorithm 4.1)

Table B.1. Large-loss CDFs and scores. Final selections (percentiles: coloured font, A–E; CDFs: boxed) correspond to maximum overall scores (boxed). Weibull (shifted; asterisked: light-tailed), Burr (type III: Dagum), and Pearson: 3, 4, and 6 parameter CDFs respectively. Coloured bars: models – quantile divided by maximum (empirical severity); scores – relative magnitude. Criteria for (failing which, ): percentile deemed to be acceptable (in terms of ME plots); spliced CDF yields consistent ILFs over a given set of limits ($10k, $100m). Underlying costs: Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, inflated to 2016

B.2 Mean Excess Plots (A-D)

Markers in Figure B.1 indicate the apparent onset of volatility, or other such irregularity due to having too few data points. These correspond to maximum permissible thresholds for use in Algorithm 4.1 (Appendix B.1).

As can be seen, MEs for classes B and C initially decrease before assuming upward concavity (possibly indicating a Burr type CDF), and ultimately, continue to increase beyond the indicated percentiles (i.e. 94%, 93% respectively). This could also be indicative of a heavy-tailed Weibull, possibly a Pareto. In contrast, MEs for class A and D reduce after the threshold of 93% (sharply so, in class D), which undermines a CDF such as the Pareto, and may even imply a short-tailed CDF for D.

Figure B.1. Empirical ME plots. Axes: x (threshold, $m), y (mean excess, values omitted as they are unnecessary for this exercise). Data: costs sourced from Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, inflated to 2016. Square markers (i.e. 94th, 96th, 93rd, and 92nd percentiles: A–D respectively) indicate the onset volatile or irregular trends (used as maximum percentiles for).

B.3. Densities, Limited Moments

For beta and gamma families (Table B.2: B.6–B.7) gamma ( $\Gamma $ ) and beta ( ${\rm B}$ ) functions, and respective lower incomplete variations are defined as follows:

(B.1) $$\matrix{ & \Gamma (a) = \int\limits_0^\infty {{u^{a - 1}}\exp ( - u)du}, \hfill & \Gamma (a;b) = \int\limits_0^b {{u^{a - 1}}\exp ( - u)du} \;f \hfill \cr & {\rm B}(a,b) = \int\limits_0^1 {{u^{a - 1}}{{(1 - u)}^{b - 1}}du} = {{\Gamma (a)\Gamma (b)} \over {\Gamma (a + b)}}, \hfill & {\rm B}(a,b;c) = {\rm B}(a,b)\int\limits_0^c {{u^{a - 1}}{{(1 - u)}^{b - 1}}du} \cr} $$

where $a,b,c \gt 0;{\rm{ }}c \lt 1$ (Klugman et al., Reference Klugman, Panjer and Willmot2004: 102, 627–629), noting that in this case, the incomplete gamma, $\Gamma (a,b)$ , is not “standardised” with divisor $\Gamma (a).$ In this table, limited moments for continuous distributions do not incorporate a shift (i.e. location parameter). For this, an adjustment can be applied as described in the following. Suppose random variable $Y = X + \phi $ has a shifted CDF, based on (non-negative) random variable $X$ with location (i.e. “shift”) parameter $\phi \gt 0$ (i.e. $Y \ge \phi ).$ Then limited moments for $Y,$ when limit $l \gt \phi $ applies, can be determined analytically using ${\rm{{\rm E}}}\left( {{Y^{(l)k}}} \right) = {\rm{E}}\left( {{{({X^{(l - \phi )}} + \phi )}^k}} \right),$ assuming respective limited moments for X exist. This follows from the fact that $\min (X + \phi, l) = \min (X,l - \phi ) + \phi.$ For $\phi \gt l \ge 0,$ ${\rm{E}}{Y^{(l)k}} = {l^k}$ by definition.

Table B.2. Discrete and continuous distributions. Limit l > 0 applies to random variable X for limited moments B.5–B.7 (Klugman et al., Reference Klugman, Panjer and Willmot2004, sec. A.2.1.1, A3.1.1). *Dagum is represented as Burr(b,c,d) – (i.e. a = 1) throughout the present research to align with Vose (2019) parameterisation of Burr (ordinarily d = 1 for Burr). Location parameter, for a shifted CDF, is included after other applicable parameters a-d (limited moments, B.5–B.7, based on need to be adjusted accordingly)

B.4. Risk-Adjusted ILFs

Figure B.2. Limit factor and gradient curves. Base limit: $100m. Risk margin (Model 4.3 (CR) in low (1–2), medium (3–4), and high environments achieve a risk margin of 5% at $10m, $100k, and $10k limits, respectively (based upon variance principle, which also applies to Models 4.5–4.6. PH transform applies to a compound Poisson-Weibull and lognormal CDF, fit to Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015 costs, inflated to end of 2016). Loss count ∼ Poisson(10) (all CR models), and 10 (deterministic for Model 4.3 IR) Model 4.3 (IR).

Key observations from the risk-adjusted ILFs and associated gradients in Figure B.2 include:

  • PH (Weibull) limit factors are closely aligned to (variance-adjusted) Model 4.3 (CR), as is the case for Models 4.5 (scenario 3) and 4.6; PH (lognormal) and Model 4.3 ILFs crossover at a limit between the $15m-$20m (due to the underlying CDFs)

  • Variance principle risk-adjusted limit factors, in this case, are generally consistent (i.e. positive and decreasing gradients, which is always the case for PH), although a subtle initial increase can be seen for Model 4.3 (i.e. closing the gap between CR and PH Weibull in medium–high risk, Figure B.2: 4, 6)

  • Increasing the risk parameter leads to a greater risk adjustment at higher limits than lower limits for a given model (i.e. discount factor reduces, whilst ILFs increase at limits greater than $1m); a similar effect can be achieved through the correlation parameter in Models 4.5–4.6 (although this is partially offset by equalising risk margins at the $2.5m limit)

Appendix C. Validation

Numerous checks have been performed by comparing ALDs and their moments against alternative derivations. One such example is depicted in Figure C.1 and Table C.1, which illustrates the close correspondence between Model 4.3 (CR) and an MC simulation based upon an algorithm developed by Homer and Rosengarten (Reference Homer and Rosengarten2011).

Figure C.1. ALDs: Monte Carlo versus FFT (Model 4.3, CR) – (1) Left (of probability =0): MC simulation with 500k iterations; (2) Right: Model 4.3 (CR) with FFT (truncation, span) – A–D: ($96.2m, $23.5k), E: ($287.1, $70.1k). Limits: A–D ($20m), E ($80m); Poisson loss count with mean 10. Vertical axes – left (A–D); right (E). Underlying data: Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015), costs inflated to year 2016.

Table C.1. Moments: Monte Carlo versus FFT. MC simulation with 500k iterations; Model 4.3 (CR) with FFT (truncation, span) – A–D: ($96.2m, $23.5k), E: ($287.1, $70.1k). Means: $m. Limits: A–D ($20m), E ($80m); Poisson loss count with mean 10. Underlying data based on Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, with costs inflated to end of 2016 year

Abbreviations

  • Akaike Information Criteria, AIC 14

  • Anderson Darling, AD 22

  • characteristic function, cf 7

  • Extreme Value Theory, EVT 3

  • Fast Fourier Transform, FFT 7

  • Increased Limit Factors, ILF 2

  • Internet Service Providers, ISP 2

  • Kullback-Leibler, KB 16

  • Limited Aggregate Severity, LAS 8

  • Maximum Likelihood Estimation, MLE 14

  • moment generating function, mgf 7

  • Multivariate Negative Binomial, MNB 12

  • Operational Risk, OR 3

  • probability generating function, pgf 7

  • Proportional-Hazard PH, 10

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Figure 0

Table 1. Extant cyber-risk models. Distributions, models – green (recognised or plausible in the context of general insurance), orange (data dependent), red (unrealistic, misrepresentative), grey (out-of-scope, not applicable, unspecified)

Figure 1

Table 2. Costs (classes A–E) and possible coverage. Descriptions for classes A–E are based on “global” cost of data breach reports (Ponemon Institute, 2012i, 2013j, 2014f, 2013j); specimen products are purely illustrative examples of first-party coverage in respect of associated costs: AIG – Illinois (Murphy, 2013); ACE –(Cresenzi & Alibrio, 2016); Federal Insurance – (Daigle & Cresenzi, 2018)

Figure 2

Figure 1. Outline of theory and model links. Theory 1–4 (blue, in addition to risk theory which introduces 1 and 3); Models 4.1–4.6 (green; all models rely upon 1 and 2; 3 and 4 are only utilised in support of Models 4.3–4.6). Generated using Freemind (Müller et al., 2004).

Figure 3

Figure 2. Flow chart for Models 4.1–4.6. Models 4.4–4.5 and Model 4.6 assume correlated aggregate loss amounts and counts (classes A–D) respectively. Adjustments (e.g. inflation, risk) may apply to limit factors based on any of these models.

Figure 4

Table 3. FFT steps for ALDs (Models 4.3–4.6) (✓) if step is relevant, (x) otherwise

Figure 5

Table 4. Selected large-loss CDFs and splicing points. Threshold: dollar value of splicing point; Burr represents inverse Burr (i.e. Dagum CDF); CDFs fit using MLE to severities from Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, inflated to end of 2016

Figure 6

Table 5. Bootstrap results. 10k samples; selected % achieving minimum AICC; 90% confidence sets based on Kullback-Leibler distance estimate for selected CDF (colour coded font, A–E – average shape parameter for Weibull CDF selections). Tail-fit ratios (KS, AD – 5% critical); consistent ILFs (rate per 100). Underlying costs based on Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015 inflated to 2016

Figure 7

Figure 3. ALDs: Model 4.3 Loss count: CRPoisson(10); IR – 10 (deterministic). Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015) costs inflated to end of 2016. Per-loss limit ($20m, A-D).

Figure 8

Figure 4. ALDs: Models 4.3–4.6 $m; Scenarios 1–3: constant covariance coefficients of 0%, 5%, 10% resp., for Models 4.4 (IR) and 4.5 (CR). Loss count: Poisson(10) (Models 4.3–4.5, CR); MNB(10,1,0.09) for Model 4.6; IR: 10 (deterministic). Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015) costs inflated to end of 2016. Per-occurrence limit (class E).

Figure 9

Table 6. Insurer ILF comparison (per-loss limits). Insurer comparison: 2016 ACE SERFF filing – Chubb Enterprise Risk Management Cyber and Digitech products (Cresenzi & Alibrio, 2016), with reference to (2015 year) SERFF filings by: AIG (Speciality Risk Protector) [AGNY-130104025], Travellers (Cyber-Essentials) [TRVD-130748646], Philadelphia (Cyber-Security Liability) [PHLX-G128091742], and ACE (MPL Advantage) [ACEH-125807939]. *$100m: ILFs estimated with Riebesell curve (implied at $10m limit). Base limit: $1m; retention: $10k. Shading: model range within insurer range (A:B)≔(min, max); partial if ranges overlap. “Median”: model ILF range. Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, inflated to end of 2016 (ILFs: adjusted to 2015)

Figure 10

Figure A.1. Identification of studies. Notes: (1) Search string: “ti:((cyber | information | interdependent) + (risk management | insur* | security)) kw: (model | empirical)” – which applies to titles (i.e. “ti”) and keywords (i.e. “kw”), through the UCT (n.d.) search engine; (2) English-only; identified Barracchini & Addessi (2014) from a similar (but excluded) Italian manuscript, ; (3) Full-text, peer-reviewed (re-included Soo Hoo (2000), Liu et al. (2007) – not peer-reviewed); (4) Period: 2000 – mid 2016; (5) 52 studies identified for full-text review by scanning titles, then abstracts, and introduced 11 new studies from online searches; references; and archived libraries (e.g. WEIS (2019); (6) eliminated 41 studies based on full-text review, leaving 22 for the model review. Motivated by Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) – (Moher et al., 2009), and Biener et al. (2015) search strategy for cyber-related losses.

Figure 11

Figure A.2. Overview of cyber-risk models. Text colour: common model types. Abbreviations: Bank for International Settlements [BIS] (2013); Honeypot – Pouget et al. (2005); ICSA: International Computer Security Association – Bridwell (2004); Ministry of Economy Trade Industry [METI] (2004); Operational Riskdata eXchange Association [ORX] (2017); SysAdmin, Audit, Admin and Security [SANS] (2019); World Development Indicators Database (WDID): World Bank (2019). SEIR: Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered, SIS: Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible. Note (1): undisclosed source.

Figure 12

Table B.1. Large-loss CDFs and scores. Final selections (percentiles: coloured font, A–E; CDFs: boxed) correspond to maximum overall scores (boxed). Weibull (shifted; asterisked: light-tailed), Burr (type III: Dagum), and Pearson: 3, 4, and 6 parameter CDFs respectively. Coloured bars: models – quantile divided by maximum (empirical severity); scores – relative magnitude. Criteria for (failing which, ): percentile deemed to be acceptable (in terms of ME plots); spliced CDF yields consistent ILFs over a given set of limits ($10k, $100m). Underlying costs: Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, inflated to 2016

Figure 13

Figure B.1. Empirical ME plots. Axes: x (threshold, $m), y (mean excess, values omitted as they are unnecessary for this exercise). Data: costs sourced from Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, inflated to 2016. Square markers (i.e. 94th, 96th, 93rd, and 92nd percentiles: A–D respectively) indicate the onset volatile or irregular trends (used as maximum percentiles for).

Figure 14

Table B.2. Discrete and continuous distributions. Limit l > 0 applies to random variable X for limited moments B.5–B.7 (Klugman et al., 2004, sec. A.2.1.1, A3.1.1). *Dagum is represented as Burr(b,c,d) – (i.e. a = 1) throughout the present research to align with Vose (2019) parameterisation of Burr (ordinarily d = 1 for Burr). Location parameter, for a shifted CDF, is included after other applicable parameters a-d (limited moments, B.5–B.7, based on need to be adjusted accordingly)

Figure 15

Figure B.2. Limit factor and gradient curves. Base limit: $100m. Risk margin (Model 4.3 (CR) in low (1–2), medium (3–4), and high environments achieve a risk margin of 5% at $10m, $100k, and $10k limits, respectively (based upon variance principle, which also applies to Models 4.5–4.6. PH transform applies to a compound Poisson-Weibull and lognormal CDF, fit to Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015 costs, inflated to end of 2016). Loss count ∼ Poisson(10) (all CR models), and 10 (deterministic for Model 4.3 IR) Model 4.3 (IR).

Figure 16

Figure C.1. ALDs: Monte Carlo versus FFT (Model 4.3, CR) – (1) Left (of probability =0): MC simulation with 500k iterations; (2) Right: Model 4.3 (CR) with FFT (truncation, span) – A–D: ($96.2m, $23.5k), E: ($287.1, $70.1k). Limits: A–D ($20m), E ($80m); Poisson loss count with mean 10. Vertical axes – left (A–D); right (E). Underlying data: Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015), costs inflated to year 2016.

Figure 17

Table C.1. Moments: Monte Carlo versus FFT. MC simulation with 500k iterations; Model 4.3 (CR) with FFT (truncation, span) – A–D: ($96.2m, $23.5k), E: ($287.1, $70.1k). Means: $m. Limits: A–D ($20m), E ($80m); Poisson loss count with mean 10. Underlying data based on Ponemon Institute (2012a–2012i, 2013a–2013j, 2014a–2014k, 2015, with costs inflated to end of 2016 year