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Social norms of corruption in the field: social nudges on posters can help to reduce bribery

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 December 2019

NILS C. KÖBIS Open the ORCID record for NILS C. KÖBIS [Opens in a new window] ,
MARLEEN TROOST ,
CYRIL O. BRANDT  and
IVAN SORAPERRA
NILS C. KÖBIS*
Affiliation:
Center for Research in Experimental Economics and political Decision-making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
MARLEEN TROOST
Affiliation:
Center for Research in Experimental Economics and political Decision-making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
CYRIL O. BRANDT
Affiliation:
Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
IVAN SORAPERRA
Affiliation:
Center for Research in Experimental Economics and political Decision-making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
*
*Correspondence to: Center for Research in Experimental Economics and political Decision-making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

Corruption in the form of bribery continues to be a major societal challenge around the world. The current lab-in-the-field study tested whether dynamic descriptive norms messages on posters can help to reduce bribery. Before, during and after placing posters throughout a medium-sized South African town, incentivized measures of social norms and bribery were assessed in a mobile lab. A total of 311 participants stemming from the general population took part. In line with the pre-registered predictions, the results reveal that people: (1) perceive bribery to be less common; and (b) engage in bribery in a corruption game less frequently when the posters were displayed. The discussion outlines how social norms nudging campaigns can be leveraged to spur collective action against corruption.

Type
Article
Information
Behavioural Public Policy , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , October 2022 , pp. 597 - 624
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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