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From base-rate to cumulative respect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

C. Philip Beaman  and
Rachel McCloy
C. Philip Beaman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Reading – Earley Gate, Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AL, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.personal.rdg.ac.uk/~sxs98cpb/[email protected]://www.psychology.rdg.ac.uk/people/lecturing/Dr_Rachel_McCloy.php
Rachel McCloy
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Reading – Earley Gate, Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AL, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.personal.rdg.ac.uk/~sxs98cpb/[email protected]://www.psychology.rdg.ac.uk/people/lecturing/Dr_Rachel_McCloy.php
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Abstract

The tendency to neglect base-rates in judgment under uncertainty may be “notorious,” as Barbey & Sloman (B&S) suggest, but it is neither inevitable (as they document; see also Koehler 1996) nor unique. Here we would like to point out another line of evidence connecting ecological rationality to dual processes, the failure of individuals to appropriately judge cumulative probability.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 256 - 257
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

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