In this article we look at the governance of SWFs from the perspective of the competing political interests embedded in the sponsor—the domestic political claims on funds and the principles and practice of governance used to discipline those interests in favour of a long-term perspective that emphasizes the conservation of wealth and the intergenerational transfer of benefits. Using the case-study of the Australian SWF known as the Future Fund, we argue that SWFs can be used as legal instruments to promote the interests of future generations. In this way, it puts into action the principle of intergenerational equity which has been hereto notoriously difficult to substantively apply in international law. By invoking the intergenerational principle, we argue that the Australian government not only responded to the legal challenges of implementing intergenerational equity but also contributed to its currency as a customary norm.

The conflict between ethical universalism and cultural diversity remains a pre-eminent problem of the present international legal system. International law is in a dilemma. It cannot abstain from adopting some material values as the international community cannot be indifferent to the suppressions of citizens or certain minorities by totalitarian regimes. Yet the international legal system must not become an instrument of Western cultural imperialism by negating any cultural differences. This contribution argues that international law is a framework concept prescribing certain basic values. However, these values are not absolute and must be balanced against competing interests. In this balancing process, states have considerable political discretion. This concept will be exemplified by an analysis of the debate on the existence of a right to democratic governance in international law. It will be shown that even though international law does not require states to be democratic, it nevertheless imposes certain standards of legitimacy.

The recently adopted Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waiver decision at the World Trade Organization is a grossly inadequate and insincere response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper criticizes the TRIPS waiver for being faulty on several fronts such as: excluding COVID-19 diagnostics and therapeutics from its fold and focusing only on COVID-19 vaccines; restricting its coverage to only patents and leaving out other intellectual property rights; excluding developed countries that possess manufacturing and technological capability from being eligible exporters of COVID-19 vaccines; and its perplexing silence on the transfer of technology. It will have negligible impact on fighting the pandemic, sets an enfeebled example for the future, and is a classic case of “too little too late”.

International clean technology diffusion is essential to mitigate and adapt to climate change, while fast and optimal diffusion can be prevented by the paywall of patents. This article explores the deficiency in clean technology diffusion caused by the legal fragmentation and rule complex of international environmental law and intellectual property law. It systematically examines three pathways to foster international clean technology diffusion through: restriction of intellectual property, including imposing external restraints in environmental law; striking internal balancing in maximizing TRIPS flexibilities; and keeping the status quo. It argues that treaty pathways may not work, and an operable pathway to promote clean technology diffusion is to maximize and consolidate TRIPS flexibilities in national laws. This option challenges the popular proposal of a “Doha-like” declaration on TRIPS and climate change due to the paralyzed multilateral trade mechanism, asymmetrical negotiation power of developing countries, prolonged negotiation process, and categorization problem in treaty negotiations.

Mainstream international law is Eurocentric. Throughout the past half millennia, no territory beyond Europe was safe from jus gentium's striking capability to legitimize the intrusion of European civilizational precepts. Beginning with the Americas but quickly shifting to Africa and Asia, each continent was a battleground for the penetration of a provincial knowledge system. In this paper, I explore the implications of Eurocentrism for international legal pedagogy. While textbook authors now pay homage to other civilizations, their effusions are ornamental only. Instead of supporting epistemological equivalency, they centre European international law throughout their works, exorcising the brutalities of European history that generated the law in question. After setting out the dilemma, I outline three approaches towards transforming international legal pedagogy that capitalize on the decolonization movement. Each method builds on the premise that, without epistemic diversity, legal pedagogy will continue to rationalize European international law's predatory impulse.

There seem to be no answers to resolve the deadlock between the Global North and the Global South on liability and compensation for loss and damage from climate change. Revisiting the original story of international environmental law from the Stockholm Conference of 1972 may help us address these historical tensions. In doing so, this article unveils the genesis of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) from the Stockholm Conference as an alternative consciousness centred around the aspirations of the Global South. Indira Gandhi's plenary address at Stockholm outlined the Global South's position on environmental issues, which greatly influenced early TWAIL scholarship in the 1980s. Locating TWAIL's origins at Stockholm allows us to: (1) chart the environmental concerns of the Global South till date; (2) infer its evolved view on the “development versus environment” debate; and (3) understand the role of future TWAIL scholarship in challenging the enduring and structural limitations of international environmental law, especially in future deliberations on loss and damage.

After protracted conflicts, Afghanistan and Iran agreed on a treaty in 1973 to share the waters of the Helmand River. However, this legal arrangement became a source of controversy over its equitable and reasonable utilization principle. The 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty reflects a history of legal and political controversy and strongly contrasting views, with some labelling it the “worst” treaty and others the “best”. This paper scrutinizes the history of legal arrangements of the Helmand River within its underlying political context to search for evidence of the aforementioned equitable and reasonable utilization principle. The findings indicate that the 1973 Treaty provides a grey space for legality and illegality, being a greatly restricted instrument to uphold the principle of equity. Examination of the principle of equity in the 1973 Treaty contributes to developing constructive controversy over the Helmand River and offers valuable lessons for other international watercourses facing similar challenges.

I argue that contextually reading two disputes involving Siam—Cheek v. Siam (1898) and the Temple of Preah Vihear (1962)—proves that both private law and public international law are structurally rigged against ex-semi-colonial nations. Nineteenth-century Siam was a political ferment known variously as a semi-colonial, semi-peripheral, non-colonial, or uncolonized polity. Siam bargained under imperial shadows her political independence by the tactical grants of concession contracts, as well as by negotiating treaties with competing European powers. In the post-colonial Temple of Preah Vihear case, colonial stationery—maps, photographs, and communiqués—as well as imperial customs offered evidentiary support to Cambodia, an ex-colonial state, against Thailand. In the early twentieth century, while authors picked Cheek v. Siam as a precedent for the law of international claims, textbooks offer the Temple of Preah Vihear case as a precedent on the form of treaties and estoppel. Conclusively, these two cases allow us to locate, if not exorcise, the ghosts of empires in Asian legal history, exposing, at the same time, Judge Koo’s Orientalization of customary international law.

Over the last decade, public-private partnerships between states and a variety of non-state actors have proliferated as vehicles for functional co-operation at the global level. In parallel, there has been an emerging trend to accord such partnerships the privileges and immunities normally reserved for intergovernmental organizations (“IO-type privileges and immunities”). After identifying the legal and normative issues associated with this trend, this article argues that IO-type privileges and immunities should be restricted to entities that are clearly established under and governed by international law, and that any approach to IO-type privileges and immunities as a uniform package deal, regardless of the precise functional requirements of the global public-private partnership and its different categories of staff, or the specific conditions in the relevant national jurisdiction where a given privilege or immunity is sought, should be avoided.

This paper analyzes one of the key factors for understanding the region of Central Asia: its distinctive relationship to water resources and how states in the region co-operate—or should do so—in order to achieve better management of this valuable resource. Section I introduces the general legal context and, after the presentation of factual data, examines the management of water resources in the region from the viewpoint of the obligation of co-operation established under general international law, including the realization of the right of access to water and sanitation by all citizens. Subsequently, we analyze how and to what extent current international co-operation tools might contribute to solving existing challenges. To this end, we explore both co-operation in the generation and distribution of hydroelectric power in the region, and regional co-operation in the management, conservation, and sustainable development of the inland fisheries of Central Asia.

This essay examines the 2013 Decision by the International Court of Justice interpreting its 1962 Judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case between Cambodia and Thailand, situating the more recent decision in the context of the Court's evolving role in Asia. Only eight Asian states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; only nine have ever appeared before it. The narrowness of the recent decision is of interest in part because of the modest role it ascribes to judicial institutions, but also for what this modesty heralds for the Court's status in Asia. A key conclusion is that Asian states are likely to retain a general preference for bilateral resolution of disputes. For smaller disputes, however, especially those concerning subjects that cannot be divided or traded—such as a temple (and, as we shall see, an island)—the ICJ may play an important role.

The conventional wisdom has been that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] Part XV dispute settlement system is narrowly restricted and this reflects the drafters’ intent. Thus, tribunals should cautiously interpret Part XV, giving broad effect to its jurisdictional limitations. The unanimous award in South China Sea deals this approach a blow. Indeed, it assumes a fundamentally different orientation to interpreting UNCLOS: one which implicitly takes the foremost principle of Part XV as being its compulsory and comprehensive character. This approach is rooted in a very different understanding of UNCLOS as a “package deal” and the consensus it reflects. Indeed, I argue that any interpretation of ambiguous provisions of UNLCOS is necessarily coloured by one’s view of the struggles involved in its negotiation. Further evidence of this difference of approach in South China Sea is found, in particular, in its treatment of the regime of islands.

Internal self-determination is a popular dimension of self-determination in international law. Often regarded as a right to democratic governance, its early promoters were largely Western states and international lawyers. A central observation made by such promoters was that the West favoured internal self-determination while the Third World did not. The present article will argue why this is a misconception and an outdated observation today. However, having argued so, the article proceeds to develop a Third World-oriented constructive critique of internal self-determination, suggesting why the Third World should nevertheless be more critically cautious and vigilant about the promotion of internal self-determination by Western actors as a distinct and concrete right in international law.

Like the apocryphal elephant defined by the blind men touching different parts of its anatomy, the content of the phrase “human security” varies with its users. In this sense it is rather like the phrase “self-determination”, which is widely employed by and for diverse interests.1 The lack of uniform definition or use stems in both cases not from intrinsic incoherence but from the way in which, from their first appearance, the phrases seemed to challenge the views, values, and interests of the practitioners of traditional diplomacy, powerful actors who then had a choice: resist them absolutely as rogue concepts threatening the very structure of international relations or neuter their revolutionary potential through an interpretation rendering them compatible with, even a reinforcement of, the basic structure of the status quo.

The historic Award in the South China Sea Arbitration gave much-needed clarity to many of the complex legal issues lying at the heart of the Philippines-China maritime dispute. Often overlooked, however, is the procedural significance of the case. This Comment submits that the South China Sea Arbitration represents a shift towards the use of judicial fact-finding initiatives as a means to overcome the adjudicatory challenges inherent to highly technical and scientific cases where one Party fails or refuses to participate. Even more striking, the Tribunal’s independently acquired facts appear to be the basis for the majority of its conclusions in the Award. This Comment highlights the appropriateness and practicality of the Tribunal’s actions in view of its extraordinary obligation under Article 9 of Annex VII of the UNCLOS to “satisfy itself” that the Philippines’ claims are “well-founded in fact and law”.

The philosophy underlying the UNESCO World Heritage Convention of 1972 [WHC] consists in promoting a system of international co-operation in the context of which the States Parties commit to preserving the cultural treasures of “outstanding universal value” located within their territories. However, it is a fact that today many properties inscribed on the List set under the WHC are endangered. This paper will focus on the role played by “non-state actors” in the enforcement of the WHC. It will thus dwell upon the relationships between public and private interests, on the one hand, and between international and domestic legal orders, on the other. Its purpose is to map out and discuss the most salient problems about the involvement of non-state actors—particularly non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and private companies—in the monitoring and implementation of the WHC.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has, on various occasions, concluded treaties on behalf of its Member States. This raises some interesting questions: is ASEAN entitled to enter into treaties on behalf of its Member States; and if so, what should be the status of ASEAN and its Member States vis-à-vis the other party to the treaty? The issue is not one of whether the ASEAN Member States have consented to such a practice—it must be assumed that they have. Instead, the real issue is whether such treaty-making practice can and should be valid under international law, even if the Member States have consented for ASEAN to conclude these treaties on their behalf. This paper will argue that, under international law, ASEAN is entitled to conclude treaties on behalf of its Member States.

This article addresses the need for clarity as regards the sources of public international law, or at least as much clarity as possible. Questions relating to sources lie at the heart of international law. Of particular concern is the lack of rigour shown by some domestic judges when it comes to determining the rules of customary international law.