Hostname: page-component-55f67697df-twqc4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-05-11T08:42:45.822Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Sanctions and Defiance in North Korea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Mel Gurtov
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

North Korea has now been sanctioned five times by the United Nations Security Council for its nuclear and missile tests: resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016). UNSC Resolution 2270 is the strongest one yet, spelling out in great detail the proscribed goods and requiring that all parties neither import them from nor export them to North Korea. Each resolution obliges the members to carry out the terms of the sanctions and (as the April 15 press statement of the UNSC says) “facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.” This is a case of mission impossible for two fundamental reasons: the sanctions will not work, and the fact of them impedes any chance for a “peaceful and comprehensive solution.” The way forward, which I discuss at the end of this article, is to address North Korea's legitimate security concerns and economic needs while also considering how to build trust and reduce tensions in Northeast Asia as a whole.

Type
Research Article
Information
Asia-Pacific Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 9 , May 2016 , e4
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2016

References

Notes

1 See here.

2 See here.

3 See here.

4 See here.

5 See here.

6 See here.

7 Andrea Berger provides a comprehensive picture of the sanctions issues.

8 See here.

9 See here.

10 See here.

11 See here.

12 See here.

13 See here.

14 See here.

15 For background, see here.

16 See here.

17 See here.

18 The notion of a “hostile US policy” is no small matter for the North Koreans. When Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok visited Washington in 2000 as a special envoy of Kim Jong-il, President Clinton pledged “no hostile intent,” which has considerable symbolic meaning for the DPRK. That visit coincided with US satisfaction that suspicions about an underground nuclear site at Kumchangri, which the North Koreans allowed to be inspected, in fact were unjustified.

19 See here.