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Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2010

ETHAN BUENO DE MESQUITA
ETHAN BUENO DE MESQUITA*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
*
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita is Associate Professor, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago, 1155 East 60th Street, Suite 108, Chicago, IL 60637 ([email protected]).
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Abstract

I study how a revolutionary vanguard might use violence to mobilize a mass public. The mechanism is informational—the vanguard uses violence to manipulate population member's beliefs about the level of antigovernment sentiment in society. The model has multiple equilibria, one equilibrium in which there may be revolution and another in which there is certain not to be. In the former, structural factors influence expected mobilization, whereas in the latter they do not. Hence, the model is consistent with structural factors influencing the likelihood of revolution in some societies but not others, offering a partial defense of structural accounts from common critiques. The model also challenges standard arguments about the role of revolutionary vanguards. The model is consistent with vanguard violence facilitating mobilization and even sparking spontaneous uprisings. However, it also predicts selection effects—an active vanguard emerges only in societies that are already coordinated on a participatory equilibrium. Hence, a correlation between vanguard activity and mass mobilization may not constitute evidence for the causal efficacy of vanguards—be it through creating focal points, providing selective incentives, or communicating information.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 104 , Issue 3 , August 2010 , pp. 446 - 466
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2010

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