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In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the constitutionally protected right to privacy includes a woman's right to terminate pregnancy. Following the decision, anti-abortion groups turned to Congress to limit or negate that right. As a result of their efforts, several "human life" statutes and constitutional amendments have been proposed. This Article focuses on the implications of proposed amendments that seek to ban or limit the availability of abortions indirectly by broadening the definition of "person" to include unborn individuals. The Article discusses the potentally serious effects such an amendment would have in areas unrelated to abortion. It finds that the resulting chaos and uncertainty would have great social costs, and concludes that if abortions are to be banned or restricted, a human life amendment that directly deals with abortion is preferable to one that defines "person" to include the unborn.
Within the physicians' services industry, doctors of osteopathy are the only "full line" competitors of medical doctors. Given the current interest in merger of the two schools of practice, this Article examines the benefits of having an independent osteopathic school. These benefits include: (1) reduction of the monopoly power of medical doctors in malpractice litigation, fee negotiations with third party payors and the formulation of health policy; (2) greater satisfaction of consumer desires; and (3) diversity and innovation in physicians' training and methods of practice. The Article concludes that society has an interest in discouraging merger of the two groups; osteopathy should be maintained as an independent school of practice. To this end, society should carefully consider the impact of legislation and regulatory policies that may have the unintended effect of eliminating osteopathy as an independent competitor.
Approximately 1.3 million of our nation's elderly live in nursing homes. Despite the increasingly important role of Medicare and Medicaid, many must bear the costs of their care. This Note examines one means of financing nursing home care—the life care contract. These require residents to pay an entrance fee and transfer to the nursing home all or part of their property in return for the home's promise to provide care for the remainder of the resident's life. The Note discusses the potential problems a life care resident may face, such as substandard living conditions or a home's financial instability. It concludes by delineating steps that potential residents can take in constructing life care contracts to ensure protection of their rights and needs.
In Vitek v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the due process clause as requiring that certain procedures be followed before transferring prisoners to mental institutions. This Note analyzes the Court's reasons for concluding that the existing transfer procedures embodied in the state's commitment statutes infringed on the prisoner's liberty interests and, therefore, were constitutionally inadequate. It finds that not only was one of the grounds used by the Court to find a constitutionally protected liberty inappropriate, but the calculus that the Court employed in mandating additional procedures was incorrect. This Note suggests alternative methods of holding the statutes unconstitutional, methods that would not lead to markedly different procedures for committing prisoners and civilians. Finally, die Note examines the procedures that the Court actually prescribed and discusses their implementation.