Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy of Law
Contemporary Non-Positivism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 February 2025
Summary
This Element defends and clarifies the thesis that the legality of a system of rules depends on its moral features. Positivists who deny this dependence struggle to explain: (1) the traditional classification of moral norms as a form of a priori law; (2) judicial reliance on moral norms in legal discovery; (3) persistent theoretical disagreement about intra-systemic, law-determining facts; (4) why radically arbitrary or immoral schemes of social organization represent borderline cases of law; and (5) why law, like other artifacts, can be evaluated in a kind-relative sense (“as law”). Meanwhile, traditional versions of non-positivism overstate the dependence going further than the desiderata warrant. A moderate theory is formulated: law is an artifact whose existence depends on adequately performing an essentially normative function. The theory's justification lies in its explanatory power: a comparison with other “value-driven” artifacts, such as artworks, proves vital for understanding legal language, reasoning, and practice.
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in Philosophy of LawOnline ISBN: 9781009288293Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 20 February 2025
References
Alexy, R. (2010a). The argument from injustice: A reply to legal positivism (1st paperback ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Almeida, G. (2023). A dual character theory of law. Journal of Legal Philosophy, 49: 1–24. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4065049.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Atiq, E. H. (2019). Legal obligation & its limits. Law and Philosophy, 38(2): 109–147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Atiq, E. H. (2020a). There are no easy counterexamples to legal anti-positivism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 17(1): 1–26. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v17i1.701.Google Scholar
Atiq, E. H. (2020b). Review of natural law and the nature of law. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/natural-law-and-the-nature-of-law/.Google Scholar
Atiq, E. H. (2021). Acquaintance, knowledge, and value. Synthese, 199(5–6): 14035–14062. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03409-9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Atiq, E. H. (2023). Legal positivism and the moral origins of legal systems. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 36(1): 37–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2022.17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Atiq, E. H. (forthcoming, 2025). Law, the rule of law, and goodness-fixing kinds. In Brownlee, K., Enoch, D., & Marmor, A. (eds.), Engaging Raz: Themes in normative philosophy. Oxford University Press. https://philpapers.org/rec/ATILTR.Google Scholar
Atiq, E. H., & Mathews, J. (2022). The uncertain foundations of public law theory. Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy, 31: 389–450.Google Scholar
Austin, J. (1832) [1995]. The province of jurisprudence determined, Rumble, W. E. (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521546.Google Scholar
Banner, S. (2021). The decline of natural law: How American lawyers once used natural law and why they stopped (1st ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197556498.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barney, R. (2023). Platonic qua-predication. Analytic Philosophy, 65(4): 453–472.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baude, W., & Sachs, S. (2019). Grounding originalism. Northwestern University Law Review, 113: 1455–1492.Google Scholar
Berman, M. N. (2022). Dworkin versus hart revisited: The challenge of non-lexical determination. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 42(2): 548–577.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, IV: 73–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burgess, J. A. (1998). Error theories and values. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(4): 534–552.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, D. J., & Jackson, F. (2001). Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation. The Philosophical Review, 110(3): 315–360. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-3-315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chilovi, S., & Pavlakos, G. (2019). Law-determination as grounding: A common grounding framework for jurisprudence. Legal Theory, 25(1): 53–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chilovi, S., & Pavlakos, G. (2022). The explanatory demands of grounding in law. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 103(4): 900–933.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, S., & Rehding, A. (2006). Music theory and natural order from the renaissance to the early twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Coleman, J. L. (2001). The practice of principle: In defense of a pragmatist approach to legal theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Corwin, E. S. (1928). The “higher law” background of American constitutional law. Harvard Law Review, 42(3): 365.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crowe, J. (2019). Natural law and the nature of law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cummins, R. (1975). Functional explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 741–764.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, W. A. (2005). Concept individuation, possession conditions, and propositional attitudes. Noûs, 39(1): 140–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dindjer, H. (2020). The new legal anti-positivism. Legal Theory, 26(3): 181–213. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325220000208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Donelson, R., & Hannikainen, I. R. (2020). Fuller and the folk: The inner morality of law revisited. In Lombrozo, T., Knobe, J., & Nichols, S. (eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6–28.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. (1967). The model of rules. The University of Chicago Law Review, 35(1): 14–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dworkin, R. (1986a). A matter of principle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dworkin, R. (1996). Freedom’s law: The moral reading of the American constitution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Enoch, D. (2011). Taking morality seriously. Oxford : Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evnine, S. J. (2016). Making objects and events: A hylomorphic theory of artifacts, actions, and organisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ewing, B. (2017). Conventionality, disagreement, and fidelity. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 30: 97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finnis, J. (1987). On reason and authority in law’s empire. Law and Philosophy, 6(3): 357–380. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00142932.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finnis, J. (2007). Grounds of law and legal theory: A response. Legal Theory, 13(3–4): 315–344. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325208070122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finnis, J. (2011). Natural law and natural rights (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fish, S. (1982). Working on the chain gang: Interpretation in the law and in literary criticism. Critical Inquiry, 9(1): 201–216. https://doi.org/10.1086/448195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Flanagan, B., & Hannikainen, I. R. (2022). The folk concept of law: Law is intrinsically moral. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 100(1): 165–179. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2020.1833953.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fuller, L. (1978). The morality of law (Rev. ed., 15. print). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Gardner, J. (2001). Legal positivism: 51/2 myths. The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 46(1): 199–227. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/46.1.199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gardner, J. (2012). Law as a leap of faith: Essays on law in general. USA: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodman, N., & Quine, W. V. (1947). Steps toward a constructive nominalism. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12(4): 105–122. https://doi.org/10.2307/2266485.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Green, L., & Adams, T. (2019). Legal positivism. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/legal-positivism/.Google Scholar
Greenberg, M. (2004). How facts make law. Legal Theory, 10(3): 157–198. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325204040212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenberg, M. (2008). Hartian positivism and normative facts: How facts make law II. In Hershovitz, S. (ed.), Exploring law’s empire: The jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, 265–290.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grey, T. C. (1978). Origins of the unwritten constitution: Fundamental law in American revolutionary thought. Stanford Law Review, 30(5): 843.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamburger, P. A. (1993). Natural rights, natural law, and American constitutions. Yale Law Journal, 102(4): 907.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hannikainen, I. R., Tobia, K. P., De Almeida, G. D. F. C. F., et al. (2021). Are there cross‐cultural legal principles? Modal reasoning uncovers procedural constraints on law. Cognitive Science, 45(8), e13024.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hart, H. L. A. (1958). Positivism and the separation of law and morals. Harvard Law Review, 71(4): 593. https://doi.org/10.2307/1338225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hedden, B., & Nebel, J. M. (2024). Multidimensional Concepts and Disparate Scale Types. Philosophical Review, 133(3): 265–308 .Google Scholar
Helmholz, R. H. (2015). Natural law in court: A history of legal theory in practice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hilpinen, R. (1993). Authors and artifacts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 155–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirsch, E. (2002). Against revisionary ontology. Philosophical Topics, 30(1): 103–127. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20023013.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, T., & Timmons, M. (1991). New wave moral realism meets moral twin earth. Journal of Philosophical Research, 16: 447–465. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1991_19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P. (2005). Reflections on meaning (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/019925124X.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, F. (1998). From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. UK: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jiménez, F. (2023). Legal positivism for legal officials. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 36(2): 359–386. https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2022.36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knobe, J., Prasada, S., & Newman, G. E. (2013). Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation. Cognition, 127(2): 242–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.01.005.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Korman, D. Z. (2009). Eliminativism and the challenge from folk belief. Noûs, 43(2): 242–264. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00705.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kovacs, D. M. (2018). The deflationary theory of ontological dependence. The Philosophical Quarterly, 68(272): 481–502. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kovacs, D. M. (2019). How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist. Synthese, 198(3): 2129–2152. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02196-8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kramer, M. H. (2007a). Objectivity and the rule of law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kramer, M. H. (2007b). When is there not one right answer? American Journal of Jurisprudence, 53: 49–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridg: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Kubala, R. (2021). Aesthetic practices and normativity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2): 408–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leiter, B. (2004). The end of empire: Dworkin and jurisprudence in the 21st century. Rutgers Law Journal, 36: 165–181.Google Scholar
Leiter, B. (2009). Explaining theoretical disagreement. University of Chicago Law Review, 76: 1215–1250. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1004768.Google Scholar
Leiter, B. (2011). The demarcation problem in jurisprudence: A new case for scepticism. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 31(4): 663–677.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leiter, B. (2021). Legal positivism as a realist theory of law. In Spaak, T. (ed.), The Cambridge companion to legal positivism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 79–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levinson, J. (1980). What a musical work is. The Journal of Philosophy, 77(1): 5–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1975). Languages and language. In Gunderson, K. (ed.), Language, mind, and knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3–35.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1983). New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4): 343–377. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408312341131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1984). Putnam’s Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62(3): 221–236. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408412340013.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liao, S., Meskin, A., & Knobe, J. (2020). Dual character art concepts. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101(1): 102–128. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindeman, K. (2017). Constitutivism without normative thresholds. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 12(3): 231–258. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mag Uidhir, C., & Magnus, P. D. (2011). Art concept pluralism. Metaphilosophy, 42(1–2): 83–97.Google Scholar
Marmor, A. (2004b). Exclusive legal positivism. In Coleman, J., Himma, K., & Shapiro, S. (eds.), The Oxford handbook of jurisprudence and philosophy of law. New York: Oxford University Press, 104–124.Google Scholar
Marmor, A. (2007). The ideal of the rule of law. In Patterson, D. (ed.), A companion to philosophy of law and legal theory. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing, 666–674.Google Scholar
Marmor, A. (2013). Farewell to conceptual analysis (in jurisprudence). In Waluchow, W. J., & Sciaraffa, S. (eds.), Philosophical foundations of the nature of law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209–229.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGrath, S. (2014). Relax? Don’t do it! Why moral realism won’t come cheap. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 9: 186–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McPherson, T., & Plunkett, D. (2024). Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity. Inquiry, 67(1): 93–126. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1873177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories. USA: The MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, M. (1992). Law as a functional kind. In George, R. (ed.), Natural law theory: Contemporary essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Murphy, L. (2001). The political question of the concept of law. In Coleman, J. (ed.), Hart’s postscript: Essays on the postscript to “the concept of law.” New York: Oxford University Press, 371–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Murphy, M. C. (2001). Natural law and practical rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Murphy, M. C. (2005). Natural law theory. In Golding, M. P. & Edmundson, W. A. (eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of law & legal theory. UK: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Murphy, M. C. (2006). Natural law in jurisprudence and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Murphy, M. C. (2012). Defect and deviance in natural law jurisprudence. In Klatt, M. (ed.), Institutionalized reason: The jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 45–60.Google Scholar
Neta, R. (2004). On the normative significance of brute facts. Legal Theory, 10(3): 199–214. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325204040224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nye, H. (2021). The one-system view and Dworkin’s anti-archimedean eliminativism. Law and Philosophy, 40: 247–276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plunkett, D. (2012). A positivist route for explaining how facts make law. Legal Theory, 18(2): 139–207. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325212000079.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plunkett, D. (2013). Legal positivism and the moral aim thesis. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33(3): 563–605.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plunkett, D. (2016). Negotiating the meaning of “law”: The metalinguistic dimension of the dispute over legal positivism. Legal Theory, 22(3–4): 205–275. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325216000070.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plunkett, D., & Phillips, J. (2023). Are there really any dual‐character concepts? Philosophical Perspectives, 37(1): 340–369.Google Scholar
Plunkett, D., & Sundell, T. (2013a). Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms. Philosophers’ Imprint, 13(23): 1–37.Google Scholar
Plunkett, D., & Sundell, T. (2013b). Dworkin’s interpretivism and the pragmatics of legal disputes. Legal Theory, 19(3): 242–281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pollock, F. (1902). The history of the law of nature: A preliminary study. Columbia Law Review, 2(3): 131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Postema, G. J. (2019). Bentham and the common law tradition (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, P. J. (1997). Natural law and birthright citizenship in Calvin’s case (1608). Yale Journal Law & Humanities, 9: 73–145.Google Scholar
Priel, D. (2020). Analytic jurisprudence in time. In Bustamante, T., & Decat, T. (eds.), Philosophy of law as an integral part of philosophy: Essays on the jurisprudence of Gerald J. Postema. New York: Hart, 213–241.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and reference. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(19): 699. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025079.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabin, G. O. (2020). Toward a theory of concept mastery: The recognition view. Erkenntnis, 85: 627–648.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Radbruch, G. (1973). Gesetzliches Unrecht und ubergesetzliches Recht. In Wolf, E., & Schneider, H. P. (eds.), Rechtsphilosophie (8th ed.). Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler.Google Scholar
Railton, P. (2019). We’ll see you in court! The rule of law as an explanatory and normative kind. In Plunkett, D. et al. (ed.), New essays on metaethics and jurisprudence. USA: Oxford University Press, 1–22.Google Scholar
Raz, J. (1994). Ethics in the public domain: Essays in the morality of law and politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Raz, J. (2004). Can there be a theory of law. In Golding, M., & Edmundson, W. (eds.), Blackwell guide to philosophy of law and legal theory. UK: Blackwell, 324–342.Google Scholar
Raz, J. (2019). The law’s own virtue. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 39: 1–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. In Hale, B., & Hoffman, A. (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, logics, and epistemology, 109–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rudolph, R. E. (2023). Contested metalinguistic negotiation. Synthese, 202: 90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryu, A. (2024). How reasons make law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24: 133.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salinger, E. (2023). Expressivism and moral independence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1): 136–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. (forthcoming, 2025). Understanding good of a kind and good for in terms of reasons. In Brownlee, K., Enoch, D., & Marmor, A. (eds.), Engaging Raz. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schroeter, L. (2012). Bootstrapping our way to samesaying. Synthese, 189: 177–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapiro, S. J. (2007). The “Hart-Dworkin” debate: A short guide for the perplexed. In Ripstein, A. (ed.), Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, D. (2015). Agreement and disagreement in law. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 28: 183.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M. (2013). A constitutivist theory of reasons: Its promise and parts. Law, Ethics, and Philosophy, 1: 9–30.Google Scholar
Smithson, R. (2020). Metaphysical and conceptual grounding. Erkenntnis, 85(6): 1501–1525. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0088-3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solum, L. B. (2015). The fixation thesis: The role of historical fact in original meaning. Notre Dame Law Review, 91: 1.Google Scholar
Soper, P. (1986). Choosing a legal theory on moral grounds. Social Philosophy and Policy, 4(1): 31–48. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026505250000042X.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soper, P. (2007). In defense of classical natural law in legal theory: Why unjust law is no law at all. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 20(1): 201–223. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900005750.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sunstein, C. R. (1996). Legal reasoning and political conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomasson, A. L. (2003). Realism and human kinds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67(3): 580–609. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00309.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tobia, K. (2022). Experimental jurisprudence. The University of Chicago Law Review, 89(3): 735–802.Google Scholar
Toh, K. (2005). Hart’s expressivism and his benthamite project. Legal Theory, 11(2): 75–123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Toh, K. (2011). Legal judgments as plural acceptance of norms. In Green, L., & Leiter, B. (eds.), Oxford studies in philosophy of law: Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 107–137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tripkovic, B., & Patterson, D. (2023). The promise and limits of grounding in law. Legal Theory, 29(3): 202–228. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325223000149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Valentini, L. (2024). Morality and socially constructed norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
van Roojen, M. (2023). Moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism. In Zalta, E. N., & Nodelman, U. (eds.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2023 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/moral-cognitivism/.Google Scholar
Vander Waerdt, P. A. (1994). Philosophical influence on Roman jurisprudence? The case of stoicism and natural law. In Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (ANRW)/Rise and decline of the Roman world. Berlin: De Gruyter, 4851–4901.Google Scholar
Waldron, J. (2001). Normative (or ethical) positivism. In Coleman, J. L. (ed.), Hart’s postscript: Essays on the postscript to “the concept of law.” New York: Oxford University Press, 410–433.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waldron, J. (2008). Positivism and legality: Hart’s equivocal response to Fuller. NYU Law Review, 83(4): 1135–1169.Google Scholar
Waluchow, W. (1994). Inclusive legal positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Watson, B. (2022a). In defense of the standard picture: What the standard picture explains that the moral impact theory cannot. Legal Theory, 28(1): 59–88. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325221000276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Watson, B. (2022b). The decline of natural law and the rise of exclusive positivism. SMU Law Review Forum, 75(1): 174–190. https://doi.org/10.25172/slrf.75.1.4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Watson, B. (2023). How to answer Dworkin’s argument from theoretical disagreement without attributing confusion or disingenuity to legal officials. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 36(1): 215–240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yale, D. E. C. (1974). Iudex in propria causa: An historical excursus. Cambridge Law Journal, 33: 80–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar