The original designs for microeconomic policies affecting industry and agriculture had undergone considerable modification by 1936. There was to be mutation as well in the thinking available to the administration concerning factors conditioning the performance of the macroeconomic system. The active ingredient in the macroeconomic component of the policy mix of late 1933 was manipulation of the gold price. Fiscal policies were absent from the conceptualization of strategy, despite the fact that the administration tolerated deficits of unprecedented peacetime magnitude. This outcome was treated as an unintended and unwelcome by-product of the depression-induced erosion of the tax base and of the administration's humanitarian commitments to relieve the plight of the destitute.

By the time Roosevelt again faced the electorate in the campaign of 1936, his administration had yet to be at one with itself with respect to its macroeconomic posture. It had, however, long since abandoned the gold purchase program that had formed the leitmotif in the early going. The results of that experiment had been decidedly disappointing. The reflationary magic claimed for this alleged stimulant failed to make an appearance. When Roosevelt announced his decision to stabilize the gold content of the dollar on January 31, 1934, the price he then set – $35 per ounce – represented an increase of nearly 70 percent over the official gold price when his administration took office. But there was precious little to show for all this.