Book contents
- Constraining Dictatorship
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Constraining Dictatorship
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?
- 3 Two Illustrative Cases
- 3.1 The Formal Model Summarized
- 3.2 Cameroon Under Ahidjo: High Levels Of Regime Institutionalization
- 3.3 Côte D’Ivoire Under Houphouët: Low Levels Of Regime Institutionalization
- 3.4 Empirical Analysis of Power Sharing in Presidential Cabinets
- 3.5 Conclusion
- Appendix Appendices
- 4 How Should Institutionalization Be Measured?
- 5 What Are the Causes of Regime Institutionalization?
- 6 What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Autocratic Stability?
- 7 What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Leadership Succession?
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Appendix - Appendices
from 3 - Two Illustrative Cases
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2020
- Constraining Dictatorship
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Constraining Dictatorship
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?
- 3 Two Illustrative Cases
- 3.1 The Formal Model Summarized
- 3.2 Cameroon Under Ahidjo: High Levels Of Regime Institutionalization
- 3.3 Côte D’Ivoire Under Houphouët: Low Levels Of Regime Institutionalization
- 3.4 Empirical Analysis of Power Sharing in Presidential Cabinets
- 3.5 Conclusion
- Appendix Appendices
- 4 How Should Institutionalization Be Measured?
- 5 What Are the Causes of Regime Institutionalization?
- 6 What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Autocratic Stability?
- 7 What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Leadership Succession?
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary

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- Chapter
- Information
- Constraining DictatorshipFrom Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes, pp. 92Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020