This book began by raising the issue of the descriptive and prescriptive validity of a realist perspective on crisis behavior. The issue of realism's validity was placed at the forefront of this investigation because of the dominant position that realism continues to hold, not only in the study of interstate relations, but in the views of national leaders as well.

Thus, the investigation proceeded from the assumption that the prevailing view of interstate conflict from a realpolitik perspective finds its theoretical expression in classical political realism, both as a description of the nature of international politics and as a guide to successful behavior. Successful crisis bargaining is presumed by realists to be dependent on the state's military power and a convincing demonstration of its willingness to use it to achieve its objectives. The admonition to demonstrate power has been extended to a theory of manipulative bargaining by conflict strategists. Conflict strategists perceive effective crisis bargaining as being dependent on exploiting the other side's fear of war through the use of credible threats and punishments, that is, on demonstrating a willingness to accept the risk of war to achieve state objectives. Viewed from this perspective, interstate crisis bargaining is an essentially competitive activity in which success is achieved through the exploitation of the other side's fear of war coupled with a demonstration of resolve.

While the investigation began with the assumption that most statesmen view interstate crises from a classical realist perspective, it questioned whether they generally act in a manner consistent with the precepts of realism, and, when they do, whether they are likely to be successful.