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2 - What Is It Like to Be a Slipper?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2025

Maurizio Ferraris
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Torino, Italy
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Summary

Epistemology/Ontology

Essential distinctions. One can do without the transcendental if one acknowledges the fundamental differences between ontology and epistemology. They are listed in the table below.

The Slipper Argument

Before proceeding to the articulation of these distinctions, I would like to explain the background of my reasoning.

  • 1. People. Take a man looking at a carpet with a slipper on it; if he asks another to pass him the slipper, the other, usually, does so without significant difficulty. This is a trivial phenomenon of interaction, but it shows very well how, if the outside world indeed depended even a little not so much on interpretations and conceptual schemes but on neurons, then the fact that the two people do not have the same neurons should make the sharing of the slipper impossible. It might be objected that the neurons do not have to be exactly identical in number, position or connections. This, however, not only weakens the argument, but contradicts evidence that is difficult to refute: the fact that differences in past experiences, culture, brain structures and capacities may lead to significant divergences at a certain level (does the Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son, or only from the Father? What do we mean by ‘freedom’?) is common knowledge, and it is the reason why there are disputes between different opinions. But the slipper on the carpet is another thing: it is external and separate from us and our opinions, and it is therefore provided with an existence that is qualitatively different from the kind we tackle, say, when discussing issues such as euthanasia. In other words, the sphere of facts is not so inextricably interwoven with that of interpretations. Even in this very simple thought experiment, we are dealing with a world external to our conceptual schemes.

  • 2. Dogs. Now let's take a dog that has been trained. He is told, ‘Bring me the slipper.’ And, again, he does so without encountering any difficulties, just like the man above, even though the differences between his brain and the man's are enormous and his understanding of ‘Bring me the slipper’ may not seem comparable to that of a human.

Type
Chapter
Information
Hysteresis
The External World
, pp. 68 - 166
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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