

Lonerger's Appropriation of the Concept of Praxis

Charles Davis

One could say I was startled into examining Lonergan on praxis. What startled me was the remark of Lonergan in his essay, "Theology and Praxis", to the effect that to ask whether theology is a praxis "is to ask whether there are basic theological questions whose solution depends on the personal development of theologians".¹

Why should that have startled me? Because, as it stands, it establishes praxis as, first, simply a matter of consciousness, and, second, a function of individual development. Such a concept of praxis startles because it contradicts one's prior expectation. Two key insights are operative in the modern, that is the post-Hegelian, problematic of the relationship between theory and practice, a problematic dominated by the thought of Marx. The first is that the human activity or praxis which fashions and transforms human beings and grounds the modes of human living is labour, that is, human action as a productive force. It is in acting upon nature to satisfy their material needs that human beings bring about modification in their own nature and develop varying forms of social order and modes of human thought and existence. In other words, the question of praxis is in the first place the question of the dependence of ideas or consciousness upon the productive forces and relationships that constitute the basis of every human society. The second insight behind the recent currency of the term "praxis" is that the activity or practice to which consciousness and theory are linked is social practice. In other words, the question of praxis is in the second place the question of the dependence of our thinking and our judgments, the formation of our consciousness and our production of theories, upon the historical development of human society and upon the place where we find ourselves in that society. In brief, as used by those, including theologians, influenced by the Marxist tradition, the concept of praxis and talk of the theory-praxis relationship point to the social origins and the essentially social reality of knowledge and consciousness. Further, for them society is not reducible to intersubjectivity, but is grounded in the productive process. Lonergan, however, presents praxis as an affair of the subjectivity of the individual theologian, operating, seemingly, independently of the material business of society.

Now, it is certainly open to a thinker of Lonergan's original-

ity and power to go back beyond recent discussions to Aristotle's distinction between *praxis* and *poiēsis*, between doing and making, and to use that, as he does, as the starting point in elaborating a concept of praxis in relation to some issues of today. In doing so, he can refer to Habermas, who also makes Aristotle's distinction, revamping it as a distinction between work and communicative action and using it to criticize and correct the positivistic element in Marx's thinking. One should note, however, that, unlike Lonergan, Habermas is as much concerned with the relationship as with the distinction between the two. Again, Lonergan is able to relate his concept of praxis to a widespread preoccupation in human studies with the question of human authenticity. The age of innocence is over, authenticity can no longer be taken for granted, and so the need for a method that discerns between products of human authenticity and products of human inauthenticity. Praxis, as understood by Lonergan, is that method, because it is the sublation of cognitional process by deliberation, evaluation, decision, action.² What, then, is the objection to Lonergan? Why should he not make his own contribution to present issues, unimpeded by the emphases of the Marxist tradition and its reception by political theology? Why not indeed? Especially in view of the contradictions and anomalies in Marxist theory, analysed recently with brilliance by Alvin Gouldner, who points out that Marx had not one, but "two tacitly different conceptions of praxis", leading to the contrast between two Marxisms, Scientific Marxism and Critical Marxism.³ All the same, there are two complementary reasons for dwelling upon the marked deviation from the expected in Lonergan's approach to praxis: first, a contention of his supporters and, second, an objection of his critics.

Two of the most important interpreters of Lonergan's thought, Matthew Lamb and Frederick Lawrence, have been frequently and vigorously urging that Lonergan's thought provides the foundational method required by a theology that would fruitfully respond to the theory-praxis problematic, raised by what Frederick Lawrence calls the Third Enlightenment.⁴ We find in Lonergan, they argue, the foundations fumblingly and unsuccessfully sought for by existing political theologies. It is a large claim. Matthew Lamb in one place shows his awareness of its initial implausibility. Characterizing Lonergan's contribution as an intentionality analysis, he raises the question of the limitation of any intentionality analysis, with its focus upon the consciously knowing and acting subject, in dealing with unintended social and cultural crises or with the value orientations assumed in social and political living and sedimented in institutions. How can an intentionality analysis with its turn to a philosophy of consciousness and cognitional theory as

a unifying ground of human knowing and doing meet the challenge of social critical methods and of ideology-critique? For Lamb, the answer lies in Lonergan's radical deprivatization of consciousness and knowledge, which makes his intentionality analysis fruitful in relating theology to the social and political order.⁵ This claim invites us to test our first impressions of Lonergan's concept of praxis to see how far they are modified by a broader consideration of his thought.

The second reason for further reflection is that the manner in which Lonergan appropriates the concept of praxis would seem to confirm one of the fundamental objections made by some against the viability of his philosophical and theological projects as a whole. Take as a representative critic, Fergus Kerr. I have heard some cite an article of his in *New Blackfriars* as being a decisive critique of Lonergan.⁶ Let me extract from that article the line of criticism relevant to the present theme. Kerr quotes the remark of Wittgenstein: "The malaise of an epoch is cured by a change in people's mode of life, and the malaise of philosophical problems could be cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not by a therapy invented by any individual"; and then adds: "What else can that mean but that the kind of issues that arise in philosophy are not solved by the intervention of a man of genius but by a change in the social order?" The point is reinforced by a quotation from *The German Ideology* of Marx and Engels to the effect that the forms and products of consciousness cannot be analysed and dissolved by mental criticism, but only by the practical overturning of the actual social relationships from which they have emerged. In brief, as subsequent remarks in the article make clear, the objection to Lonergan is that, contrary to his programme, what counts is not consciousness, but the mode of action. Lonergan, it is being urged, does not take seriously enough the critique of philosophy inaugurated by Marx and Engels. "But whatever theologians," writes Kerr, "imagine about themselves, there is no theology, no exegesis, which is impartial and neutral, as opposed to partisan and committed, in relation to the deep antagonisms and contradictions in our society. There can be no 'objective' theological scholarship; the 'a-political' scholar who goes on studying, impervious to the origins of the money which gives him the freedom to research, cannot be regarded as innocent and uncommitted".⁷

Allow me to reformulate the criticism. The very practical or praxis-oriented character of Lonergan's *Insight* and *Method in Theology* reveals the essential defect in his programme. The impetus of those writings is to launch people – and they have in fact launched many – upon a course of intellectual self-appropriation

and the self-conscious articulation of religious conversion. But the programme is presented as an individual enterprise, as though it had been formulated and was available independently of economic conditions and social position. Whatever may be the theoretical acknowledgment of social conditioning – and that theoretical acknowledgment is made by Lonergan – it does not essentially affect the level of performance. We are told how to change our consciousness, but not how to change society, and the result is to make people think that the first action can be performed without the second. Nor does it seem necessary within a Lonerganian context to enquire into the social origins of Lonergan's thought and the social conditions required to interpret him correctly.

So, the question of Lonergan's concept of praxis lies at a point where two conflicting evaluations of his overall project clash: the first finding in Lonergan the much-needed foundations of a praxis-oriented theology at the level of present-day social and political issues; the second regarding Lonergan as locked into a pre-Marxist, pre-Wittgensteinian philosophy of consciousness, which has failed to make the shift to the recognition that knowing is a social activity and knowledge is a social product, inseparably interwoven with the whole round of activities and relations that constitute the structure and history of the society of the knowers – a failure that leaves Lonergan's thought open to dissolution by a critique of ideology.

In support of a positive evaluation is Lonergan's repeated insistence on the social conditioning of our knowledge, indeed of our conscious activity in general. To give a few examples: In "Metaphysics As Horizon" he differentiates his own thought from Cor eth's by his own recognition of the inquirer as an incarnate subject who "develops in a development that is social and historical".⁸ In "Existenz and Aggiornamento" he becomes eloquent in showing how "it is only with respect to the available common meanings of community that the individual becomes himself", so that the authenticity of the subject is a minor authenticity as contrasted with the major authenticity that justifies or condemns the tradition itself.⁹ Then again, who has not been moved by the pathos of his account in *Insight* of the dialectic of community and the problem of social decline, given when he discusses common sense and taken up again when he sketches the heuristic structure of the solution.¹⁰ Further, his analysis of the necessity and functioning of belief is in effect an analysis of knowledge as a social reality.¹¹ That analysis is carried over into *Method in Theology*, where we find it in the chapter on "The Human Good", from which I may quote the summary statement: "Human knowledge, then, is not some individual possession but rather a common fund, from which

each may draw by believing, to which each may contribute in the measure that he performs his cognitional operations properly and reports their results accurately".¹²

One could continue in that vein. It would not be difficult to produce a long catena of passages to show Lonergan's acute awareness of the social context and conditioning of the conscious operations of the individual subject. There are also in Lonergan's writings the elements of a comprehensive and sophisticated theory of society and history. Moreover, he easily surpasses other theologians, even when they are proclaiming a political theology or a theology of liberation, in the thoroughness with which he has done his homework in the social sciences. Reports of his ongoing work in economics confirms what was clear before, namely that Lonergan does not use theology or philosophy as a sounding-board for abstract, verbal or naive answers to complex concrete social and political problems, but in keeping with his generalized empirical method insists upon getting to grips with the wealth of data.¹³ There are therefore some good reasons for the contention of Matthew Lamb and others that Lonergan's method offers us the basis we need for an attentive, intelligent, critical, responsible and loving engagement in the human enterprise in all its range.

It is more difficult to lay one's finger on the cause of disquiet among those who, despite an admiring appreciation of many of its features, continue to hold that Lonergan's project as a whole is askew. Since I share that disquiet, let me try to pin it down.

Lonergan's account in *Insight* of the human predicament when he considers the general bias of common sense and the resulting longer cycle of decline amounts to saying that long-term social decline is generated by the failure to acknowledge the primacy of theory over practice. There takes place, he argues, a major surrender of intellectual detachment, manifested in a succession of ever less comprehensive viewpoints, and that succession of less comprehensive viewpoints is "a succession of adaptations of theory to practice".¹⁴ The same analysis is given later in *Insight* under the problem of liberation. That problem is said to lie essentially in an incapacity for sustained development, due to a tension between man's intelligence, reasonableness and willingness as rooted in a detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know and his sensitive and intersubjective attachment, interest and exclusiveness. That tension thus originating in the two sides of man's makeup has as its basic effect the dividing and disorientating of cognitional activity by the conflict of positions and counter-positions. Lonergan goes on: "This conflict issues into contrary views of the good which in turn make good will appear misdirected and misdirected will appear good. There follows the confounding of the social situ-

ation with the social surd to provide misleading inspiration for further insights, deceptive evidence for further judgments, and illusory causes to fascinate unwary wills".¹⁵

Now I suggest that that analysis of the human condition is intellectualist and individualist. It is intellectualist because it identifies the fundamental obstacle, preventing us from becoming fully human as our inability to retain intellectual detachment in the midst of the pressures of living. That failure of intellectual self-transcendence is regarded as providing a deeper explanation of the human predicament than the selfishness of individual bias or the prejudice and thirst for domination of group bias. It is essentially individualist, because it places the root of the trouble in the dynamic makeup of each individual human person, not in any social factor. As Lonergan himself writes: "The problem is not primarily social. It results in the social surd. It receives from the social surd its continuity, its aggravation, its cumulative character. But its root lies elsewhere".¹⁶

I am surprised that account of the human predicament has been so easily accepted and so little questioned by students of Lonergan. Despite the eloquent pathos with which it is presented, it is most questionable.

We are all indeed familiar with the distortions of intelligence in the interests of expediency, but those distortions would seem to be effect, not the cause or condition of the evil choices at the heart of the problem of human liberation. Frederick Lawrence, referring to the studies of Leo Strauss, places Machiavelli at the origin of modern political philosophy, seeing him as the initiator of the succession of lower syntheses characteristic of the socio-cultural decline of the modern world, and he describes the Machiavellian option in words taken from Lonergan: "to develop 'realist' views in which theory is adjusted to practice and practice means whatever happens to be done".¹⁷ But surely the false intellectual 'realism' of Machiavelli was consequent upon the deeper failure of his moral hold upon the good, a failure that allowed him to envision and advocate politics without morality, that is, to dismiss moral values as politically irrelevant. Lonergan makes much of the objectively absurd situations, the social surd, caused by the blockage of disinterested intelligence through the bias of common sense. These objective absurdities are, it is said, treated as matters of fact, which are then used to discredit the intelligent, the reasonable and the good. But a genuinely moral person will not be deflected from moral values by an intellectual analysis purporting to show that such values are impracticable. The hold on moral values is retained in the midst of the social surd, because, as Lonergan has acknowledged in his writings after *Insight*, the

notion of the good, with the dynamism that notion implies, is a distinct notion and is not to be merged into the intelligent and reasonable as these are analysed in an intellectualist fashion in *Insight*.

Following upon the development in his thought upon the notions of good and value, Lonergan presents his account of the deep cause of cumulative social decline somewhat differently in *Method in Theology*. There to elaborate how objectively absurd situations do not yield to treatment, we read: "Corrupt minds have a flair for picking the mistaken solution and insisting that it alone is intelligent, reasonable, good".¹⁸ Here we have a corruption of mind that uses the social surd, but would not seem to be caused by it. Is not that corruption the deeper explanation of cumulative decline? Compare, however, these remarks from *Insight*: "But good will is never better than the intelligence and reasonableness that it implements. Indeed, when proposals and programmes only putatively are intelligent and reasonable then the good will that executes them so faithfully and energetically is engaged really in the systematic imposition of ever further evils on the already weary shoulders of mankind".¹⁹ There the account of the human predicament is so exclusively intellectual that, because of the bias of common sense and the social surd it produces, good will with its conscientiousness does more harm than good. What is lacking is the recognition that good will and the actions or praxis in which it is embodied do not simply implement intelligence and reasonableness, but generate them.

Lonergan in his later writings acknowledges the latter point in his presentation of praxis as a movement from above downwards, in contrast to the empirical method, which moves from below upwards. In other words, praxis is the movement from love and its revelation of values down through the cognitional operations to achieve a discernment and healing of bias and inauthenticity. But that development demands a much greater modification of his analysis of the human predicament and of social decline than is evidenced so far.

Another objection to Lonergan's account of the human condition with its incapacity for sustained development concerns his placing of the root cause in the tension between the level of intelligence and the level of sense and spontaneous intersubjectivity. He speaks of sensitive, and intersubjective attachment, interest, and exclusiveness as in opposition to the disinterestedness and unrestrictedness of man's intelligence. The underlying supposition is that human bodily makeup is an obstacle to the self-transcendence proper to the human spirit. I have argued against that supposition in my book, *Body as Spirit*.²⁰ Let me simply ask here: Is

it our concrete human experience or a bad intellectual tradition that makes us regard our bodily spontaneity as hindering the dynamism of our spirit? If like the Scholastics I may use the angels for a thought experiment: Does an angel achieve the self-transcendence appropriate to a finite spirit as a matter of course without let or hindrance because an angel is a pure spirit without a body? If human beings fail, so did the devils. I do not think that bodily spontaneity blocks intellectual self-transcendence by locking us into the counter-positions, any more than it blocks moral self-transcendence by locking us into sensuality. The counter-positions and sensuality are deformations or corruptions of the spirit, not to be blamed upon the body.

The virtual absorption of the spiritual into the intellectual in *Insight* is corrected in *Method in Theology*, where the intellectual is sublated by the moral and religious. At the same time, there is in *Method in Theology* a new recognition of feelings as intentional responses to values, as well as greater attention to the various embodiments of non-conceptual meaning. But some still doubt whether the one-sided stress upon the theoretical has been sufficiently overcome. Art, literature and poetry are the chief cultural expressions of the non-theoretical dynamism of the human spirit, but Fergus Kerr is led to speak of his unease "about a theological methodology grounded on an account of meaning which seems so offhand about, and so notionally engaged with, the uses of intelligence embodied characteristically in works of literature and art". He finds that "Lonergan seems to have a curiously extrinsic and non-participatory conception of poetry, which in turn casts doubt on his notion of symbol, and that becomes serious in any theoretician of language and meaning".²¹ In effect, what is being asked here is whether the developments between *Insight* and *Method* are merely concessions or incidental modifications within an unshaken adherence to a limited notion of rationality.

This brings us directly to Lonergan's concept of praxis. The concept preceded the use of the word. If Lonergan's account in *Insight* of the human predicament may be summarized, though a little tendentiously, by saying he attributes it to the failure to acknowledge the priority of theory over practice, even in *Insight* the solution is not seen as coming from the theoretical intelligence, but as the achievement under God of a higher integration of human living, that is, as a matter of praxis.

Faith is a key element in that higher integration. It is defined in *Insight* as transcendent belief, that is, belief operative within a new and higher collaboration of man with God.²² That definition is modified in *Method* to read: "Faith is the knowledge born of religious love".²³ A knowledge born of love is a knowledge reach-

ed through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love. Faith is such knowledge when the love is God's love flooding our hearts.²⁴ Among the values faith discerns is the value of believing. Hence by faith one enters into the religious community as a community of belief, which is a higher collaboration of men and women in disseminating the judgments of fact and the judgments of value proposed for their acceptance by the word of religion.²⁵

How Lonergan envisions the gift of God's love as solving the human predicament may be seen from his lecture, "Healing and Creating in History". There he states: "Where hatred only sees evil, love reveals values. At once it commands commitment and joyfully carries it out, no matter what the sacrifice involved. Where hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the bias of unconscious motivation, the bias of individuals or group egoism, or the bias of omniscient, short-sighted common sense. Where hatred plods around in ever narrower vicious circles, love breaks the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the power of hope".²⁶ This process is referred to as a development from above downwards, in contrast to the development that passes from experience to understanding, from understanding to judgment and from judgment to action.

It is in this context that we may grasp Lonergan's concept of praxis. He sees praxis as a method, namely, in his own definition, as a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results, that proceeds from love, effectively from transcendent love or religious conversion.²⁷

But while the manner in which love overcomes individual and group bias needs no further comment since it is so obvious, it is not at all clear how love overcomes the general bias of common sense, to which the longer cycle of social decline is attributed. In *Method in Theology*, after reference to the deeper level of decline caused by the use of corrupt minds of the objectively absurd situations to discredit progress, it is simply noted that "a religion that promotes self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, will have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of decline, restore the cumulative process of progress".²⁸ But that does not meet the point made in *Insight*, where, with explicit reference to Christian charity, it is stated that good will is never better than the intelligence and reasonableness it implements and when unenlightened it does more harm than good.²⁹

Love as a form of good will cannot directly overcome the social surd caused by the general bias of common sense. It seems to me that for Lonergan it does so indirectly by leading people to

accept a system of religious beliefs. Love gives birth to faith, and faith discerns the value of believing. Hence a movement from above downwards leads people into acceptance of a set of beliefs, an acceptance which counteracts the blockage of the upward movement of human intelligence when it works from the data of experience. In brief, Lonergan's analysis of the human predicament located the problem in the defective working of human intelligence under the pressure of practice. Theory, he said, was wrongly subordinated to practice. The solution he outlines has a corresponding structure. It consists in the acceptance by faith of a set of beliefs. Belief functions as a knowledge that goes before practice, because it is not immanently generated by personal experience but accepted from without. Hence Lonergan's insistence upon doctrines in contrast to Voegelin's criticism of doctrines and doctrinization, despite his general sympathy with that thinker's work.³⁰

Perhaps now I am in a position to indicate more precisely why, despite the wealth of valuable analyses it offers, Lonergan's project as a whole strikes me as somewhat awry:

(1) The primacy of praxis means that within the total context of human activities the theoretical interest or systematic pursuit of knowledge has a subordinate place and function. Granted that it has an integrity that must be respected, it itself must be limited and corrected by the practical activities by which human beings in society struggle to achieve a fully human existence. Those practical activities constitute praxis, which is the concrete embodiment of spirit as intelligence and love. Now, Lonergan's work, it seems to me, is skewed by an over-evaluation of the theoretical and, consequently, of the doctrinal. *Logos* dominates *mythos*; and he is never free from the compulsion to seek the literal in the symbolic,³¹ thus losing the contribution of the symbolic.

(2) Praxis is not an inner event, but the embodied activities of socially related men and women, whereby they struggle with nature as a reality independent of consciousness and with the sedimented, objectified products of past human action, in order to shape their world and themselves in their world. Knowledge or consciousness in general is not a reality apart from praxis, a realm or world of its own, proceeding purely by its own laws as an independent totality; it is an element within praxis itself, so that modes of knowledge and forms of consciousness are to be understood in the context of the other elements and relationships that constitute praxis as a totality. However, what Lonergan offers us is essentially a philosophy of consciousness, in which the inner events or states of consciousness are always independent variables, of which everything else in human living and history is a function. What he says about the Church and the future of Christianity is representative, I think,

of his general attitude to human affairs: “the perpetually needed remedy is not outer but inner”.³² That expresses a dichotomy the recent concept of praxis was designed to exclude.

(3) Further, praxis consists necessarily of social activities, because no individual as an individual can establish a human world or create the conditions for a human existence. The insistence upon the unity of theory and praxis is the contention that knowledge is not a separate, essentially individual achievement, which is then applied to social purposes and which may be affected by social conditions. Knowledge is a product of the same dynamism that creates, develops and changes society. It is not just socially conditioned; it is not just socially applied; it is a social reality, an element in the ongoing history of social development, participant in its progress and subject to the distortions of its false growths and its periods of decline. For Lonergan the dynamic at the origin and foundation of knowledge is essentially individual. It is prior to social praxis, which is seen as its application. Thus, at the beginning of his article, “Theology and Praxis”, he presents the liberation theologies as examples of the conversion of theology into a tool for some distinct and praiseworthy end.³³ This completely overlooks the more important consideration that the struggle for liberation has a cognitive force creative of a new theology. The liberation theologies are degraded into an activism, if they are understood simply as the application of a pre-existing theology. Elsewhere, he interprets praxis as raising “the final issue: What are you to do about it? What use are you to make of your knowledge of nature, of your knowledge of man ...?”³⁴ But is knowledge an achievement prior to the resolution of the final issue of authentic social praxis?

(4) Finally, some find a troubling lack of reflexivity in Lonergan’s work concerning its own social origins and consequent limitations. The incantatory declaration of *Insight* – “Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding” – and the reiterated imperatives of the later writings – Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible – tend to create the illusion of a privileged standpoint, where one escapes the limitations of social position and historical context. However, the characteristic of Lonergan’s work whereby it seems to stand apart from the more time-bound achievements of his contemporaries, thus claiming a uniquely universal validity is not, I suggest, unconnected with the social apartness of the Catholic cleric, the *déclassé* position in society, with the freedom of movement, accompanied by a universal claim, this carries with it. For the same reason Lonergan’s intellectual development

was less affected by the division of labour that inhibits most secular academics from attempting the range of intellectual work so superbly accomplished by him. Lonergan's social position had indeed its advantages; but also its disadvantages. Social apartness creates a false sense of social transcendence. The point is the primacy of praxis, which is the contention that even intellectual crises are not fundamentally resolved by the detached thinking of a man of genius, but by changes in the mode of living and in the social order.

- 1 *The Catholic Theological Society of America: Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Convention, Toronto, Ontario, June 15-18, 1977. Vol 32*, Edited by Luke Salm, F.S.C. p 2.
- 2 Cf. his account of praxis in his article, "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods", *SR: Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1976-7, 351-2.
- 3 Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980). For the two concepts of praxis in Marx, see p 33.
- 4 Among the writings of Matthew Lamb, see especially: *History, Method, and Theology: A Dialectical Comparison of W. Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason and B. Lonergan's Meta-Methodology* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977); "The Theory-Praxis Relationship in Contemporary Christian Theologies", *The Catholic Theological Society of America: Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., June 9-12, 1976, Vol. 31*, pp 149-178; "A Response (II) to Bernard Lonergan", *The Catholic Theological Society of America: Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Convention, Toronto, Ontario, June 15-18, 1977, Vol. 32*, 22-30. Among the writings of Frederick Lawrence, see especially: "Political theology and 'The Longer Cycle of Decline'", *Lonergan Workshop: Volume I*, edited by Fred Lawrence (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), pp 223-255; "The Horizon of Political Theology" in *Trinification of the World: A Festschrift in Honour of Frederick E. Crowe In Celebration of His 60th Birthday*, Edited by Thomas A. Dunne and Jean-Marie Laporte (Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978), pp 46-70.
- 5 Matthew Lamb, "Contemporary Education and Sinful Social Structures". An unpublished paper given at the *Lonergan Workshop*, 1979.
- 6 "Beyond Lonergan's Method: A Response to William Matthews", *New Blackfriars*, 57 (1976), 59-71. This article is the most weighty piece in a debate about Lonergan in *New Blackfriars*.
- 7 Op. cit. 70.
- 8 *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J.*, edited by F.E. Crowe, S.J. (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1967), p 219.
- 9 *Collection*, pp 245-6.
- 10 *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. Revised Students Edition. (London/ New York/Toronto: Longmans, 1958), pp 225-244; 688ff.
- 11 *Insight*, pp 703-718.
- 12 *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), p 43.
- 13 As he remarks concerning economic problems, with an unmistakable reference to theological critiques of capitalism: "Again, when the system that is needed for our collective survival does not exist, then it is futile to excoriate what does exist while blissfully ignoring the task of constructing a technically viable economic system

- that can be put in its place”, “Healing and Creating”, *Bernard Lonergan: 3 Lectures* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute for Adult Education, 1975), p 66.
- 14 *Insight*, p 232.
 - 15 *Insight*, p 630. In the last chapter of *Insight*, which comes after the account of general transcendent knowledge and the affirmation of God, the theme of sin is introduced, and the social surd becomes the reign of sin (p 692). However, the analysis of the human predicament remains essentially unaltered, inasmuch as its root cause is still seen as the failure of intellectual detachment and reflection.
 - 16 *Insight*, p 631.
 - 17 Frederick Lawrence, “Political Theology and “The Longer Cycle of Decline””, *Lonergan Workshop: Volume I* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), p 240. The quotation from Lonergan is from his essay, “The Role of a Catholic University in the Modern World”, in *Collection*, p 116. Lawrence is using the account of the role of Machiavelli in the essay of Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves of Modernity” in *Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss*, edited with an introduction by Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis/New York: Pegasus, 1975), pp 81-98.
 - 18 *Method in Theology*, p 55.
 - 19 *Insight*, p 629.
 - 20 New York: Seabury Press, 1976.
 - 21 *Op. cit.* 60-1.
 - 22 *Insight*, p 720.
 - 23 *Method in Theology*, p 115.
 - 24 *Method in Theology*, p 115.
 - 25 *Method in Theology*, p 118.
 - 26 *Bernard Lonergan: 3 Lectures*, p 63.
 - 27 His presentation of praxis as a method is in the article, “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods”, *SR: Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses*, Vol. 6, No 4, 1976-7, 351-5.
 - 28 *Method in Theology*, p 55.
 - 29 *Insight*, p 629.
 - 30 His essay, “Theology and Praxis” contains his remark, “Now I think Voegelin’s criticism of doctrines and doctrinization to be exaggerated” (p 13), but in the context of a favourable account of Voegelin’s work.
 - 31 In the article, “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods”, he twice refers to extracting the literal meaning from the symbolic as though that were an unproblematic aim and procedure: cf. p 353 and 354.
 - 32 “The Future of Christianity” in *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J.*, Edited by William F. J. Ryan S.J. and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S.J. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), p 159.
 - 33 “Theology and Praxis”, p 1.
 - 34 “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods”, p 351.