



RESEARCH ARTICLE

# The Association between ideology and resistance to governmental apology depends on political knowledge

Kazunori Inamasu<sup>1</sup> , Shoko Kohama<sup>2</sup>, Nobuhiro Mifune<sup>3</sup> , Yohsuke Ohtsubo<sup>4</sup>  
and Atsushi Tago<sup>5,6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>School of Sociology, Kwansai Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Hyogo, Japan, <sup>2</sup>Public Policy School, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, <sup>3</sup>School of Economics & Management, Kochi University of Technology, Kochi, Kochi, Japan, <sup>4</sup>Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of Tokyo, Bunkyo, Tokyo, Japan, <sup>5</sup>School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Shinjuku, Tokyo, Japan and <sup>6</sup>Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway  
**Corresponding author:** Kazunori Inamasu; Email: [k-inamasu@kwansai.ac.jp](mailto:k-inamasu@kwansai.ac.jp)

(Received 23 March 2022; revised 12 April 2023; accepted 21 May 2023; first published online 3 July 2023)

## Abstract

This study examines the relationship between ideology and resistance to the government's apology to Asian victims of Japan's colonial rule policy, which varies according to political knowledge. Based on existing research, because only a limited percentage of voters consider politics to be ideology based, it is expected that the association between ideology and resistance to intergroup apologies by one's own government differs according to their level of political knowledge. We selected three issues of political apologies: colonial rule in Asian countries, comfort women, and the massacre of Korean people based on false rumors at the time of the 1923 Kanto Earthquake; thereafter, we conducted an online survey of a panel selected by Nikkei Research Inc. The results suggest that the relationship between ideology and resistance among voters to political apologies varies with the level of political knowledge, as expected. On the contrary, social dominance orientations (SDO) were associated with resistance to apology, regardless of their level of political knowledge. We then tested the reproducibility of this finding by conducting a follow-up test on registered users of a crowdsourcing service after conducting a preregistration. In addition, we also measured general attitudes toward personal apologies and neighboring countries victimized by Japan's colonialist policies as factors that might predict resistance to apologies even among the politically uninformed. The association between ideology, SDO, and resistance to governmental apologies was generally replicated in this study.

**Keywords:** Historical injustice; ideology; intergroup apology; political knowledge

## 1. Introduction

An apology is an act of the transgressor(s) to seek forgiveness from the victim(s) and to promote reconciliation between them. This social practice is widely observed in interpersonal, intergroup, and even cross-national contexts. In psychology, studies on interpersonal apologies and forgiveness (e.g., Ohbuchi *et al.*, 1989; McCullough *et al.*, 1997; McCullough *et al.*, 1998; Hannon *et al.*, 2010; Schumann, 2018; for a review, see Fehr *et al.*, 2010) have outnumbered those on intergroup apologies (see Blatz and Philpot, 2010, and Hornsey and Wohl, 2013, for reviews). The research imbalance would not be a problem if the two kinds of apologies – interpersonal and intergroup ones – were, in essence, the same. However, that is not the case. Intergroup apology, especially one between countries, has a distinctive feature from interpersonal apology as the former is done among groups of people. Interpersonal apologies are made by the perpetrators themselves, whereas many group apologies

are made by leaders, leaving the public to choose whether or not to support the apology. Thus, there tend to be some members who oppose the group apologies in the apologizing groups. They may emphasize the fact that they were not directly involved in the transgression, and thus deny their responsibility (Štambuk *et al.*, 2022). In the absence of sufficient agreement by its apologetic group members, the victim may judge the apology to be insincere (Wenzel *et al.*, 2017).<sup>1</sup>

Most political apologies are made for *historical* injustices. It is thus common that those who were involved in the original conflict are no longer alive. Hence, it is the *descendants* of the transgressor group that apologize to the *descendants* of the victimized group for the former's *past* misconducts.<sup>2</sup> Unsurprisingly, there are vast differences in perceptions of the political apology among the members of the transgressor group. Within the transgressor group, some agree to apologize while others do not. For instance, in Japan, citizens are divided over whether to regard Japan's colonial expansion, which contributed to World War II and caused great damage to Asian countries, as something to be truly regretted or as something that was unavoidable in the age of colonialism. Therefore, some people claim that an apology is required for the damage caused by the Japanese military to the people in Asian countries during World War II, while others deny the need for such an apology (Jou and Endo, 2016a). Thus, Japan, where apologies for historical events have become an important point of contention that divides public opinion, is an effective research target for clarifying the characteristics of group apologies, which differ from apologies between individuals (Blatz and Philpot, 2010).

By the time a politician makes an apology, it is positioned in an abstract political context away from the context of the specific incident, and most people do not have sufficient information about the context in which the offense was committed. Therefore, people's attitudes toward the apology may be tied not only to their perception of the original offense, but also to other political and psychological factors such as personality and political ideology. Furthermore, the association between resistance to intergroup apology and ideology is likely to vary depending on an individual's level of political knowledge. Why such differences are likely to be found is explained in the next section.

## 2. Theory and hypothesis

Multiple studies claim that individual-level political *ideology* is associated with opposition to intergroup apologies. For example, Hornsey *et al.* (2017) demonstrated that conservative ideologies negatively correlated with one's general tendency to apologize and this relationship was mediated by entity belief and social dominance orientation (SDO), where SDO emerged as a more robust mediator variable. SDO is defined as one's tendency to endorse the existence of hierarchies among social groups (Pratto *et al.*, 1994). Those who are high in SDO tend to be unwilling to apologize, even when they have committed transgressions. Extending this finding to the political apology context, Mifune *et al.* (2019) demonstrated that both conservative ideology and SDO were positively correlated with opposition to the Japanese government tendering apologies to Asian countries. Mifune *et al.* (2019) also found a positive correlation between opposition to governmental apologies and militarism, which is operationally defined as one's endorsement of 'the use of military force sometimes to protect national interests in international politics.'

However, in three of the four studies by Karunaratne and Laham (2019), political ideology was not found to correlate significantly with opposition to the US government's apologies after controlling for

<sup>1</sup>Prior studies have investigated the effects of intergroup apologies on the ensuing improvement of relations (see Blatz and Philpot, 2010, for a review). For example, by scrutinizing the contents of real governmental apologies for historical injustices, Blatz *et al.* (2009) demonstrated that most governmental apologies included elements similar to interpersonal apologies (i.e., admission of injustice, acknowledgment of harm, expression of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, forbearance, and an offer of repair). However, unlike interpersonal apologies, which generally foster victim forgiveness (Fehr *et al.*, 2010), social psychological studies have revealed that political apologies do not promote victim group members' forgiveness (Hornsey and Wohl, 2013).

<sup>2</sup>Regarding the issue of comfort women, which is the subject of this study, some of the victims are still alive. Nevertheless, few Japanese citizens have a direct understanding of the context of that time.

SDO and for right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998), while SDO continued to be significantly (though weakly) correlated with opposition to political apologies. Further, in the studies of Hornsey *et al.* (2017) and Mifune *et al.* (2019), SDO was relatively more strongly associated with resistance to apology than was ideology. In summary, the association between SDO and opposition to political apologies is robust, but the relationship with political ideology is not always consistent across studies. As summarized by Jost (2021), the study of ideology in psychology assumes that people share naive ideological conflicts, such as whether to accept or reject the status quo and whether to tolerate or reject disparities, and it is on this assumption that group apologetics research in psychology is conducted. However, as political science has long made clear, even if people do have ideologies, it is also true that it is difficult for many ordinary voters to link their ideological positions with attitudes toward policy issues. The weak relationship between political ideologies and opposition to intergroup apologies might be related to the fact that only a limited portion of people can view various political issues in light of their political ideology. Ideological divides such as left–right and conservative–liberal are concepts that experts frequently use to describe politics. However, political science literature has already established that, in general, voters do not have a solid and coherent understanding of ideologies. Converse (1964) found that *political elites* (e.g., politicians and political scientists) connect and understand a wide variety of political issues based on ideology, while most ordinary voters do not use this perspective. He conducted a study on the belief systems of voters using open-ended responses from American National Election Studies, finding that only 2.5% of the population understood politics based on ideology, and that this figure only reached 15% even when he relaxed the criteria for the acceptable level of understandings of political ideology. Furthermore, he demonstrated that, because there was no solid link between ideology and political issues in the belief system of a majority of citizens, there was little systematic association among the voters' attitudes toward separate political issues. The findings presented by Converse were harshly criticized, in part because they had the potential to undermine the very foundation of democracy, which is based on the premise that voters cast their ballots based on political issues (e.g., Bennett, 1973; Nie and Andersen, 1974; Pierce and Rose, 1974; Achen, 1975; Miller and Miller, 1976); however, the basic findings have yet to be disproved (e.g., Luskin, 1987; Kinder, 1998; Lupton *et al.*, 2015). Moreover, the idea that many voters do not understand politics on the basis of ideology has been demonstrated not only in the USA, but also in Japan (Miyake *et al.*, 1967; Miwa, 2015).

It has been suggested that even when voters appear to understand ideology, they may just respond to cues offered by the elites. Kinder and Kalmoe (2017), for example, pointed out that apparent ideology-based responses to social surveys may, in fact, reflect respondents' use of cues, such as those of political parties, in forming their political opinion. Moreover, with regard to the issue of whether to support a big government or a small one, Johnston *et al.* (2017) found that people with little political knowledge or concern appear to have rational attitudes based on self-interest, whereas people with political knowledge and interests appear to be irrational. However, this apparent irrationality is owed to their understanding of the issues in terms of conflicts of opinion between political elites. These results indicate that very few people perceive politics according to ideology. Accordingly, if only this limited fraction of the population has a coherent understanding of political ideologies, it is not surprising that correlations between ideology and political issues may depend on situational factors of salience and framing by the political elites.

Luskin (1987, 1990) conceptualized political sophistication as the extent to which voters, like political elites, understand the various cognitive elements involved in politics by linking them together under an abstract framework of political ideology. According to the studies, the level of political sophistication is operationalized by the number and range of cognitive elements (e.g., knowledge of policies, political parties, or candidates) in people's belief systems, as well as the strength of the association between cognitive elements. Because political sophistication is defined by a combination of these multiple factors, there is no single measure that satisfies them all, and a variety of measures have been used. The most widely used are quiz-style political knowledge items that correspond to the number and range of cognitive elements in people's belief systems (e.g., Baum and Jamison,

2006; Weisberg and Nawara, 2010; Lau *et al.*, 2014; Bergbower *et al.*, 2015; Rapeli, 2018). As summarized by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), political knowledge is an understanding of (a) the systems under which politics operates, (b) the politicians and political parties that currently play a role in politics, and (c) specific policy-related events. Of course, having knowledge of political systems, political actors, and current events is not the same as connecting various issues based on ideology. But understanding these issues is necessary for understanding the arguments of political elites, and is also closely tied to the interconnectedness of cognitive elements based on ideology (Luskin, 1987). This study does not claim that people do not have an ideology. However, we believe that conducting research based on the assumption that most people use the same axis as do political elites to define their own ideological positions and link themselves to specific policies hinders understanding of the relationship between ideology and opposition to collective apologies. Indeed, Jost (2021) also acknowledges that many people cannot understand policy issues based on the ideology shared by political elites, but argues that this does not necessarily mean that people do not have an ideology.

Thus, when investigating the association between resistance to a collective apology and ideology, we need to explore the possibility that the strength of this association differs by political knowledge. We hypothesize that political knowledge moderates the association between ideology and opposition to governmental apologies: in particular, the correlation between ideology and opposition is likely to be stronger for individuals with higher levels of political knowledge than for those with lower levels.

Intergroup apologies used in this study involve apologies made by the Japanese government for the atrocities committed by the Japanese military against Asian countries before and during World War II. Previous studies conducted in Japan have repeatedly demonstrated that conservatives show a more negative attitude toward intergroup apologies by the government, because evaluations of the old political system (i.e., the political system in the pre-World War II period) are closely connected to ideological confrontations between conservatives and progressives<sup>3</sup> (e.g., Kabashima and Takenaka, 1996, 2012; Jou and Endo, 2016a, 2016b; Mifune *et al.*, 2019). That is to say, while Japanese progressives who disavow the prewar political system do not oppose apologies for shameful past misdeeds, conservative groups that do not necessarily disavow the prewar political system oppose apologies, possibly because they tend to imply the wrongness of the prewar political system. However, given the findings in ideological studies since the work of Converse (1964), discussed earlier, it is possible that these relationships merely reflect conflicts among those with political knowledge. In this study, we also address the relationship between SDO and resistance to collective apology in order to compare our findings that the relationship between ideology and resistance to collective apology differs depending on political knowledge. Hornsey *et al.* (2017) consider that SDO, which measures people's attitude toward between-groups inequality and equality, can be conceptualized as an ideological belief. However, we believe that there are significant differences between typical measure of political ideology and SDO. As noted above, a typical measure of political apology asks respondent to identify their own position on the unidimensional ideological axis and link it to political issues, which requires specialized knowledge of politics. The measure of SDO asks respondents to report their endorsement for intergroup status differences (Pratto *et al.*, 1994), and evaluating political issues based on their level of endorsement does not require knowledge of politics. Moreover, a twin study revealed genetic influences on not only SDO but also concrete political attitudes toward issues related to intergroup status differences (Kleppetø *et al.*, 2019). The presence of genetic influences on both abstract (i.e., SDO) and concrete (political attitudes) levels is consistent with the idea that detailed knowledge of politics is not necessary to apply one's level of SDO to political issues. Thus, it is expected that the relationship between SDO and opposition to collective apology does not depend on political knowledge, whereas the relationship between political ideology and opposition to collective apology is likely to depend on the knowledge.

Furthermore, study 2 examines two factors that are associated with resistance to governmental apologies, both of which have little to do with political knowledge: general attitudes toward apologies

<sup>3</sup>Japanese political scientists use the word 'progressive' (*kakushin*) in place of 'left' (*saha*) or 'liberal' (*riberaru*) to measure ideology in Japan (Kabashima and Takenaka, 1996; Jou and Endo, 2016b).

and general attitudes toward neighboring countries that were affected by Japan's colonial policies in the past. Whether one approves of the act of apology itself and whether one favors the target country can be assumed to be conceptually independent of ideology. After adding independent variables to the regression analysis with the resistance to apology as the dependent variable, we will test whether the relationship found in study 1 between ideology, SDO, and resistance to group apology is replicated.

### 3. Study 1

#### 3.1. Method

We conducted an online survey over the period 7–14 March 2019, through a service provided by Nikkei Research Inc.<sup>4</sup> The total number of respondents was 2,354. The target group was recruited to approximate the national census as closely as possible in terms of age, gender, and place of residence (six major regions). At the beginning of the study, it was explained to respondents through written instructions that they could opt out of the study at any point and that they could choose the 'I don't know' option to the questions that they did not want to answer. Only those who agreed to participate in the study after reading these instructions proceeded to the survey page. This study was approved by the institutional review board at Kwansei Gakuin University (2018-32).

In this study, examples of group apologies included those of the colonial and occupational rule, the comfort women issue, and the massacre of Korean people during the 1923 Kanto Earthquake. Respondents were asked to rate their response to each governmental apology on a four-point scale (1 = strongly support, 2 = somewhat support, 3 = somewhat oppose, and 4 = do not support at all), with higher values showing greater resistance.

To measure their ideologies, respondents were asked about their own ideological standpoint using the question, 'In politics, we often hear the words "conservative" and "progressive" (*kakushin*). What do you believe your political position to be on a scale of 0 to 10? "Progressive" is represented as 0 and "conservative" is represented as 10.' When conducting the analysis, a scale of 1–11 was used by adding a constant of 1.

To assess the respondents' political knowledge, 10 multiple-choice format quizzes (with four response choices) about political systems were used. Of the 10 quizzes, five probed the respondents' knowledge about the Japanese political system: the requirements for becoming Prime Minister, the conditions for reinstatement of a law by the House of Representatives after rejection by the House of Councilors, the function of the three-tiered judicial system, the clauses that renounce war in the Japanese Constitution, and the Public Offices Election Law concerning online elections. The other five questions covered news reports between December 2018 and February 2019 about the revisions to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, the timing of the announcement of the new name of the Imperial Era, the party that agreed to merge with the Democratic Party for the People, falsifications of the monthly labor statistics survey, and the name of the current Minister of Defense. In addition to the four multiple choice options, the 'I don't know' option was provided (this option was coded as an 'incorrect' answer). To discourage respondents from researching the correct answers and to encourage them to use the 'I don't know' option when they did not know the correct answers, respondents were told that their monetary rewards would be fixed, regardless of their performance on the quiz.

To measure SDO, a Japanese version of the 16-item SDO-6 (Pratto *et al.*, 2006) was included in the survey (see Pratto *et al.*, 1994, for the original, and Mifune and Yokota, 2018, for the Japanese version). This scale consists of eight items that endorse the status difference between groups (e.g., 'It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom') and eight items that endorse equality among groups (e.g., 'All groups should be given an equal chance in life'). Respondents rated their attitudes on a seven-point scale (1 = Completely disagree/disapprove; 7 = Completely agree/favor).

<sup>4</sup>The questionnaire, translated into English, is included as the Supplementary materials.

In addition, militarism, and demographic variables such as age, gender, and education were measured and included in the analyses as control variables. The reason for using militarism as a control variable is that it was found to be correlated with both governmental apology and conservative ideology in Mifune *et al.* (2019). As a measure of militarism, respondents rated their support for the statement 'In international politics, to protect the interests of the state, it is often necessary to use military force,' with responses on a four-point scale (1 = Completely disagree, 4 = Strongly agree). For all these items, the 'I don't know' option was provided in addition to the above scale values. The 'I don't know' responses were treated as missing values. The respondents were asked to state their birth year, which was subtracted from 2019 to determine their age. The three response options for gender were 'Male,' 'Female,' and 'I do not want to answer.' The education item was accompanied by the following seven response categories: 1 = Enrolled in elementary, junior high, or have withdrawn from any of them, 2 = Have withdrawn from high school, technical college, vocational school, or junior college, 3 = Graduated from high school, technical college, vocational school, or junior college, 4 = Enrolled in or have withdrawn from university, 5 = Graduated from university, 6 = Enrolled in or have withdrawn from graduate school, and 7 = Graduated from graduate school.

The survey responses to the resistance to apology items exhibited an unexpected pattern: approximately 30% of respondents (699 of 2,354) failed to respond to at least one of the three resistance to apology items.<sup>5</sup> A comparison between those who responded to all the questions and those who did not revealed that the former clearly had a higher level of political knowledge. This comparison is presented in Table S1 of the Supplementary materials.

### 3.2. Results

We first examined the reliability of the three items of resistance to governmental apologies, each corresponding to the three historical misdeeds (i.e., colonial and occupational rule, comfort women, and the massacre of Korean people in the aftermath of the 1923 Kanto Earthquake).<sup>6</sup> Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient was 0.89. Therefore, following Mifune *et al.* (2019), a single score of resistance to group apology was obtained by aggregating these three item scores. In particular, the three resistance scores were standardized within each item; thereafter, the three standardized scores were summed for each participant. Cronbach's  $\alpha$  coefficient of the 16 items measuring SDO was 0.86, indicating sufficient internal consistency. Therefore, the average value of the 16 items was obtained and used as SDO.

For the 10 items measuring political knowledge, correct answers and incorrect answers (which included 'I don't know' responses) were assigned 1 and 0, respectively. Applying item response theory, we estimated the discrimination and difficulty parameters for each item and latent variable  $\theta$  for the political knowledge of respondents. As shown in Table 1, although there was some variation, the discrimination parameter for each item was ensured (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.67$ ). For difficulty, there was substantial variance in the difficulty parameters – indicating some items were considerably difficult, while others were relatively easy. Accordingly, the 10 items used here were considered as a valid measure of political knowledge.

Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the variables of interest of this study. During the recruitment of respondents, an attempt was made to match the age and gender proportion as closely as possible to those of the national census. For the ideology measure, the midpoint of the scale was 6. Although the mean of 6.566 of this measure was slightly inclined toward the conservative ideology, it was statistically significantly lower than the midpoint owing to the large sample size ( $t[2056] = 11.524$ ); however, the effect size was small (Cohen's  $d = 0.254$ ). More importantly, this was comparable to the result of a social survey based on national random sampling in Japan. For

<sup>5</sup>This may reflect the fact that the historical issues addressed by the three items are controversial in Japan, and people learn only sketchy information about them at school.

<sup>6</sup>Resistance to apology for individual topics was 2.508 (colonial rule), 2.278 (comfort women issue), and 2.439 (genocide due to false information), respectively. All of these values were close to the midpoint of the four-point scale.

**Table 1.** Results of applying item response theory to political knowledge items

	Discrimination	Difficulty
The requirements for becoming Prime Minister	0.623	0.947
Reinstitution of a law by the House of Representatives	0.757	0.141
Three-tiered judicial system	1.136	-0.210
Clauses that renounce war in the Japanese constitution	2.217	-1.293
Online election campaigns	0.511	4.092
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act	1.445	-0.035
Announcement of the new name of the Imperial Era	0.407	-0.773
Falsifications in the monthly labor statistics survey	1.707	-0.023
Merger of party with the Democratic Party for the People	1.514	0.920
The name of the Minister of Defense	2.042	0.103

**Table 2.** Number of valid responses, average values, standard deviation, and correlation matrix for each variable

	Age	Gender (male)	Education	SDO	Militarism	Conservatism	Political knowledge	Resistance to apologies
Age	1.000							
Gender (male)	0.015	1.000						
Education	-0.161**	0.202**	1.000					
SDO	-0.218**	0.098**	0.045*	1.000				
Militarism	-0.149**	0.217**	0.059**	0.377**	1.000			
Conservatism	-0.033	0.002	-0.015	0.265**	0.211**	1.000		
Political knowledge	0.218**	0.226**	0.165**	-0.195**	0.024**	0.000	1.000	
Resistance to apologies	-0.092**	0.078**	-0.009	0.410**	0.333**	0.214**	-0.093**	1.000
S.D.	13.109	0.500	1.311	0.787	0.873	1.833	2.334	0.919
Mean	47.444	0.492	4.261	3.527	2.161	6.466	4.698	-0.006
<i>n</i>	2,354	2,338	2,354	2,354	2,137	2,057	2,354	1,655

Note. \*\* $P < 0.01$ , \* $P < 0.05$ .

example, The Utokyo-Asahi Survey (UTAS) (2017) conducted by Masaki Taniguchi of the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo and the Asahi Shimbun data obtained in October 2017 had a mean of 6.206 and a standard deviation of 1.568, while the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), module 5 data obtained in February 2018 had a mean of 6.348 and a standard deviation of 1.766.<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, it can be said that the composition of respondents in this study does not systematically deviate from the population at large in terms of political ideology.

Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables of interest. Listwise deletion was applied when there were missing values. Militarism and ideology were positively correlated with resistance to apologies. Political knowledge was negatively correlated with resistance to apologies. However, the negative correlation was not so strong that it would pose a serious problem when used as a moderator variable.

To examine whether the association between ideology and resistance to intergroup apology varies by political knowledge, we conducted a multiple regression analysis with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation (shown in Table 3). In addition to the SDO used for comparison with the ideology measured by respondents' self-reports, demographic variables and militarism, which represents differences in basic values about international relations, were entered in the analysis as control variables.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup>CSES, module 5 data can be downloaded from: <https://cses.org/data-download/cses-module-5-2016-2021/>.

<sup>8</sup>In analyses that did not control for demographic variables, SDO, and militarism, the absolute values of the regression coefficients were larger for both the association of conservatism and political knowledge with resistance to apology and for the interaction between conservatism and knowledge. These results are presented in Table S2 of the Supplementary materials.

**Table 3.** Moderation effect of political knowledge on the association between conservatism and resistance to group apologies

	<i>b</i>	S.E.	<i>P</i>
Age	0.001	0.162	0.717
Gender (male)	0.033	0.046	0.472
Education	-0.010	0.017	0.444
SDO	0.315	0.029	0.000
Militarism	0.187	0.027	0.000
Conservatism	0.026	0.013	0.036
Political knowledge (PN)	-0.055	0.029	0.061
Conservatism × PN	0.033	0.015	0.026
Intercept	-1.484	0.160	0.000
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.202		
<i>N</i>	1,487		

Note. OLS model. Conservatism and political knowledge are centralized.


To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients of the main effects of the variables, conservative ideology and political knowledge were mean-centered. The result revealed that resistance to apologies was significantly associated with SDO, militarism, and conservative ideology. More importantly, the ideology × political knowledge interaction was significant ( $b = 0.033$ ,  $S.E. = 0.015$ ,  $P = 0.026$ ). As Figure 1 shows, the association between ideology and resistance to group apologies was significant only among individuals high in political knowledge, by a simple slope analysis ( $b = 0.058$ ,  $S.E. = 0.018$ ,  $P < 0.001$ ), whereas the association was not significant among individuals low in political knowledge ( $b = 0.01$ ,  $S.E. = 0.017$ , ns). In addition, Figure 2 illustrates the marginal effects of conservative ideology on resistance to apologies at different levels of political knowledge. Figure 2 shows that the association between political conservatism and resistance to group apologies becomes significant around the mean level of political knowledge (as this variable is mean-centered, the political knowledge of 0 in Figure 2 corresponds to its sample mean). Therefore, for individuals with average or higher levels of political knowledge, political conservatism significantly predicted their resistance to group apologies, while for individuals with lower-than-average levels of political knowledge, political conservatism was not significantly associated with their resistance to group apologies.<sup>9</sup>

The strong resistance to apologies among people of low political knowledge, regardless of ideology, deserves some speculation. People with low political knowledge may not consider apologies based on the historical and political background under which each of the apologies was made, but rather may make decisions based on their feelings toward the target country. In the results of a poll conducted by Nikkei on 21 January 2019, the percentages of Japanese voters who had negative impressions about China and South Korea were 72 and 61%, respectively.<sup>10</sup> Thus, a majority of the Japanese voters today seem to have some negative impression about at least one of the two countries (i.e., the

<sup>9</sup>In this study, we did not adopt a model in which SDO mediates between ideology and resistance to apology, as Hornsey *et al.* (2017) did. This is because it has been shown that very few people are able to perceive politics and determine their own political positions based on ideology, and it is difficult to assume that this variable predicts SDO, a characteristic that applies to many people. On the contrary, when we modeled SDO as a mediating variable between conservatism and resistance to apology, as Hornsey *et al.* (2017) did, we found an effect of political knowledge on moderating the association between conservative ideology and resistance to apology, but the indirect effect was not moderated by political knowledge (Table S3). The difference in the 95% confidence interval of the average causal mediation effects between political knowledge with a mean of +1 standard deviation and that with a mean of -1 standard deviation was -0.01 to 0.02. We performed 2,000 resamplings using the nonparametric bootstrap method to calculate the confidence intervals. This result, similar to the analysis in Table 3 of this paper, shows that the association between ideology and resistance to apology is found among people with high political knowledge, whereas the association between SDO and resistance to apology is found regardless of political knowledge.

<sup>10</sup>Although North Korea is also a neighboring country that suffered from Japan's colonial policy, the attitude of Japanese people toward North Korea seems to be defined more by post-World War II issues such as the abduction of Japanese citizens and the launching of missiles into the waters around Japan than by these historical issues.






**Figure 1.** Interaction effect between conservative ideology and political knowledge. Predicted resistance to governmental apologies as a function of conservatism at low (−1 S.D.) and high (+1 S.D.) levels of political knowledge. Prediction is generated from the model shown in Table 3. The values of all other variables are held constant at their respective means.

recipients of the governmental apologies that this study utilized). Accordingly, we suspect that respondents with low levels of political knowledge might have responded negatively to the governmental apologies based on their sentiments toward the countries.

Contrary to the analysis with ideology as an explanatory variable, the moderation effect of political knowledge was not significant for the association between SDO and resistance to group apologies. These results are shown in Table 4.



**Figure 2.** Changes in the marginal effects of political conservatism on resistance to apologies by political knowledge. Shaded bands represent 95% confidence intervals. Marginal effects and confidence intervals are generated from the model shown in Table 3.

**Table 4.** Moderation effect of political knowledge on the association between SDO and resistance to group apologies

	<i>b</i>	S.E.	<i>P</i>
Age	0.001	0.002	0.679
Gender (male)	0.039	0.046	0.397
Education	-0.014	0.017	0.428
SDO	0.035	0.012	0.003
Militarism	0.187	0.027	0.000
Ideology (conservative)	0.304	0.031	0.000
Political knowledge (PN)	-0.054	0.029	0.064
SDO × PN	0.053	0.034	0.121
Intercept	-0.602	0.156	0.000
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.201		
<i>N</i>	1,487		

Note. OLS model. SDO and political knowledge were mean-centered.

To confirm the generality of the aforementioned moderation effect of political knowledge across the three types of past misdeeds, we conducted the same multiple regression analyses for separate issues (i.e., colonial rule, comfort women, and the massacre of Korean people owing to false rumors at the time of the 1923 Kanto Earthquake). The results of a set of three separate multiple regression analyses showed the generality of the results reported in Table 3. Figure 3 shows the regression coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals. The 95% confidence intervals of the regression coefficients overlapped each other for all dependent variables regardless of the issue. Most importantly, the ideology  $\times$  political knowledge interaction effects were almost equivalent across the three issues.

## 4. Study 2

We conducted a replication study to test the moderating effect of political knowledge on the association between ideology and resistance to governmental apologies, and also to examine the two factors that may be associated with among people without political knowledge. As mentioned in Section 2, the first factor is the general attitude of individuals toward apologies, and the second factor is their attitude toward Korea and China, which were victimized by Japan's colonialism policies before and during the war.

### 4.1. Method

We conducted an online survey during the period 25–27 August 2021, with participants recruited through the crowdsourcing service 'Lancers.'<sup>11</sup> The respondents were over 18 years old and had Japanese nationality. Based on Shieh (2009), we calculated the required sample size for power of 0.80 to be 1,029 in the interaction between two continuous variables in multiple regression analysis, with resistance to apology as the dependent variable, ideology as the independent variable, and political knowledge as the adjusted variable. In study 1, 63.2% of the respondents answered all the questions used in the analysis; thus, the sample size used for study 2 was  $1,029/0.632 = 1,629$ . On the Lancers site, the recruitment was closed at 1,629, but 15 people responded without receiving rewards, so the actual sample size was 1644. This research has been preregistered in the Open Science Framework.<sup>12</sup>

The methods for measuring demographic variables, militarism, SDO, and ideology were the same as in study 1. The format for measuring political knowledge was the same as in study 1, but the five items measuring knowledge of current events were replaced with events between June and August 2021, including the name of the current Minister of Defense, the country where the Delta strain of the novel coronavirus was first identified, the Japanese government's greenhouse gas reduction target for the fiscal year 2030, the government agency to which the Central Minimum Wage Council belongs, and the city that the International Olympic Committee President Bach visited on 16 July 2021. In addition, we measured the response time to determine the extent to which respondents used the Internet or other means to research the correct answers to the political knowledge items.

The measurement methods for the newly added variables in study 2 are as follows. To measure the general attitudes toward apologies, we employed the Japanese Proclivity to Apologize Measure, a translation of the Proclivity to Apologize Measure developed by Howell *et al.* (2011) and translated by Otsubo *et al.* (2015). This scale is used in psychology to measure individual differences in willingness to apologize for one's wrongdoing. Attitudes toward China and Korea, along with attitudes toward other countries, were rated on a scale of 0–100, and the

<sup>11</sup><https://www.lancers.jp/>.

<sup>12</sup>[https://osf.io/z7w3s/?view\\_only=e646cfcc40e645b3a2da7c9a785c2074](https://osf.io/z7w3s/?view_only=e646cfcc40e645b3a2da7c9a785c2074).




Figure 3. Determinant factors in resistance to apologies in connection with the three items. They are colonial rule, the comfort women issue, and the massacre caused by false information. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals of coefficients.

averages of the attitude scores toward the two countries were used; on this scale, a higher value indicates a more positive attitude.

4.2. Results

We first examined the reliability of the scale items used in this study. Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  coefficient for resistance to the three group apologies was calculated to be 0.87.<sup>13</sup> Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  coefficient of the 16 items measuring SDO was 0.86. The reliability of these scales was satisfactory, as in study 1. The reliability of the Japanese Proclivity to Apologize Measure, a newly added measure in study 2, was also satisfactory at  $\alpha = 0.89$ . For political knowledge, the scale was constructed using item response theory, as in study 1. As shown in Table 5, although there were slightly more items with low difficulty

<sup>13</sup>As in study 1, resistance to apology for individual topics was 2.195 (colonial rule), 2.302 (comfort women issue), and 2.220 (genocide due to false information), respectively. All of these values were close to the midpoint of the four-point scale.

**Table 5.** Results of applying item response theory to political knowledge items (study 2)

	Discrimination	Difficulty
The requirements for becoming Prime Minister	0.731	0.755
Reinstitution of a law by the House of Representatives	0.698	0.057
Three-tiered judicial system	0.801	-0.591
Clauses that renounce war in the Japanese constitution	1.402	-1.768
Online election campaigns	0.656	2.252
The name of the current Minister of Defense	1.216	0.248
The country where the Delta strain of the novel coronavirus was first identified	0.777	-1.709
The Japanese government's greenhouse gas reduction target for fiscal year 2030	1.369	1.277
Government agency to which the Central Minimum Wage Council belongs	0.825	0.579
The city that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Bach visited	0.708	-1.103

**Table 6.** Moderation effect of political knowledge on the association between conservatism and resistance to group apologies (study 2)

	<i>b</i>	S.E.	<i>P</i>
Age	0.002	0.002	0.427
Gender (male)	0.097	0.046	0.036
Education	-0.045	0.018	0.014
SDO	0.296	0.030	0.000
Militarism	0.227	0.028	0.000
Conservatism	0.068	0.013	0.000
Political knowledge (PN)	0.136	0.030	0.000
Conservatism × PN	0.033	0.018	0.062
Intercept	-1.463	0.159	0.000
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.219		
<i>N</i>	1,308		

Note. OLS model. Conservatism and political knowledge are centralized.

than in study 1, a certain degree of discrimination was observed, and the dispersion of difficulty levels was sufficiently ensured. Therefore, it can be said that the 10 items in this study also offered an appropriate scale on which to measure political knowledge.<sup>14,15</sup>

As in study 1, we conducted a multiple regression analysis using OLS estimation to determine if there was a moderation effect on the association between ideology and resistance to governmental apology (Table 6). In this analysis, we entered demographic variables, SDO, and militarism as control variables. To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients of the main effects of the variables, conservative ideology and political knowledge were mean-centered. As a result, the regression coefficient of the interaction between ideology and political knowledge was almost the same as in study 1 ( $b = 0.033$ , S.E. = 0.018,  $P = 0.062$ ), although not significant at the 5% level because of the large standard error compared with study 1. As Figure 4 shows, the results of a simple slope analysis showed that the association between ideology and resistance to group apology was stronger for individuals with high political knowledge ( $b = 0.095$ , S.E. = 0.018,  $P \leq 0.001$ ), than for those with low political knowledge ( $b = 0.045$ , S.E. = 0.019,  $P = 0.018$ ). In study 1, people less informed of political knowledge were

<sup>14</sup>The time spent on the page for the quiz to measure political knowledge is shown in Table S5. This table shows that most respondents completed their answers within 30–60 s. Because it would be difficult for them to read the question and the choices and then look up the answer to the quiz using the Internet within this time, it is assumed that many respondents answered the question without searching for the answer as instructed in the question.

<sup>15</sup>The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix in study 2 for the variables used in study 1 are shown in Table S6. There were more males in study 2, and respondents were slightly younger, and answered more political knowledge items than those in study 1, but the values for the other variables were similar.

more resistant to the government's apology, while in study 2, people with political knowledge were more resistant to the apology. One possible reason for this discrepancy is the salience of the Japan–South Korea conflicts in ordinary Japanese citizens. A few months before study 1 was conducted, a South Korean Navy destroyer allegedly irradiated a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol plane with radar. The media coverage of this incident increased the salience of the issue of the Japan–South Korea conflict. As a result, attitudes toward Korea among the politically uninformed, regardless of ideology, became negative, and resistance to an apology might have also been intensified. By contrast, during the period when study 2 was conducted, topics such as COVID-19 and the Tokyo Olympics were widely covered in the press, and the salience of the topic of Japan–Korea and Japan–China conflicts was low. Therefore, only those who had political knowledge and perceived the issue based on conservative ideology responded more negatively to the Japanese government's apology scenarios. In addition, Figure 5 illustrates the marginal effects of conservative ideology on resistance to apologies at different levels of political knowledge. Figure 5 shows that the association between political conservatism and resistance to group apologies becomes significant around the mean  $-0.7$  S.D. level of political knowledge.

In addition to the above analysis, we conducted a multiple regression analysis in which we added attitude toward interpersonal apology as an explanatory variable as a factor predicting resistance to group apology among those with low political knowledge (Table 7). The results showed that the main effect of interpersonal attitude toward apology and the interaction effect with political knowledge were not significant at the 5% level.


Next, we conducted a multiple regression analysis, adding as an explanatory variable the attitudes toward neighboring countries that were affected by Japan's colonial policies in the past (Table 8). The results revealed that the attitudes toward neighboring countries were associated with resistance to apologies. Although the interaction effect between attitudes toward neighboring countries and political knowledge was significant at the 1% level, a simple slope analysis revealed that the association between attitudes toward neighbors and resistance to apology was found among both those with high ( $b = -0.015$ , S.E. = 0.002,  $P \leq 0.001$ ) and low ( $b = -0.009$ , S.E. = 0.014,  $P \leq 0.001$ ) levels of political knowledge.<sup>16</sup>

## 5. Discussion

This study investigated the moderation effects of political knowledge in the relationship between ideology and resistance to intergroup apologies by one's own government. Although there were differences in the main effect of political knowledge on resistance to collective apology due to differences in political conditions, the moderation effect of political knowledge was consistent across the two studies. In study 1, opposition to political apologies by the government was associated with ideology only for individuals with high levels of political knowledge, and in study 2, the association between these variables was stronger for individuals with high levels of political knowledge.

Our study explains the mixed (i.e., both *pro* and *con*) findings on the associations between these variables in previous studies. In the studies that found a correlation between conservatism and resistance to apology, the political knowledge of the subjects was high, and studies that did not find a correlation may have been aimed at people with low levels of political knowledge. In countries where a correlation between the two variables was observed, the structure of rivalry between the two major political parties clearly corresponded to conservative–liberal ideology, and even people little informed of political ideology may be able to respond to surveys in a manner corresponding to the political


<sup>16</sup>In addition to China and Korea, this study also measured attitudes toward the USA, UK, Germany, Russia, India, Israel, and Australia. Of these, attitudes toward the UK ( $r = -0.063$ ,  $P < 0.05$ ), Germany ( $r = -0.125$ ,  $P < 0.001$ ), Russia ( $r = -0.156$ ,  $P < 0.001$ ), and Australia ( $r = -0.158$ ,  $P < 0.001$ ) were negatively correlated with resistance to governmental apology, but the effect size was small.



**Figure 4.** Interaction effect between conservative ideology and political knowledge. Predicted resistance to governmental apologies as a function of conservatism at low (−1 S.D.) and high (+1 S.D.) levels of political knowledge. Prediction is generated from the model shown in Table 6. The values of all other variables are held constant at their respective means.

ideology using party cues. In any case, our findings suggest that measuring political knowledge will be important in future studies examining the link between conservatism and resistance to apology.

The results of this study also revealed that SDO is associated with resistance to governmental apologies, even among politically less informed people. Although it is held that many diplomatic issues are difficult for ordinary voters to understand (e.g., Lippmann, 1955; Almond, 1960; Converse, 1964), the implication of this research is that many people may hold opinions influenced by focusing on



**Figure 5.** Changes in the marginal effects of political conservatism on resistance to apologies by political knowledge. Shaded bands represent 95% confidence intervals. Marginal effects and confidence intervals are generated from the model shown in Table 6.

intergroup relations.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, contrary to initial assumptions, SDO and attitude toward neighboring countries turned out to be predictor variables of resistance to collective apology not only among individuals without political knowledge but also among individuals with knowledge. These results imply that people's political judgments (e.g., whether to support or oppose the government's apology), which political scientists usually considers as being driven by political ideology, may in fact be explained in significant part by a simpler factor: perceptions of intergroup relations. On the contrary, this study did not find any results to indicate a relationship between individuals' general attitude toward apology and governmental apology. These results suggest that intergroup apologies by one's own government are viewed differently from interpersonal apologies.

<sup>17</sup>Of course, other scholars, such as Baum (2003), have argued that it is not necessarily desirable for people to form opinions about diplomatic issues too easily.



**Table 7.** Moderation effect of political knowledge on the association between attitude toward interpersonal apology and resistance to group apologies

	<i>b</i>	S.E.	<i>P</i>
Age	0.001	0.002	0.494
Gender (male)	0.101	0.046	0.030
Education	-0.047	0.018	0.010
SDO	0.293	0.031	0.000
Militarism	0.237	0.028	0.000
Conservatism	0.075	0.013	0.000
Attitude toward interpersonal apology (AIP)	0.004	0.022	0.857
Political knowledge (PN)	0.129	0.030	0.000
AIP × PN	0.009	0.027	0.751
Intercept	-1.921	0.171	0.000
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.221		
<i>N</i>	1,296		

Note. OLS model. Attitude toward interpersonal apology and political knowledge are centralized.

**Table 8.** Moderation effect of political knowledge on the association between attitude toward neighboring countries and resistance to group apologies

	<i>b</i>	S.E.	<i>P</i>
Age	-0.001	0.002	0.643
Gender (male)	0.083	0.045	0.062
Education	-0.037	0.018	0.033
SDO	0.266	0.029	0.000
Militarism	0.185	0.027	0.000
Conservatism	0.054	0.012	0.000
Attitude toward neighboring countries (ANC)	-0.012	0.001	0.000
Political knowledge (PN)	0.096	0.029	0.001
ANC × PN	-0.003	0.001	0.008
Intercept	-1.519	0.165	0.000
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.289		
<i>N</i>	1,276		

Note. OLS model. Attitude toward neighboring countries and political knowledge are centralized.

In addition to the abovementioned interaction effect, multiple regression analysis revealed that resistance to the Japanese government's apologies was positively correlated with conservative ideology and SDO after controlling for demographic variables and militarism in both studies 1 and 2. This is consistent with the results of Mifune *et al.*'s (2019) survey, which drew its respondents from a different Japanese crowdsourcing service, Crowd Works, and thus suggests the robustness of the correlations between these variables.

Thus, although the association between ideology and resistance to a group apology varies with political knowledge, the finding that psychological variables related to intergroup relations predict resistance to a group apology regardless of the amount of political knowledge indicates that it is important to integrate both political science and psychological approaches when considering the issue of approval or disapproval of a Japanese governmental apology.

## 6. Limitations and future research

It should be mentioned that the measurement items used in this study have not yet been sufficiently validated, which is a limitation of this study. For example, resistance to apology was measured using a four-point scale, but the fourth option, 'do not support at all,' may have been too strong compared with the other options. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to assume that this item was measured

by an interval scale.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, this study relies on a single-item measure that locates each participant's ideological position on a single axis in order to explain the discrepancy in findings in previous psychological research dealing with resistance to group apology. However, given the difficulty for many people to identify their own ideological position on the single axis, it seems informative to operationalize political ideology as a latent variable extracted from responses to divergent items, and examine its relationships with resistance to collective apology.

Among the components of political sophistication, this study used quiz-style political knowledge, which measures the number and extent of cognitive components in voters' belief systems, as a moderator. However, no single method can measure all aspects of political sophistication (i.e., whether voters, like political elites, are able to relate to and understand diverse political events based on an abstract framework such as ideology). Therefore, in the future, it is necessary to examine whether the moderation effects shown in this study can be replicated when political sophistication is measured by the strength of the interrelationships among cognitive factors or by directly measuring understanding of ideological concepts using open-ended responses as in Converse (1964).

Because the group apology targeted in this study was made in response to complex phenomena such as conflict and historical trauma, there is a limit to examining the determinants of attitudes toward group apologies in quantitative research alone. Therefore, in the future, it is necessary to conduct a qualitative study that examines one case in detail, and to verify the validity of the findings of the current study by comparing them with the results of the qualitative study. In particular, a historical examination of how resistance to apologies by past political leaders affects voters' resistance to apologies by their governments is warranted.

In addition, the most important limitation of this study is that it is not designed to allow inferences about causal relationships among variables. Similar to previous psychological studies that have examined the relationship between ideology and resistance to group apologies, this study employs a correlational research design based on observational data. Moreover, an 'easy' linear regression was chosen because there was not enough information to construct a model of how people's resistance to apology is formed. Thus, it is not possible to determine whether conservative ideology in fact fosters resistance to collective apology, or their association was merely a spurious correlation due to an unknown third variable. To resolve this issue, experimental studies that test the impact on resistance to collective apology by involving manipulations that promote ideology-based policy understandings or further research using statistical modeling on the relationship between ideology and resistance to collective apology are needed. Previous psychological research examining the relationship between ideology and resistance to apology has assumed that voters are aware of their own political positions on an ideological axis and then link them to policy issues. However, based on the findings of political science on ideology, in this study, we found that the relationships differed based on the level of political knowledge. While governmental apologies are important in encouraging national reconciliation, not all citizens share the same views on apology. One must consider the differences in perspectives of people with different levels of political knowledge while communicating messages that would make it easier for citizens to understand the need for an apology. Thus, despite these limitations, this study's finding that political knowledge moderates the relationship between ideology and resistance to apologies has implications for the study of intergroup apology and policies to promote reconciliation among nations.

This study was limited to Japanese voters. In future studies, it may be possible to determine the reason for the inconsistency in the association between ideology and resistance to group apologies found in prior studies by considering intergroup apologies in various countries and by investigating the moderation effect of political knowledge. We believe that this offers the first step toward that goal.

**Supplementary material.** The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/N4K8YA> and <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109923000130>.

<sup>18</sup>However, as shown in Table S4, the results for the correlation matrix using Spearman's rank correlation coefficients were almost identical to those in Table 2 using Pearson's correlation coefficients.

**Competing interests.** The authors declare none.

## References

- Achen CH (1975) Mass political attitudes and the survey response. *American Political Science Review* **69**(4), 1218–1231. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1955282>
- Almond GA (1960) *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Altemeyer B (1998) The other ‘authoritarian personality’. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* **30**, 47–92. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60382-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60382-2)
- Baum MA (2003) *Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Baum M and Jamison A (2006) The Oprah effect: how soft news helps inattentive citizens vote consistently. *Journal of Politics* **68**(4), 946–959. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00480.x>
- Bennett SE (1973) Consistency among the public’s social welfare policy attitudes in the 1960s. *American Journal of Political Science* **17**(3), 544–570. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2110744>
- Bergbower M, McClurg S and Holbrook T (2015) Presidential campaign spending and correct voting from 2000 to 2008. *Social Science Quarterly* **96**(5), 1196–1213. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12199>
- Blatz CW and Philpot C (2010) On the outcomes of intergroup apologies: a review. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* **4**(11), 995–1007. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00318.x>
- Blatz CW, Schumann K and Ross M (2009) Government apologies for historical injustices. *Political Psychology* **30**(2), 219–241. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00689.x>
- Converse PE (1964) The nature of belief systems in mass public. In Apter DE (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: Free Press, pp. 206–261.
- Delli Carpini MX and Keeter S (1996) *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Fehr R, Gelfand MJ and Nag M (2010) The road to forgiveness: a meta-analytic synthesis of its situational and dispositional correlates. *Psychological Bulletin* **136**(5), 894–914. <https://doi:10.1037/a0019993>
- Hannon PA, Rusbult CE, Finkel EJ and Kamashiro M (2010) In the wake of betrayal: amends, forgiveness, and the resolution of betrayal. *Personal Relationships* **17**(2), 253–278. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6811.2010.01275.x>
- Hornsey MJ and Wohl MJA (2013) We are sorry: intergroup apologies and their tenuous link with intergroup forgiveness. *European Review of Social Psychology* **24**(1), 1–31. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2013.822206>
- Hornsey MJ, Schumann K, Bain PG, Blumen S, Chen SX, Gómez Á and Wohl MJA (2017) Conservatives are more reluctant to give and receive apologies than liberals. *Social Psychological and Personality Science* **8**(7), 827–835. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617691096>
- Howell AJ, Dopko RL, Turowski JB and Buro K (2011) The disposition to apologize. *Personality and Individual Differences* **51**(4), 509–514. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.05.009>
- Johnston CD, Lavine HG and Federico CM (2017) *Open versus Closed: Personality, Identity, and the Politics of Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Just JT (2021) *Left and Right: The Psychological Significance of a Political Distinction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jou W and Endo M (2016a) *Generational Gap in Japanese Politics: A Longitudinal Study of Political Attitudes and Behaviour*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jou W and Endo M (2016b) Ideological understanding and voting in Japan: a longitudinal analysis. *Asian Politics and Policy* **8**(3), 456–473. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12270>
- Kabashima I and Takenaka Y (1996) *Gendai-Nihonjin-No-Ideology [Ideology in Contemporary Japan]*. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press (in Japanese).
- Kabashima I and Takenaka Y (2012) *Ideology (Gendai-Seijigaku-Sousyo 8) [Ideology (Modern Politics Series 8)]*. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press (in Japanese).
- Karunaratne K and Laham SM (2019) Social dominance orientation predicts opposition to hierarchy – attenuating intergroup apologies. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* **45**(12), 1651–1665. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219838549>. PubMed: 30975023.
- Kinder DR (1998) Opinion and action in the realm of politics. In Gilbert DT, Fiske ST and Lindzey G (eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th edn. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, pp. 778–867.
- Kinder DR and Kalmoe NP (2017) *Neither Liberal Nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kleppe TH, Czajkowski NO, Vassend O, Roysamb E, Eftedal NH, Sheehy-Skeffington J, Kunst JR and Thomsen L (2019) Correlations between social dominance orientation and political attitudes reflect common genetic underpinnings. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* **116**(36), 17741–17746. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1818711116>
- Lau RR, Patel P, Fahmy DF and Kaufman RR (2014) Correct voting across thirty-three democracies: a preliminary analysis. *British Journal of Political Science* **44**(2), 239–259. <https://doi:10.1017/gov.2016.23>

- Lippmann W (1955) *Essays in the Public Philosophy*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co.
- Lupton RN, Myers WM and Thornton JR (2015) Political sophistication and the dimensionality of elite and mass attitudes, 1980–2004. *The Journal of Politics* 77(2), 368–380. <https://doi.org/10.1086/679493>
- Luskin RC (1987) Measuring political sophistication. *American Journal of Political Science* 31(4), 856–899. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111227>
- Luskin RC (1990) Explaining political sophistication. *Political Behavior* 12(4), 331–361. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00992793>
- McCullough ME, Worthington Jr EL and Rachal KC (1997) Interpersonal forgiving in close relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73(2), 321–336. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.73.2.321>. PubMed: 9248052.
- McCullough ME, Rachal KC, Sandage SJ, Worthington Jr EL, Brown SW and Hight TL (1998) Interpersonal forgiving in close relationships: II. Theoretical elaboration and measurement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75(6), 1586–1603. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.75.6.1586>. PubMed: 9914668.
- Mifune N and Yokota K (2018) The external validity of the relationship between social dominance orientation and political or discriminatory attitudes toward foreigners using a Japanese sample. *Japanese Journal of Social Psychology* 34(2), 94–101.
- Mifune N, Inamasu K, Kohama S, Ohtsubo Y and Tago A (2019) Social dominance orientation as an obstacle to intergroup apology. *PLOS ONE* 14(1), e0211379. <http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211379>
- Miller AH and Miller WE (1976) Ideology in the 1972 election: myth or reality – a rejoinder. *American Political Science Review* 70(3), 832–849. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400174271>
- Miwa H (2015) Voters' left–right perception of parties in contemporary Japan: removing the noise of misunderstanding. *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 16(1), 114–137. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109914000413>
- Miyake I, Kinoshita T and Aiba Z (1967) *Kotonaru-level-no-senkyo-niokeru-touhyo-koudou-no-kenkyu* [Research of voting behavior in multilevel elections]. Tokyo: Soubunsha (in Japanese).
- Nie NH and Andersen K (1974) Mass belief systems revisited: political change and attitude structure. *Journal of Politics* 36(3), 540–591. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2129245>
- Ohbuchi K, Kameda M and Agarie N (1989) Apology as aggression control: its role in mediating appraisal of and response to harm. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 56(2), 219–227. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.56.2.219>. PubMed: 2926625.
- Ohtsubo Y, Yamaura K (2015) Development of Japanese measures of reconciliatory tendencies: The Japanese trait forgivingness scale and the Japanese proclivity to apologize measure. *Japanese Journal of Social Psychology* 31(2), 135–142.
- Pierce JC and Rose DD (1974) Nonattitudes and American public opinion: the examination of a thesis. *American Political Science Review* 68(2), 626–649. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400117435>
- Pratto F, Sidanius J, Stallworth LM and Malle BF (1994) Social dominance orientation: a personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67(4), 741–763. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.67.4.741>
- Pratto F, Sidanius J and Levin S (2006) Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: taking stock and looking forward. *European Review of Social Psychology* 17(1), 271–320. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280601055772>
- Rapeli L (2018) Does sophistication affect electoral outcomes? *Government and Opposition* 53(2), 181–204. doi: 10.1017/gov.2016.23
- Schumann K (2018) The psychology of offering an apology: understanding the barriers to apologizing and how to overcome them. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 27(2), 74–78. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417741709>
- Shieh Gwonen (2009) Detecting Interaction Effects in Moderated Multiple Regression With Continuous Variables Power and Sample Size Considerations. *Organizational Research Methods* 12(3), 510–528. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1094428108320370>
- Štambuk M, Čorkalo Biruški D and Kapović I (2022) Deeds, not words: understanding intergroup apology and forgiveness from different sides of conflict. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 28(3), 397–405. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000622>
- The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems** ([www.cses.org](http://www.cses.org)). CSES Module 5 Second Advance Release [dataset and documentation]. 14 May 2020 version. doi: 10.7804/cses.module5.2020-05-14
- The UTokyo-Asahi Survey (UTAS)** (2017). Conducted by Masaki Taniguchi of the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo and the Asahi Shimbun. <http://www.masaki.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/projects.html>.
- Weisberg HF and Nawara SP (2010) How sophistication affected the 2000 presidential vote: traditional sophistication measures versus conceptualization. *Political Behavior* 32, 547–565. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9117-x>
- Wenzel M, Okimoto TG, Hornsey MJ, Lawrence-Wood E and Coughlin A-M (2017) The mandate of the collective: apology representativeness determines perceived sincerity and forgiveness in intergroup contexts. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 43(6), 758–771. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217697093>