

THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY REVISITED:
U.S. Relations with Latin America
and the Caribbean

Stephen J. Randall
University of Calgary

- THE SECOND CENTURY: UNITED STATES–LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1889.* By Mark Gilderhus. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2000. Pp. 282. \$55.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.)
- UNITED STATES–LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1850–1903: ESTABLISHING A RELATIONSHIP.* Edited by Thomas M. Leonard. (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press, 1999. Pp. 303. \$44.95 cloth.)
- THE FRENCH IN CENTRAL AMERICA: CULTURE AND COMMERCE, 1820–1930.* By Thomas D. Schoonover. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2000. Pp. 244. \$55.00 cloth.)
- THE DANGER OF DREAMS: GERMAN AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA.* By Nancy Mitchell. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. Pp. 312. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.)
- WHOSE AMERICA? THE WAR OF 1898 AND THE BATTLES TO DEFINE THE NATION.* Edited by Virginia Marie Bouvier. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001. Pp. 256. \$62.95 cloth.)
- MANAGING THE COUNTERREVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES AND GUATEMALA, 1954–1961.* By Stephen M. Streeter. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000. Pp. 384. \$30.00 paper.)
- THE LEGACY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.* By David W. Dent. (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1999. Pp. 417. \$59.95 cloth.)
- OIL, WAR, AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AMERICAN AND BRITISH REACTIONS TO MEXICO'S EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN OIL PROPERTIES, 1937–1941.* By Catherine E. Jayne. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001. Pp. 210. \$62.50 cloth.)

- SECRET HISTORY: THE CIA'S CLASSIFIED ACCOUNT OF ITS OPERATIONS IN GUATEMALA, 1952–1954.* By Nick Cullather. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. Pp. 142. \$39.50 cloth, \$14.95 paper.)
- THE UNITED STATES IN HONDURAS, 1980–1981: AN AMBASSADOR'S MEMOIR.* By Jack R. Binns. (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2000. Pp. 397. \$39.95 paper.)
- GUNBOATS, CORRUPTION, AND CLAIMS: FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN VENEZUELA, 1899–1908.* By Brian S. McBeth. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2001. Pp. 307. \$69.95 cloth.)
- RAG-TAGS, SCUM, RIFF-RAFF, AND COMMIES: THE U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1965–66.* By Eric Thomas Chester. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001. Pp. 353. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.)
- SUGAR AND POWER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EISENHOWER, KENNEDY AND THE TRUJILLOS.* By Michael R. Hall. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2000. Pp. 163. \$55.00 cloth.)

Several very clear and consistent scholarly messages come through from this selection of recent publications on the external relations of the countries of the Caribbean and Latin America. The first is that scholarly, cultural and political interest in U.S.–Latin American relations remains a thriving industry. A second is that, increasingly, scholars are appropriately seeking to move beyond the bilateral U.S.–Latin American relationship to explore more fully the role of European countries in this hemisphere, setting the U.S.–Latin American relationship into the larger context of international affairs. These scholars are also making the effective use of European archival sources that many in the field have long advocated. There are several excellent examples of that orientation among the volumes discussed in this review. A third message is that scholars are also making more effort to use Latin American archival sources, although the obstacles are frequently substantial, especially because of limited access to those sources. A fourth feature is that U.S.-based and largely North American-born and educated scholars continue to dominate the field, and there appears to be relatively little consideration given to, or evidence of familiarity with, scholarship published in Latin America and the Caribbean itself, although a number of the essays in both the Bouvier and Leonard volumes represent important exceptions to that tendency. A fifth observation is that there has only been marginal innovation in the conceptualization and methodology in the writing on inter-American relations. But, there are exceptions to this observation among the volumes under review—these make an important contribution not only to the study of inter-American relations but also to the study of foreign policy in general. A number of the conceptual models that have been applied to the study of U.S. foreign

policy in general are represented in a number of the works under review, including world systems/social imperialism (Schoonover) and hegemony (Streeter). Nonetheless, much of the historical literature on hemispheric relations fails to take into consideration methodological techniques from other disciplines let alone the critical knowledge that can be gleaned from cultural and literary studies, economics, political science, sociology, and law. Finally, there continues to be a reasonable balance in the new publications between the more narrowly focused monograph, frequently the product of a doctoral dissertation, and the more comprehensive syntheses. Some of the volumes reviewed do push back the frontiers of our knowledge of hemispheric relations in the past two centuries. Others, unfortunately, do not.

Four of the reviewed volumes are either syntheses or collections of original papers: Bouvier, Dent, Gilderhus, and Leonard. Taken together they cover the chronological period since the 1820s and thematically everything from such traditional issues as the Monroe Doctrine and bilateral economic and diplomatic matters to the images of the United States, Cuba, and Spain contained in political cartoons in the 1890s. The Dent volume is, as its sub-title suggests, a reference guide to U.S. relations with Latin America. It is a useful compendium, synthesis and reference work for the non-specialist and undergraduate student. The Bouvier and Leonard edited volumes, on the other hand, make the most significant and original contribution to our understanding of inter-American relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Of the two, the essays in the Leonard collection are the more traditional. Individual chapters on the main Latin American countries and regions (excluding the Caribbean islands) are excellent. Most are based on primary research and provide both the specialist and more general reader with thorough guides to the main secondary literature. The volume is a sequel to Ray Shurbutt's *United States–Latin American Relations, 1800–1850*.

Leonard's main thesis is that in the course of the nineteenth century, economic, security, and political developments in the United States, Europe, and Latin America converged to set the stage for a more permanent relationship between the United States and the region. Leonard and his contributing authors demonstrate that although security and political considerations were factors in shaping the relations during these decades, the primary basis of the relationship by the turn of the century was economic and was derived from rapid U.S. industrialization in the late nineteenth century and the resulting search for markets and raw materials. Leonard, correctly in my view, divides the historiography on U.S. foreign policy along the lines identified earlier by Robert Beisner in *From the Old Diplomacy to the New*, which represented a synthesis among several schools of scholarship: the traditionalists, who portrayed the United States as a beacon of democracy; the new left and

progressives, who focused on the economic factors driving policy; and the realists, who portrayed policy as based strictly on power politics considerations. For Leonard, as for Beisner earlier, U.S. foreign policy, whether toward Latin America or the rest of the world, was the product of a combination of domestic and international factors.

In the specific case of Latin America in the second half of the nineteenth century, Leonard suggests that the United States did not have a consistent policy except for protecting private U.S. interests threatened by local crises. That thesis is open to considerable debate. The overwhelming balance of the historical literature on inter-American relations suggests that U.S. policy toward the region was consistently driven by a combination of security and economic factors. These included the intent to minimize European involvement in the area, especially but not exclusively in the Caribbean and Central America as interest in an isthmian canal intensified; the quest for open markets and sources of raw materials; and, as an integral part of the other factors, the effort to facilitate hemispheric stability under U.S. leadership. As Leonard himself suggests in his introduction to the volume, the two main interest groups in the United States that pressed for U.S. governments to take a stronger leadership role in the hemisphere were industrialists and advocates of a large navy. Leonard, along with most of the other authors in his volume and the other works under review in this essay, demonstrates several other overriding characteristics of U.S. actions and the bilateral relationship. One was the tendency for the United States to act alone rather than in cooperation with Latin American countries when hemispheric security seemed threatened by European powers. A second was the suspicion, even antagonism, that existed in Latin America toward the United States and its culture, and the perception of Latin America by U.S. policymakers as undemocratic, corrupt and underdeveloped. A third characteristic, which is presented most vigorously and compellingly by Nancy Mitchell in *The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America*, is that the claims of U.S. leaders and propagandists to American exceptionalism rang hollow. The literature underlines the extent to which the United States was an imperial power, even if, as William A. Williams indicated decades ago, the preference was for informal empire rather than traditional colonialism in the European mold.

Virginia Marie Bouvier's edited volume, *Whose America? The War of 1898 and the Battles to Define the Nation*, contains highly interdisciplinary and original essays, ranging from her own chapter on the political cartoons in the *New York Herald* in the 1890s; Sylvia Hilton's insightful and thoroughly documented paper on Spanish perspectives on the role of the United States in the Cuban crisis in the 1890s; Kristin Hoganson's chapter which examines the "imperatives of manhood" in the U.S.

Congressional debates over war with Spain; through an outstanding essay by Lillian Guerra on Cuban émigrés who led the Cuban independence movement in the United States in the late nineteenth century; to fine papers on the legacies of 1898 by Luis Perez, Jr. (on Cuba); Francisco Scarano (on Puerto Rico); and Jim Zwick (on the anti-imperialist movement in the United States through the 1920s). Lester Langley contributes an introductory paper that is an effective summary of arguments he advanced in his lead volume in the United States and the Americas series published by the University of Georgia Press.

This collection advances our understanding of developments in Cuba, the United States, and Spain in the 1890s and in the aftermath of the Spanish-American Cuban War. It is impossible in a short review of this nature to do justice to the range of analyses advanced in the collection, but a few aspects warrant highlighting. The volume makes the most serious effort to incorporate ideology and popular culture into an understanding of U.S. foreign policy of any of the general books under review, although Thomas Schoonover's study of France and Central America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the most effective of the monographs in this respect. There are both strengths and limitations to a predominantly cultural approach. One of the main concerns is the extent to which a narrowly defined group of individuals or a single political cartoonist in a single newspaper can be taken as representative of a more general world view or as a measure of influence in foreign policy circles. Lillian Guerra's discussion of Cuban nationalists in the United States largely avoids these pitfalls. She provides a convincing analysis of the extent to which such leaders as Estrada Palma departed from the more socially revolutionary approach to the Cuban nationalist movement, ideas as she indicates that "informed the nationalism of many revolutionary officers, popular-class soldiers, and their working class émigré counterparts in the United States" (81). As she suggests, in departing from those objectives and values, the middle-class and elite leaders of the Cuban independence movement "facilitated Cuba's development as a neocolony long before the U.S. military ever intervened" (81). Luis Perez, Jr., extends this analysis in his chapter on the legacies of 1898. He suggests that in their efforts to Americanize Cuba, U.S. leaders failed to anticipate the extent to which Cubans would be imbued with a first-world frame of reference within a third-world reality, a conclusion which might also be applied to Scarano's analysis of the U.S. possession of Puerto Rico.

Virginia Bouvier's and Kristin Hoganson's chapters, respectively, on political cartoons and "the imperatives of manhood" in Congressional war debates embody the strengths and limitations of cultural analysis in attempting to understand foreign policy. Bouvier's consideration of the work of *Herald* cartoonist Charles Nelan identifies several charac-

teristics of his and by extension the newspaper's attitude toward the Cuban situation, including caution toward entry into the war, support for the McKinley administration's decision once war was engaged, and criticism of U.S. military competence in Cuba. As she indicates, there is no evidence in Nelan's cartoons of humanitarian considerations as a deciding factor to go to war. Indeed, his cartoons reflect a lack of respect for Cubans and their leaders as well as for other Latin American countries, who are portrayed as childish, politically immature, and ungrateful for U.S. assistance.

One cannot quarrel with these conclusions. Yet, the article is only suggestive of what might be done with this methodology. Bouvier suggests in her introduction that cartoons can help to understand "evidence of variations in regional interpretations of an event, challenging previous periodization schemes, and illustrating continuities and changes in historical representations" (9). To accomplish such a goal requires consideration of more than one political cartoonist in one leading newspaper in a single city over a short period of time. She is on much stronger methodological grounds in suggesting that political cartoons are a valuable source of information and insight that cannot be readily gleaned from more traditional historical sources.

A similar concern applies to the otherwise excellent analysis of congressional debates by Kristin Hoganson. Her argument is convincing: congressmen, debating entry into a war against Spain, were conditioned by values they associated with male honor, by which they understood, "an attribute of a potent, mature and chivalrous man, a man who wielded power, who was poised to fight" (126). Certainly the record of the debates which she cites lends credence to that perspective and to the conclusion that "jingoist congressmen applied their personal standards of behavior to international affairs" (127). The chapter is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the role of gender in U.S. perspectives on international relations. Nonetheless, the link between such cultural assumptions and actual foreign policy decisions needs to be more effectively established than is the case here. The result is that the article is suggestive rather than definitive.

The fourth of the synthetic volumes is Mark Gilderhus's *The Second Century: United States–Latin American Relations since 1889*, which provides an overview of U.S. policy, goals, and tactics and, to some degree, the Latin American response since 1889. In a manner consistent with much of the best literature on inter-American relations, Gilderhus attempts to set U.S.–Latin American relations in the larger context of global politics and economics, although the absence of a clear conceptual framework for such an analysis, unlike the approach that characterizes, for instance, the Schoonover volume, limits the analysis. Again, unlike Schoonover's work, there is no clear interpretation of the factors

that drive foreign policy. Nonetheless, the volume provides an excellent review of the historiography on inter-American relations, setting the U.S.–Latin American relationship in the larger context of U.S. foreign policy in general. Gilderhus is also sensitive to the contributions to the literature from outside traditional historical scholarship, drawing (for instance) from Peter Smith's work on international relations theory. Although the sections dealing with the Latin American reaction to U.S. policy tend to be sketchy, the result is still the best single volume overview of U.S. policy in the region during the twentieth century.

There is no readily identifiable single theme in the monograph literature contained in this review. The volumes range from a highly original and exhaustively researched study by Thomas Schoonover of French policy in Central America between 1820 and 1930 to specialized monographs on single countries. Nancy Mitchell provides an insightful and equally well researched account of German–United States relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Brian McBeth supplements Mitchell's analysis with his study of foreign intervention in Venezuela at the turn of the century. Several authors add to our knowledge of U.S. policy in the Cold War years, including Stephen Streeter and Nick Cullather on Guatemala, Eric Chester and Michael Hall on the Dominican Republic, and the ambassadorial memoir on Honduras from 1980 to 1981 by Jack Binns.

Each provides insight into inter-American affairs, although Schoonover's main contribution is to place U.S. and Central American relations into the larger context of European politics and policies and world systems analysis. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the Schoonover volume is the most intellectually sophisticated of the dozen or so books considered in this review, although his assumptions and conclusions about the nature of foreign policy will not resonate with all scholars. Building on his previous book on Germany in Central America during the same time period, Schoonover effectively contends that the historical literature on Central America has been overly concerned with the role of the United States and Great Britain in the region, in the process neglecting the relationship and impact of major European countries such as France, Spain, Italy, and Germany as well as regional powers such as Mexico. Especially important is his suggestion that a bilateral approach to foreign policy analysis tends to be overly limiting, a critique that applies to much of the historical literature on U.S.–Latin American relations.

Schoonover's conceptual framework is a capitalist world systems analysis, with the result that his approach to "culture" tends to be heavily weighted toward economics, and the state tends to be little more than the agent of the capitalist class. The term "social imperialism" is essential to an understanding of Schoonover's scholarship and, from his

perspective, critical to an understanding of the relationship between the metropolis and the periphery. "Theories of social imperialism and dependency," he suggests, are "useful tools for analyzing the impact of metropole rivalry upon the domestic and international history of Central America" (xvi). Schoonover thus traces the evolution of French involvement in the region with particular emphasis on foreign investment, trade, and strategic considerations from the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars to the onset of the Great Depression. He appropriately indicates that in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, during the period when much of the early work on the Panama canal occurred, French capitalists held the largest share of foreign investment in the region. This was the apogee of French material involvement in the area, but the impact of France went beyond investment and trade to incorporate military missions and the promotion of French cultural institutions. As he notes, at the turn of the century, with the exception of Guatemala, the social and political elites of Central America were confirmed Francophiles. In Costa Rica, for instance, in the 1890s French residents and admirers of French culture established two associations: the French Society for Charity and the French Society for Information. Although the material involvement of France in the region faded with the rise of the United States as a major industrial and military power, their cultural role continued through the twentieth century.

Brian McBeth and Nancy Mitchell both select a tableau broader than U.S.–Latin American relations for their portraits of foreign intervention in Venezuela and German-American imperialism in Latin America at the turn of the century. Of the two works, Mitchell's is the more challenging and comprehensive and adds important insight into the nature of Wilhelmine foreign policy toward Latin America and relations with the United States. As she indicates, the 1961 publication of Fritz Fischer's study of German foreign policy touched off a debate in German historical scholarship similar to that sparked by William A. Williams' *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Although not concerned with Latin America, Fischer portrayed Wilhelmine foreign policy as recklessly expansionist. Few scholars then or since have been attracted to the issue of German policy in the Caribbean and Latin America. Holger Herwig's study of Germany's visions of empire in Venezuela at the turn of the century is an exception. Mitchell provides a thoroughly researched and closely argued study of the nature of German policy and relations with the United States prior to World War I. She notes the tensions between the two countries over such issues as U.S. meat exports from the 1880s onward as well as over the critical question of German naval buildup and draft plans for a potential invasion of the United States. At the same time she presents a strong challenge to Herwig and David Trask's thesis that German war plans against the United States were serious at the turn of the century. In

subsequent chapters she provides a detailed and original account of the Germanization of Brazil, which experienced the influx of almost half a million German immigrants beginning in 1824. At the same time Mitchell demonstrates that, in spite of the jingoist German press and such organizations as the Pan-German League, the Colonial Association, and the German-Brazil Society, all of which at times supported the idea of a German republic in southern Brazil, there was no German government interest in such an idea. As she indicates, whether in Brazil, Venezuela, or Mexico, which was Germany's fourth largest trading partner in Latin America, the German government consistently placed good relations with the United States above any other ambitions it might have had in the Western Hemisphere. She concludes succinctly: "What did Germany actually do to establish hegemony in the region? The simple answer is nothing. There was no German threat" (217).

Brian S. McBeth's study of foreign intervention in Venezuela in the early twentieth century is less comprehensive than the title implies. Well researched in British, Venezuelan, and U.S. primary sources, the volume focuses more on Venezuelan politics and economics than it does on British, Italian, German, or U. S. policies, although the United States was Venezuela's most important trading partner, followed closely by Britain and Germany. He does not address the larger question of the relationship between the United States and the European powers. Nonetheless, in his focus on the policies of the Castro government, he has fleshed out an historical period that is less well documented than foreign policy dimensions, and it is valuable that he has written the study largely from a Venezuelan perspective. The volume casts considerable light on the impact of German investment and trade after the 1880s with the onset of the coffee boom. But his main focus is on the years in which Venezuela was governed by Cipriano Castro, whose accession to power by the force of arms in 1899 began a series of four dictatorships that endured until 1945. McBeth recounts in detail the relationship between Castro and the U.S.-dominated asphalt industry, German interest in the Gran Ferrocarril de Venezuela, and French interests in communications. In the course of Castro's years in power, Venezuelan ports were blockaded by the European powers, the French and the Dutch broke diplomatic relations, and political opposition to his regime intensified. McBeth argues convincingly that the notion that Castro was a Venezuelan nationalist cannot be sustained. Rather his government was characterized by the kind of personalism and caudillismo that plagued Venezuelan politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 1908 coup that brought to power Juan Vicente Gómez marked the continuation of that tradition, although Gómez proved to be supportive of foreign investment and anxious to restore positive relations with the United States and European powers.

Catherine Jayne picks up the story of Anglo-American relations over the specific issue of the Mexican nationalization of much of the oil industry in 1938 and the efforts of American and British governments and companies to obtain a settlement of their claims. The author struggles to set her work apart from the existing literature on the subject, whether Lorenzo Meyer's studies of British and American relations with Mexico or more U.S.-focused studies such as Bryce Wood's and Irwin Gellman's, among others. Yet the author's contention that the extant scholarship does not take into consideration British and American concerns that the nationalization provided an entering wedge for Germany, Italy, and Japan simply cannot be sustained. As well, the existing literature already documents effectively the bureaucratic and inter-personal rivalry that existed over control of policy in the Roosevelt administration. Where Jayne is on stronger ground is in her carefully researched discussion of British policy, and she provides considerable insight into the role of John Balfour, the head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, and Frederick Starling, the director of the Petroleum Department. She correctly concludes that both Balfour and Starling perceived the Mexican nationalization from the outset as a strategic threat to Britain in a time of war. She is also correct to suggest that the British government took an unequivocal stand against the nationalization and in favor of British commercial interests in Mexico, unlike the Roosevelt administration, which demonstrated hostility to the companies at times and placed enhanced relations with Mexico above the narrower interests of the private sector.

The volumes addressing U.S.–Latin American relations in the Cold War era are all solid research monographs, with the exception of Jack Binns' memoir of his year as Ambassador to Honduras in the transition from the Carter to the Reagan administration. Stephen Streeter's study of the decade following the U.S.-backed coup in Guatemala in 1954 transcends the long-standing historical focus on the pre-coup decade to examine the subsequent impact Castillo Armas's government had on Guatemala. Thoroughly researched in the unfortunately scant archival and government-printed materials available in Guatemala, he has made effective use of the U.S. National Archives, presidential archives, and several university-based collections, including the oral history collection at Georgetown. His conceptual framework is hegemony, which he convincingly uses to explain why popular resistance to the counter-revolution that followed the 1954 coup consistently failed to generate sufficient force to reverse the direction and return to the "spring" of the Arévalo and Arbenz years. U.S. hegemony was not, however, the only factor. The ethnic and class divisions that characterized Guatemalan society served to reinforce hegemony by "inhibiting unified nationalism" (4). Like much of the literature on U.S. government relations with

the oil industry at the time of the Mexican oil nationalization, Streeter also demonstrates that in the case of Guatemala, although U.S. corporations exercised considerable influence in Washington, government officials often resisted corporate advice on foreign policy issues. Given the nature of this argument, it is somewhat surprising not to find Michael Hogan's work on corporatism cited in the bibliography.

Following an excellent synthesis of the pre-coup reform decade, Streeter's volume traces in detail the efforts on the part of the Eisenhower administration to manipulate elections, isolate dissidents, and strengthen the Guatemalan armed forces. He also provides an intriguing account of the Guatemalan relationship to the training of Cuban nationalist exiles following Castro's rise to power in Cuba. The U.S. support for the Guatemalan security forces helped to create as one of the major legacies a highly repressive political and social environment. As he notes, an estimated 200,000 civilians disappeared in Guatemala between 1954 and 1991. U.S. government support for U.S.-based companies in transportation, agriculture, and electricity also undermined any Guatemalan efforts to achieve a higher degree of economic diversification and autonomy. The irony of course is, as Streeter notes, U.S. policy in Guatemala during the Eisenhower administration was a resounding success. The coup in 1954 was followed by a successful counter-revolution that reversed or at least contained the forces of reform that had been so encouraging in the pre-coup years.

Nick Cullather's volume provides a micro-analysis of the 1954 coup. Hired in 1992 as an historian by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during its "openness initiative" to work on Operation PBSUCCESS that overthrew Arbenz, Cullather completed the study only to find that it would be classified. It was only released a decade later. Cullather demonstrates in this slim volume that the success of the 1954 operation confirmed the views of the Eisenhower administration and the CIA, in particular, that covert operations offered a safe and inexpensive substitute to armed intervention against Communism in the Third World. In turn that success contributed to a degree of complacency, in particular about the nature of popular opinion and its role in a counter-revolution, when it came to coping with Castro at the Bay of Pigs early in Kennedy's presidency. He also demonstrates that Truman and Eisenhower both believed that the Guatemalan government was in fact succumbing to Moscow's influence, and this, far more than the direct threat land reform posed to U.S. companies such as United Fruit, drove policy.

Michael R. Hall's and Eric Thomas Chester's volumes on the Dominican Republic during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidencies provide chronological and thematic continuity with Streeter's and Cullather's studies of Guatemala and tell similar tales. Hall's study covers the transitional years from the Eisenhower administration through

1962 in the Kennedy administration and focuses on the significance of sugar production and exports on the bilateral relationship. Unlike some bilateral studies, Hall's attempts to give equal attention to the role of Dominicans in the development of the political economy and policy toward the United States, as much as the author clearly sets the analysis in the conceptual framework of hegemony. Hall provides one chapter of solid historical background on the evolution of the sugar economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries before turning to the evolution of U.S. policy. He notes the extent to which Rafael Trujillo in the Truman and Eisenhower years worked to monopolize the sugar industry in order to consolidate his control over the economy. Hall's presentation of the bilateral relationship contains no startling new conclusions. The author notes that the United States had no need for Dominican sugar imports and was concerned primarily with Cold War issues, in particular preventing what was perceived as the spread of Castro's influence through the Caribbean region. As Hall concludes, under both Eisenhower and Kennedy, U.S. policy preferences were for stable, even if authoritarian, regimes in the area. Thus, the emergence of Juan Bosch, leader of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, as president provided difficulties for the Johnson administration, especially given the internal conflict over political control which emerged under Bosch. In addition, Hall confirms Cullather's conclusions about the impact of the 1954 Guatemalan coup on U.S. policy in demonstrating the extent to which the Kennedy administration continued to support CIA clandestine operations in the country against dissident political elements.

Chester picks up the analysis of U.S. relations with the Dominican Republic under Lyndon B. Johnson, covering the specific period between 1965 and 1966 through the presidential election in June 1966. His focus is more precisely on U.S. policy and the political developments in the Dominican Republic with less attention to the more subtle analysis of the Dominican political economy provided by Hall. Chester's conclusions on the objectives of U.S. policy are consistent with the historical consensus: policy was driven by the desire of the Johnson administration to assert hegemony in the region, prevent another Cuban revolution, and prevent Bosch from returning to power since he was regarded as a socialist who would not be able to maintain a stable government. The Johnson administration's perception that political instability in the Dominican Republic posed a security threat to U.S. interests resulted in the first direct military intervention by the United States in Latin America since the late 1920s. The direct result was the establishment of a repressive political regime under Belaguer and the repression of Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) activists. Chester adds that U.S. policy was inherently self-defeating, since the exacerbation of poverty and the defeat

of political pluralism heightened conflict in the country and created more fertile soil for anti-American elements.

Jack Binn's memoir account of U.S. policy in Central America, in particular Honduras, where he was ambassador in the transition between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, reaches conclusions similar to those advanced by Chester and others. He appropriately notes the importance of Honduras as the operational center for the CIA's covert operations against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua as well as a base for U.S. military operations. He argues, convincingly, that the Reagan administration was so intent on fighting the Cold War in Central America that, as on so many previous occasions in the history of U.S. foreign policy, it undermined its own policy goals, which included promoting democracy, advancing human rights, and influencing economic development along capitalist lines. The tragedy continues.