

# Meta-ideologies of Textuality: Authorship, Plagiarism, Copyright

---

Marc Perlman, *Brown University*

## ABSTRACT

Few manifestations of intertextuality are better known than plagiarism and copyright infringement, yet few have been less studied by linguistic anthropologists. A variety of textual ideologies of plagiarism and copyright are evident in English composition pedagogy and intellectual-property law, some more and some less author-centric or committed to the values of individuality and originality. The tension between them is articulated in sophisticated arguments, in the course of which the disputants draw explicit attention to the ideological character of the debate, giving it a reflexive, meta-ideological cast. These lay ascriptions of ideology play a wider variety of roles than do ascriptions by linguistic anthropologists—for example, to delegitimize expansive copyright jurisprudence, ward off plagiarism accusations, and rally support for the cultural commons. To facilitate the analysis, a cognitive account of language ideology is developed along with notions of accentuation, focalization, and peripheralization that can be of use in the study of language ideology more generally.

Given linguistic anthropology's enduring concern with intertextuality and the extensive body of sophisticated work on language ideology, it is surprising how little we know about the ideological aspects of pla-

Contact Marc Perlman at Music, Brown University, Box 1924, Providence, RI 02912 (marc\_perlman@brown.edu).

This article is based on materials first presented in 2016 and 2018 at conferences on Semiotic Anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to my colleague Paja Faudree for inviting me to participate in the 2016 event. I'm also indebted to her as well as Claudia Strauss, Greg Urban, Joseph Errington, and Lynnette Arnold for comments that were valuable in the course of revision. I'm particularly grateful to Asif Agha for his encouragement and his helpful suggestions. My thinking on focalized and peripheralized authorship (what in an earlier draft I call hypercognized and hypocognized authorship) was enriched through discussions with David Fossum. To all I express my thanks, while taking responsibility for whatever errors and misinterpretations I may have introduced.

---

Signs and Society, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 2019). © 2019 by Semiosis Research Center at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. All rights reserved. 2326-4489/2019/0702-0005\$10.00

giarism and copyright infringement.<sup>1</sup> The neglect of these forms of transgressive interdiscursivity is hard to explain, especially considering the heavy normative (moral and legal) freight they bear and the controversies that surround them. Few kinds of intertextuality call forth so much vehemence and impassioned argument. That they rouse such passions suggests that they are entangled with deeply rooted assumptions about (and valuations of) textuality, individuality, and creativity. Surely, then, they are relevant to the study of the beliefs people hold about language—that is, to the study of language ideology.

But in some ways they are unlike the ideological phenomena with which we are familiar (such as presuppositions about the nature of language varieties and language users, and the purposes of language and the ways it achieves them). The ideologies of plagiarism and copyright are focused almost exclusively on text-artifacts. Hence they are ideologies of textuality: assumptions about the nature of texts and about the identities and characteristics of authors and audiences, criteria for the evaluation and interpretation of texts, and so on (cf. Bielo 2009, 51–52; Faudree 2015). As we shall see, there are reasons to suppose that textual ideologies will have a distinct physiognomy, a set of preoccupations that differentiates them from other types of semiotic ideology (Keane 2003).

More precisely stated, the ideologies that subtend plagiarism and infringement are ideologies of authorship. They regiment the allowable relations between an author, her text, and the texts of others. They prescribe a minimum distance that texts must maintain between themselves in similarity space. They establish the value of authorial originality and justify the condemnation of anything that detracts from it.

Plagiarism and infringement are most often invoked as accusations, agonistic speech acts meant to delegitimize some person or behavior. This makes them ideal sites for studying ideologies of authorship, since as we know controversy often brings cultural assumptions to light. These underlying assumptions exist both in common, widely shared forms and as professional ideologies (Kroskrity 2000, 10, 15), where they are most extensively elaborated (especially because of the moral panic associated with plagiarism and the legal sanctions associated with infringement). As in any profession, varying material and reputational interests lead different professionals to take divergent stances, ensuring a steady

1. Among the few extant studies on plagiarism are Duranti (1993) and Scollon (1995, 2000). There is a growing body of linguistic-anthropological work on the law (cf. Mertz 2007; Andrus 2012; Eades 2012), but little of it relates to intellectual-property law.

level of controversy conducive to ideological effervescence. Under such conditions, it can become clear to the disputants that they bring different fundamental presuppositions or attitudes to the debate.

None of this is surprising; we are familiar with the role of contestation in promoting discursive consciousness (Kroskrity 2004, 505). But what has gone unremarked is that ideological conflict can produce a consciousness of ideology *as ideology*: the awareness that one's opponent is working from a set of basic assumptions different from one's own. Once brought to consciousness, the fact of ideological multiplicity can then itself become a topic of comment and even a rhetorical weapon. In this way, some educators and legal scholars have come to deploy a concept very much like ideology—and in some cases use that very term to describe it.

Thus any discussion of the ideological aspects of plagiarism and copyright infringement, though it must start by examining varieties of authorial ideology, cannot stop there. It must also note the self-conscious use of concepts of ideology to achieve rhetorical goals—for example, to shift the burden of proof or to mitigate the blameworthiness of the accused. These strategies require the disputants to attribute various language ideologies to others, which in that respect means they must act like linguistic anthropologists. An accredited linguistic anthropologist's study of these strategies—that is, a study of how laypersons act like linguistic anthropologists—therefore takes on what I will call a *meta-ideological* aspect.<sup>2</sup> Hence my aim in this article is twofold: to introduce some of the varieties of textual ideology that inform discussions of plagiarism and infringement and to expand our field of theoretical vision to include the meta-ideological aspects of language ideology.

I begin by setting out the conceptual tools I'll need. Chief among them is the concept of ideology itself, an unwieldy and temperamental instrument. It is a “cluster concept” (Kroskrity 2004, 501) made up of many partially overlapping semantic components. Despite its entangled meanings, it is too deeply entrenched a term to be dispensed with. But especially since I am proposing to raise ideology to the second degree, as it were, I want to be as clear as possible about what I mean by it. So I'll start with a brief reconstruction of it, using basic concepts of culture theory to resolve some of its ambiguities, soften some dichotomies, and prepare for its extension in conceptual space.

2. While I am reluctant to add to the “meta” menagerie (metalinguistic, metasemantic, metapragmatic, metasemiotic, metacultural, etc.), the phenomenon I describe here seems distinct enough to deserve its own label. I should, however, add that—taking my cue from Wilce's (2005) interpretation of “metaculture”—I think of meta-ideology as an aspect of ideology rather than as something apart from it.

### Language Ideology as Cultural Model

*Ideology* is a term notoriously overstuffed with connotations—cognitive, perceptual, emotional, ideational, practical, and institutional. It is one of many terms that refer to more or less informal, inconspicuous collective frameworks that orient human perception, thought, feeling, and action.<sup>3</sup> As Woolard (1998, 5–9) points out, what especially sets ideology apart from its congeners is its critical flavor. It suggests a view from a particular location in social space, a partial, interest-laden view, one that reinforces, rationalizes, or mystifies the existing social, economic, or political power structures—indeed, a view that is downright false. Arguably, this connotation is inescapable and will arise even where it is unintended (1998, 8). Without it, ideology seems rather generic. If we subtract the element of interestedness, we are left with the most familiar, foundational notions of anthropological culture theory (“folk beliefs or assumptions,” “culturally shared ideas and values,” “cultural representations,” “reflexive sensibilities,” “cultural conceptual schemata,” “invokable schemata,” “interpretive schemes,” “idealized models,” “models of/for,” among others).<sup>4</sup> This is unfortunate, as “interestedness” is a problematic criterion.<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, to distinguish concepts of ideology according to the presence or absence of the criterion of interestedness occludes an important distinction. In its neutral sense, ideology says nothing about the epistemic adequacy of a belief and nothing about its social function—that is, it implies neither the falsity of that belief nor the existence of power disparities that are perpetuated by its falsity. In its critical sense, ideology implies both. However, these two conditions are conceptually separable: a belief can be empirically inadequate without necessarily serving the interests of those in power. (Distortions in the perception of language forms and functions can also be caused by universal “cognitive limitations on human linguistic awareness”; Hill 1998, 79.)

3. Some other members of this highly populated semantic domain are *zeitgeist*, *weltanschauung*, (Whorfian) “fashions of speaking,” *mentalité*, conceptual schemes, “webs of significance,” *habitus*, *doxa*, *episteme*, discursive formation, cultural models, “repertoires of meaning,” ontology, *et alia*.

4. These are all terms used to define or characterize language ideology, taken from Silverstein (1979, 193; 1998, 129, 132); Milroy (2004, 162); Matoesian (1999, 519); Swigart (2001, 105); Woolard (1998, 5, 8, 15); Weissbourd and Mertz (1985, 624); Kroskrity (1998, 115); Spitulnik (1998, 165, 169); Briggs (1998, 238, 249); and Makihara and Schieffelin (2007, 4, 14).

5. Either we interpret “interest” so broadly as to become tautological (anything that increases one’s “utility” is in one’s interest, even self-sacrifice), or else we must be able to contrast interested behavior with an alternative. Yet to know what that alternative is, we would need to have secure access to some standard (of truth, rationality, normativity, etc.). Only with such a standard could we determine whether some set of beliefs merely reinforces or mystifies existing power structures. Without it, any purportedly “scientific” or “objective” view can be accused of harboring ulterior motives (“right-wing politics in disguise,” as Silverstein [1998, 127] puts it).

It is possible to accommodate this more nuanced distinction while at the same time integrating the notion of linguistic ideology explicitly within the larger domain of culture theory if we regard the central distinguishing characteristic of ideology as selectivity or bias that affects perception, emotion, memory, or reasoning. The cause of that bias may be self-interest, and its function may be to support social relations of unequal power. But the biasing of thought is a much more general phenomenon, within which interest-driven bias is only a special case. “Cognitive limitations on human linguistic awareness” are just one of many kinds of cognitive limitation.

Cognitive psychology has long had a sophisticated vocabulary to describe the mental chiaroscuro by which the mind foregrounds certain aspects of experience and backgrounds others. Most basic is the notion of “graded-structure concepts.” These are concepts whose instantiations vary in typicality. The most typical instances are the easiest to think of and the easiest to remember; the least typical hover at the dim edges of the concept, and people may be in some doubt whether the concept applies to them at all (Murphy 2002). We could say that a graded-structure concept draws a relief map of its field of reference or that it spotlights certain examples and consigns others to the shadows. For example, while ‘bird’ applies to robins and penguins alike, the former is more typical than the latter. (Thus ‘bird,’ as a graded-structure concept, is biased against penguins and toward robins, as it were.<sup>6</sup>) We could say the robin is a *focal* example of a bird, and the penguin is a *peripheral* example.

What is true of concepts holds equally for more elaborate constructs such as schemata, models, or theories.<sup>7</sup> All of these are cognitively useful because they generalize and idealize, abstracting away from experience in one direction or another (Strauss and Quinn 1997). However, while they may streamline or filter reality, they do not censor it. They are biased toward certain aspects of experience and against others, but the latter are not rendered completely inaccessible. I shall refer to this effect of selective emphasis common to graded-structure concepts and cultural schemas by speaking of *focalizing* and *peripheralizing*.

Thinking of language ideology as an interpretive scheme or idealized model is not unprecedented (cf. Niedzielski and Preston 2000, 308, 322; Milroy 2001,

6. The concept of “bird” can be differently structured for different people in different social groups. I use the robin as an illustration, but for some people it may be less typical than some other bird.

7. In arriving at this formulation of the focalizing and peripheralizing effects of cultural schemas, I benefited from a conversation with Claudia Strauss.

64). But it seems not to have been widely appreciated how naturally this formulation accounts for many of language ideology's distinguishing characteristics. For example, it gives us an elegant way to understand erasure, which follows automatically from the graded structure of cultural schemas. For a phenomenon to become "unobserved or unattended to" (Irvine and Gal 2000, 38) is simply for it to be peripheralized, to be made less thinkable. What's more, construing erasure as peripheralization has some advantages: for example, it encourages us to think of erasure as a matter of degree.

Similarly, a cultural-model account of language ideology nicely captures its multiplicity and internal heterogeneity (Kroskrity 2004, 503). Ideology, like any other cultural manifestation, is by definition shared, but sharing is never complete. While the epidemiological tendency of cultural schemas to spread through a population exerts centripetal pressure toward homogeneity and uniformity, it is countered by centrifugal forces that promote variation, mutability, divergence, and niche differentiation (Strauss and Quinn 1997, 130–34). The degree of sharedness of language ideology is thus a gradient, ranging from near-total uniformity to near-total idiosyncrasy. Hence this approach can accommodate ideologies that rest on widely shared, taken-for-granted cultural conventions, as well as ideologies of more restricted provenance, such as the professional ideologies I will discuss later. (There is even a notional "ideology degree zero" held by a single person. It may seem paradoxical to use the word in this context, but if a schema is cultural to the extent that it is shared, then any sharable schema is *potentially* cultural—an ideology-in-waiting.)

The availability to a single speaker of multiple, possibly mutually incompatible schemas accounts for another dimension of ideological multiplicity: the "fluid coexistence" and "interaction" of distinct language ideologies. A culture bearer may have access to more than one ideological model, which are selectively activated according to context. Further, their availability can also afford strategic use (Jourdan and Angeli 2014, 282).

Cultural schemas can also mitigate the tendency to think of language ideology as propositional. Definitions of ideology are often couched in terms of beliefs, ideas, representations, or thought, even though we recognize that feelings can be as important as ideas (Kroskrity 2004, 498). Cultural schemas, since they play emotional and conative as well as cognitive roles, can accommodate the noncognitive aspects of ideology.

Similarly, they can also provide a more natural account of ideological influences on mental operations. As an example, let's return briefly to the phenomenon of erasure or peripheralization. Consider the song "Happy Birthday to

You.” This familiar meme is a song like any other, yet we do not usually treat it as such—in fact, we don’t often treat it as a cultural artifact. It is not merely that we are ignorant of its composer’s name; we don’t ordinarily think of it as having been composed at all (Cone 1974, 49–50). This is clearly a lacuna of the sort we call ideological, but it’s not easy to capture it in propositional form. “The Happy Birthday song has no composer” is not accurate, since it suggests a negative belief rather than the absence of belief. By contrast, it’s more plausible to think of the song as part of a cultural schema (birthday party) that has no “composer slot,” unlike the schema for a classical music concert, where we expect to see the names of the composers in the program notes, or the schema for a popular music recording, where we expect to find them in the liner notes or the metadata. Thus we are unlikely to notice our ignorance of the composer’s name.

Finally, understanding language ideology as an interpretive schema also accommodates another of its well-known features: that it serves to explain or rationalize some aspect of language usage (Irvine and Gal 2000, 37). The explanatory potential of cultural models is one of their key features. When someone uses a cultural model to understand some aspect of language, it serves an epistemic role comparable to the role that the disciplinary resources of linguistic anthropology provide us as we try to understand some aspect of language behavior.<sup>8</sup> This parallel has often been noted; we are frequently reminded of the ideological nature of the linguistic sciences (e.g., Silverstein 2003, 203). Understanding language ideology as a cultural model allows us to further elaborate this parallelism, as I will show *infra* in my discussion of meta-ideology.

To summarize, ideologies are cultural schemas that screen perception, channel thought, and canalize desire. All of them focalize and peripheralize experience to a greater or lesser extent. Some of them are held in place by their conformance with a society’s prevailing distribution of power, but many are not. Their biasing effects are not crippling. Peripheralized aspects of experience are not rigidly shielded from conscious awareness; they just require more effort to bring to mind.

With these preliminaries settled, let us now return to the ideologies of plagiarism and copyright. These are ideologies of textuality focused on questions of origin, a concern relatively uncharacteristic of the language ideologies we are

8. Of course, the same ideology can be used in different ways by different actors to explain different things. For example, while the content of an ideology of reference-and-predication can serve the speaker as a rationalization of her own language use, the ascription of that ideology to culture-bearers can serve the linguistic anthropologist as an explanation of certain developments in the history of the language concerned.

more accustomed to studying. I suspect that to some extent this focus is fostered by the nature of textuality itself. To show why, and to establish a context for the rest of my analysis, I will start with a general discussion of ideologies of textuality.

### **Ideologies of Textuality: Some Examples**

Textual ideologies appear in a great variety of forms. Some ideological attributes attach to single text-artifacts. For example, conservative American evangelicals regard the Bible as the inerrant word of God, a constant guide to all of life's challenges (Bielo 2009). By contrast, the Friday Apostolics of Zimbabwe view the Bible as a biased document of Christianity that is irrelevant to Africans (Engelke 2007, 5). In other times and places, other prestigious texts have been thought to have divinatory powers, which warrants their use in practices of bibliomancy such as *sortes Virgilianae* (Ziolkowski and Putnam 2008, 829–30), in which one would open a book of Virgil at random in order to predict the future.

Ideology may stipulate the appropriate uses of texts or categories of texts. Sacred texts are often surrounded by norms dictating how they should be read, but other genres may also carry assumptions concerning proper and improper ways of reading them. Since at least the eighteenth century some commentators have distinguished “active” and “passive” reading and promoted the former over the latter (Woodmansee 1994, 87–102). One very widespread conception of the proper way of understanding and appreciating poetry and prose fiction concerns the role the author's intentions should play in the interpretation of his or her text (the issue literary theorists have debated under the rubric of the “intentional fallacy”; Iseminger 1992; Livingston 2005). The ideology of authorial intention may be an application or special case of a broader language ideology, the (usually implicit) ideology of personalism (Holquist 1983, 2), which considers the meaning of an utterance to depend on the intention of the speaker. However, when applied to texts, this relationship can be made explicit and even problematized without necessarily impugning the wider ideology of personalism—suggesting that ideologies of textuality may be more prone to explicitation and contestation than other kinds of language ideology.

Ideologies of textuality have some other features related to the specificities of text-artifacts as types of discourse. Many reported language ideologies concern entire languages or language varieties, whereas textual ideology concerns discourses formulated within a language. There are of course many more texts



than languages, and the average speaker constantly encounters new instances of them. Thus one theme that may be more prominent in textual ideology than in language ideology overall is that of origin or creation (i.e., authorship). While there are occasional instances of ideological concern with the origin of a language (e.g., Woolard 2002), the creation of texts is likely to be much more salient to average speakers.

### Ideologies of Authorship

The author's relationship to his or her text is well-traveled ground in both literary criticism and linguistic anthropology. As Irvine has pointed out (1996, 132), the Bakhtinian concern with multivocality tends to converge with the sociolinguistic interest in "footing" and participant roles. In both cases, the object of analysis is usually a specific segment of discourse that exploits culturally appropriate devices to assure proper uptake.<sup>9</sup> Similar frameworks allow an author to design distinctions of voice into a text-artifact.<sup>10</sup>

Beyond such intratextual encodings of authorship, there are also assumptions about author-text relations encoded by extratextual features of the event. These assumptions often cover whole categories of discourse, as when a particular social status conventionally implies a special relationship between author and text. This is clear in the case of vatic authorship, when a certain class of creators is thought not to originate texts but to receive them from supernatural sources. For example, some composers among the Suyá/Kisedje of Brazil are said to learn their songs from the spirits of bees, birds, fish, trees, armadillos, or vaginas (Seeger 2004, 52ff.).

Of all the presuppositions about authorship that the recipient brings to the text, I will focus on the role and valuation of authorial individuality and originality. I range ideologies of authorship along a single axis, with ideologies that privilege originality at one pole, and those that efface it at the other. (I will discuss only explicit ideologies, mostly professional ideologies that circulate in

9. In a face-to-face situation these devices can allow a speaker's discourse to be parsed into Principal, Animator, Relayer, Sponsor, Ghostor, or any of a number of other contextually contingent roles delineable through shared interpretive frameworks. Of course, shared conventions can never assure perfect uptake, and different hearers may assign a given discourse fragment to different participation roles. But indeterminacy of assignment can be conventional as well. Even in the *xaxaar* poems that Irvine discusses, where authorial responsibility is dissimulated, the masking of responsibility is understood by all and gleefully exploited by the participants.

10. These include conventional devices of contrastive individuation and biographic identification, or more-or-less enregistered social characterization (Agha 2005). The author is also free to explicitly assume participant roles, whether conventional or idiosyncratic, like the fictional editor (e.g., John Ray, Jr., in Nabokov's *Lolita*) or the ghost narrator (e.g., Kurt Vonnegut's *Galápagos* [1985] and Alice Sebold's *The Lovely Bones* [2002]).

scholarly communities, such as literary critics, folklorists, or poststructuralists).<sup>11</sup>

### Ambiguities of Originality

Since ideological accounts of authorship vary greatly, in starting out it's helpful to consider why this might be so. I suggest that ideological multiplicity is facilitated by interpretive ambiguity. The more ways there are to construe a situation, the greater the possibility for one's perception of it to be ideologically skewed. In accounts of text production, the exact relation of the author to the work is a major site of ambiguity. Our judgment of the author's contribution—her originality—is necessarily an interpretation of an inchoate situation; indeed, the author herself can't be sure how much of her contribution is "really" her own. This is true for both psychological and conceptual reasons.

An individual author is never the sole point of origin for a text. Sometimes this is literally true, as when the author collaborates with others in the real-time creative process. But even an author who works in solitude does not work alone. Insofar as her work observes the conventions of a language and a tradition, she will necessarily use preexisting materials (vocabulary, syntax, collocations, registers, styles, genres, allusions, proverbs, etc.) of known or unknown origin. A text that respected no conventions whatsoever could not be recognized as a meaningful text: "An ideal originality would result in an incomprehensible idiolect" (Stewart 1991, 25).<sup>12</sup> (The inevitable coexistence of old and new can be deduced from the nature of language itself. Any sign system that is more than a limited set of discrete, fixed signals—any system displaying productive compositionality—can generate an indefinite number of texts from a finite vocabulary. Since they are made up of the same components, all of those texts will resemble each other to *some extent*.<sup>13</sup>)

11. I ignore implicit "sittings" of the ideologies of authorship, but this is not because they don't exist. For example, there is experimental evidence of a preference for both individuality (audiences evaluate a work more positively when they think it is the product of a single creator rather than several; Smith and Newman 2014, 308), and originality (audiences evaluate something more negatively when they think it is a copy of another work; Newman and Bloom 2012). These sittings deserve more attention than they've received, but I can do no more than mention them here.

12. This is slightly oversimplified. In the right sociohistorical context, a highly unconventional production could still be accepted as a text, though not a (literally) meaningful one—for example, Hugo Ball's "Gadji beri bimba."

13. Considered in the abstract, if the vocabulary is very large and the texts generated with it are very short, one could build many texts that have no vocabulary elements in common; indeed, it might be that most texts would be entirely disjoint. But if the distribution of vocabulary tokens obeys some version of Zipf's Law (as is the case in all natural languages), even short texts would be likely to share elements.

Furthermore, an individual author can never be sure how much credit she deserves for her creative ideas, because the contents of the mind do not usually bear marks of provenance. When a thought arises, the individual has no infallible way of telling whether its origin is interior (a novel idea) or exterior (a memory). Through “source monitoring” (Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay 1993) he must use the thought’s contents and any available circumstantial evidence to infer its origin. When source monitoring fails, a novel idea can be misinterpreted as a memory, or in the case of cryptomnesia (Perfect and Stark 2008) a memory can surface with the feeling that it is a new idea. Both overclaiming and cryptomnesia render judgments of originality uncertain, even for the author himself.

But even if, *per impossibile*, we could trace the source of each and every aspect or component of a text, judging its originality would still require an act of interpretation. Originality is a criterion-relative concept. Since old and new co-exist in every text, a new text will necessarily resemble existing texts to some degree. But similarity can only be judged with reference to a standard (Irvine 2005, 77). By choosing an appropriate standard, we can make any text look like either a minor variant of, or a major departure from, an existing text.

The relativity of originality can be easily illustrated with examples from the history of the language disciplines themselves. For researchers have taken a very wide variety of stances on the average degree of novelty in discourse, with some finding it everywhere and others nowhere. Notoriously, the rise of the generative grammar paradigm emphasized the radical originality of most utterances: “Virtually every sentence that a person utters or understands is a brand-new combination of words, appearing for the first time in the history of the universe” (Pinker 1995, 22); “Every speaker of a language has the astonishing capacity to produce completely intelligible sentences that have never been uttered before in history, and every speaker pulls off this enormous stunt several times each day” (Peters 2008, 22).

Yet in literary theory, the near-contemporaneous development of the concept of intertextuality emphasized the radical *un*-originality of linguistic productions. Barthes famously declared every text to be “woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages . . . antecedent or contemporary, which cut across it through and through in a vast stereophony” (1977, 160).

These claims, antithetical in their emphasis, are not necessarily contradictory. However, they show that judgments of originality are perspectival and relational. (This fact has been discussed by Greg Urban in terms of “interpretative metaculture.” While there are affinities between his account and mine, I

don't adopt his terminology here since it seems to conflate aspects of the phenomenon that I wish to keep separate.<sup>14</sup>)

In short, to the extent that standards of comparison vary, they offer some degree of latitude to ideological influence. To see how far that latitude extends in the realm of textual authorship, let us now take a closer look at the axis of authorial individuality and originality. I'll illustrate it with a few highly contrasting examples taken from opposite ends of the continuum.

### Ideologies of Focalized and Peripheralized Authorship

At one end of the continuum of originality is what is often referred to as a "Romantic" ideology, according to which texts are produced by a process of "solitary, ex nihilo creation" (Wilf 2014, 398). This ideology is said to be consistent with modern Western values of individualism, insofar as its exclusive focus on the isolated author discounts collective and traditional contributions to text generation. At the other extreme, the latter are emphasized and the role of the individual minimized. I will refer to these as ideologies of focalized and peripheralized individual authorship, respectively.

Explicitly focalized authorship is conventionally called "Romantic," no doubt because late eighteenth-century Britain witnessed the publication of several vigorous defenses of originality (among them Edward Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition* [1759] and William Duff's *An Essay on Original Genius* [1767]). Novelty, originality, and individuality were also praised by eminent contemporaneous writers, such as Wordsworth (the writer should "owe nothing but to nature and his own genius" [Macfarlane 2007, 22]) and Shelley ("I am unwilling to tread in the footsteps of any who have preceded me" [Macfarlane 2007, 30]).

14. The perspectival nature of judgments of originality—the fact that the same textual phenomenon can be considered original or derivative—is implied by Urban's (2001) contrast between the "metaculture of tradition" and the "metaculture of newness." However, Urban's account of these is complex, as he recognizes both "empiricist" and "relativist" views of metaculture (2001, 36–37). Furthermore, for him metaculture plays interpretative, evaluative, and motivational roles: a metaculture of newness skews comparative judgments toward findings of "different" rather than "similar"; assigns greater worth to difference than to similarity; and encourages actors to produce items of culture that differ from existing items. Interpretative metaculture without motivational force he calls "false consciousness" (2001, 80). While it is plausible to suppose that (what I would call) ideologies of focalized originality would impel creators to maximize the novelty of their productions, I prefer to maintain a conceptual distinction between the interpretative and motivational aspects of ideology. Thus I have not adopted Urban's terminology, despite the affinities between his two varieties of metaculture and my own vocabulary of focalization and peripheralization. It is possible, however, that my notion of ideologies of focalized originality corresponds better to a precursor of the metaculture of newness, what Silverstein and Urban call the "ideology of textual newness": "the idea . . . of a continuously moving or evolving culture, even though the 'new' text—as recognized by the metadiscourse—may be no more new than the recontextualization of what a different metadiscourse recognizes as an 'old' text" (1996, 13).

Focalized (“Romantic”) authorship has been extensively discussed; much less attention has been paid to the varieties of peripheralized authorship. These can be roughly categorized into two types, depending on whether the texts concerned are nominally attributed or unattributed. The authorship of unattributed texts comes already peripheralized, as it were. In the Euro-American tradition, one key site for the discussion of the authorship of unattributed texts has been the anonymous products of oral tradition, such as folk songs. There is a long history of debate on this subject. At one extreme, anonymity was dismissed as an accidental gap in our knowledge, the mere forgetting of an author’s name. At the other extreme, anonymity was interpreted as an ontological, not merely an epistemic, condition: the fact that a folk song was unattributed was taken to indicate that it was a spontaneous product of group creativity exercised en masse (“planless, spontaneous poetry, offspring of the instant and of the need for expression, is likely to be the product of a throng”; Gummere 1897, xc). In between these extremes, some theorists allowed for individual composition but insisted the individual creator’s individuality was overwhelmed by the spirit of the group: “the individual personality . . . disappears in the general character of a People” (Uhland 1868, 4).<sup>15</sup>

Alternatively, the thesis of individual creation followed by communal recreation (Sharp [1907] 1965) dispenses with any direct involvement by a group, but neither does it posit an individual who can ventriloquize the people’s feelings. Instead, we have a chain of successive individual revisions of an individual creation, gradually purging it of all idiosyncrasies unpalatable to communal taste. Under this theory, individual authorship is peripheralized by the multiplication of individualities.

In the case of attributed texts, there are two ways to peripheralize the role of the nominal author. One way is to emphasize the author’s debt to specific prior authors. This, it is said, was characteristic of the literary aesthetics of antiquity and early modern Europe, when authors were not expected to be wholly original but could “imitate” previous writers. Often signaled by the terms *inventio* and *imitatio*, this was an aesthetics of borrowing and appropriation, allusion and embellishment, the recasting, rearranging, and recombining of existing models.

In more radical peripheralizations, individual authorship can be dissolved into a generalized pool of prior texts. This is perhaps a more recent approach;

15. It was from David Fossum’s dissertation, “A Cult of Anonymity in the Age of Copyright” (Brown University, 2017), that I learned of Uhland and Gummere.

in any case, its most extreme form is associated with poststructuralism and often described with the term *intertextuality*. Coined by Julia Kristeva in her exposition of the thought of Bakhtin, she used it to describe an inherent property of all literature: any text is “a mosaic of quotations,” a “dialogue among several writings.” Every text is “a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another.” Since “the ‘literary word’ is an intersection of textual surfaces,” the author’s intention cannot anchor her text; rather, its meaning emerges from its juxtaposition and collision with whichever other texts a reader brings to it. This evacuation of the author made intertextuality attractive to Barthes, whose famous thesis of the “death of the author” can be considered the ne plus ultra of poststructuralist authorial peripheralization.<sup>16</sup>

### From Ideology to Meta-ideology

One aspect of language ideology—its explanatory role—gives its study by linguistic anthropologists a reflexive dimension. As a scholarly discipline, linguistic anthropology is committed to accounting for, understanding, and explaining language in society. Language ideology, insofar as it too is used to account for, understand, and explain language, is thus the topic of linguistic-anthropological study that most closely resembles the discipline itself. We have repeatedly pointed out this correspondence between the conduct and object of our researches, be-

16. The reception history of “intertextuality” is an ironic illustration of Bakhtin’s remark that the word in language is half someone else’s. Kristeva could not make her radically peripheralizing concept of intertextuality adhere to the term: it almost immediately succumbed to the undertow of traditional literary criticism, slipping out of her grasp (indeed, she quickly abandoned it). In much of the humanities and social sciences *intertextuality* was recuperated as a term for allusion, parody, and all of the other familiar ways authors intentionally reference previous texts. (Genette [1982] 1997] gives an extensive catalog of these evocative devices.) It is this more restricted sense of the word, closer to *imitatio*, that has gained wide currency everywhere except folklore and linguistic anthropology, which have radicalized the concept even further by applying it to all forms of discourse, not just text-artifacts. There, intertextuality refers to a (potentially bidirectional) out-of-time relationship between two samples of discourse (Silverstein 2005), in contrast to interdiscursivity, which describes a directional relation between datable speech events. “Token-interdiscursivity” results when one specific speech event points to a previous one (as in reported speech, or metalinguistic references to specific utterances), and thus corresponds, *mutatis mutandis*, to the allusive relations between particular texts denoted by (the restricted sense of) “intertextuality.” By contrast, “type-interdiscursivity” has no clear Kristevan cognate: it is a relation between a datable speech event and a “generalized or abstracted model” of discourse, such as a speech genre. (It thus corresponds to what Bauman calls “generic intertextuality,” and what Genette calls architextuality.) Both Silverstein and Bauman seem to treat the indexing of an abstract model or “generic schema” as equivalent to the indexing of “other instances of the generic class” (Bauman 2004, 7; emphasis added), though this seems to identify the “intension” of a genre with its “extension,” so to speak. Interestingly, linguistic anthropology in a way restores the universal reach of Kristevan intertextuality. Kristeva took Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism (a property of only some texts) and enlarged it into an intertextuality that pervades all texts (Pfister 1991, 212). Silverstein generalizes the idea even further: for him, interdiscursivity is the necessary infrastructure of language functions as basic as denotation (2005, 10–12).

tween our own “theories” about the behavior of a language community and the “ethno-theories” held by the community’s members.

From the very beginning, we have treated “native ideological rationalization” and “so-called ‘scientific’ description” as coordinate terms (Silverstein 1979, 193), recognizing that we ourselves employ “basic assumptions” that reveal the operation of “linguistic ideology in our current scholarly life” (Gal 1998, 319). “Ideologically presented rationalization . . . function[s] . . . in the same metapragmatic semiotic mode as ‘real’ (social) science. . . . So we do just what the ‘natives’ do, schematically speaking, and we should not ever forget that” (Silverstein 2003, 203).<sup>17</sup>

But we can go beyond this general parallel between what we do and what the “natives” do. When we write about language ideology, much of the time we are ascribing ideologies to certain people. Is there a “native” cognate to this business of ours? Do “natives” do anything resembling the identification and analysis of language ideologies? Is there a “lay ideology critique” to correspond to our own “accredited” ideology critique?<sup>18</sup>

I suggest that there is. Laypersons, too, identify and analyze the presuppositions and value systems underlying various types of linguistic behavior. They don’t do it in many contexts, and they don’t necessarily call what they discover “ideology,” but it is easily recognizable as such from within our discipline. If the explanatory function of language ideology in general makes it a kind of ethno-science (Silverstein 2003, 203), we could call this particular variety of it the *ethno-ascription of ideology*. In other words, just as there is a “folk linguistics” (Niedzielski and Preston 2000), a lay counterpart to our “‘scientific’ statements about language” (Silverstein 1979, 193), there is also a folk ideology critique that serves as a lay counterpart to our own studies of language ideology.

The ethno-ascription of ideology is thus a cultural model that (like all language ideology) tries to explain or rationalize some aspect of a group’s linguis-

17. This oft-noted resemblance can be interpreted in two different ways. We could try to maintain an epistemological distance between our own “comprehensive” ideologies and the selective, “hegemonic” ideologies that we study (Kroskrity 2004, 496). Or in a deflationary move we could collapse them together as “partial truths” (Kroskrity 1998, 118), embracing an “ironical and reflexive fallibilism” to remind ourselves of “the situatedness of our own work” (Nakassis 2016, 333). We have elaborated neither of these views in much detail. No one has explained what exactly it is about our own ideology that could make it epistemologically privileged; nor, on the other hand, has anyone spelled out the consequences of placing our own ideology down on all fours with those of the communities we study. I myself see no way of avoiding claims to some kind of privilege, no matter how tentative and partial (how else, for example, could we justify our claims to have discovered instances of ideological erasure?). But I will not further defend that stance here.

18. Following Niedzielski and Preston, I use *folk* and *lay* broadly to refer to “those who are not trained professionals in the area under investigation” (2000, viii). Thus the discourse of philosophers, historians, and literary theorists represents “lay discourse” insofar as its authors were not trained in linguistic anthropology.

tic behavior. It is unusual only in that it does so by attributing a language ideology to that group—to explain its behavior or attitudes as produced by certain taken-for-granted assumptions about language widely shared among group members. It is this ideological ascription of ideology that I call *meta-ideology*.<sup>19</sup>

In the rest of this article I illustrate this claim by presenting various examples of meta-ideology. The subject of meta-ideology seems to have attracted little notice among linguistic anthropologists; in most published studies of language ideology, the only one ascribing ideologies to anyone is the anthropologist. However it has not entirely escaped scholarly attention. I therefore start with two examples of language meta-ideology, one made familiar by Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs, the other from one of the most famous works of Michel Foucault.

In book 4, chapter 16 of his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* ([1689] 1979), Locke presents his influential doctrine of the “degrees of assent” as part of his larger campaign for proper epistemic hygiene. Bauman and Briggs (2003) have described this as an attempt to discredit appeals to authority and to delegitimize tradition as a source of knowledge. Locke advocates decontextualization to extricate discourse from the passions of factionalism and deprecates indexicality in order to drive a wedge between a statement and its human sources. Besides attacking reliance on any named individual authority (an Aristotle or Cicero), he also finds it necessary to criticize the veneration of (possibly anonymous) claims distinguished only by their great age. He writes:

Any testimony, the further off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has. . . . In traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of: because I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand years since would not, to a rational man contemporary with the first voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground propositions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first be-

19. In responding to an early draft of this essay, Claudia Strauss asked if the ideology/meta-ideology relation could also be understood in terms of indexical orders (cf. Silverstein 2003). I don't have space to consider the question here; however, given the well-known dependence of indexicality on language ideology (Hanks 1996, 46–47, 120; Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 594), an analysis in terms of ideology rather than indexicality might be the most straightforward approach.



ginning, come, by an inverted rule of probability, to pass for authentic truths; and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors, are thought to grow venerable by age, and are urged as undeniable.

In casting doubt on the reliability of tradition, Locke passes judgment as well on those who trust it. There are “some men” who (he claims) put their faith in opinions whose main or only warrant is that they have been repeated often enough to survive the passage of time. Not only does the chain of transmission leave the validity of an opinion undiminished for these men, it actually seems to strengthen it. As Bauman and Briggs might put it, these are men for whom interdiscursivity itself bears epistemological weight.

Locke presents his view of language contrastively, positioning it “vis-à-vis opposing linguistic ideologies” (Bauman and Briggs 2003, 9). He attributes to vaguely described others an attitude toward inherited opinions—an ideology of traditionality—that Locke believes to be misguided. Notice that Locke’s own language ideology is quite explicit, but he does not treat it as ideological. He presents his degrees of assent as simply “out there” in the real world. The only assumptions he identifies as such are the mistaken ones he attributes to the de-luded unfortunates he is criticizing. When he describes his view of the degrees of assent his discourse is ideological; when he attributes an “inverted rule of probability” to others, his discourse is meta-ideological.

Without knowing who those “some men” were (if indeed Locke had any specific people in mind at all) we have no way of judging the accuracy of Locke’s portrait of them. It is open to us to doubt its exactness. (Were there ever people who applied a truly inverted rule of probability, considering a thousand-year-old claim to be twice as credible as one a mere five centuries old?) But of course this tactic can be rhetorically effective without being empirically adequate.

Let us now look at a more recent example. Foucault’s treatment of language in *The Order of Things* is a veritable meta-ideological cavalcade. He famously presented there a vision of European intellectual history marked by deep discontinuities between successive “epistemological fields” that he called *epistemes* (1970, xxiii). In the earliest episteme that he describes—that of the sixteenth century—language is supposed to be intertwined with the world; words and things are connected by similitudes and signatures. Humankind’s original language, lost after the Tower of Babel, was said to be not a collection of arbitrary signs but a set of true marks, necessarily linked with their denotata by resemblance (1970, 37–49). Language, it was thought, did not merely “represent” reality but was itself “a thing inscribed in the fabric of the world” (1970, 48).

This sixteenth-century episteme is not the only language ideology Foucault describes, but I need not summarize his account of the Classical age and the nineteenth century except to mention that he posits sudden, abrupt historical breaks between them. Each episteme is an internally consistent deployment of certain master “codes” set off by radical disjunctures from those that precede and follow it.

As is well known, historians were never convinced by Foucault’s interpretations, even as they backhandedly admitted the “oracular force” (Grafton 2006, 23) of the “rhetorical overstatement at which he excelled” (Wolin 1998, 722). A great deal of subsequent research has shown that the eras of Foucault’s periodization are far more internally diverse than he allows. The episteme of similitudes, for example, was only one strain of sixteenth-century thought, and by no means a dominant one; Foucault can make it seem characteristic of that era only by a highly selective use of sources (Huppert 1974). Likewise, his picture of the language ideology of the Classical episteme ignores the era’s internal tensions and contradictions (Bauman and Briggs 2003, 8–9). Nor are the details of his periodizations any more reliable (Aarsleff 1982, 22–23).

There is an aspect that is common to these two examples, one I wish to emphasize since we will encounter it repeatedly. What we may suspect of Locke’s meta-ideological analysis seems demonstrable in the case of Foucault. He exaggerates the integrity of each language ideology he discusses and overstates the differences between them. He overlooks—peripheralizes—the aspects of sixteenth-century language ideologies that can also be found in earlier and later centuries.

We are familiar with this discursive move, by which some complex heterogeneous phenomenon is treated as a self-consistent, self-contained, internally coherent whole. It usually involves focalizing some conspicuous aspect of the phenomenon, a strategy that in other contexts we call essentialism. The corresponding peripheralization—the pruning away of the details that would spoil the picture of uniformity and consistency—is familiar to us as erasure (Irvine and Gal 2000). This coordinated use of focalization and peripheralization to create a dichotomy out of a continuum of differences is common enough to deserve its own name. Borrowing a concept from social psychology, I will refer to the tendency to homogenize entities in order to exaggerate the contrast between them as *accentuation*. Accentuation—also known as the *contrast effect* (McGarty, Yzerbyt, and Spears 2002; Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004; Chen and Hanson 2004, 1160–63; Yzerbyt and Demoulin 2010, 1035)—refers to the effect that categorization has on perceptions of social groups, whereby

the perceived variability within each group is reduced and the perceived difference between groups increases. (It is accentuation that is responsible for the infamous they-all-look-the-same-to-me syndrome.<sup>20</sup>)

\* \* \*

I have used the writings of Locke and Foucault as examples of the ethno-ascription of ideology for convenience of exposition. Of course, they don't illustrate widely shared, taken-for-granted cultural conventions. They are the unique products of individual thinkers, and the ideas they contain may have never attained the broad acceptance and taken-for-grantedness of most language ideology. At best, they became professional ideologies shared within disciplinary enclaves, and the same could be said about most (though not all) of the other examples I am about to present. I suspect that most meta-ideology is like this.

### Mapping Meta-ideologies of Authorship

The study of textual meta-ideologies is thus a study of the ways textual ideologies are discursively deployed: how people talk about them, how they populate the social world with them. To whom do they attribute them? Where do people locate them in geographical, chronological, and sociocultural space, with reference to what markers of identity? What, in other words, are the correlates of meta-ideological differentiation?

My examples are drawn from two different Euro-American professional discourses. One is a pedagogical discourse about how novices can acquire the skills of text creation; the other is a legal discourse that looks to the nature of text making in order to frame principles of intangible ownership. In each case I show how meta-ideological ascriptions of concepts of authorship support projects of Othering, constructing differences between groups according to an "orientalist" logic. This requires a good deal of accentuation in order to purify the terms of comparison, purging them of shared elements that spoil the desired effect of stark contrast.

I map the meta-ideological projection of peripheralized and focalized authorship using two sets of coordinates. Textual ideologies are sometimes aligned with sociocultural differences, located among distinct ethnic, racial, or national groups. But we also find chronological mappings, assigning different textual ideologies to different eras.

<sup>20</sup> *Accentuation* already has a technical sense in linguistic anthropology, associated with Voloshinov, but I introduce the social-psychological sense here trusting that the homonymy will not cause confusion.

## Two Examples: The Debates over Composition Pedagogy and Copyright Expansion

My examples come from two discursive fields with their own reasons for concern about ideologies of authorship: the teaching of college writing—“composition”—and the debate over the expansion of intellectual-property law.

### Composition Pedagogy

Authorial originality is highly relevant to the introductory English writing classroom. In North American institutions of higher education, teachers of composition must make sure their students distinguish between their own writing and the texts of others they reproduce, and that the students properly attribute the latter to their respective authors. Failure to do so is plagiarism, a serious breach of academic ethics.

Plagiarism has long been a major concern of writing teachers and of their institutions, which typically list it in their codes of conduct as a form of academic dishonesty.<sup>21</sup> It acquired extra opprobrium with the rise of the “student-centered” pedagogical philosophy of “expressivism” in the 1960s, which emphasized the creativity of the autonomous, individual writer discovering his or her “authentic voice” (Stewart 1972; cf. Elbow 1968, 1975; Murray 1968, 1970; Stewart 1969). Meanwhile, the influx of foreign students into US institutions continued to grow, bringing composition teachers a new clientele with new needs, who—they felt—seemed to have special difficulty grasping the ideal of the creatively autonomous author.

In the late twentieth century, pedagogical innovations such as collaborative in-class writing groups and peer tutors at campus writing centers—instituted in part as a response to the open admissions policies of the 1970s (Carino 1996)—came under suspicion because they broke the writer’s envelope of solitude and so could be accused of encouraging plagiarism (Bruffee 1973; Clark 1999). As composition pedagogy professionalized and developed its own disciplinary identity, defenders of collaborative learning counterattacked, questioning the assumptions of expressivist pedagogy. Denying that a writer can ever be totally self-reliant, and emphasizing the social aspects of composition, they tried to transvalue student copying: what looked like plagiarism was often simply “patchwriting” (Howard 1993, 1995), a bridge students could use to enter a writing culture into which they had no other entrée.

21. For relevant documents on the history of American composition pedagogy, see Ede (1989); Carino (1992); Kinkead (1996); and Shamoon and Burns (1999).

### Copyright Expansion

The history of intellectual-property law in Euro-American legal systems is one of gradual expansion (Bracha 2016). Over the centuries, the protection afforded authors has increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. The duration of protection grew by an order of magnitude; for example, copyright in the United States—at first limited to 28 years of protection—now lasts until 70 years after the death of the author. Qualitatively, the law gave a widening spectrum of copyright owners ever-greater degrees of control over the uses to which their works were put. While at first only the actual wording of a text was protected, this was soon enlarged to include more abstract versions of a work (summaries and translations, plot outlines, even fictional characters). New technologies, such as sound recording and radio broadcasting, were brought within the owner's sphere of control. The emergence of the so-called information society further accelerated the technology-fueled expansion of intellectual-property protection.

In reaction, legal scholars since the 1960s started to question this extension in scope of the individual's rights. They emphasized the importance of the social contribution to individual creativity, the importance of a public domain in a world of private property. Meaningful creativity would be impossible without a commons: a shared basis for innovation, a mutually intelligible language to make artistic communication possible. These scholars and activists promoted their views in the courts, in the law reviews, and in popularized accounts, which spread the idea of protecting the public domain against enclosure as a form of cultural environmentalism (Kapczynski 2008, 821–39).

\* \* \*

Both the writing teachers and legal scholars discussed focalized and peripheralized ideologies of authorship, as I illustrate in what follows. I organize my presentation around the master frames of synchrony and diachrony. The composition teachers (and, occasionally, the legal scholars) projected textual ideologies across social space, while the legal scholars (and, occasionally, the teachers) projected them across time. I will present examples of all these strategies, and end with an idiosyncratic, possibly unique example of meta-ideological attribution that fits neither category.

### Culturalizing Textual Ideologies

I start by showing how peripheralized authorial ideologies have been projected into distant places and Othered (sub)cultures. Peripheralized authorship is cul-

turalized when it is ideologically attributed to a group—that is, when the culture of that group is said to attach little importance to authorial individuality, originality, or ownership (or is even said to lack those concepts entirely).

Such culturalization is a variety of accentuation that operates by the familiar binary logic of orientalism, in which the Other is described as the opposite of the Self. In the usual orientalist scenario, the valence of the Other is negative: “we” are “good” and “they” are “bad.” However, as Baumann (2004) points out, the Self/Other dichotomy need not be one-sidedly Manichaean. In certain respects the Other may lack what we have, while in other respects we are thought to lack something valuable that the Other has. For example, the Self may be wealthy, powerful, and modern in contrast to the poor, powerless, and backward Other; yet simultaneously the Other can be seen as altruistic and deeply spiritual, while the Self is greedy, competitive, and materialistic.

The Romantic ideals of originality and innovation are often invoked in framing these dichotomies. Originality is associated with “our” individualistic culture and is contrasted with the creative ideals of “collectivist” cultures (Sawyer 2006, 147–48):

In our individualist culture, we think that creativity is the expression of a unique individual. We believe that there are individual differences in talent that are probably innate. We believe that a created work is invested with the unique emotional and personal experience of the creator. And above all, we value innovation and breaking conventions. As a result, creators in our culture are likely to emphasize these aspects of their works. . . . In collectivist cultures, conceptions of creativity are radically different. In these cultures, it’s important for the work *not* to be different. . . . As a result, creators tend to emphasize exactly the opposite qualities of their work; they deny that the work contains any innovation, and they claim that it accurately represents tradition.

The Other in these scenarios is variously located in non-Western societies or in oral traditions within developed countries. Some writers point to East Asia, where “there is little premium put on individuality and the expression of individual, personal feeling. In contrast to post-Romantic interests in the West, there is little mention of originality in the traditional discourse. Excellence resides in perfection of skills, mastery of principles of an art genre, and submission to the inner order of the world” (Dewoskin 1992, 69). Consequently, there is little stigma attached to appropriation: “Chinese artistic traditions are not so concerned with individual property rights as are our own, and have more re-

laxed conventions about borrowing and adapting the work of others” (Kraus 1989, 123).

Peripheralized authorship can be given either positive or negative valence. In the quotations above, “our” individualism is contrasted with “their” collectivism, and likewise with the binaries inspiration versus skill, private property versus common property, and innovation versus honoring the ancestors. Notice also how “they” are described as more spiritual, more attuned to the cosmic order (just as we would expect from Baumann’s reading of orientalist logic).

Discussion of the Other’s peripheralizing notions of authorship can be found in both the introductory English writing classroom and the rhetoric of copyright activists, so I will treat them both in turn. US English composition teachers are on the alert for signs of literary theft in all student work, but they are liable to stigmatize foreign students as especially prone to commit plagiarism. There have been many voices lamenting the latter’s supposed unconcern with creativity and disregard for intellectual property.

The projection onto the Other of a propensity to plagiarism could be an example of garden-variety orientalism, in which plagiarism (seen as an ethical deficiency or character flaw) distinguishes the moral Self from the immoral Other. In this context, the meta-ideological culturalizing of peripheralized authorship can actually assume a redemptive function, vindicating the Other by pitting one exoticization against another. To borrow the vocabulary of the courtroom, it is a sort of “cultural defense” of plagiarism: it’s not that the foreign student is cheating, it’s that she inhabits a different thought-world, one in which the relation of texts to authors is radically different from that in the West. Her culture has no concept of plagiarism, and hence she is not aware of doing anything wrong.

Many American writing teachers report that students from other cultures are initially confused by Western ideas of originality, attribution, and plagiarism (McLeod 1992, 12): “The notion of stealing ideas or words is . . . profoundly Western. Students from certain Middle Eastern, Asian, and African cultures are baffled by the notion that one can “own” ideas, since their cultures regard words and ideas as the property of all rather than as individual property.” East Asian societies are often singled out as especially Other. Their difficulty in understanding the concept of literary theft is sometimes attributed to the supposed supreme value they place on honoring the past (Buranen 1999, 66): “rather than seeing copying from books or other sources as ‘cheating,’ . . . Asians see it as a way of acknowledging one’s respect for the received wisdom of their ancestors.” Another common explanation invokes the supposed anti-individualist ten-

dencies of these cultures (Dryden 1999, 77): “It may be hard for Westerners to imagine a culture in which personal opinions, originality, and the need to distinguish one’s own views from those of received wisdom might carry little value and, in fact, usually harbor the potential for social disharmony and personal stigma. But those conditions must be acknowledged if we are to understand Japanese attitudes toward the ownership of words and ideas—attitudes that differ widely from those in the West.” For these reasons, they argue, “plagiarism comes naturally to the Japanese” (Wheeler 2009, 26).

This sort of Othering is not confined to faraway, exotic societies, but can also be applied to a disadvantaged minority’s folk culture. One of the most notorious plagiarism cases in recent American history illustrates the Othering of African-American textual ideology. It also shows how redemptive exoticization can be projected onto the plagiarizing subject, where it is interpreted as resistance to the majority culture.

In the late 1980s, the editors of Martin Luther King Jr.’s papers became aware that many of his writings from his graduate student days—including his dissertation on systematic theology—contained passages taken without attribution from other sources (Martin Luther King, Jr., Papers Project 1991). The many cases of unacknowledged textual debts, not only in his dissertation but also his sermons and later publications, quickly became bones of political contention, with right-wing commentators accusing King of plagiarism to discredit him and his supporters (e.g., Pappas 1998).

Scholars reacted in several ways to these revelations. Some saw King’s plagiarisms as unfortunate blots on his reputation, but others argued that they had to be understood in the context of “African-American orality” and specifically a tradition of “voice-merging” practiced in the Black church (Miller 1991, 121):

Black folk preachers could not own their sermons because they did not write them down. Instead, they borrowed sermons from each other on the assumption that everyone creates language and no one owns it. . . . [F]or only with the arrival of print have people come to view language as private property to be copyrighted, packaged, and sold as a commodity. In the folk pulpit, one gains an authoritative voice by adopting the persona of previous speakers as one adapts the sermons and formulaic expressions of a sanctified tradition. Like generations of folk preachers before him, King often borrowed, modified, and synthesized themes, analogies, metaphors, quotations, illustrations, arrangements, and forms of argument used by other preachers. Like other folk preachers, King typ-



ically ended his oral sermons (and almost every major speech) by merging his voice with the lyrics of a spiritual, hymn, or gospel song.

As a very young undergraduate, seminarian, and doctoral candidate, King ventured outside the universe of African-American orality to negotiate his way through the unfamiliar terrain of intellectualized print culture. Thoroughly schooled in folk homiletics, he resisted academic commandments about language and many ideas espoused by his professors and the Great White Thinkers. As part of his resistance, he began the process of creatively translating into print the folk procedures of voice merging and self-making.

Thus for Miller, King's plagiarisms were the result of his transposition of the textual ideology of the Black folk preacher into the White academy.

This sort of "cultural defense" is also found in the copyright debates, though it is not as prominent there. As we will see, the critics of copyright expansion have depended largely on a chronological schema, a European history in which an early regime of peripheralized authorship was followed by the reign of focalized authorship. However, some of them have ventured further afield. I will present one brief but revealing example that adds cultural distance to temporal distance. It was first discussed by a legal scholar familiar with Chinese history and later taken up by a writer closely associated with the "cultural environmentalist" movement dedicated to preserving the public domain.

Early in his "defense of the cultural commons" against the creeping advance of intellectual property rights, Lewis Hyde turns to distant times and places where our taken-for-granted notions of intangible ownership are absent. "Creativity in ancient China was not self-expression but an act of reverence toward earlier generations and the gods. . . . To honor the past was a consistent virtue for a thousand years in imperial China and thus to copy the work of those who came before was a matter of respect rather than theft. Said the fifteenth-century artist Shen Zhou 'If my poems and paintings should prove to be of some aid to the forgers, what is there for me to grudge about?'" (2010, 20).

### **Culturalizing Textual Ideologies: Patterns of Accentuation**

In both of these cases, maintaining an us/them dichotomy requires a good deal of accentuation: a culturalizing meta-ideology must overlook considerable evidence of similarity between "our" ideas of authorship and "theirs." As is well known, cultural value systems can rarely if ever be described in a few simple generalizations. But beyond this truism, there is evidence that the features of

the orientalized ideologies that have been meta-ideologically suppressed are precisely those that would render them less Other. In what follows I'll review some of the evidence for erasure in both the pedagogical and intellectual-property cases.

Surveys of students in Chinese (Hu and Lei 2015) and Japanese (Wheeler 2009) universities have uncovered little evidence of a culturally validated laxity regarding originality and attribution. Wheeler, for example, asked students studying English at Hokkaido University to evaluate sample paragraphs supposedly taken from student essays. The examples that appeared to be plagiarized were almost unanimously given lower grades, often with comments that the author should "think for himself" rather than copy another's work. (Almost half of the students gave the "plagiarized" text the lowest possible grade.) These results, along with the strict disciplinary action Japanese universities take against researchers found to have plagiarized (2009, 26), lead Wheeler to conclude that the idea of Japanese culture as plagiarogenic has no factual basis.

Similar results have been found in studies of non-native writers from many other cultures. Buranen concludes that this meta-ideology is an urban legend, a by-product of the fact that dependence on published text is much easier to sense in writings by non-native speakers. In any event, it essentializes (Buranen 1999, 70).

Accentuation is equally evident in the story of Shen Zhou. Its transformation presents an especially interesting demonstration, since we can observe the process of Othering in operation. By following the anecdote as it is successively reproduced through the chain of citation, we can see the progressive filtering-out of contextual detail as meta-ideology reshapes the story into the expected form.

Hyde found the story of Shen Zhou in a book by the legal scholar William Alford, where it is used to support Alford's claim that China's traditional political culture, with its hierarchical organization and orientation to the past, was inhospitable to the development of intellectual property rights. Alford's general argument has attracted much criticism (cf. Ivanhoe 2005; Shao 2005; Stone 2008; Liu 2009; Lu 2009), but I will concentrate on this single example that Hyde found so evocative in his defense of the cultural commons.

As reported by Alford (1995, 29), Shen Zhou's comment was a reply to a question: "Shen Zhou (1427–1509) is reported to have responded to the suggestions that he put a stop to the forging of his work by remarking, in comments that were not considered exceptional, 'if my poems and paintings, which

are only small efforts to me, should prove to be of some aid to the forgers, what is there for me to grudge about?" Alford presents this as evidence of the kind of attitude typical in a culture where it was unthinkable to "exclude others from the common heritage of all civilized persons."

But the anecdote is puzzling. It's unclear why Alford thinks Shen Zhou's answer was unexceptional, especially since—as he admits—the fact that the artist had a friend who was bothered by the forgeries indicates that some Chinese were concerned about unauthorized reproductions. Why wasn't Shen Zhou concerned as well? As is apparent when we look to Alford's source, Alford has omitted the information we need to answer this question.

Alford found the story of Shen Zhou in an article by Wen Fong (1962) on forgeries in Chinese art. Fong used it to illustrate "the general attitude of tolerance, or indeed willingness, shown on the part of the great Chinese painters toward the forging of their own works" (1962, 100). He gives the full anecdote as follows:

Chu Yun-ming (1460–1526) wrote in his *Chi Shih-t'ien Hsien-sheng Hua*: "Master Shen Chou is one whom everybody looks up to in the present generation. People begging for his paintings often fill the hall and the inner chambers of his house. . . . Gradually, counterfeit scrolls of his paintings have become increasingly numerous. When one original piece of [work on] silk has been released in the morning, by noon a duplicate version will already have appeared. Sometimes, within ten days, there will be ten or more copies appearing everywhere. The 'blind' ones merely tried to judge by his seal impressions; but soon these were freely forged. Besides, the master himself possessed several identical seals [all at one time]. As the seals were no longer distinguishable, people tried to distinguish the style of the master's written poems. Then there appeared persons who could imitate his calligraphy almost exactly. Finally, the master himself began to write the same inscription all over the place. When people pointed out that some ten paintings had born the same poem, all these [ten versions] could actually have come from the master's own hand. . . . Someone brought the matter up with the master and asked him to put a stop to it. Whereupon the master remarked: 'I have my own ideas about this. When people beg me for my paintings, do you suppose they merely want them for enjoyment, for appreciation, or for passing on to their sons and grandsons as family treasures? [To be truthful], they merely want them for making profit on them. So, if my poems and

paintings, which are only small efforts to me, should prove to be of some aid to the forgers, what is there for me to grudge about?"

Fong (1962, 101) explains that Shen Zhou and his artistic colleagues were "prominent intellectual and social leaders as well as famous painters. As 'gentlemen-painters,' *they were not supposed to accept any fee for their artistic work*, and the demands made upon them were often a nuisance to bear. It was understandable, therefore, that, under certain circumstances, they would be only too glad to lend their distinguished names to imitations by lesser artists as a form of social amenity" (my emphasis).

Shen Zhou's attitude does not seem to have been just a purely selfless display of beneficence and nonattachment, but was highly context specific.<sup>22</sup> Because of his elevated social status, he was not supposed to reap any material benefits from his art. Perhaps he sought immaterial reward in the satisfaction of entrusting his paintings to connoisseurs who could appreciate them properly, who would contemplate them with pleasure all their lives and bequeath them to their children as precious heirlooms. But the multitudes who clamored for his paintings were not of that sort. Their intent was purely mercenary: they had discovered a racket by means of which they could profit from Shen Zhou's talent in ways that he could not.

Shen Zhou's attitude was schematized as his story was condensed in successive citations in the secondary literature. It is Alford who leaves out most of the detail (including the important fact that the Chinese literati could not profit from their paintings). It is easy to suspect that this omission was tendentious, since the excised information would weaken the general point he wants to make about Chinese culture. Still, he at least admits (though only in a footnote) that some of Shen Zhou's contemporaries objected to the unauthorized reproduction of his paintings—thus retaining a clue that there may have been heterogeneity or internal inconsistency in the ideology of the day. But when the anecdote is further abbreviated, even that faint clue vanishes. Erasure is complete, and Shen Zhou's statement is left to stand for a thousand years of Chinese culture.<sup>23</sup>

22. The full text of the story also raises doubts about how widespread Shen Zhou's attitude was. His statement, "I have my own ideas about this," seems to imply that he was aware that his opinion was not widely shared.

23. I should emphasize that I am being deliberately pedantic here: I am focusing on a minute, virtually microscopic aspect of Hyde's book. He uses the Shen Zhou story as a rhetorical ornament, not as a premise in his argument. My discussion of the role of accentuation in the successive retellings of the story is thus not meant as a veiled attack on Hyde's thesis about the importance of the cultural commons, which in no way depends on this example.

### Chronologizing Textual Ideologies

While my examples to this point have projected difference along the synchronic axis, the remaining ones project it along the diachronic axis. When different concepts of authorship are assigned to different historical periods, Romantic authorship is usually associated with modernity, and peripheralized authorship with the premodern (and sometimes the postmodern) period. The source of this periodization was no doubt English literary criticism. “Romantic” was not originally the designation for a historical era, but it came to be used as such in the late nineteenth century. The idea that the emphasis on original genius was a Romantic innovation was well established in the United States by the early twentieth century (e.g., Babbitt 1908).

Chronologized peripheralized authorship played a role in the pedagogical debates, but it was relatively minor. Some of the educators trying to combat the demonization of plagiarism looked to the past, arguing that the dread of imitation was a recent innovation that had not troubled some of the greatest luminaries of English literature (McLeod 1992, 12): “The very notion of being able to ‘own’ words or ideas is after all a relatively recent one. Classical notions of art involved mimesis, or imitation: originality was not valued, nor was the individual artist; writers borrowed freely from one another. Few of Shakespeare’s plots were his own. . . . It is perhaps not by accident that our modern notion of plagiarism was born at about the same time as two other ideas: the romantic notion of the single, original author expressing his innermost feelings through art, and the capitalist notion of private property.” By contrast, chronological accentuation played a much larger role in the copyright debates.

When American jurists trying to hold back the rising tide of protection looked into history for an explanation of the increasingly stringent interpretations of copyright law that characterized the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they found it in the Romantic ideology of authorship (Umbreit 1939; Kaplan 1967; Jaszi 1981). “This change of conception among authors as to what it is that constitutes ‘literary property’ was a result of the substitution of the canons of romanticism for those of classicism as the criteria of literature” (Umbreit 1939, 947–48). As Kaplan (1967, 23–25) explained:

From the classical writers, as expounded by critics of the Italian and French Renaissance, the Elizabethans had received the notion that artistic excellence lay in imitating the best works of the past, not in attempting free invention. All the needed, indeed all the possible, subjects and materials for literary production were already disclosed in existing

writings. . . . What was required of an author was to give to the old materials an expression compatible with his own time. . . . Now Edward Young and those who followed spoke for original as against imitative genius, for innovation as desirable in itself. . . . In placing a high value on originality, the new literary criticism, I suggest, tended to justify strong protection of intellectual structures in some respect “new,” to encourage a more suspicious search for appropriations even of the less obvious types, and to condemn these more roundly when found.

Thus the meta-ideological importation of Romantic authorship into the discourse of copyright law was tendentious from the start: legal scholars who were dissatisfied with the current state of the law “blamed” it on the influence of author-centric Romantic textual ideology.

### **Chronologizing Textual Ideologies: Patterns of Accentuation**

The legal scholars’ meta-ideological periodization of concepts of authorship requires two levels of accentuation. First, in constructing a historical holding pen for focalized authorship, chronological boundary drawing must obscure the degree to which both originality and fidelity to tradition are values upheld in virtually all eras. Romantic authors did not consistently espouse the so-called Romantic ideology, and quasi-Romantic ideas of originality have been professed throughout Western literary history. Second, in promoting the idea that an epochal shift in textual ideology was a major factor behind copyright expansion, this periodization distracts attention from the many other (and perhaps more significant) historical forces conspiring to inflate intellectual property rights. I discuss these two levels of accentuation in turn.

As far back as the ancient Greeks there were writers who lauded originality. Isocrates, for example, felt it was important to “discover things to say that are entirely different from what others have said”; it would be “most disgraceful and painful” to write “just like what others had written.” Orators who seek fame confront a daunting task, “since most [topics] have been taken up. If they say the same things as their predecessors, they will appear to be shameless babblers, but those who seek novel topics . . . have great difficulty finding something to say” (Behme 2004, 201). In the sixteenth century, Ludovico Castelvetro likewise denounced *imitatio* as theft and insisted that a true poet “neither follows the examples already set forth, nor does what has already been done . . . but makes a thing wholly different from anything that has been done before” (White 1935, 26–27).

Moreover, ancient Greece and the Renaissance were not free from accusations of plagiarism, some of which look absurdly overblown even by Romantic standards. For example, Theopompos of Chios accused Plato of having stolen the idea of the immortality of the soul from Homer's description of the death of Patrocles (Olcott 2002, 1051). Similarly, White notes that during the reign of *imitatio*, borrowing was "frequently attacked in a manner closely resembling that of the most captious modern demands for 'originality'" (1935, 13).<sup>24</sup>

The theorists of *inventio* were not oblivious to the value of a personal style, and there were attempts to reconcile the imitation of esteemed models with the cultivation of an individual voice. Erasmus famously linked originality with the multiplication and diversification of models ([1528] 1908, 123, emphasis added):

I approve of the imitation of *a model agreeing with your genius* . . . I do not approve of the imitation of one copy from whose lines you would not dare to depart, but that which *culls from all authors* . . . what in each excels and *accords with your own genius*,—not just adding to your speech all the beautiful things that you find, but digesting them and *making them your own*, so that they may seem to have been born from your mind and not borrowed from others . . . so that your speech may not seem a patchwork, but a river flowing forth from the fount of your heart.

As this passage suggests, even under the rule of *imitatio*, derivativeness was stigmatized. When Petrarch discovered that in one of his writings he had inadvertently quoted literally from Virgil and Ovid, he modified his phrasing so that it suggested, but did not replicate, the originals (DellaNeva 1989, 449–50). Thus there was a permanently contestable boundary to be drawn somewhere in the gray zone between legitimate imitation and slavish copying.

Contrariwise, even the Romantic poets did not consistently espouse "Romantic" authorship. Textual ideology during this era was hardly univocal, but was a site of "important cultural tensions" (Mazzeo 2007, 750). According to Macfarlane (2007, 29), "no unified or consistent doctrinal position toward originality and literary resemblance can easily be abstracted from contemporary Romantic documents. Undeniably, Romantic writers . . . can be shown to have coveted novelty and lack of influence as vital poetic criteria. However, they can also be shown . . . to have addressed with varying degrees of cynicism and disbelief the concept of originality as creation out of nothing. They did associate genius

24. I should emphasize that I am not positing an essentialized notion of plagiarism as a historical invariant. Even if borrowing has been condemned for centuries, it has been condemned for rather different reasons in different periods (Hammond 2003).

with originality, but they also perceived creativity as a function of description, assimilation, and arrangement.” In the second half of the nineteenth century this tension becomes increasingly visible, as British literary aesthetics embraced both a focalized authorial ideology and a strong reaction against it (Macfarlane 2007, 6). Thus Charles Dickens, the century’s “most convinced believer in art as the product of solitary genius” (2007, 62), worked amid widespread skepticism about the paradigm of the heroic creator.

It is worth noting the great variety of specific, contingent social and intellectual developments that fertilized the growth of this skepticism. One stimulus was the scholarly “unmasking” of some of the reigning icons of exemplary authorship: for example, “Homer” was shown to label a process of cumulative creativity rather than to name an individual of genius, and Shakespeare turned out to have been heavily indebted to previous authors. On another front, the growth of the discipline of psychology diluted received ideas of secure, self-possessed individuality by exposing the social formation of identity and the role of the unconscious mind. Emerging philosophical notions of collective consciousness (such as Emerson’s “universal mind”) further eroded the atomistic view of society. Meanwhile, the new sport of plagiarism hunting “revealed” instances of unoriginality in some of the most esteemed classic and contemporary writers (Milton, Byron, Tennyson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Alexandre Dumas *père*). Eventually these “literary detectives” provoked a backlash: their accusations of plagiarism were seen as the carping of vindictive, talentless hacks. In the last decades of the nineteenth century they were denounced by a growing chorus of writers who normalized plagiarism as a natural consequence of the inevitable interdependence of authors in a literary culture (Macfarlane 2007, 43–49, 67–73).

It’s true that the highly accentuated periodization embraced by Umbreit, Kaplan, and later jurists was borrowed rather than homemade. Literary critics and historians had spent decades building the image of a Romantic textual ideology, downplaying the common ground between Neoclassical and Romantic aesthetics, the internal heterogeneity of each era, and the ambiguity and relativity inherent in the notion of authorship; indeed, the work of accentuation may have started already in the Romantic period.<sup>25</sup>

But beyond the erasures of historical periodization, there is a second level of accentuation that was contributed by the jurists themselves, embodied in the

25. Macfarlane (2007, 28, 33–41) suggests that the modern image of Romantic-era aesthetics is due to critics of the 1820s and 1830s such as Hazlitt and Carlyle, who simplified it and eliminated its contradictions. As for the “Romantic Ideology,” that seems to be a twentieth-century coinage popularized by McGann (1983).



thesis that a Romantic-period ideology of focalized authorship was a key driver of copyright expansion. As the critics of this thesis have noted (Lemley 1997; Bracha 2008; Lavik 2014), it highlights the role of aesthetics to the detriment of several much more powerful historical forces, such as economic factors, interest-group lobbying, international harmonization, neoliberal policies, and the changing role of government. Furthermore, they show that the thesis is unable to explain many of the actual provisions of copyright law that don't put the author's interests first (and indeed even subordinate them to a concern for the public domain).

In my two examples, the meta-ideological frameworks by means of which peripheralized textual ideologies were projected into distant times or peoples are frameworks shared within delimited social groups, and to that extent can be considered cultural. Among composition teachers and proponents of copyright reform there seems to have been fairly broad acceptance of the idea that associates peripheralized authorship with the distant past and distant peoples.

As a final contrasting example, let us look briefly at a recent case of meta-ideological projection, one that is not widely shared (at least, not yet). While it may exemplify nothing more than a single individual's idiosyncratic attitudes, it might be a meta-ideology *in statu nascendi*. It's also interesting in that it tracks neither chronological periods nor cultural groups. It illustrates how a textual ideology can be projected not just into other times and nations but also into other creative media.

### **Authorial Meta-ideology in the Making?**

In 2004, the writer Malcolm Gladwell published "Something Borrowed," an article about the British playwright Bryony Lavery, whose play *Frozen* was enjoying a successful run on Broadway. Lavery had copied several short passages, 675 words in total, from an article Gladwell had published in 1997. "Something Borrowed" is Gladwell's account of his feelings about having been plagiarized. At first he accused Lavery of literary theft. But he started having second thoughts, and the more he found out about her play, about copyright law, and about practices of artistic borrowing, the more he was inclined to exonerate her. I find it noteworthy that many of those thought-provoking practices involved musical borrowing (Gladwell 2004):

Not long after I learned about "Frozen," I went to see a friend of mine who works in the music industry. We sat in his living room on the Upper East Side, facing each other in easy chairs, as he worked his way through

a mountain of CDs. He played “Angel,” by the reggae singer Shaggy, and then “The Joker,” by the Steve Miller Band, and told me to listen very carefully to the similarity in bass lines. He played Led Zeppelin’s “Whole Lotta Love” and then Muddy Waters’s “You Need Love,” to show the extent to which Led Zeppelin had mined the blues for inspiration. . . . My friend had hundreds of these examples. We could have sat in his living room playing at musical genealogy for hours. Did the examples upset him? Of course not, because he knew enough about music to know that these patterns of influence—cribbing, tweaking, transforming—were at the very heart of the creative process. True, copying could go too far. There were times when one artist was simply replicating the work of another, and to let that pass inhibited true creativity. But it was equally dangerous to be overly vigilant in policing creative expression, because if Led Zeppelin hadn’t been free to mine the blues for inspiration we wouldn’t have got “Whole Lotta Love.”

Gladwell seems to be comparing the literary world unfavorably with the musical world. Writers are possessive, they guard their turf and snarl at intruders, but musicians can rise above such pettiness. Gladwell seems to hold up their tolerant attitude as an example that writers should aspire to.

But it’s ironic that he uses the story of Led Zeppelin’s “Whole Lotta Love” in defense of “cribbing, tweaking, [and] transforming.” This is a singularly inappropriate example for an article designed to persuade writers to be more tolerant of borrowing. The song he attributes to Muddy Waters, “You Need Love,” though sung by that artist, was composed by Willie Dixon. Perhaps Gladwell’s friend was not upset about the band’s recourse to Dixon’s song, but *Dixon* was upset—upset enough to file a lawsuit against Led Zeppelin in 1985, which was settled out of court in 1987 (Inaba 2011, 192–97). (As a result, all subsequent reissues of the song have included Dixon’s name as one of the composers.) So much for musicians’ cheerful acceptance of the borrowing that is “at the very heart of the creative process.”

Like the composition teachers, Gladwell is seeking clemency for a writer accused of plagiarism. But where the teachers located difference in stereotypical places (the exotic cultures of foreign countries and minority enclaves), Gladwell—perhaps uniquely—looks for it in a nearby community of artistic practice. We could think of him as constructing a “nonce meta-ideology,” a schema in which the carping, jealous possessiveness of writers contrasts with musicians’ deeper understanding of the essence of creativity. It’s not a cultural schema

(if he is the only one to hold it), at least not yet. However, it too accentuates, exaggerating differences between social identities and attaching opposite valences to them.<sup>26</sup>

### Conclusion

The legal scholars attributed a peripheralized ideology of authorship to pre-Romantic authors and a focalized ideology to the jurists whose decisions pushed copyright law in the direction of ever-stronger protection. Composition teachers attributed a peripheralized ideology of authorship to the foreign students they taught, just as Alford and Hyde attributed it to Ming Dynasty Chinese painters. In each case the attributors had clear rhetorical reasons for doing what they did. The legal scholars wanted to delegitimize juridical developments they considered misguided. The composition teachers wanted to temper criticism of their foreign students and plead their case for new pedagogical approaches. Hyde wanted to hold up Ming Dynasty painters as a moral example to inspire the partisans of the cultural commons. Likewise, Gladwell wanted his literary colleagues to emulate the (supposedly) more tolerant attitude of the musicians.

This variety of purposes contrasts with the limited range of functions ideology ascription typically plays in the writings of linguistic anthropologists. Some of the latter point out the effects of certain cognitive limitations on the speaker's awareness of the pragmatics of her own language, but most show how language ideologies serve the interests of some social groups more than others—which is the classic ambition of ideology critique.

My meta-ideological examples show a more diverse set of uses. The composition teachers attributed an ideology of peripheralized authorship to their Asian students in order to defend them against imputations of moral laxity. In ascribing ideologies of peripheralized authorship to Shakespeare and Shen Zhou, the writers I've cited weren't trying to "unmask" the hidden interests behind the supposedly lax attitudes toward artistic property rights displayed by Elizabethan England and Ming Dynasty China. To the contrary, the conception of authorship attributed to Shakespeare and Shen Zhou is presented as more realistic than ours, a more adequate recognition of the true nature of creativity. Similarly, the ideology Gladwell ascribed to musicians demonstrated how well they understood the "very heart of the creative process."

26. It also presents what looks like a very conspicuous example of erasure, in which Dixon's lawsuit has been completely suppressed. It's not clear, though, how this happened, or what it means.

Of course, there are also hints of unmasking in some of these stories. Romantic ideology could certainly be seen as serving the material interests of writers and their publishers. There are mentions in my sources of the effects of printing technology, the growth of the literary market, and the “capitalist notion of private property.” But even so the emphasis tends to be on the *grands récits* of epochal change rather than the corporate self-interest of particular groups.

All in all, it seems reasonable to suppose that the ascription of ideology is put to a wider variety of uses outside the confines of linguistic anthropology than within it. Perhaps that is only to be expected. Lay “ethnolinguistics” escapes many of the constraints that “accredited” scholars must respect—for example, in being overtly normative and evaluative. And folk etymology is all the more inventive, imaginative and humorous because it isn’t tied to the canons of philology.

\* \* \*

Over the past century we have learned to appreciate the cultural work that “folk” conceptualizations of language do; “secondary rationalizations” are not mere epiphenomena but exist in dialectical relation with the “primary” manifestations of language. Moreover, they are comparable to our own theories insofar as they occupy the same level of reflexivity. They function in “the same metapragmatic semiotic mode as ‘real’ (social) science”: that is, “we do just what the ‘natives’ do” (Silverstein 2003, 203).

In this article I have suggested that when it comes to the analysis of language ideology, the ‘natives’ do just what we do. “Native ideology analysis” is less common and less pervasive than the other “native theories” of language we are used to studying, but it does exist. And once we know where to look, we may be surprised at how much more we can find. For example, we have a rich body of it ready at hand in the history of literary theory. Just as Silverstein (1979, 213) can read J. L. Austin’s philosophy as “objectifying the metapragmatic capability of his own language into a ‘native theory’ of the true nature of speech,” we can find in “the tradition of metacommentary on literature called ‘literary criticism’” (Agha 2005, 43) many detailed (if unintended) formulations of textual ideologies, and in the debates between them much evidence of meta-ideological clashes.

## References

- Aarsleff, Hans. 1982. *From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Agha, Asif. 2005. "Voice, Footing and Enregisterment." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 15 (1): 38–59.
- Alford, William P. 1995. *To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Andrus, Jennifer. 2012. "Language Ideology, Fractal Recursivity, and Discursive Agency in the Legal Construction of Linguistic Evidence." *Language in Society* 41 (5): 589–614.
- Babbitt, Irving. 1908. "On Being Original." *Atlantic Monthly* 101:388–96. (Reprinted in *Literature in the American College*, 215–45. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.)
- Barthes, Roland. 1977. *Image – Music – Text*. Trans. Stephen Heath. London: Fontana.
- Bauman, Richard. 2004. *A World of Others' Words: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Intertextuality*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Bauman, Richard, and Charles L. Briggs. 2003. *Voices of Modernity: Language Ideologies and the Politics of Inequality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baumann, Gerd. 2004. "Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach." In *Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach*, ed. Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich, 18–50. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Behme, Tim. 2004. "Isocrates on the Ethics of Authorship." *Rhetoric Review* 23 (3): 197–215.
- Bielo, James S. 2009. *Words upon the Word: An Ethnography of Evangelical Group Bible Study*. New York: New York University Press.
- Bracha, Oren. 2008. "The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright." *Yale Law Journal* 118 (2): 186–271.
- . 2016. "United States Copyright, 1672–1909." *Research Handbook on the History of Copyright Law*, ed. Isabelle Alexander and H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, 335–71. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Briggs, Charles L. 1998. "'You're a Liar—You're Just Like a Woman!': Constructing Dominant Ideologies of Language in Warao Men's Gossip." In *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, ed. Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard, and Paul Kroskrity, 229–55. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov. 2004. "Ethnicity as Cognition." *Theory and Society* 33:31–64.
- Bruffee, Kenneth A. 1973. "Collaborative Learning: Some Practical Models." *College English* 34:634–43.
- Bucholtz, Mary, and Kira Hall. 2005. "Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural Linguistic Approach." *Discourse Studies* 7 (4–5): 585–614.
- Buranen, Lise. 1999. "But I Wasn't Cheating: Plagiarism and Cross-Cultural Mythology." *Perspectives on Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World*, ed. Lise Buranen and Alice M. Roy, 63–74. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Carino, Peter. 1992. "What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Our Metaphors: A Cultural Critique of Clinic, Lab, and Center." *Writing Center Journal* 13 (1): 31–42
- . 1996. "Open Admissions and the Construction of Writing Center History: A Tale of Three Models." *Writing Center Journal* 17 (1): 30–48.
- Chen, Ronald, and Jon Hanson. 2004. "Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory." *Southern California Law Review* 77:1106–1253.

- Clark, Irene. 1999. "Writing Centers and Plagiarism." *Perspectives on Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World*, ed. Lise Buranen and Alice M. Roy, 155–67. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Cone, Edward. 1974. *The Composer's Voice*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- DellaNeva, JoAnn. 1989. "Reflecting Lesser Lights: The Imitation of Minor Writers in the Renaissance." *Renaissance Quarterly* 42 (3): 449–79.
- Dewoskin, Kenneth J. 1992. "Chinese and Japanese Aesthetics." In *A Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. David Cooper, 68–73. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dryden, L. M. 1999. "A Distant Mirror or Through the Looking Glass? Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in Japanese Education." *Perspectives on Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World*, ed. Lise Buranen and Alice M. Roy, 75–85. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Duff, William. (1767) 1964. *An essay on original genius and its various modes of exertion in philosophy and the fine arts, particularly in poetry*. Gainesville, FL: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints.
- Duranti, Alessandro. 1993. "Beyond Bakhtin: Or the Dialogic Imagination in Academia." *Pragmatics* 3 (3): 333–40.
- Eades, Diana. 2012. "The Social Consequences of Language Ideologies in Courtroom Cross-Examination." *Language in Society* 41 (4): 471–97.
- Ede, Lisa. 1989. "Writing as a Social Process: A Theoretical Foundation for Writing Centers?" *Writing Center Journal* 9 (2): 3–13.
- Elbow, Peter. 1968. "A Method for Teaching Writing." *College English* 30: 115–25.
- . 1975. *Writing without Teachers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Engelke, Matthew. 2007. *A Problem of Presence: Beyond Scripture in an African Church*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Erasmus, Desiderius. 1908. *CICERONIANUS, or a Dialogue on the Best Style of Speaking*. (Translation of *Dialogus Ciceronianus*, 1528). Trans. Izora Scott. New York City: Teachers College, Columbia University.
- Faudree, Paja. 2015. "Tales from the Land of Magic Plants: Textual Ideologies and Fetishes of Indigeneity in Mexico's Sierra Mazateca." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 57 (3): 838–69.
- Foucault, Michel. (1966) 1970. *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. London: Routledge.
- Gal, Susan. 1998. "Multiplicity and Contention among Language Ideologies: A Commentary." In *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, ed. Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard, and Paul Kroskrity, 317–31. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Genette, Gérard. (1982) 1997. *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Gladwell, Malcolm. 2004. "Something Borrowed: Should a Charge of Plagiarism Ruin Your Life?" *New Yorker*, November 22.
- Grafton, Anthony. 2006. "The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950–2000 and Beyond." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67 (1): 1–32.
- Gummere, Francis. 1897. *Old English Ballads*. Boston: Ginn & Co.
- Hammond, Brea. 2003. "Plagiarism: Hammond versus Ricks." In *Plagiarism in Early Modern England*, Paulina Kewes, ed, 41–55. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Hanks, William F. 1996. *Language and Communicative Practices*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Hill, Jane. 1998. "'Today There Is No Respect': Nostalgia, 'Respect,' and Oppositional Discourse in Mexicano (Nahuatl) Language Ideology." In *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, ed. Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard, and Paul Kroskrity, 68–86. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Holquist, Michael. 1983. "The Politics of Representation." *Quarterly Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition* 5 (1): 2–9.
- Howard, Rebecca M. 1993. "A Plagiarism Pentimento." *Journal of Teaching Writing* 11 (3): 233–45.
- . 1995. "Plagiarisms, Authorships, and the Academic Death Penalty." *College English* 57 (7): 788–806.
- Hu, Guangwei, and Jun Lei. 2015. "Chinese University Students' Perceptions of Plagiarism." *Ethics & Behavior* 25 (3): 233–55.
- Huppert, George. 1974. "Divinatio et Eruditio: Thoughts on Foucault." *History and Theory* 13:191–207.
- Hyde, Lewis. 2010. *Common as Air: Revolution, Art, and Ownership*. New York: Farrer, Straus & Giroux.
- Inaba, Mitsutoshi. 2011. *Willie Dixon: Preacher of the Blues*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow.
- Irvine, Judith. 1996. "Shadow Conversations: The Indeterminacy of Participant Roles." *Natural Histories of Discourse*, ed. Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban, 131–59. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2005. "Commentary: Knots and Tears in the Interdiscursive Fabric." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 15 (1): 72–80.
- Irvine, Judith, and Susan Gal. 2000. "Language Ideology and Linguistic Differentiation." *Regimes of Language: Ideologies, Politics, and Identities*, ed. Paul Kroskrity, 35–83. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
- Iseminger, Gary, ed. 1992. *Intention and Interpretation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Ivanhoe, Philip. 2005. "Intellectual Property and Traditional Chinese Culture." In *Law and Social Justice*, ed. Joseph Keirn Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier, 125–42. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Jaszi, Peter. 1981. "When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest." *UCLA Law Review* 28:715–815.
- Johnson, Marcia K., Shahin Hashtroudi, and D. Stephen Lindsay. 1993. "Source Monitoring." *Psychological Bulletin* 114 (1): 3–28.
- Jourdan, Christine, and Johanne Angeli. 2014. "Pijin and Shifting Language Ideologies in Urban Solomon Islands." *Language in Society* 43 (3): 265–85.
- Kapczynski, Amy. 2008. "The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property." *Yale Law Journal* 117 (5): 804–85.
- Kaplan, Benjamin. 1967. *An Unhurried View of Copyright*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Keane, Webb. 2003. "Semiotics and the Social Analysis of Material Things." *Language & Communication* 23 (3–4): 409–25.
- Kinhead, Joyce. 1996. "The National Writing Centers Association as Mooring: A Personal History of the First Decade." *Writing Center Journal* 16 (2): 131–43.

- Kraus, Richard. 1989. *Pianos and Politics in China: Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle over Western Music*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kroskrity, Paul. 1998. "Arizona Tewa Kiva Speech as a Manifestation of a Dominant Language Ideology." In *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, ed. Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard, and Paul Kroskrity, 103–22. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . ed. 2000. *Regimes of Language: Ideologies, Politics, and Identities*. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
- . 2004. "Language Ideology." In *A Companion to Linguistic Anthropology*, ed. Alessandro Duranti, 496–517. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lavik, Erlend. 2014. "Romantic Authorship in Copyright Law and the Uses of Aesthetics." In *The Work of Authorship*, ed. Mireille van Eechoud, 45–93. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Lemley, Mark. 1997. "Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property." *Texas Law Review* 75:873–906.
- Liu, Deming. 2009. "Reflections on Lack of a Patent System throughout China's Long History." *Journal of World Intellectual Property* 12 (2): 122–36.
- Livingston, Paisley. 2005. *Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Locke, John. (1689) 1979. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lu, Jia. 2009. "Chinese Culture and Software Copyright." *New Media & Society* 11:1372–93.
- Macfarlane, Robert. 2007. *Original Copy: Plagiarism and Originality in Nineteenth-Century Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Makihara, Miki, and Bambi B. Schieffelin, 2007. "Cultural Processes and Linguistic Mediations: Pacific Explorations." In *Consequences of Contact: Language Ideologies and Socio-cultural Transformations in Pacific Societies*, ed. Miki Makihara and Bambi B. Schieffelin, 3–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martin Luther King, Jr., Papers Project. 1991. "The Student Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Summary Statement on Research." *Journal of American History* 78 (1): 23–31.
- Matoesian, Gregory. 1999. "The Grammaticalization of Participant Roles in the Constitution of Expert Identity." *Language in Society* 28 (4): 491–521.
- Mazzeo, Tilar. 2007. Review of Robert Macfarlane, *Original Copy: Plagiarism and Originality in Nineteenth-Century Literature*. *Review of English Studies*. 58 (237): 750–51.
- McGann, Jerome. 1983. *The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McGarty, Craig, Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, and Russell Spears, eds. 2002. *Stereotypes as Explanations: The Formation of Meaningful Beliefs About Social Groups*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McLeod, Susan H. 1992. "Responding to Plagiarism: The Role of the WPA." *WPA: Writing Program Administration* 15:7–16.
- Mertz, Elizabeth. 2007. *The Language of Law School: Learning to "Think Like a Lawyer."* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, Keith D. 1991. "Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Folk Pulpit." *Journal of American History* 78 (1): 120–23.



- Milroy, Lesley. 2001. "Britain and the United States: Two Nations Divided by the Same Language (and Different Language Ideologies)." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 10 (1): 56–89.
- . 2004. "Language Ideologies and Linguistic Change." In *Sociolinguistic Variation/Critical Reflections*, ed. Carmen Fought, 161–77. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Murphy, Gregory. 2002. *The Big Book of Concepts*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Murray, Donald. 1968. *A Writer Teaches Writing*. Boston: Houghton.
- . 1970. "The Interior View: One Writer's Philosophy of Composition." *College Composition & Communication* 21:21–26.
- Nakassis, Constantine. 2016. "Linguistic Anthropology in 2015: Not the Study of Language." *American Anthropologist* 118 (2): 330–45.
- Newman, G. E., and Bloom, P. 2012. "Art and Authenticity: The Importance of Originals in Judgments of Value." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 141:558–69.
- Niedzielski, Nancy, and Dennis Preston. 2000. *Folk Linguistics*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Olcott, Marianina. 2002. "Ancient and Modern Notions of Plagiarism: A Study of Concepts of Intellectual Property in Classical Greece." *Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.* 49 (4): 1047–52.
- Pappas, Theodore. 1998. *Plagiarism and the Culture War: The Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Other Prominent Americans*. Tampa, FL: Hallberg.
- Perfect, Timothy J., and Louisa Stark. 2008. "Tales from the Crypt . . . omnesia." In *A Handbook of Memory and Metamemory*, ed. J. Dunlosky and R. A. Bjork, 285–314. New York: Psychology Press.
- Peters, John Durham. 2008. "History as a Communication Problem." In *Explorations in Communication and History*, ed. Barbie Zelizer, 19–34. London: Sage.
- Pfister, Manfred. 1991. "How Postmodern is Intertextuality?" In *Intertextuality*, ed. Heinrich Plett, 207–24. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Pinker, Steven. 1995. *The Language Instinct*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Sawyer, R. Keith. 2006. *Explaining Creativity: The Science of Human Innovation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scollon, Ron. 1995. "Plagiarism and Ideology: Identity in Intercultural Discourse." *Language in Society* 24 (1): 1–28.
- . 2000. "Plagiarism." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 9 (1–2): 188–90.
- Seeger, Anthony. 2004. *Why Suyá Sing: A Musical Anthropology of an Amazonian People*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Shamoon, Linda, and Deborah Burns. 1999. "Plagiarism, Rhetorical Theory, and the Writing Center: New Approaches, New Locations." In *Perspectives on Plagiarism and Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World*, ed. Lise Buranen and Alice M. Roy, 183–92. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Shao, Ke. 2005. "Alien to Copyright?: A Reconsideration of the Chinese Historical Episodes of Copyright." *Intellectual Property Quarterly* 4:400–431.
- Sharp, Cecil. (1907) 1965. *English Folk Song: Some Conclusions*. 4th rev. ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Silverstein, Michael. 1979. "Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology." In *The Elements: A Par session on Linguistic Units and Levels*, ed. R. Cline, W. Hanks and C. Hofbauer, 193–247. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.

- . 1998. "The Uses and Utility of Ideology: A Commentary." In *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, ed. Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard, and Paul Kroskrity, 123–45. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2003. "Indexical Order and the Dialectics of Sociolinguistic Life." *Language and Communication* 23:193–229.
- . 2005. "Axes of Evals: Token versus Type Interdiscursivity." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 15 (1): 6–22.
- Silverstein, Michael, and Greg Urban. 1996. "The Natural History of Discourse." In *Natural Histories of Discourse*, ed. Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban, 1–17. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Smith, Rosanna K., and George E. Newman. 2014. "When Multiple Creators Are Worse Than One: The Bias Toward Single Authors in the Evaluation of Art." *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts* 8 (3): 303–10.
- Spitulnik, Debra. 1998. "Mediating Unity and Diversity: The Production of Language Ideologies in Zambian Broadcasting." In *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, ed. Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard, and Paul Kroskrity, 163–88. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stewart, Donald. 1969. "Prose With Integrity: A Primary Objective." *College Composition and Communication* 20:223–27.
- . 1972. *The Authentic Voice: A Pre-writing Approach to Student Writing*. Dubuque, IA: W. C. Brown.
- Stewart, Susan. 1991. *Crimes of Writing: Problems in the Containment of Representation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stone, Charles. 2008. "What Plagiarism Was Not: Some Preliminary Observations on Classical Chinese Attitudes toward What the West Calls Intellectual Property." *Marquette Law Review* 92:199–230.
- Strauss, Claudia, and Naomi Quinn. 1997. *A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Swigart, Leigh. 2001. "The Limits of Legitimacy: Language Ideology and Shift in Contemporary Senegal." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 10 (1): 90–130.
- Uhland, Ludwig. 1868. "Sagengeschichte des germanische und römische Völker." Vol. 7 of *Uhlands Schriften zur Geschichte der Dichtung und Sage*. Stuttgart: Cotta.
- Umbreit, Kenneth. 1939. "A Consideration of Copyright." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register* 87 (8): 932–53.
- Urban, Greg. 2001. *Metaculture: How Culture Moves through the World*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Weissbourd, Bernard, and Elizabeth Mertz. 1985. "Rule-Centrism versus Legal Creativity: The Skewing of Legal Ideology through Language." *Law & Society Review* 19 (4): 623–60.
- Wen Fong. 1962. "The Problem of Forgeries in Chinese Painting." *Artibus Asiae* 25 (2–3): 95–140.
- Wheeler, Greg. 2009. "Plagiarism in the Japanese Universities: Truly a Cultural Matter?" *Journal of Second Language Writing* 18:17–29.

- White, Harold Ogden. 1935. *Plagiarism and Imitation during the English Renaissance: A Study in Critical Distinctions*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wilce, James. 2005. "Traditional Laments and Postmodern Regrets: The Circulation of Discourse in Metacultural Context." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 15 (1): 60–71.
- Wilf, Eitan. 2014. "Semiotic Dimensions of Creativity." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 43: 397–412.
- Wolin, Richard. 1998. "Between Fact and Interpretation: On the Social Misconstruction of Reality." *Theory and Society* 27 (5): 709–23.
- Woodmansee, Martha. 1994. *The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Woolard, Kathryn A. 1998. "Introduction: Language Ideology as a Field of Inquiry." In *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, ed. Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard, and Paul Kroskrity, 3–47. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2002. "Bernardo de Aldrete and the Morisco Problem: A Study in Early Modern Spanish Language Ideology." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44 (3): 446–80.
- Young, Edward. (1759) 1918. *Conjectures on Original Composition*, ed. Edith J. Morley. Manchester.
- Yzerbyt, Vincent, and Stéphanie Demoulin. 2010. "Intergroup Relations." In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey, vol. 2, 1024–83. New York: John Wiley.
- Ziolkowski, Jan M., and Michael C. J. Putnam. 2008. *The Virgilian Tradition: The First Fifteen Hundred Years*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.