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EDITORIAL

'Music and . . .' is the concluding topic in Ludmilla Jordanova's editorial in an earlier issue of this journal (*Eighteenth-Century Music* 1/2 (2004), 153–155), and in reverse it will be the starting-point in mine. I fell into writing about music as an active amateur (and briefly professional) cellist with a background in theory consisting of a year's tutoring in old-fashioned species counterpoint as an unruly fourteen-year-old. In the autumn of 1979 I was writing about the origins of reverie – that is, of representations and discussions of unfocused or unconscious awareness – in writings of the 1780s, chiefly by Rousseau, Kant and William Cowper. It occurred to me that the drifting sensibility I was describing was perfectly captured by the introduction to Mozart's Dissonance Quartet. It started as a footnote, but finally required a small essay to define the contexts and work out the details. Then, however, I could invoke the representation of a state of feeling not encumbered by the rational straitjacket of concepts. Whether they knew it or not – Kant certainly didn't, Rousseau at some level certainly did – music was what my authors were after!

One thing led to another, one step at a time, with each music-related essay seeming to be a last gasp. The second was an overview, 'Origins of Modernism: Musical Structures and Narrative Forms', paralleling in a series of specific examples the emergence of atonality with the development of modernist narrative; the third was a meditation on Keats's phrase 'unheard melodies', with some incidental musical examples. (These first three essays are included in my collection *Turning Points: Essays in the History of Cultural Expressions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). The others I'll mention, some previously published in journals, are to be collected, save one, in *'The Tooth That Nibbles at the Soul': Essays on Music and Poetry*, under contract with the University of Washington Press.) Some subsequent essays have been general: a set of impressions of literary history based on musical imagery in critical and literary works, with a pause in the centre for the Bach revival; a theory of lyric voice launched by a Schubert song; a discussion of formalism in a review of John Daverio's *Nineteenth-Century Music and the German Romantic Ideology* (New York: Schirmer, 1993); and most recently 'Music and Fantasy', where I muse over an odd sonority in the Overture to *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and puzzle over the fitfulness of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Other essays have been work studies, generally of neglected corners of the repertory (Mozart's string-trio introductions to and arrangements of Bach fugues, K404a, Haydn's solo songs), or more survey-like (Handel's oratorios and the literary culture of their time, German romantic music aesthetics). Finally, I have risked a shot at a core masterpiece with a reading of the libretto and music of *Don Giovanni* under the aegis of the account of absolute freedom in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

I apologize for the self-celebratory list, but there is a point. The encounters with music have been occasional and varied, never systematic. In my intellectual life, music is always an opportunity, just at the horizon of possibility. At the same time, drawing on the lived experience of music, the stimulus has always been musical texts, not musical culture, not the accompanying verbal texts and, finally (and I'll come back to this), not the performances themselves. Sometimes, from my side of the divide, it's a struggle: I had to mount an argument to persuade the editors of *Critical Inquiry* to reproduce the score of the Mozart passages that I described in some detail, and Oxford University Press dropped the musical examples from the literary history essay and refused to reinstate them in proof. Music is a little beyond the ken of us literary types. Indeed, none of my attempts to cross over would have succeeded without a generous welcome from your field and the meticulous help of literally dozens of musicologists whom I have known as colleagues, musical partners and occasional acquaintances.

And so my topic is not 'music and . . .' but '. . . and music'. Not, that is, what my work adds to music, but what music adds to it. I have found myself impelled towards music from the feeling that musical meanings are deeper than words and more intimate than ideas; my accounts are based on musical experiences that are more intuitive than structural, and they look for surprises that transcend definable critique. Because music conveys intuitions that cannot be grasped conceptually, it functions for me as 'the spiritual essence' that Hegel calls 'die Sache selbst' (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, paragraphs 410–418; at one point creatively translated

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by A. V. Miller as 'the heart of the matter'), fulfilling the 'instinct of reason' (paragraphs 250–255). This isn't the place for exegesis, but the terms may be suggestive enough on their own. From this perspective, the musical condensation of feelings takes place enfolded (as instinct) within a material manifestation (*Sache*), embodying the higher form of comprehension known as reason rather than the lower, merely logical, 'understanding'.

The first consequence I draw (or practise) shares the suspicion of references to 'the body' that Elisabeth LeGuin has expressed in her editorial (*Eighteenth-Century Music* 4/1 (2007), 3–5). Unlike her, however, my kind of study is based on music as written, not on music that is performed. The heart of the matter in poetry, its soul (to use another Hegelian term), lies in the feel of the words, not in their utterance. (For an articulate overview of both sides of the issue of reading aloud see Peter Middleton, *Distant Reading: Performance, Readership, and Consumption in Contemporary Poetry* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 25–103.) Scholars in comparative literature are fated to read poems in languages they don't speak – sometimes, indeed, in dead languages that no one speaks. So I turn to music to transcend language, not to articulate, let alone to body it forth. The matter itself is the score, or, as Hegel says at this stage of his dialectic, 'The outer is merely the expression of the inner' (paragraph 263). Discursive interpretation guides practical execution. When I discern a crucial surprise if a constant pulse masks the transition from the Andante to the Molto allegro in the *Don Giovanni* Overture (an expressive nicety that many conductors ignore), or when Richard Will prescribes a flowing tempo (such as apparently no recorded performance observes) for the moment of pardon at the climax of *Le nozze di Figaro* in order to ally the close of the opera to the comic genre ('The Ambivalence of Mozart's Countess', in *Music, Libraries, and the Academy: Essays in Honor of Lenore Coral*, ed. James P. Cassaro (Middleton, WI: A-R Editions, 2007), 31–53), we are premising a best practice for performance on our understanding of the written music. Performance expresses the atmosphere, as with the swampy ophicleide solo in the Overture to *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, which must be heard if the music's fantasy is to be fully realized. But it must be heard in a way that fulfils the spirit of the music. Imagination precedes execution; *la musique dans les lettres* is on the page before it is on the stage. (Lawrence Kramer gets the dialectic of work and performance exactly right, and more complexly than I can suggest here, in *Why Classical Music Still Matters* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 71–109. But then, perhaps because we share a background as students of romantic poetry, I think he gets almost all the fundamentals right, with the one exception of the relationship of body and soul. He generally regards performing as physical exertion, the sort of thing that 'ripples throughout the whole body' (153), yielding climaxes of *jouissance*, whereas to an amateur like me, performance is a more purely exhilarating kind of joy.) Music as composed completes the significances aimed at by imaginative literature as written.

A second consequence follows from music's transcendence of conceptual meaning. '. . . and music' implies that the spirit is beyond the letter: completion also entails a degree of correction. The particular inspiration here is Adorno; among his many virtues (and despite his many problems) is the recognition that transcendence entails critique and not an empty idealism. So, for instance, in the great chapter 'Mediation' in his *Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, he warns against regarding music 'as a continuation of society by other means': 'In fully autonomous music, society in its existent form is opposed by the turn against the imputation of dominion, an imposition disguised in circumstances of production' (*Introduction to the Sociology of Music*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), 204–205). Here, as ever, Adorno's language fights grammatical transparency so as to evoke the transformative resistance exerted by musical form when it exposes social forms – the hidden labour of production in this case – and hence critiques them. Kramer's first book, *Music and Poetry: The Nineteenth Century and After* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), offers a series of relevant terms that are queer in the now obsolete sense of the word – 'transmemberment', 'overvocalizing', 'naming and unnaming' and 'chronophany' – and also suggest the kind of gender-bending that queries and complicates identities. Even a simple Haydn song can be a work of genius when the setting must confront disparate curves of feeling in successive strophes, shooting rays of illumination when harmonies that seem natural in one stanza prove wryly piquant in another. Expression lodges in the unexpected, hence always at the edges or interstices of form. Utopian accounts in the manner

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of Ernst Bloch, Freudian (Catherine Clément), dialectical (Adorno) or materialist (Attali) accounts, all offer different approaches to the peculiar spirit of music; they are summed up in Deleuze and Guattari's view of music as diagonal to sense (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 297–298). In music an aura of wisdom cushions or deepens conflicts and ideologies. 'Aura' is, of course, Walter Benjamin's word; had he been writing in English, I like to think he would have used a different word of mystery, reintroduced into the language by Walter Scott and unparalleled in other languages, 'glamour'. For Adorno the dubious paradigm is Wagner, in whose sheen bourgeois culture both masters and hides the labour of its production (*In Search of Wagner*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1991); see the end of chapter 5). In the music of the eighteenth century the sonic glamour typically occupies a gap between the local effects of topical semiotics and the long-range effects of organic integration. ('Anyone fully able to grasp why Haydn doubles the violins with a flute in *piano* might well get an intuitive glimpse into [dem könnte aufblitzen] why thousands of years ago, men gave up eating uncooked grain and began to bake bread.' *In Search of Wagner*, 83.) Topics and formal organization are conventional; glamour is both more personal and more ideological.

Another synonym is 'style', as when a personality gains a glamorous aura through her or his style. Until the end of the eighteenth century 'style' was a descriptive and collective term; only at the end of our period did the word become individual and evaluative. When Wordsworth imagines an encounter with a solitary reaper, 'alone and singing by herself', in a Gaelic he cannot understand, he transmutes collective folksong into a uniquely valuable personal moment, not mediated by words: 'The music in my heart I bore / Long after it was heard no more'. The displacement of 'it' (the music) by 'my' is the heart of the matter, the intuitive flash of spiritual illumination. '. . . and music' entails the search for personal expression, style, aura, glamour, features that have special import for this journal in its concern with the era when these notions were emerging. (I discuss the concept of style at length in 'Why Style Matters: The Lessons of Taine's *History of English Literature*', *Turning Points*, 33–87; a philosophical reflection can begin with Berel Lang, 'Style As Instrument, Style As Person', *Critical Inquiry* 4 (1978), 715–739; from the perspective of musicology the issues are concisely yet richly digested at the opening of Charles Rosen's *Classical Style* (New York: Faber, 1997), 19–23.)

Finally, '. . . and music' implies complementarity. Here I would raise the issues of periodization that have confronted this journal from its inception. The first number contains an incisive essay by James Webster arguing for the coherence of the period 1720–1780 ('The Eighteenth Century as a Music-Historical Period?', *Eighteenth-Century Music* 1/1 (2004), 47–60). For literary scholars it seems a truism to consider the Enlightenment as a unit. The cultural break marked by the French Revolution, Kantian philosophy, *Lyrical Ballads* and the *Athenäum* has overpowered all other divisions. The post-1760 (or post-1740) sentimentalism that once was seen as an early form of Romanticism now universally appears as a trend that harks back to Shaftesbury and that merely inflects the universalist predilections of the Enlightenment by singular cases. Clearly, there is no point seeking bright boundary lines from the muddle of history. But comparison of different media can regulate, complicate or rectify common assumptions. So, for instance, musical continuities linking the early-century 'Baroque' with the late-century 'Classic' include the repertory of topics and the role of the composer as craftsman, while the 'Romantic' pre-eminence of large-scale formal effects and the composer as genius emerge fitfully in Mozart, but systematically only in Beethoven. (The transitional character of Mozart's career is portrayed, perhaps overemphatically, in Norbert Elias, *Mozart: Portrait of a Genius*, ed. Michael Schröter, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).) These are intricate matters, needless to say, and on the large scale I mean only to endorse this journal's enterprise of seeing the century as a whole. More particularly, however, I would like to urge finer-grained parallelisms than I sometimes see. Webster warns against Zeitgeist thinking as well as against its complement, uneven development (*die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen*). But the cure to such premature generalizations is not different generalizations but greater specificity. Again I'll give two examples from my own work. Much discussed in connection with Haydn is the contemporary characterization of the composer as 'launisch'. But scholars who relate *Laune* either to British 'wit' or romantic 'irony' are looking too far

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afield. Both translations are too intellectual for the moody unpredictability targeted by *Laune*, whose etymological associations lie with lunacy. Reviewers related Haydn to Laurence Sterne, and the novelist's word that applies in this case is 'whimsy'. To understand how Haydn's contemporaries situated the aura of his music, a closer alliance of literature . . . and music is advantageous on all sides. In the case of Handel, periodizing accounts have placed him all the way from a late manifestation of court culture to an early forerunner of Romanticism, proffering generalizing contexts from the wrong time and sometimes the wrong country. But Handel's success with the public strongly marks him as a man of his own day, and the mood of the country in the Walpole era (1721–1742) – always subject to partisan splits, of course – was markedly different from that of the succeeding decades. Sharp-edged satire and brilliant wit mark the Walpole decades; a far more refined, often nostalgic sentimentality those of the mid-century (persuasively characterized in a well titled book by John Sitter, *Literary Loneliness in Mid-Eighteenth-Century England* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982)). Consequently, I have tried to distinguish the mood of Handel's oratorios from that of his operas and to understand the tenor of the oratorios in relationship to the writing of their precise moment and culture. Musicologists such as Mary Hunter and Edmund Goehring have excelled at linking repertory opera buffas to the largely forgotten stage practices of their time and place, but when it comes to the history of ideas, the teeth of the combs sometimes grow much coarser. In cases such as these, '. . . and music' implies an exacting scrutiny of moments and settings.

'. . . and' can mean . . . and more, . . . and yet, or . . . and so. In these three guises musical moments serve for me to enrich (rather than to perform) verbal meanings, to invoke ideologies at their most impalpable, most ideological level, and then also to corroborate and confirm specific understandings of specific historical moments. These aspects are only a small part of the richness of our musical culture, but it is the part most readily available to me as a textualist able to take occasional and limited advantage of what enters my ears.

MARSHALL BROWN

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