

Corrigendum

Who Punishes Extremist Nominees? Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in U.S. Elections — CORRIGENDUM

ANDREW B. HALL

DANIEL M. THOMPSON

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000023>. Published online by Cambridge University Press, 07 March 2018.


The authors regret the inclusion of an error in the above article. At one point in the merging of data for our analyses, we used an incorrect district variable from the 2012 CCES (cdid rather than cdid13) that does not always accurately reflect redistricting. Correcting this error and updating our datasets results in minor changes to all estimates

throughout the paper, and does not alter substantive takeaways. The article has been corrected. All updated tables and figures are included below. The authors have also updated the corresponding replication materials at the American Political Science Review Data-verse. The corrected online appendix is also available there.

TABLE 1. Effect of Extremist Nominee on Party's General-Election Vote Share and Victory, U.S. House, 2006–2014. (Corrected)

	Vote Share					Victory		
Extremist Nominee	–0.13 (0.04)	–0.07 (0.03)	–0.10 (0.04)	–0.15 (0.04)	–0.37 (0.16)	–0.35 (0.12)	–0.42 (0.14)	–0.48 (0.17)
N	113	234	234	118	113	234	234	115
Polynomial	1	3	5	CCT	1	3	5	CCT
Bandwidth	0.10	–	–	0.11	0.10	–	–	0.10

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses in columns 1–3 and 4–7; standard errors in columns 4 and 8 come from rdrobust package and are clustered by district. The running variable is the extremist primary candidate's vote share winning margin in the primary.

FIGURE 2. The Effect of Extremist Nominees on Validated Partisan Turnout in the General Election. U.S. House, 2006–2014. (Corrected)

Note: The dependent variable (on the vertical axis) is the share of all CCES respondents who turned out in a given general election who reported being strong, not very strong, or leaning supporters of the party holding the primary election (each observation is a district-year-primary). Points are averages in equal-sample-sized bins of the horizontal axis variable. Regression lines are from OLS estimated on raw data (not binned), separately on each side of the discontinuity. Shaded area represents 95% confidence interval.

TABLE 2. Effect of Extremist Nominee on Party's General-Election Turnout, U.S. House, 2006–2014. (Corrected)

	Partisan Share of Turnout			
Extremist Nominee	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.03)	-0.11 (0.04)
N	109	228	228	111
Polynomial	1	3	5	CCT
Bandwidth	0.10	–	–	0.10

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses in columns 1-3; standard error in column 4 comes from rdrobust package and is clustered by district. The running variable is the extremist primary candidate's vote share winning margin in the primary.

TABLE 3. Effect of Extremist Nominee on Party's General-Election Turnout, U.S. House, 2006–2014. (Corrected)


	Partisan Share of Turnout			
	(Catalist)			
Extremist Nominee	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.06)
N	112	231	231	108
Polynomial	1	3	5	CCT
Bandwidth	0.10	–	–	0.10

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses in columns 1-3; standard error in column 4 comes from rdrobust package and is clustered by district. The running variable is the extremist primary candidate's vote share winning margin in the primary.

TABLE 4. Effect of Extremist Nominee on Party's General-Election Turnout Across Scalings, U.S. House, 2006–2014. (Corrected)

	Partisan Share of Turnout			
Hall-Snyder	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.03)	-0.11 (0.04)
CF Score	-0.14 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.05)
Dynamic CF	-0.14 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.05)
DW-DIME	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)
Polynomial	1	3	5	CCT
Bandwidth	0.10	–	–	–

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses in columns 1-3; standard errors in column 4 come from rdrobust package and are clustered by district. The running variable is the extremist primary candidate's vote share winning margin in the primary. Each pair of rows represents the effect estimates from a different measure of ideology.

FIGURE 3. RD Effect of Extremist Nominees on Vote Share and Partisan Share of Turnout, U.S. House, 2006–2014. (Corrected)**TABLE 5. Effect of Extremist Nominee on Party's General-Election Turnout in Midterm and Presidential Years, U.S. House, 2006–2014. (Corrected)**

	Partisan Share of Turnout							
	Midterm				Presidential			
Extremist Nominee	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.05)
N	61	128	128	80	47	100	100	44
Polynomial	1	3	5	CCT	1	3	5	CCT


Note: Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses in columns 1-3 and 4-7; standard errors in columns 4 and 8 come from rdrobust package. The running variable is the extremist primary candidate's vote share winning margin in the primary.

TABLE 6. Effect of Extremist Nominee on Rates of Partisan General-Election Turnout, U.S. House, 2006–2014. (Corrected)

	Own Party				Opposing Party			
	Turnout Rate	# Turn Out	# Identify w/ Party	N	Turnout Rate	# Turn Out	# Identify w/ Party	N
Turnout Rate	0.03 (0.07)	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
# Turn Out	-8.04 (5.08)	-9.07 (4.09)	-7.92 (4.61)	-8.71 (5.53)	1.90 (5.68)	0.23 (4.08)	0.76 (4.91)	2.05 (5.85)
# Identify w/ Party	-12.78 (5.68)	-16.16 (4.51)	-13.30 (5.21)	-12.44 (7.12)	-0.46 (6.86)	-4.21 (5.03)	-3.61 (6.07)	0.51 (7.23)
N	112	233	233	142	112	233	233	144
Polynomial	1	3	5	CCT	1	3	5	CCT

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by district in parentheses in columns 1-3 and 5-7; standard errors in columns 4 and 8 come from rdrobust package and are clustered by district. The running variable is the extremist primary candidate's vote-share winning margin in the primary. In the first row, the dependent variable is the total number of CCES respondents in the party who turned out to vote divided by the total number of respondents identifying with the party. The second and third row dependent variables are the numerator and denominator of this ratio, respectively.

FIGURE 4. Difference in Effect of Extremist Nominee on Turnout Rate, Opposing-Party Voters Minus Own-Party Voters. (Corrected)



Note: Line reflects RD estimates using 3rd-order polynomial of running variable. Shaded area represents 95% confidence interval from robust standard errors clustered by district.

REFERENCE

- Hall, Andrew B. and Daniel M. Thompson. 2018. "Who Punishes Extremist Nominees? Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in US Elections." *American Political Science Review* 112(3): 509–24.