

Lemberg/Lwów/Lvov/Lviv: Identities of a 'City of Uncertain Boundaries'

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Leopolis in Latin, Lemberg in German, Lwów in Polish, Lviv in Ukrainian, this city located in the historic province of Eastern Galicia (Galizien, Galicja, Halychyna) has a history marked by the successive conquests of the region by imperial powers. Founded in the 13th century by Prince Danylo of Galicia as a fortress against the Tatar and Mongol invasions of the period, then bequeathed to his son Lev (Leo) who built it into the city which bears his name, in the 14th century it came under rule of the kings of Poland for the next 400 years or more, emerging as a major centre of the Polish–Lithuanian union. Its multi-ethnic make-up was nevertheless established very early on, like that of most Central-European cities, as a consequence of coming under the 'Magdeburg rights' legal system in 1352. Through this development, the city attracted a large number of immigrants of diverse origins (Germans, Czechs, Poles, Jews, Armenians, Tatars, Moldavians and Saracens, both merchants and artisans, who established themselves in their own ethnic quarters in various parts of the city). They had been invited there by King Casimir the Great who was anxious to develop prosperous urban centres in Poland. It was also this 'German law' status (*jus teutonicum*) that set the city apart from its hinterland, populated by Ruthenian peasants and a Polish petty nobility.

In 1772, after the First Partition of Poland, the city came under Austrian domination. It was retained as part of Cisleithania, that is to say in the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy, of which Galicia was the easternmost province, at the time of the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867. Being a multicultural city situated on the Austro-Russian border, Lemberg, as it was then called, did not escape the ebb and flow of nationalities. The 1890s onwards saw a strong influx of Poles after the Polish elites had managed to secure a *de facto* autonomy for the province, while for the Ruthenian national movement it also constituted a sort of 'Ukrainian Piedmont'. As a frontier city, it would also become an object of dispute at the end of the First World War. In October 1918 a short-lived National Republic of Western Ukraine was declared there, at the same time as another independent state was taking shape in

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central Ukraine, a sign of the particularity of a region that was being contested by both Poles and Ukrainians. In 1918–19, at the battle of Lwów, Ukrainian troops confronted the Polish 'Eaglets', who eventually recaptured the city. Lwów became officially incorporated into an independent Poland in 1923. In 1939, following the secret Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, the region was invaded by the Red Army and Sovietized until June 1941, when divisions of the German Wehrmacht swept over it, ushering in the darkest period of its history. After the Second World War, the city would become part of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, and then in 1991 of the newly independent Ukraine.

A 'city of uncertain boundaries', in the words of the writer Joseph Roth,¹ Lemberg/Lwów/Lvov/Lviv has known many overlords. Its history embraces that of the region of Eastern Galicia of which it is the capital. The little state of Galicia-Lodomeria (Галицько-володимирська держава or Halycz-Wołyń) which arose in the 13th century is claimed by some to have been the successor of Kievan Rus, back to which the upholders of Ukrainian national historiography, along with their leading figure Mykhailo Hrushovs'kij, trace the origins of the modern Ukraine. This remote province nevertheless reached its high point during the Polish golden age at the beginning of the 17th century, and thereafter faded along with Poland's decline. The urban landscape of Lviv continues to be marked by the Renaissance splendours of its old city, recalling those of Kraków, with its numerous Polish monastic churches (Dominican, Carmelite, Jesuit, Benedictine and Bernardine). But it is equally dominated by the classic *Jugendstil* architecture of late 19th-century Vienna. Raised to the status of provincial capital of Galicia (while Kraków was reduced to a secondary role), it is to this former role as the seat of Austrian administration that Lviv owes its fine parks, opera house and university, its water reticulation system, its electric tramway, and its link to the railway network with its splendid *Jugendstil* station building, installations which brought it the nickname of 'Little Vienna'. But the city's importance was to decline under the state regimes by which it was ruled after the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Already relegated to minor status by the Polish 2nd Republic, which incorporated it into the region of Little Poland (Małopolska) of which Kraków was made the capital, it was reduced still further under Soviet control to the mere rank of chief town of the Lvov *oblast*, a frontier region in a forgotten corner of the Soviet Union. The very name 'Ukraine', borne by what was then just one of the tributary republics of the Soviet Union, can take the meaning of 'march, borderland'. It was only when Ukraine recovered its independence in 1991 that the local elites could assert the significance for the whole nation of the broader region of western Ukraine (*zakhidna Ukraina*) as being the historic cradle of Ukrainian identity, or furthermore that of *Halychyna* (Галичина, Galicia), as being a very ancient regional entity, denoting foreign 'occupation', which had been ignored under the Communist regime.

Lemberg/Lwów/Lviv: a complex urban identity

Lemberg/Lwów/Lvov/Lviv has thus been characterized by a succession of identities (Austrian, Polish, Soviet and Ukrainian, to which one must add a Jewish

identity which survives in the memory of a few survivors of the Holocaust, now scattered to the four corners of the world) as a consequence of the turbulence of history. On the one hand, it can with good reason be seen as a precursor model of the modern multicultural city,² if its population statistics are taken into account (broadly speaking, in the inter-war period, they showed that 51 percent were Poles, 30 to 35 percent Jews, and 12 to 20 percent Ukrainians, but with fluctuations between these figures, and also problems in determining identities for people to whom the religious, linguistic and ethnic criteria did not consistently correspond).³ But, in reality, the city met during the 20th century with multiple tragedies and violent upheavals, notably the genocide of its Jewish population (which numbered some 100,000 pre-war, to which one must add more than 40,000 refugees from western Poland who arrived in 1939), and the near total expulsion of the Polish population in 1946. The history of this frontier city could well be an example of what American historians, following the book by Rogers Brubaker in which he refocuses the study of nationalisms on inter-ethnic zones, call *shatter zones* or *crush zones*.⁴

In the Lvov of the immediate post-Second World War period, when it had been emptied of nearly 80 percent of its inhabitants, the vacated apartments were occupied by Russians from the interior of the USSR (nearly 200,000 persons) or by rural dwellers coming in from the countryside. This city which had previously been in the far east of Austria-Hungary, then in the east of Poland, and until the war was considered 'central-European' according to the mental cartography of its citizens and Polish-Jewish by ethnic make-up, became, in the words of the Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, 'an Eastern European Slavic city', 'Ukraino-Russian'. It henceforth found itself in the far west of the Soviet Union. This sudden and brutal change of identity made Lviv 'a perfect example of the failure of the idea of multi-culturalism in that part of Europe',⁵ as it was first and foremost derived from extermination and ethnic cleansing, which Hrytsak does not entirely acknowledge. Indeed, despite the rediscovery in Germany, in Austria, in the United States and in Israel of the city's multicultural past, of the plurality of its memories and the colourful juxtaposition of its former communities, the 'city of the imagination' remains remote from its real counterpart. No matter how much the Habsburg myth and the *fin-de-siècle* splendours of the city, along with the richness of its Polish and Jewish cultures, are celebrated in nostalgic publications, the divide that separates the imagined past from the real present cannot but result in painful disenchantment.⁶

If anything constant in the city's identity can be discerned, it may be that of its frontier location, 'at the outer reaches', always at a distance from the centre and from the capitals (Vienna, Warsaw, Moscow, Kiev) from which it is governed and which shift with the ebb and flow of regimes. This circumstance tends to overlay it with an old-fashioned air of subordinated provincialism, but which is also one of the charms of the city. For civil servants, a promotion to Lemberg was always considered a track to nowhere on one's career path, and this perception continues to this day. It was only with the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections that Lviv could perhaps begin to hope that it was passing from a state of marginality towards a position of some centrality, one which nevertheless remains largely to be negotiated.

Modes of successive reappropriation of the past

Tossed back and forth at the mercy of military and political conquests of which it had no part, the city has undergone successive reappropriations which can be traced in the history of its main street. It was on the site of the ramparts and moat which formerly surrounded the old city that at the end of the 18th century the Austrians constructed a broad street lined with bourgeois mansions, which in the 19th century bore the name of *Karl-Ludwig-Strasse*, then *Wały hetmanskie* in Polish. When Poland became independent it was renamed *Wały Legionów* (Boulevard of the Legions, in honour of the Polish legions which had defended Lwów against the Ukrainians). In the Soviet era it was given the name of *Prospekt Lenina* (Lenin Avenue), and then finally, upon Ukraine's independence, *Prospekt Svobody* (Freedom Avenue). At the bottom of the main square, the former Polish *Teatr Wielki* has become the Ivan Franko National Opera House. The square itself has seen a coming and going of monuments: in 1904 a monument was erected in honour of the Polish national poet Mickiewicz; later, in its Soviet form, the square was embellished with a statue of Lenin, torn down in 1990; but since 1993, it is the monument to the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko which has become the focal point of all demonstrations, as most recently it was for the political gatherings during the Orange Revolution. But it also serves more mundanely as the starting point for marriage processions.

The former *Plac Mariacki* (St Mary's Square, which called attention to the city's Polish Catholic heritage) has today been extended to become Galicia Square, dominated by the monumental but rather unsightly statue of Prince Danylo of Galicia, the founder of the city, according to Ukrainian historiography. Nearby, on the edge of the park which since the Soviet years has born the name of Ivan Franko Park but which was formerly the Austrian Stadtpark, then Kościuszko Park under Polish rule, stands the former Galician Parliament Building (the *Landtagsgebäude* in German becoming the *Sejm galicyjski* in Polish). It became the Ivan Franko National University during the Soviet period, named after the leading Ukrainian socialist writer Ivan Franko, a name it retains today. Apart from the ubiquitous references in public nomenclature to Franko and to other respected Ukrainian intellectuals such as Drahomanov and Hrushovs'kij, many streets were renamed in the 1990s after leaders of Ukrainian nationalist movements such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) or the Ukrainian Insurrection Army (UPA). Among such leaders with streets named after them are war leaders and Nazi collaborators, such as Stepan Bandera, Yehven Konoval's', Andrij Melnik or Roman Shukhevych alias Tshuprynka (*vul. [street] Stepana Bandery, vul. Konoval'tsia, vul. Henerala Tshuprynky*, etc.). Russian street-names, even those commemorating Lermontov or Pushkin, were removed without any compunction, a sign of the resolutely anti-Soviet, anti-Russian and nationalist determination of the commission that has overseen the allocation of new street names since independence.

By marking their presence through successive changes to the urban toponymy, the different municipal authorities demonstrated their subordination to distant political centres (Vienna, Warsaw, Moscow) of which they were a dependency. This model was maintained by the 1990s municipality which has inscribed in the

street-names and general urban signage a sort of national pantheon which is both pan-Ukrainian and local, characterized both by the commemoration of a common 'national' history and by a resolutely nationalistic, bellicose local one.

While some tourist guidebooks seek to resuscitate the memory of the Polish or Jewish presence in the city,⁷ despite everything its Jewish past has undergone the most significant obliteration. Of the 'Golden Rose' synagogue, built by an Italian architect of the Renaissance period and destroyed by the Nazis, there remains but a single wall, a scar of the past in the heart of the old city. Over the site of the old Jewish cemetery, used between the 14th and 18th centuries, the Kraków market was built in 1947. At the end of Zamarstyniv's'ka Street, the impressive monument to the victims of the Lviv ghetto commemorates the murder of 160,000 Jews, 45 percent of the population of the time, by the Nazis between 1941 and 1943. But, in the same street, the monument erected in honour of the Stalinist persecutions, sited next to the former NKVD prison, makes no mention of the terrible pogroms that took place there when the Germans arrived in June 1941. Despite a Jewish community which still numbered 20,000 at the fall of Communism (7000 today) with two functioning synagogues, the Board of Museums of the city in 2004 inaugurated an exhibition with the title, resonant in its implications, of 'Images of a bygone world'. Jewish Lemberg, along with Polish Lwów, are resolutely considered as gone for ever.

Invention of a local identity and a 'Galician' and 'Lvivian' narrative

Since around 1990, there has been a rediscovery of the Galician dimension as a focal point around which local elites are reforming an identity. To a certain extent, even during the Soviet era, Lviv had always been a focus of latent dissidence where family and regional memories were kept alive, which passively resisted Russification and managed to maintain a Ukrainian national identity in spite of the dominant internationalist and Russifying discourse. In a city whose post-war population was more than 50 percent made up of peasants from the countryside, the memory of Stalinist oppression was of necessity reduced to personal accounts of family and local persecutions, magnifying but at the same time unaware of the tragedies which had struck the other communities of the city and region. In consequence, after 1989, local intellectuals sought to 'reinvent' Galicia and Lviv its capital as both a frontier territory but also as a centre of Ukrainian nationalism, a victim of Grand-Russian and Communist oppression.

The word *Halychyna* (Galicia) has been reinvigorated and applied to commercial enterprises, a brand of fruit juice, etc. This renascent regionalism is re-appropriating certain icons of the past which recall the region's role as a 'Ukrainian Piedmont'. The reactivation of the Hapsburg myth is one example. Two so-called 'Viennese' cafes, aimed mainly at tourists, have been opened, and in 2000, the 170th anniversary of the birth of the Emperor Franz Josef was celebrated with a ball worthy of the Imperial court. Nevertheless, it is especially a resolutely Ukrainian character that the local elites want to imprint on the city, calling it '*nashe slavno misto Lviv*' (our famous city of Lviv). The word '*nashe*' ('our') is particularly stressed, in that it is applied to all that is 'Ukrainian' in opposition to what might be Russian, Polish or foreign; one

finds it similarly used in the current expression 'po nashomu' ('in "our" language', that is to say, in Ukrainian), or again in the name that the opposition coalition used in order to assert their common cause: *Nasha Ukraïna* ('our' Ukraine, as opposed to 'theirs'). The naming of streets, the affixing of various commemorative plaques and the erection of monuments to the dubious heroes of western Ukraine who had collaborated with the Nazis rather than with the Soviets is one of the more troubling signs marking this late-appearing and somewhat tense Ukrainization.

Some Galician writers and essayists back a vision of local identity which is at once more intellectual, more refined and more open, expressed for example through the journal *Ji* (a name derived from the letter 'ї', a distinctive mark of Ukrainian in relation to Russian), whose director is Taras Vozniak. This journal, financed by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, is imbued with a resolutely European spirit, promoting a regional identity that is oriented towards the West rather than the East. It has displayed great efforts towards reconciliation with Jews and Poles, as witnessed by the special editions devoted to these communities.⁸ It also defends Galician specificity and even in certain cases an autonomism, in contrast to the centralism of Kiev and the Russianness of the eastern regions of the country.

One edition of the journal in 2003, which was devoted specifically to the city of Lviv, is of particular interest for the scope of its contents. In an overview article in which he sets out his philosophy of the city, Taras Vozniak sketches a lofty future for it. His vision for Lviv, arising out of its multinational past, is as the 'Strasbourg of East-Central Europe', whose mission would be to spearhead the lobbying for the Europeanization of Ukraine. He sees it as the driving force for a 'Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation' and equally of a reconciliation between Ukraine and the Jewish world. (For the moment, however, given the current orientation of the municipal council, this seems little more than a pious wish and reveals just how far apart Vozniak is from the local authorities.) For him, it is especially vital that Lviv should be the focal point of a new axis linking Galicia to Poland and, more broadly, Ukraine to Europe. To bring this about, he is supporting the projected but not yet adopted plan to create the San Euro-region, which would take Lviv and Rzeszów, in south-eastern Poland, as its two dynamic centres. Driven by visionary inspiration, he even envisages the creation of a zone of free exchange around Lviv, thereby allowing a rejuvenation of the frontier trade with Poland.

Vozniak also has in mind the transformation of Lviv into the leading university and media centre of modern Ukraine, building on the potential of its youth and on the local nationalist tradition and its historic independent stance vis-à-vis Kiev. Finally, he wants to raise Lviv out of its modest role as merely the capital of the Lviv *oblast* and give it the importance it merits, that of the chief metropolitan centre of western Ukraine through the creation of a large federal region with Lviv as its capital and incorporating the historic Galicia (comprising the Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk *oblasts*) with Transcarpathia, Volhynia and Bukovina. With the advantage of this enlarged size, this super-region would then become the dynamic engine driving a swift integration of Ukraine with Europe.⁹ Vozniak's project is thus quite ingenious: he is making use of the city's history and location on the frontier to envisage the creation of an intermediary space directed towards Europe. His desire to resist the hegemony of the Kiev government (still led by Kuchma when the

particular edition of *Ji* appeared) was part of an original and self-assertive process of promoting the nationalism of western Ukraine as a model for pro-Western democracy throughout the country.

Vozniak's propositions, which he had derived well before the elections of November–December 2004 and the accompanying Orange Revolution, bring attention to the problem that Lviv has found itself confronted with since the enlargement of Europe in May 2004. The key question is where the eastern frontier of Europe is now to be drawn,¹⁰ because, since Poland's entry into the European Union, the border separating the well-off of Europe from those left out in the cold now passes between Poland and Ukraine, a few tens of kilometres from Lviv. Since that time, the city finds itself once again isolated behind a *cordon sanitaire* all the more unbreachable because of the visas now required for Ukrainians going into Poland, affecting hundreds of thousands of people who subsisted on cross-border smuggling or on illegal employment in the West, notably in Poland. The frontier between East and West, which not long ago passed through the centre of Berlin or between Bavaria and the former 'Sudeten' region of Czechoslovakia, is today at Rava Russ'ka, a border post on the Lviv road, in mockery of all historic traditions of the region, for Eastern and Western Galicia historically were part of one and the same province.

The mental cartography of Ukraine and the place that Lviv occupies in it are of prime importance for the way in which, both in Ukraine and in Europe, the links between the two parts of Ukraine are conceived. In this context, Samuel Huntington's book *The Clash of Civilizations* generated a strong public following in Lviv to the extent that he laid down the postulate of a fundamental cleavage (fault-line) dividing the modern world and coinciding with the furthest extent reached by Christianity in 1500, which would therefore pass through the centre of Ukraine, dividing it in two.¹¹ This fault-line between two incompatible civilizations would in consequence divide Western Ukraine from Eastern Ukraine, opposing the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Ukraine against the Orthodox Ukraine, the Ukrainian-speaking regions against the Russian-speaking regions, pitting nationalist Ukraine against pro-Russian Ukraine, bourgeois Ukraine against communist Ukraine, and corresponding to the historic division between Hapsburg Galicia and the parts of Ukraine dominated by Tsarist Russia. It also coincides with the local cliché that sets in opposition, though in mutually distorted mirror-image representations, the *banderivtsi* (the Ukrainian nationalist followers of Stepan Bandera, anti-Semitic, anti-Polish and anti-Russian) with the *moskali* (the Russified or Sovietized supporters of Moscow). More ironically, it could be further suggested that this line of cleavage is also the frontier between coffee and tea drinking, which may be a no less convincing criterion for the measure of cultural difference.

The 2004 elections and the Orange Revolution: a turning-point?

The divide anticipated by both Vozniak and by Huntington seemed at least in part confirmed by the Ukrainian presidential election campaign of December 2004. The voting certainly revealed an east–west division of the country, with Yanukovich, Kuchma's candidate, carrying the east of the country, while Yushchenko, the 'demo-

cratic' and pro-western candidate, was supported by the central and especially the western regions. While this was happening, the elections in Romania were being held almost unnoticed, and even those in Georgia did not attract the same level of attention in Europe. But a sort of acceleration of history took place when Western media reported the falsification of the election result by the pro-Russian regime in power, the apparent poisoning of Yushchenko by the secret service, and the wave of peaceful demonstrations of the Orange Revolution which swept the country. Among Western countries, Poland took a particularly active role in sending observers, while Polish buses were made available for the demonstrators, and Kwaśniewski and Lech Wałęsa lent their support to Yushchenko.

That said, despite this apparent division of the country, the East/West split in these elections should not be exaggerated. The struggle in reality was between the democratic, student and intellectual components of Ukrainian society on the one hand, and on the other, post-Soviet oligarchies, broadly tainted by corruption, who survived in the industrial regions to the east through tradition or influence. But these latter were hardly any different as far as their background or mentality was concerned from similar hardliners found in the west of the country. Yushchenko himself was supported by a coalition only belatedly cobbled together between free-marketeers, opportunists, socialists and Ukrainian nationalists, to whom it came as a great surprise to find themselves suddenly under the spotlight. Yushchenko, in his campaign in the west of the country, had to highlight themes likely to gain support in that region, visiting for example the memorial erected to a local UPA fighter. It was only very late in the piece that he distanced himself from the embarrassing support of the little *Svoboda* (Freedom) Party, an offshoot of the nationalist and pro-Nazi UNA-UNSO party, whose jack-booted auxiliaries marched through the streets of Lviv brandishing red and black flags; or again from the KUN (*Kongres Ukraïntsiikh Natsionalistiv*) previously headed by Slava Stets'ko (wife of Yaroslav Stets'ko, a colleague of Stepan Bandera in the leadership of the OUN in 1939–40), who had only recently died while deputy for Ivano-Frankivsk.¹² A member of the opposition coalition *Nasha Ukraïna* (Our Ukraine) until July 2004, Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of the *Svoboda* Party (which had previously been the Ukrainian National-Socialist Party) had campaigned under the slogan 'Ukraine for the Ukrainians' and 'moskali and Jews out' (which was the former slogan of the pro-Nazi OUN). Such graffiti could be seen in the streets of Lviv, even if the theory has been advanced that in some instances these were the work of *agents provocateurs* from among the pro-government secret service, for which there is a certain plausibility.¹³ The nationalists in the west of the country, who have been demanding for a certain time now the recognition of former soldiers of the OUN and UPA and their rights to pensions on the same basis as for partisans and soldiers of the Red Army, are now hoping to see their demands recognized.

On Jewish issues in particular, Yushchenko has been slow to make any progress. When the opposition newspaper *Sil'ski visti* published an anti-Semitic article which declared, among other ridiculous claims, that the Jews were responsible for the famine of 1933, that the NKVD had been 99 percent made up of Jews guilty of the deaths of millions of Ukrainians, and that Jews had participated in the invasion of Ukraine by the Wehrmacht to which they contributed a contingent of 400,000

soldiers, Yushchenko had to have his arm twisted before distancing himself from this newspaper, which Kuchma had had closed down.¹⁴ In fact, *Sil'ski visti* had been numbered among the supporters of Yushchenko's campaign, and the latter could not decide how to respond to the substance of the article. It was only very belatedly, no doubt after the arrival of American advisers who took his campaign in hand, that he sent a message of perfect political rectitude to the Jewish community of Ukraine on the occasion of the Hanukkah festival in December 2004. At the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, he was able to fall back on the experiences of his father, who had been interned there through being a Soviet prisoner of war, to guarantee that there would never be any anti-Semitism in Ukraine.

Even if these rather gross slip-ups can be treated to some extent as marginal in view of the major leap forward in democracy that the Orange Revolution can give hope for, these clumsy beginnings reveal that a considerable immaturity remains in Ukrainian politics, even though they were scarcely noticed by the Western media. In the political life of Lviv since 1989, it can be said that the former Soviet propaganda has largely been replaced by 'Ukrainian' propaganda, but the intellectual mind-set of the leading political figures and of the local elites has remained the same, a mind-set that was formed by the Soviet system. In Lviv, it is still not possible to enter into public debate on some issues, even with university professors. Training in the rules of two-sided debate and in differentiated thought processes still remains part of a desired environment for the future. In this sense, the two Ukraines – west and east – even in opposition to each other due to their political preferences and their differing traditions, are not fundamentally distinct one from another. Hence, western Ukraine cannot basically be reckoned as more European in its deep way of thinking.

The embracing of European values by Yushchenko's camp and by certain of his electoral and local partners is slow and very recent and remains incomplete. The work of confronting the past and the associated anti-Semitism which Europe demanded and got from Polish historians still remains totally to be undertaken in Ukraine, in the same way that Turkey still has some way to go in acknowledging the Armenian genocide, even if a strict parallel cannot be drawn between the two. The question remains: can the nationalism of certain of Yushchenko's supporters be accommodated within the European Union?

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Translated from the French by Colin Anderson

Notes

1. 'Es ist die Stadt der verwischten Grenzen' (Roth, 1990: 289).
2. It was notably the writer Joseph Roth who was responsible for developing the myth of the Austro-Slavic provinces of the Hapsburg monarchy, whether through his great novels like *The Radetzky March* (1932) or through his journalistic articles quoted earlier. This Austro-Hungarian myth has also been propagated by Claudio Magris in his 1963 book *Der habsburgische Mythos in der modernen österreichischen Literatur* (Magris, 1966).

3. *Historia Polski w liczbach* (1993); Eberhardt (1994).
4. Brubaker (1996).
5. Hrytsak (2002: 6).
6. See Bechtel (2004: 56–77).
7. For example *Lwów, Ilustrowany Przewodnik*, Lviv, 'Centrum Europy', 2001; and Biriuliouov (2002).
8. See the number of *Ji* devoted to the Volhynia massacres in 1942–3, *Волинь 1943. Боротьба за землю, І*, no. 28, March 2003.
9. Тарас Возняк, 'Львів. Sine qua non – 'без чого немає': Філософія міста', *ЛьВІВ. LEOPOLIS. LWÓW. LEM-BERG. GENIUS LOCI, І*, no. 29, August 2003.
10. Luiza Bialasiewicz, 'Re-ordering Europe's Eastern Frontier: Galician Identities and Political Cartographies on the Polish-Ukrainian Border', [<http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/PEC/johnno/pub/galician.doc>].
11. Huntington (1996).
12. See for example Leicht (2004).
13. See Komsky (2004) or, with due care, 'Shadow of Anti-Semitism over Ukraine's Disputed Election' [<http://www.bhhrg.org/Latest.News.asp?ArticleID=51>]. For an analysis of possible acts of provocation, see Kuzio (2004) [<http://www.utoronto.ca/crees/faculty/kuzio18.htm>].
14. The article which drew the sanction was 'The Jews in Ukraine Today: The Reality beyond the Myths', by Vasyl Yaremenko [<http://www.infoukes.com/re-ukraine/2004/0205.html>] and see Rosenthal (2005).

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