

particular philosophy' (p. 47). As we read, or rather study, we are borne along by one who is manifestly master in his analysis of text after text, in his marshalling of evidences, and in the handling of all that is relevant. Careful reading of such a book, following the ways and cross-ways of a great mind at work, is in itself an education in exegesis.

The present work is in four parts: The Christian Dispensation (I), Christian Hopes and Expectations (II), The Present Status of the Christian (III) and finally, The Christian faces the Mystery of God (IV). Parts II-IV correspond to the three stages of St Paul's thought, as manifested in Thessalonians and

I Corinthians 15; in the major epistles, I and II Corinthians, Romans and Galatians; and finally in the captivity epistles—including Ephesians (which Mgr Cerfaux, not without difficulty, finally deems to be authentically pauline). Part I traces out the Christian Dispensation or *oeconomia salutis* in terms of St Paul whose vocation was a response to Christ's intervention and whose faith was in a gospel which was of God and for the salvation of Jew and Gentile.

It is fortunate that such a work is now available in English, and it reads reasonably well.

ROLAND POTTER, O.P.

ST THOMAS AQUINAS: SUMMA THEOLOGIAE. Vol. V: God's Will and Providence (la xix-xxvi), Thomas Gilby, O.P., 204 pp. 42s.; Vol. X: Cosmogony (la lxx-lxxiv), William A. Wallace, O.P., 250 pp. 42s. *Blackfriars*; London: Eyre and Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill.

These two volumes of the new edition of the *Summa* follow as a matter of course the general pattern of Introduction, Latin text with English translation *en face*, Appendices and Glossary. The treatise on Providence and Predestination provides ample scope for Fr Gilby's lively pen and it is always delightful to compare his racy renderings with the Latin original. Fr Ian Hislop has contributed a concise but comprehensive Introduction and a very brief Appendix on Sin and the Divine will; Fr Gilby's own comments, which are numerous, voluminous and often entertaining, are confined to the footnotes. He remarks *à propos* of the relations between ends and means that St Thomas rode a mule towards the end of his life. Fr Wallace, faced with what some would consider the ungrateful task of dealing with the works of the six days of creation, frankly admits that St Thomas's treatment, immersed as it is in patristic exegesis and medieval science, has long been looked on as an antiquarian piece. Part of its interest, however, lies in the extremely non-committal attitude that the Angelic Doctor takes up on most of the points at issue. He is content to register the diverse interpretations of the Genesis text given by the fathers and for the most part refrains from

expressing any opinion of his own; and, while registering the divergent cosmological doctrines of the scientists of his day, he refrains from entangling himself in the controversies; it is only rarely, and then on the points on which the scientists were agreed, that, with the due deference of the layman for the expert, he uses their views for anything more than illustrative purposes. Seen in this light the treatise has more lessons for us than we might expect and Fr Wallace helps us to learn them. He provides a number of very apt Appendices, dealing successively with the texts of Genesis available to St Thomas, General Problems of the Material Creation, Ancient and Medieval Astronomy, Aristotelean Physics, Medieval Optics, Medieval Biology and Evolution, and four discussions of the Hexaemeron itself: Patristic Accounts, the Medieval Background, St Thomas's Analysis, and Later Interpretations, concluding with the Seventh Day and its eschatological implications. Fr Wallace has, in fact, dealt fruitfully and interestingly with an unpromising subject; both Galileo and Teilhard de Chardin receive attention. Both his volume and Fr Gilby's attain the standard which the earlier volumes of the series have led us to expect.

E. L. MASCALL

SCEPTICISM AND THE FIRST PERSON, by S. Coval. *Methuen*. 113 pp. 25s.
KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIONS, by Betty Powell. *Allen & Unwin*. 112 pp. 18s.

Each of these small books seems to me to show a regrettable tendency to go back on an important development in recent philosophy. They are in this sense reactionary books. The important development I have in mind is a recognition, quite absent from Ryle's *Concept*

of Mind, for instance, of the difference between the way in which I say certain things of myself and the way in which I say them of others. Professor Coval's thesis is precisely that there is no difference, or only a difference of degree, between 'self-ascription' and 'other-ascription'.

Miss Powell is concerned to minimize the difference in one particular case, the case where it is actions which I attribute to myself or to other people. The concept of *action* was never far from the centre of the picture in the development I have mentioned. Miss Anscombe devoted the greater part of *Intention* to the notion of *intention in acting*; Professor Hampshire called his book 'Thought and Action'; and Professor Strawson, in *Individuals*, signalized the concept of *action* as one to which we must attend if we are to reconcile ourselves to his doctrine of persons. These three books are, perhaps, the main representatives of the development I have mentioned. In so far, therefore, as they emphasize the concept of *action*, and in so far as Miss Powell is concerned to belittle the first person—other person asymmetry in its use, her book may be regarded as one attempt to set this particular clock back. The case is much clearer with Coval: the asymmetry in question is what he is gunning for: Strawson is the main target of his criticisms: we know where we stand.

If Coval's strategy is easy to understand, his tactics are often difficult. One of his moves seems to be to examine our use of what he calls the 'personal demonstratives' (p. 15), by which he means 'I', 'you' and 'he', and to argue that the supposed first person—other person asymmetry is a consequence of the way in which we use these words. He then claims that the fact that we have words which we use in this way is a mere matter of linguistic convenience, and that accordingly any asymmetry which results from it is a contingent asymmetry having no deep epistemological significance. I find his treatment of the personal pronouns unsatisfactory: in particular he seems to be unaware of the characteristics of 'he' which Quine and Geach have pointed out. My chief objection to his argument, however, would be that the asymmetry in question could be indicated without the use of any pronouns whatever: it would be possible to get people to appreciate the difference between self- and other-ascription by contrasting propositions like 'Mrs Thompson said Mrs Thompson was feeling sick' with propositions like 'Mrs Jackson said Mrs Thompson was feeling sick', and by pointing out the appropriateness of the question, 'How did Mrs Jackson know?' and the inappropriateness of the corresponding question in the case of Mrs Thompson. Coval's elaborate exposition of the rules for the use of 'I' seems as unnecessary as it is unconvincing.

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One of Coval's fundamental mistakes is, I think, to suppose that the position which claims to see an asymmetry between self- and other-ascription is necessarily a sceptical position. This may be due to a misunderstanding of Strawson's doctrine which becomes apparent as early as the introduction (p. x, 'His view that . . . the criteria (what I feel "in" myself and what I see, etc., of you) must differ'). Strawson is represented as saying that my ascription of experiences to you lacks a basis which my ascription of them to myself possesses. In fact Strawson is careful to say not that I ascribe experiences to myself on a different basis from that on which I ascribe them to others, but that I ascribe them to myself 'not on this basis'. The asymmetry is therefore seen by Coval as consisting in my having less good grounds for saying you are depressed than I have for saying I am. His arguments—bad as they are—for saying that my grounds in each case can in principle be as good as the others are, therefore, beside the point.

Miss Powell, by contrast, allows us a clearer view of her tactics than of her strategy. Indeed, a proper understanding of her strategical purpose has so far escaped me. She argues that not every action has a motive; that more knowing *that* is involved in knowing *how* than Ryle allows; that sentences of the form 'Do *x* in order to achieve *y*' state matters of fact; that how the world is as well as how *x* behaves is to be consulted before we attribute knowledge to *x*; that it is inappropriate for me to ask her how she knows what she is doing, not because she is never, but because she is seldom, ignorant

of such matters. With some of these contentions it is possible to agree. Where it is not possible it is usually easy to locate the stage in the argument where disagreement sets in. On any given page it is, as a rule, not difficult to have an idea what Miss Powell is up to: the contrast with Coval is striking on this score. But since it is less easy to make out what Miss Powell is up to in the book as a whole, it is not easy to make any overall criticism. Perhaps my main complaint would be that she has failed to take sufficiently to heart the many things that have been said recently about the different levels at which an action can be described. When I do something unintentionally there is usually some description of what I do under which I *can* be said to have intended to do it. 'They know not what they do' was said not of men who were in a coma, or acting absent-mindedly, but of men who knew of the man they were crucifying only that he was an alleged rebel against the civil power.

As with Miss Powell's arguments, so with her style: by contrast with Coval it is clear and easy to follow. Coval's style is so unnatural as to be distressing. His departures from accepted standards are, one supposes, attempts to introduce the liveliness or sophistication achieved by Ryle or Austin. He would have done better to aim at a more pedestrian clarity. I shall not tire the patience of readers by attempting to list his infelicities. It is easier to notice the rare slips of Miss Powell's pen: page 18, lines 32, 33 and page 83, line 17 seem to contain examples of a double negative; the last line but one on page 105 seems to show dittography.

C. J. F. WILLIAMS

HOPKINS: SELECTIONS, NEW OXFORD ENGLISH SERIES, ed. G. Storey. *O.U.P.*, 1967. 206 pp.

This is an elegantly produced selection of the poetry and prose of Hopkins, chosen by Graham Storey who completed the editing of the Journals and Papers of the poet. There is an Introduction to Hopkins, as man and poet, a select bibliography and some notes on the Text.

The extracts from the letters are useful and entertaining, full of Hopkins' off-the-cuff remarks on literature and authors. There is the amused-hurt letter to Bridges complaining about the latter's adverse criticism of *The Wreck of the Deutschland*—'You drew off your criticisms all stinking'; the informal explanations to Bridges and Dixon of the secrets of Sprung Rhythm, so much clearer than Hopkins' official utterances on the subject; the long

letter to Baillie on the kinds of language a poet uses, notably 'Parnassian', Hopkins' coinage for the style a good poet may adopt when he is cruising along, in between bouts of authentic inspiration. There are some penetrating remarks on English authors: on the 'rich and nervous poet' Marvel (*sic*), on Tennyson, whom Hopkins even then saw to have 'vogue, popularity, but not the sort of ascendancy Goethe had, or even Burns'; on the 'frigid bluster' of Kingsley 'which is all a kind of munch and a not standing of any blasted nonsense from cover to cover'; on Wordsworth's high inspiration but lack of technique. There are signs that Hopkins' letters, like those of Keats, are on their way to classic status.

The extracts from the Oxford diaries show