From the Editor:

Slavic Review publishes letters to the editor with educational or research merit. Where the letter concerns a publication in Slavic Review, the author of the publication will be offered an opportunity to respond. Space limitations dictate that comment regarding a book review should be restricted to one paragraph; comment on an article should not exceed 750 to 1,000 words. The editor will not publish ad hominem discourse.

E.D.M.

To the Editor:

Robert M. Hayden (in *Slavic Review* 51, no. 4) raises some important questions concerning the ex-Yugoslavia. He sees a balance of blame between "each of the republics" (654) and between "each" of their "nationalist" governments (655). He writes about "civil war" (654) but he does not explain why the international community has imposed the sanctions against only one, Serbian-led party in this "civil" war.

Although Hayden states that he is not "focusing only on Croatian nationalism" (663), a disproportionate part of his article analyzes Croatia from a particularly proserbian perspective. Before the first democratic elections in 1990, the Croatian Territorial Defence forces were disarmed, but Hayden, for unknown reasons, writes that Croatia's "Serbs... were disarmed in 1990" (658, emphasis mine). Describing Bosnia, he uses only Serbian terminology (e.g. opština [661], not the Croatian form općina which is in use in some areas of Bosnia). He praises the Serbian "independent" papers Vreme and Borba as "easily the most reliable of the press media in what used to be Yugoslavia" and supports his evaluation by citing another text of his own (666). When Hayden was not "able to obtain" original texts he was "forced to rely mainly" on the cited Serbian media sources and a Serbian scholar (666). Those rare authors who, for Hayden, "were completely outside of the nationalist parties" are also, coincidentally, Serbs (662). Hayden sadly notes that in the ex-Yugoslavia "the condominium solution—federation—is rejected out of hand" (670), not mentioning that it was only Serbia and Montenegro who supported a "strong federation."

Hayden's presentation of less recent history is equally tendentious. He mentions the "fascist 'Independent State of Croatia'" (657) and reminds the reader about "manifest tendencies towards fascism during World War II" in "Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia" (672). He forgets fascist Serbia (1941–1944), led by General Milan Nedić, and the Serbian fascist party "Zbor" of the anti-Semite Dimitrije Ljotić. (See Philip J. Cohen, M.D.'s "Holocaust History Misappropriated," *Midstream* [November 1992]: 18–20, for an analysis of wartime Serbian anti-Semitism and collaboration with nazis.)

Hayden's translation of a fragment from Dr. Franjo Tudjman's book is a combination of mistranslation, additions to and deletions from the original. Hayden's interpretation is also misleading. (I have examined that mistranslation and misinterpretation elsewhere in more detail.) The preliminary section of the 1990 Croatian constitution, Izvorišne osnove, is not "Basic Sources" (657) but "Original Foundations." The constitution does not mention any "Croatian kingdom" (657), but rather "Croatian principalities (kneževine)" of the seventh century. Hayden writes that the constitution prescribes "the Croatian language and Latin script' (art. 12), thus excluding the Serbian dialects and the Cyrillic alphabet" (657). This is a simple falsehood. The same article 12 explicitly allows use of "another language and the Cyrillic or some other script" (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia [Zagreb, 1991], 34). Hayden writes that the "Preamble [of the Macedonian constitution] apparently took its cues primarily from that of the Croatian constitution" (659). That is not so apparent. The Macedonian Preamble mentions, for instance, the "centuries-long struggle" of the Macedonian people for freedom (659). In the Croatian Preamble there is no such expression; however, as Hayden himself shows, the Serbian Preamble writes about a "centuries-long struggle" of the Serbian people (660).

Referring to a text of his own, Hayden states that "the Slovenes pioneered the destruction of the Yugoslav federation in 1989" (663). I would venture the argument Slavic Review 52, no. 2 (Summer 1993)

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that the real pioneers were the Serbs who before 1989 curtailed the autonomy of the provinces of Kosova and Vojvodina, constituent parts of the ex-Yugoslav federation. Any subsequent Slovene (or Croatian or Bosnian) moves to "destroy" the Yugoslav federation cannot be understood outside the context of what was perceived as advancing Serbian encroachment. In summary, Hayden presents a highly partisan view of the situation he analyzes.

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Professor Hayden replies:

Since Anto Knežević brands my article as "tendentious," it is surprising that he has so tendentiously misrepresented it in his opening paragraph. My article at no point discusses "blame," nor does it deal with the international politics surrounding the war(s) in the former Yugoslavia. So he accuses me of not explaining something

outside of my frame of reference, a questionable rhetorical trick.

What my article was meant to do was set up a framework for understanding the continuation of what Günther Grass in *The Call of the Toad* (1992) has called the "century of expulsions" in post-communist societies that claim to be following the best traditions of democracy. I analyzed constitutional and legal failings of democracy in Croatia (along with Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia), yet it can hardly be said that my analysis was "pro-Serbian" unless *any* analysis that dares to critique what President Tudjman was wont in 1990 to call "the most democratic state on earth" is perforce pro-Serbian. Having written off (660) the constitutions of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as primarily tools for the continued one-man rule of Slobodan Milošević, having viewed the guarantees of minority rights in those documents as comparable to the guarantees of rights and freedoms in the Stalin constitution of 1936, and having even questioned the status of Serbia as a constitutional state, I find the "pro-Serbian" label a bit rich. To continue to beat the stillborn horse of Serbian constitutionalism might have made my analysis less "disproportionate" but seemed to me pointless intellectually.

The ethnic partisan label is emblematic of a dangerous intellectual failing in Knežević's comments, however. His second paragraph accuses me of relying on Serbian souces or on Serbian scholars, without bothering to assess the reputation of the sources or scholars themselves. That Borba and Vreme are indeed independent and reliable has been reported elsewhere (e.g. Milan Andrejevich and Gordon Bardos, "The Media in Regions of Conflict: Serbia and Montenegro," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 39 [2 October 1992]: 88–89; Christian Science Monitor, 26 January 1993: 12). Should their reporting be discounted because they are Serbian? Will Croatian media be more reliable, in light of the following assessment by the UN's Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights? "The [Croatian] government thus exercises full control over the mass media, in particular radio and television. Journalists believe that the independence and freedom of the press were more respected during the period between 1989 and 1990" (United Nations, Economic and Social Council, document E/CN.4/1993/50, 10 February 1993, "Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia," 29). But perhaps the Special Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, is "pro-Serbian."

Knežević's attempt to discredit scholars by national identity is bad enough when it is applied to the one on whose paper I did indeed rely, Vojin Dimitrijević, Professor of Law at Belgrade University, leading member of the opposition to the nationalist-socialist regime of Slobodan Milošević, and a scholar with an international reputation for integrity. It is worse when applied to Zdravko Grebo, Professor of Law at the University of Sarajevo, whose political courage in criticizing the nationalist politicians who destroyed Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is matched only by his personal courage in refusing to leave besieged Sarajevo despite opportunities to have done so. But the intellectual sloppiness of Knežević's critique is shown here, since I am told that Grebo is a Muslim.

Knežević's comments are otherwise filled with misrepresentations, of which I can only address some of the most misleading and inaccurate. Thus, he says that I did not note that only Serbia and Montenegro supported a "strong federation," but the quotation marks are on his own words, not mine; I never mentioned, much less advocated, any specific form of federation. (That my comment on the rejection of any kind of federation was made "sadly" is true enough, but my sentiments were caused by my acceptance of the views of those famously pro-Serbian writers Hamilton, Madison and