A too rarely emphasized feature of modern deontological ethics is the structure of its directives. Faced with alternatives, the question for the moral agent is “which, if either, must I perform (or avoid)?” Getting it right, one is, morally speaking, done…until the next set of freighted options presents. We should wonder whether this makes sense: whether there is not a more complex structure to deontological requirements that resists the “one and done” idea. Rehabilitating the Kantian idea of duty as a value-based deliberative principle, I argue for a more plausible deontology whose requirements are often temporally extended and interpersonally complex.

Cross-cultural studies of humans using methods developed in evolutionary biology and comparative linguistics are flourishing. ‘Cultural macroevolution’ has great potential to address fundamental questions of cultural transformation and human history. However, this field is poorly integrated with core cultural anthropology, although both aim in part at addressing similar issues. Claude Lévi-Strauss established a comparative approach searching for universals and documentation of diversity to bring understanding to cultural phenomena. Recognizing the nomothetic nature of Lévi-Strauss’ work, his abstraction and modelling, provides an example within anthropology of the search for universals and the study of big data, akin to cultural macroevolution studies. The latter could benefit, beyond the sophisticated analyses of big data mined from ethnographic work, from the integration with the intellectual legacy and practice of core anthropology and thus propitiate the synergistic interaction of disciplines. Attempts at rapprochement of disciplines from the natural sciences that lack pluralism and present a narrow view are deemed examples of ‘Wilson's effect’.

The relationship between phylogenetic reconstruction and evolutionary theory is reassessed. It is argued here that phylogenies, and evolutionary principles, should be analysed initially as independently from each other as possible. Only then can they be used to test one another. If the phylogenies and evolutionary principles are totally consistent with one another, this consilience of independent lines of evidence increases confidence in both. If, however, there is a conflict, then one should assess the relative support for each hypothesis, and tentatively accept the more strongly supported one. We review examples where the phylogenetic hypothesis is preferred over the evolutionary principle, and vice versa, and instances where the conflict cannot be readily resolved. Because the analyses of pattern and process must initially be kept separate, the temporal order in which they are performed is unimportant. Therefore, the widespread methodology of always proceeding from cladogram to evolutionary ‘scenario’ cannot be justified philosophically. Such an approach means that cladograms cannot be properly tested against evolutionary principles, and that evolutionary ‘scenarios’ have no independent standing. Instead, we propose the ‘consilience’ approach where phylogenetic and evolutionary hypotheses are formulated independently from each other and then examined for agreement.