The caliph Al Mansur literally forged the city plan in fire in 762 CE. His Round City was an architectural symbol of order in a vast combustible empire. Ninth-century Baghdad had relations extending from the Atlantic to China, with tranches of coins found as far afield as Scandinavia. The city was by design the heart of a vast city network at a time of pronounced urbanization, an urban golden age by standard reckonings. At the height of Abbasid power its population was an estimated 840,000. It thereby stretched the geographic boundaries of time and space across Eurasia, a Silk Roads terminus in its own right. Baghdad was one of the world’s preeminent “open cities,” incubating trade, knowledge in art, astronomy, mathematics, amidst a myriad of other cross-cultural exchanges. It attracted generations of scientists, philosophers, planners, and literati, especially from Central Asia. Migratory flows included a durable revolving network linking Baghdad to Merv and other key centers of learning and trade along the Silk Roads. Rapidly expanding Islamic civilization had to develop new forms of city building to spread Dar al Islam (the realm of Islam) across vast disparate realms.

This introduction poses the central thesis of this volume: that the early Islamic empire was tied together by networks of social dependency that can be tracked through the linguistic and material traces of interconnectivity in our sources. It is suggested that the particular relationships that emerge from the granular case studies in this volume can illuminate the constituent parts of the early Islamic empire as a whole. Studies link material and textual sources, and in particular focus on the language and rhetoric used by sources to describe relations and interactions, and what they show of the modes, expressions and conditions that governed communication and interaction. It is suggested that empires are not ruled by top–down force alone, but that legitimacy and stability are created in various ways, both top–down and bottom–up.

A graph superimposes the growth–decline curves of major Stirrup Rider Empires, from 600 to 1200. While being a major advance in horse riding, the stirrup just offers a short term for the intermediary phase of Rider Empires. Expansion of Islamic Caliphate was the towering event. It surpassed the Xiongnu area record. Apart from Tang, Tufan in Tibet, Liao, and Seljuk, all other medieval empires remained of modest size. In population, Song in 1125 briefly reached 38% of the world population – the largest percentage any empire has ever reached. The Caliphate altered the language mix throughout North Africa, introducing the Arabic. The Seljuks did so from Central Asia to Anatolia, introducing Turkic. The Caliphate clashed with Tang in Central Asia in 751. The forces of an empire reaching to the Atlantic Ocean confronted for the first time those of an empire that reached to the Pacific. Neither realized the momentousness of this skirmish. Western Europe developed feudalism, a maddeningly complex multistranded hierarchical order, which does away with single territorial authority.

Chapter two presents the views of the prominent Sunni scholar ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) in his Succour of Nations Amidst the Confusion of Darkness (Ghiyāth al-umam fī iltiyāth al-ẓulam). If early Sunni theologians conceived of the imamate in theological terms that strictly adhered to precedence, while later jurists understood the office in pragmatic and legal terms, then al-Juwaynī was a representative of the latter approach. Unlike many of his predecessors, al-Juwaynī came to terms with the termination of the ideal early caliphate. He endeavoured to provide a political theory that accommodated rulers who met the minimum requirements of Islamic law. A key thesis of al-Juwaynī is that jurists are essential to the governing process and that without them, a state would fail, thus, he posits the ruler’s consultation of jurists as a key source of his legitimacy. Furthermore, al-Juwaynī rejects the claim that a legitimate ruler must possess many of the ideal qualities associated with the early caliphs in Islamic history.

One of the most enduring sources of conflict among Muslims is the question of who or what represents legitimate power and authority after the Prophet Muhammad. This introduction briefly examines the diverse answers that key representatives of the classical Islamic tradition offered to this controversial question. A concise overview of early Islamic political history is followed by a survey of Islamic thought on the subject of authority in the formative (seventh-ninth centuries) and classical periods (ninth-thirteenth centuries). This introduction presents the views of six major theological schools of the classical period: Ashʿarism (representative of Sunnism), Muʿtazilism, Ibadism, Twelver Shiʿism, Ismaʿilism, and Zaydism. Finally, this chapter discusses the classical Arabic texts that appear in English translation in this anthology as well as their respective themes, authors, and historical contexts.

Chapter one presents the views of the Sunni scholar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Fūrak (d. 406/1015) in his Précis of the Doctrines of Abū ’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (Mujarrad maqālāt Abī ’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī). In this work, Ibn Fūrak discusses the teachings of the famous Sunni theologian, Abū ’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935−6), and quotes him directly from writings that are not extant. The Précis provides a brief overview of traditional Sunni views on the imamate. Ibn Fūrak and al-Ashʿarī interpret the history of succession after the Prophet Muhammad in a way that is charitable to the Companions and downplays the conflicts among them. This approach reflects the Sunni view of the first four caliphs as individuals who possessed all of the requisite qualities of an ideal ruler.

Chapter five presents the views of the prominent Muʿtazili scholar Rukn al-Dīn Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141) in his Book of Excellence on the Fundamental Principles of Religion (Kitāb al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl al-dīn). The Book of Excellence, which is extant in full, is a summary of his larger work, a comprehensive theological summa entitled The Reliable Book on the Fundamental Principles of Religion (al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn), of which only parts survive. The Book of Excellence is an important source for contemporary researchers since it is one of the last available texts from the Sunni Muʿtazili tradition, which disappeared by the end of the classical period in the seventh/thirteenth century. Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s chapter on the imamate, in particular, represents this tradition’s views up until the sixth/twelfth century. It justifies the Muslim community’s right to select its own leaders and affirms the legitimacy of the first four caliphs. Ibn al-Malāḥimī also defends ʿAli’s character against accusations of wrongdoing, while refuting Imami doctrines about his designation (naṣṣ) and infallibility.

Chapter six presents the views of the Ibāḍī scholar Abū ʿAmmār ʿAbd al-Kāfī b. Yūsuf al-Warjalānī (d. ca. 570/1174) in his Concise Book (al-Mūjaz). In this work, al-Warjalānī defends those doctrines that he considers to be correct and refutes the views of rival religious traditions, both Muslim and non-Muslim. His chapter on the imamate provides a broad overview of Khārijī and Ibāḍī views on the qualities of a legitimate imam. The function of the imam is to aid the community in commanding right, forbidding wrong, establishing justice, and administering ḥudūd (fixed, nondiscretionary penalties). The Khārijī-Ibāḍī tradition is unique in outlining a procedure for the removal of an imam. If an imam violates a divine commandment, he should be compelled to seek repentance. Repeat offenses or a refusal to repent are grounds for disqualification and removal from office. If an imam refuses to give up his authority, he is to be fought until he is dislodged from power or killed. For the Ibāḍīs, cancelling the authority of an imam to restart the selection process and appoint another is considered a legitimate procedure. When the Ibāḍīs do not have the ability to appoint imams, their doctrine permits them to dissimulate and live peacefully among non-Ibāḍī Muslims.

The examples of political advice contained in this anthology, written across terrain that stretched from Egypt to Central Asia, date from the first half of the tenth century to the first half of the twelfth century (roughly, the Islamic Early Middle Period). The mirror-writers were both formed by and responded to the conditions in which they lived. This second chapter presents an overview of political and intellectual developments in western Asia in the Early Middle Period. It begins with a general, thematic discussion of the processes of historical change taking place in the region in the tenth to twelfth centuries, and proceeds to offer a narrative history of the major polities of the period (Samanids, Karakhanids, Buyids, Ghaznavids, Seljuks, Fatimids). It locates each mirror and mirror-writer within their specific contexts and points to interconnections among them across this historical-geographical canvas.

Chapter 6 provides an overview of the history and development of the Sunnis, emphasizing how adherence to the community (jamāʿa) and the authoritative example (sunna) of the Prophet allowed for a variety of groups to contribute to an ideal of a universal Islam. It shows how the notion of the “rightly guided” caliphs functioned to promote unity across the far-flung ʿAbbāsid Empire, and how the emergence of legal schools sat in creative tension with caliphal pretensions to absolute authority. It shows how a combination of Ahl al-Ḥadīth piety, Murjiʾite notions of faith, as well as Ashʿarite and Māturīdī theology provided the theological basis for a broadly conceived consensus on proper religion. It also shows how Seljuq promotion of the madrasa system allowed for Sunnism to become the dominant communal tendency among Muslims after the sixth/twelfth century. The chapter ends with a discussion of the Karrāmiyya as an example of a group that medieval scholars excluded from the Sunni consensus, and considers why they might have done so.

Chapter 7 focuses on the two entities most often considered instances of revolutionary state formation after 2011 and which came into conflict with one another: the ISIS caliphate founded across Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and the autonomous cantons ruled by the Kurdish PYD party in ‘Rojava’, or the Kurdish areas of north-eastern Syria, on the other. The chapter acknowledges that in attempting to create new forms of state – ‘democratic confederalism’ in the case of Rojava, and a Sunni Caliphate in the case of ISIS – these instances do resemble previous cases of revolutionary transformation. Yet their relationship with the revolutionary uprisings of 2011 is more complicated. In the case of ISIS, the chapter demonstrates that the caliphate is better thought of as a form of counter-revolution against that uprising, while in Rojava the PYD maintained an ambiguous relationship with the regime against which it was directed. For both the PYD and ISIS, international intervention proved decisive as the former were able to ally with the United States to defeat the latter – only then to suffer Turkish invasion once US support was withdrawn.

This chapter takes up the “forever war” theme by returning to Iraq just prior to Obama’s troop pullout and to Afghanistan where he inherited a failing war. Coming into the White House, Obama fulfilled his campaign pledge to end Bush’s “dumb war” in Iraq but left the country vulnerable. The violence in the Syrian civil war attracted al Qaeda militants from Iraq. They formed the nucleus of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the most fearsome terrorist network in the world. ISIS seized land in Syria, invaded Iraq, and announced a caliphate. Obama answered Iraq’s pleas for help. US and allied airpower, along with SOF, turned the tide of battle. The Pentagon again used local allies; this time mostly Kurds who formed the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces. The SDF fought ISSI and the Damascus regime to carve out an enclave in Syria. Meanwhile in Afghanistan, Obama endorsed the Pentagon’s surge of troops to nearly 100,000 so as to exit the war as in Iraq. He changed course and stopped U.S. participation in combat roles in 2014. He decreased troops to around 8,000 before leaving office. At first Trump upped the troops and gave his generals greater freedom to act. Then, he, too, scaled them down to 2,500 in Afghanistan and Iraq, while negotiating with the Taliban to leave totally by May 1, 2021.

At the core of the politicization of Islam is the territorialization of Islamic belonging, which during the nation-building phase has manifested itself in ways previously unknown in the former Muslim Empires. This territorialization was combined with the elimination of religious and cultural diversity, leading to a specific form of religious nationalism called hegemonic. The genealogical investigation shows the conceptual and institutional changes that constitute the bedrock of the current manifestations of Political Islam from the last phase of the Ottoman Empire to the current national situations. Areas of politicization in Syria and Turkey are presented from the inception of the nation-state to today’s civil war in Syria and the role of Turkey. These areas cover the status of sharia in state law, the boundaries of the secular space, the status of political violence, and the influence of regional and transnational political and religious actors.

This chapter looks at the thinking and practice of international relations and world order in the Islamic world. It opens by setting Islam's complex geopolitical context. In terms of thinking it covers the umma, the realms of al-Harb, al-Islam, and al-Ahd, jihad, the work of Ibn Khaldun, and Ijtihad. In terms of practice it covers the relationship between the umma and the Islamic state, the division of Islam into rival empires, and the rivalry between Sunnis and Shias within Islam. A key theme is the contradictions between thinking and practice.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the political history of the Islamic world, from the seventh-century Arabian conquests to the formation, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of the three great early modern Muslim empires: the Ottomans in Asia Minor, the Safavids in Iran and the Mughals in India. Its structure reflects the major political formations and transformations of this period: firstly, the Arabian ‘conquest polity’ which replaced the antique balance between Rome and Iran; then, after the demise of that empire in the mid-tenth century, the tumultuous era of ‘Berber’, Daylami and Turkic leaderships; finally, following the cataclysmic Mongol conquest of the eastern Islamic lands in 1258, the assimilation of these conquerors in the east and the political achievements of Turco-Mongol military strongmen and entrepreneurs in Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Anatolia. It looks at the elites and political structures that shaped and underlay this history and at their interaction with Islam. This had developed into a more fully articulated and stable ideological system, whose continued success lay in the new elites’ capacity to adopt and adapt it to their needs.

The Qurʾan, and the problems of its interpretation, is even more central to Islamic political culture than is the Bible to the Latin west and Byzantium. It became accepted in the mid-ninth century that interpretation of the law and many case rulings should be the preserve of the ʿulamaʾ. So although the caliph was revered as the guardian of the faith and supreme leader, his rule was not engrained in the courts of law and the maintenance of property rights and inheritance in the manner of western or Byzantine rulers. This partly accounts for the relatively poor survival rate of archival holdings. Yet narratives and prescriptive texts can shed light on actual practices and help chart change over time, from the caliphate’s imperial palaces to the predominance of Turco-Mongol warlords in the later middle ages. Evidence is particularly full for the Ilkhan rulers of Iran and those of Egypt and Transoxania. Their entourages brought new ideas and practices to Islamic political culture without abandoning core elements of Islamic ideology. The Ottomans’ conquest of Asia Minor and, above all, of Constantinople created the most enduring blend of Islamic traditions and new modes of rulership.

The early caliphate adopted the political organisation predominant in the late antique Middle East – imperial monarchy, sanctioned by divine power – but with a distinctively Islamic ideology of leadership involving kinship, piety, victory and justice. The prime location for the performance of royal power was the court, particularly for caliphal accessions or successions. The warrior rulers filling the caliphal vacuum after 945 adopted Islamic means of legitimisation, including oaths of loyalty, honorific titles, robes of honour, and being named on coinage and in Friday prayers; while the ʿulamaʾ increasingly claimed spiritual authority as ‘heirs of the Prophet’. The new Turco-Mongol elites from the thirteenth century on found a role for military strongmen, incorporating the nomadic virtues of strong leadership, good fortune and royal genealogy into a fluid mixture of ideologies. Performance of power encompassed the hajj, hunting parties, public sessions dispensing justice and rituals designed to bind the palaces of the court more closely to the towns wherever they were based.