In practice, there are several obstacles to the application of the substantive legal framework analysed in the previous chapters. First, there is a risk of contractual provisions that deviate from the legal norm. The qualification of certain rules as mandatory law may prevent such contractual deviation. Even so, effective recourse to the protective regimes throughout the course of the contract is not guaranteed. Reference may be made to the possibility for corporate partners to have recourse to trade secret protection and the apparent limited invocation of the protective legal framework. Collective enforcement may contribute to enhanced transparency throughout the music value chain and counter musicians’ fear of commercial retaliation. Further bolstering extra-judicial enforcement is likely to fulfil an important complementary role.

• ◦ In this case of a bread cartel in Israel, the bakeries’ executives agreed to raise the price of sliced dark bread and challah in some stores and to stop competing in each other’s local markets. Overall, the bakeries complied with these agreements. Although the executives admitted to most of the charges, their interpretation of the events differed from those of the Israeli Competition Authority (ICA) and that is where the case becomes interesting.

• ◦ The market power of retail chains caused bakeries to sell sliced dark bread and challah at a loss in order to be able to sell other bread products to retailers. From that normal state of affairs, in response to entry into its home market, one of the bakeries started offering stores a special deal of "3 loaves for 10 shekels NIS (Israeli new shekel)". A few months later, the bakeries entered into an unlawful agreement to stop the "3 for 10" deals (along with raising some other prices).

• ◦ The ICA argued that, prior to the agreement, the bakeries had fiercely competed and the intent of the cartel was to raise prices to supracompetitive levels. The ICA also claimed that, but for the cartel, this level of competition would have continued indefinitely. In contrast, the bakeries claimed the motivation for the agreements was to stop a price war from spreading to other stores. They saw their conduct as intended to raise prices to competitive levels from subcompetitive levels, and that the fierce competition was an aberration that would not have lasted long even without collusion.

• ◦ It is not clear whether the “normal” conduct that the agreement restored was one of genuine competition or of a tacit agreement involving an allocation of geographic markets (which the aggressive conduct preceding the agreement may have violated).

This chapter tests cycles of silence in Lagos to evaluate its applicability in a Global South context where, unlike Baltimore, the state and the police have limited resources. The chapter’s results come from an original survey of shopkeepers, paired with interviews and observation, in the city’s expansive markets, pockets in which “area boy” crews engage in violence and extortion. Consistent with the patterns found in Baltimore, area boy violence reduces cooperation by boosting perceived retaliation risk and making cooperation norms appear to be weaker than they are. Underlying cooperation support exists among shopkeepers, the chapter’s final section explains, in part, because the area boy crews have largely failed to gain legitimacy with Lagosians.

This chapter tests cycles of silence theory in Baltimore to evaluate its applicability in a Global North context where the state and the police are well resourced. It provides background on how Baltimore residents become exposed to violence by drug crews and details the results from an original survey of residents in the city’s violence- affected communities. Violence heightens perceived retaliation risk, and the heightened risk perception in turn pushes residents who support cooperation to keep that support private. As result, residents share less information than they otherwise would in absence of this norm suppression. The chapter’s final section explains that the underlying cooperation support exists, because the drug crews have largely failed to gain legitimacy in eyes of residents.

This chapter details cycles of silence theory explaining how criminal groups constrain citizen cooperation with the police. Criminal group violence not only reduces cooperation by heightening retaliation risk to cooperators but also by making community norms favoring cooperation appear weaker than they are to citizens. Due to violence- induced retaliation risk, citizens who support cooperation are forced to keep that support private. The potency of social norms in driving human behavior means that this suppression of norms that favor cooperation ultimately reduce witnesses’ willingness to come forward with information. The chapter also interrogates the theory’s central premise that underlying support for cooperation exists in communities. Perceptions of police and criminal group legitimacy are an important driver of support, so cycles of silence dynamics primarily operate in communities where criminal groups have failed to gain legitimacy. The chapter then theorizes why criminal groups’ primary goal of illicit economic gain undermines their legitimization efforts.

As indicated by the title, this chapter covers cases raising issues not covered in other chapters. Most prominent are cases concerning recusal not related to campaign fundraising or expenditures, most of which do not result in an order for recusal. Other issues covered include judicial districting unrelated to voting rights, retaliation, challenges to the creation of new positions arising in the context of filling them, method of selection (appointment or election) unrelated to filling an interim vacancy, recall, and a range of other miscellaneous issues.

This personal chapter reflects the experience and observations of a clinical and forensic psychologist that has treated victims and worked in the legal system for decades. The chapter describes the myriad of decisions and barriers victims face when reporting and the unanticipated consequences of reporting.

This essay examines the reciprocal contest of wills as mediated through the use of political violence from roughly 1773 to the end of the war in 1783. In other terms, it covers the escalating application of violence and how that led to outright war in April 1775, as well as the war itself. In both periods, violence was used to influence the will of one’s opponent and the political preferences of the undecided—but sometimes its political intent was exceeded, with escalatory effects. Three broad categories of violence are considered here. The first, “intimidative and catalytic” was primarily associated with the period from 1773 to 1776, in which violence was used by both sides, mostly publicly, to force political opponents to accede or step aside. Some of those efforts at intimidation catalyzed further violence, leading ultimately to armed military confrontation. Once the war had begun, the strong conventions associated with “war” shaped military behavior by both sides’ regular forces, although not always successfully, and always subject to logistical requirements. These behaviors form the second category of “Regular and Logistical.” The third category, “Retaliatory” was primarily associated with peripheral militia forces, which were much less restrained by the customs and usages of war, and often instead indulged in escalating retaliation.

Chapter 5 is concerned with Articles 22.6 DSU and 4.10 SCM Agreement – namely, those provisions that allow one Member to bring retaliatory measures against another Member where that other Member fails to bring its measure into compliance with the covered agreement(s). The chapter argues that, although not reflected in current jurisprudence, there should be a need to demonstrate the causal link between a Member’s failure to bring its measure into conformity with a DSB ruling and the level of nullification or impairment incurred (that is, a causal link analysis). The chapter also raises parts of the jurisprudence that would seem to support a non-attribution analysis being used in this context, too. The chapter then puts forward the Non-attribution/Causal Link Analysis as one method for performing these analyses.

Chapter 8 deals with the potential remedies available to protesters when their constitutional rights are violated. It focuses on damages remedies intended to make protesters whole for such injuries. The law of public protest severely restricts such remedies. Under principles of “qualified immunity,” the law generally immunizes all but the most incompetent officers from civil liability. Empirical evidence shows that in protesters’ First Amendment and Fourth Amendment cases, defendants’ qualified immunity claims are granted 60 percent of the time. Protesters also face nearly insurmountable obstacles in terms of holding municipalities liable for constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has recently limited protesters’ ability to bring First Amendment “retaliation” claims. Finally, the Court has all but sounded the death knell for First Amendment damages claims against federal officials. The chapter joins the chorus calling for qualified immunity reform. It also encourages states and localities to restrict officers’ ability to invoke qualified and other immunities, and to create causes of action against officials for violations of state constitutional law.

Chapter 7 conducts part two of the deeper dive into the new regulations, but here the focus is on the changes made to the investigation and adjudication of sexual assault. The chapter explains the ways in which the new procedures differ from those under the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, and how they better protect complainants and the accused. In considering the fairness of the new procedures, the chapter compares them to the consensus recommendations of the 2017 ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Campus Due Process and Victim Protection. Along the way, suggestions are offered for how schools can implement the new regulations in a way that is compliant with those regulations but better protects the rights of victims and the accused.

Chapter 3 investigates the problematic beginnings of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) issued by the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) under President Obama. It explaina how the DCL misrepresented existing data, violated the Administrative Procedure Act by changing the law without going through notice and comment, and flouted existing norms. In the process, the chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the changes brought about by the DCL, including mandating a lower standard of proof in sexual assault hearings.

This chapter examines the phenomenon of cyberterrorism through the lens of political psychology. The emergence of cyberterrorism as a novel threat has roiled international security and given rise to a new wave of research that seeks to understand how exposure to destructive digital attacks influences political attitudes and behaviour. In this chapter, we review the leading empirical studies that have emerged as part of this new research focus. We begin by presenting a consolidated political psychology model of exposure to cyberterrorism that guides our analysis throughout the chapter. We then apply this model to the two predominant political outcomes that recur in the empirical literature – public confidence and trust in institutions, and foreign policy attitudes. Finally, we pinpoint the key gaps in our understanding of the psycho-political effects of cyberterrorism exposure and propose a research agenda that accounts for the evolving nature of the field.

This chapter discusses the remedies that are available under WTO law. It explains that the preferred solution to a dispute is a mutually agreed solution. If this is not possible, and the defending party does not implement any adverse rulings, the defending party may offer compensation (in the form of equivalent trade concessions). The last and least desirable option is retaliation, or the suspension of concessions. The chapter explains the procedures for each of these possible remedies, with a particular focus on the arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU of the amount of retaliation proposed by the complaining party. The chapter also discusses the “sequencing” problem arising out of the deadlines to request the right to retaliate in the DSU. Finally, the chapter discusses the special rules governing disputes over subsidies and the role played by suggestions by the panel and Appellate Body on implementation.

Kami Chavis utilizes KRS-One’s 1993 song “Black Cop” to consider the contradictions inherent in being a black police officer. The song reveals the complex role that black police officers play in the subjugation of black communities. In the song, black officers are portrayed as utilizing the same street justice and harassment as their white counterparts to “oversee” black people, just as plantation owners and enslavers used black overseers on plantations to keep enslaved people subjugated. In fact, the lyrics suggest the deliberate use of the black officer to effectuation the continued oppression of the black community. The George Floyd death was the last ember to land upon a long-burning fire that would spread throughout the country. In response to protests against police brutality, several municipalities made significant and broad changes to their police practices. Among these changes are demands to diversify the police, arguing that if there were just more black officers, this might ameliorate the complaints of racial profiling and police violence against blacks. However, a careful analysis of Black Cop and its enduring themes require us to examine this proposition.