This paper investigates the long-run nexus between wealth inequality and aggregate output using a DSGE model in which wealth inequality endogenously affects individual entrepreneurship incentives, thereby influencing aggregate output. Our model passes the indirect inference test against the UK data from 1870 to 2015. We find that shocks to aggregate TFP, entrepreneurial barriers, government grant support and general government spending played significant roles in shaping historical inequality dynamics in the UK. Directly removing entrepreneurial barriers or indirectly providing government grant support to the private sector such as through inclusive loan subsidies are effective means of reducing inequality and stimulating output growth.

We study a growth model with two types of agents who are heterogeneous in their degree of family altruism. We prove that every equilibrium path of consumption, bequests, and capital converges to a unique steady state and study the effect of altruism on the properties of steady-state equilibrium. We show that aggregate income is positively related to both level of altruism and altruism heterogeneity. When altruism heterogeneity is low or moderate, income inequality follows an inverse U-shaped pattern relative to the level of altruism. These observations are consistent with the cross-country Kuznets curve linking different steady-state levels of income to steady-state levels of inequality. When altruism heterogeneity is high, income inequality decreases with the level of altruism. Our results suggest that heterogeneous altruism is a possible mechanism linking economic growth and income inequality.

In this article, we use a three-country macroeconomic model of trade, in which we allow for the presence of labour market frictions and heterogeneous firms, to analyse the effects of Brexit on UK productivity. We find that, under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, UK GDP would have been expected to fall by approximately 7.5% in 2021, that is, as soon as the United Kingdom exited the European Union. Our model suggests that UK GDP would then recover, rising back to a long-run level around 4% below where it would have been had Brexit not happened. This fall in GDP is driven by the negative productivity effects of the implied increase in the costs of trading between the United Kingdom and European Union. Specifically, the increase in trading costs will lead to fewer, higher-productivity, UK firms exporting and reduced competition from EU firms in the UK domestic market allows more ‘low productivity’ firms to remain in the market.

This paper develops a monetary R&D-driven endogenous growth model featuring endogenous innovation scales and the price-marginal cost markup. To endogenize the step size of quality improvement, we propose a tradeoff mechanism between the risk of innovation failure and the benefit of innovation success in R&D firms. Several findings emerge from the analysis. First, a rise in the nominal interest rate decreases economic growth; however, its relationship with social welfare is ambiguous. Second, either strengthening patent protection or raising the professional knowledge of R&D firms leads to an ambiguous effect on economic growth. Third, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate fails to be optimal in view of the social welfare maximum. Finally, our numerical analysis indicates that the extent of patent protection and the level of an R&D firm’s professional knowledge play a crucial role in determining the optimal interest rate.

Over a thousand years, military employment rises, peaks, and then falls. I argue that rising military shares were driven by structural change out of agriculture, and the recent declines are driven by substitution from soldiers toward military goods. I document evidence for this substitution effect and introduce a model of growth and warfare that reproduces the time series patterns of military expenditure and employment. The model also correctly predicts the cross-sectional patterns, and that military employment and expenditure shares are decreasing in income during wars. Finally, I show that faster economic growth can reduce military expenditure in the long run.

There is limited evidence about the role that participating in international trade has on the diffusion of technologies. This paper analyzes the impact of exporting on firms’ adoption of technologies that are more sophisticated, using a novel dataset, the Firm-level Adoption of Technology (FAT) survey, that includes more than 1,500 firms from Brazil. The survey provides detailed information about the use of more than 300 technologies, combined with data from Brazil's census of formal workers (RAIS) and Brazil’s exports data from the Ministry of Trade. To address some critical endogeneity concerns, we apply a difference-in-differences estimation with multiple periods to examine the effects of entering export markets on technology adoption. We find that exporting has positive effects on firms’ likelihood of adopting advanced technologies in business functions related with business administration, production planning, supply chain management, and quality control, which are important to manage tasks associated to export activities.

This paper examines the impact of trade-related technology diffusion from G7 countries to Latin America and East Asia on total factor productivity controlling for education, governance, and distance. We build on the trade and distance-focused strands of the technology diffusion literature and find that (i) total factor productivity (TFP) increases with education, trade, and governance (ETG) and declines with distance to the G7 countries; (ii) increasing Latin America's ETG to East Asia's level would double TFP, accounting for about 75% of the TFP gap between the two country groups; and (iii) South America's greater remoteness relative to Mexico's from the US and Canada significantly reduces its TFP and similarly for Singapore's greater remoteness from Japan relative to Hong Kong.

This study develops a new dynamic general equilibrium model to explore the role of people’s love of novelty as a cultural preference in innovation and innovation-based growth. The model considers (a) an infinitely lived representative consumer who has standard love-of-variety preferences for differentiated products and additional love-of-novelty preferences for new products and (b) technological progress driven by two costly and time-consuming innovation activities, new product development and existing product development. We demonstrate that consumers’ love of novelty is a source of innovation-based growth, wherein economies with a moderate love of novelty can achieve innovation and long-run growth through endogenous cycles between periods in which new product development is active and those in which existing product development is active. However, if love of novelty preference is too weak or too strong, the economy is caught in an underdevelopment trap with less innovation and no long-run growth. We also provide some suggestive empirical evidence that supports our theoretical predictions.

The current unsustainable growth of the world economy is largely a consequence of the crisis of social capital experienced by much of the world’s population. Declining social capital leads economies towards excessive growth, because people seek, in economic affluence, compensation for emotional distress and loss of resources caused by scarce social and affective relationships. To slow down economic growth requires an increase in social capital that is a fundamental contributor to happiness. From a wide range of possible approaches to increasing present happiness, this article suggests policies that would shift the economy to a more sustainable path. It focuses on a more politically sustainable set of proposals for a green ‘new deal’ than some of those currently under discussion.

Under what circumstances can minimum wages increase without adverse effects on employment levels? In 31 Chinese provinces between 2004 and 2015, the employment effect of a minimum wage depended on the minimum wage level, foreign direct investment, per capita gross domestic product and labour productivity. A minimum wage increase reduced hiring as foreign direct investment inflow rose, regardless of the amount of investment. Any positive employment effect of a minimum wage increase was mitigated by per capita gross domestic product growth, except when per capita gross domestic product was above the average. Above-average labour productivity enhancement significantly mitigated the adverse employment effect of the minimum wage. Employers responded to a rising minimum wage by increasing hiring when the geometric growth rates of the minimum wage and foreign direct investment for a particular province within a period of time were above the overall average across provinces. However, they scrutinised both annual and overall economic growth within a time period when making hiring decisions in the face of minimum wage adjustments. An inverted U-shape relationship between minimum wages and employment suggest a maximum threshold value for the minimum wage. Thus, government policy measures should foster short-term and long-term economic growth, to facilitate employment creation when minimum wages increase.

In practice, firms face a number of scarce innovation projects. They choose one towards which to direct their effort, but do not coordinate these choices. This gives rise to coordination frictions. This paper develops an expanding-variety endogenous growth model to study the implications of these frictions for growth and welfare. We find that the coordination failure generates a number of foregone innovations and reduces the economy-wide research intensity. Both effects decrease the growth rate. This creates a general equilibrium effect that endogenously amplifies the fraction of wasteful simultaneous innovation. Furthermore, formalizing the coordination frictions uncovers a novel link between the “stepping on toes” and “standing on shoulders” externalities—their magnitudes are endogenously determined through the ratio of firms to innovation projects. We find that the “stepping on toes” externality is larger for all parameter values.

I develop a dynamic model of consumption variety in status goods by introducing a realistic aspect that is new in the existing literature—that a good will not carry status appeal unless it is advertised. As advertisements will divert resources from new product research, growth in new products will be reduced. However, status-good advertisements also enhance distinctiveness of a good and increase a firm’s profit. This will motivate more researches. With the two effects offsetting each other, the original market bias in a standard product-development model—insufficient research due to a general knowledge spillover—cannot be overcome. While introducing advertising into models of this kind does not reverse the original welfare implication of suboptimal growth, this makes available a new and better intervention option—taxing advertisements. This tax is superior to consumption tax, the conventional solution to inefficient status competition, as consumption tax is found to be ineffective in the present model. It is also superior to research subsidies, the conventional solution to suboptimal growth, as subsidies must be financed and is not a self-sufficient policy.

Six decades ago, Cuba initiated a momentous social and economic experiment. This paper documents the effects of the experiment on Cuban living standards. Before the revolution, Cuban income per capita was on a par with Ireland or Finland. Indeed, Cuba was one of the richest of the Spanish-speaking societies. Growth is glacially slow after the revolution as GDP per capita increased by 40 per cent between 1957 and 2017 equal to an annual growth rate of 0.6 per cent—among the lowest anywhere. To be sure, other dimensions of well-being such as education and health improved, yet broader welfare measures do not change the conclusion that the revolution impoverished Cuba relative to any plausible counter factual.

Are institutions a deep cause of economic growth? This paper tries to answer this question in a novel manner by focusing on within-country variation, over long periods of time, using a new hand-collected data set on institutions and the power-ARCH econometric framework. Focusing on the case of Brazil since 1870, our results suggest (a) that both changes in formal political institutions and informal political instability affect economic growth negatively, (b) there are important differences in terms of their short- versus long-run behaviour, and (c) not all but just a few selected institutions affect economic growth in the long-run.

We construct and parameterize an overlapping generations model for an open economy with individuals who differ in innate ability. Key endogenous variables are hours worked, investment in human and physical capital, and per capita growth. The model replicates important data in Belgium since 1960 remarkably well. Simulating it, we observe that behavioral adjustments by households and firms contribute to reverse the negative arithmetical effect of future demographic change on per capita growth. Individuals work and study more. However, with unchanged policies, there remains a net negative effect on annual per capita growth of almost 0.3%-points on average in the next 25 years. This is mainly due to adverse consequences of reduced fertility and a declining working-age population on (the return to) physical capital investment. Model projections also point to rising income inequality induced by demographic change. Differences in the capacity of individuals to respond to increasing life expectancy by investing in education, and by saving, are key.

Classic accounts of the English industrial revolution present a long period of stagnation followed by a fast take-off. However, recent findings of slow but steady per capita economic growth suggest that this is a historically inaccurate portrait of early modern England. This growth pattern was in part driven by specialization and structural change accompanied by an increase in market participation at both the intensive and extensive levels. These, I argue, were supported by the gradual increase in money supply made possible by the importation of precious metals from America. They enabled a substantial increase in the monetization and liquidity levels of the economy, hence decreasing transaction costs, increasing market thickness, changing the relative incentive for participating in the market and allowing agglomeration economies to arise. By making trade with Asia possible, precious metals also induced demand for new desirable goods, which in turn encouraged market participation. Finally, the increased monetization and market participation made tax collection easier. This helped the government to build up fiscal capacity and as a consequence to provide for public goods. The structural change and increased market participation that ensued paved the way for modernization.

We analyze the spatio-temporal dynamics of a simple model of macroeconomic geography in which demography and pollution dynamics mutually affect each other. Pollution, by reducing the carrying capacity of the natural environment – which determines the maximum amount of people a given location can effectively bear – crucially affects labor force dynamics which in turn alter the amount of resources available for abatement activities aiming to reduce pollution. Such mutual links determine the eventual sustainability of the development process in different locations and economies, and spatial interactions further complicate the picture. We show that neglecting the existence of mutual feedback between population and pollution leads to misleading conclusions about the eventual sustainability of a specific location. We also show that even neglecting the existence of spatial externalities can lead to misleading conclusions about the sustainability of different regions in the spatial economy. This suggests thus that both the nature of the population and pollution relationship and geographical factors may play a critical role in the process of sustainable development.

In this paper we explore the relationship between the presence of agglomeration economies and regional economic growth in Spain during the period 1870-1930. The study allows us to revisit the existence of a trade-off between economic growth and territorial cohesion, and also to examine whether the existence of agglomeration economies could explain the upswing in regional income inequality during the early stages of development. In doing so, we present alternative indicators for agglomeration economies and estimate conditional growth regressions at province (NUTS3) level. In line with new economic geography models, agglomeration economies in a context of market integration widened regional inequality in the second half of the 19th century and hindered its reduction during the early decades of the 20th.

This paper measures the direct contribution of railways to economic growth before 1914 in four Latin American economies with large railway systems (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay) using growth accounting techniques. The outcomes of the analysis indicate that the growth contribution of railways in Uruguay was very low. By contrast, in Argentina and Mexico railways provided huge benefits, amounting to 20-25% of income per capita growth before 1914. Finally, in Brazil, the growth contribution of railways was even higher, although this was largely a consequence of the stagnation of the Brazilian economy. These results provide an example of a technology whose growth contribution was much higher in some peripheral economies than in the core countries where it was developed.

This paper reviews the analysis of technological change by cliometricians. It focuses on lessons about total factor productivity (TFP) from growth accounting and on aspects of social capability that are conducive to the effective assimilation of new technology. Key messages are that when TFP growth is very rapid this typically involves reductions in inefficiency not just technological advance and that even really important new technologies have small initial effects on aggregate productivity. Incentive structures matter greatly for the adoption of new technology, but social capability is not independent of the technological epoch as the information and communications technology (ICT) era has emphasized to Europeans.