China’s approach to investment facilitation is embodied in China’s views during the active participation in negotiations for the WTO’s Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement, G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, and Free Trade Agreements, besides China’s foreign investment and outbound investment laws and regulations. China’s approach to investment facilitation is advancing with the times and displays certain specific characteristics and is continuously improving and developing. China’s comprehensive approach to investment facilitation is conducive to the shared sustainable development of China and other actors. In the future, China’s policies and measures to investment facilitation should adhere to the spirit and guidance of shared sustainable development and competitive neutrality.

Investment facilitation provisions are incorporated in many international investment agreements (IIAs). Especially, because investment facilitation measures have their root in international trade law and investment law and national law, disputes concerning these measures could be settled through methods in these different legal regimes. Notably, such disputes could be submitted to investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) or WTO dispute settlement, or both, by different types of disputants and relying on different treaties or laws. This makes settlement of investment facilitation disputes a complicated issue. This chapter presents a structural review of the issue of settlement of investment facilitation disputes, including dispute prevention, settlement of investment facilitation disputes through ISDS, and WTO dispute settlement, and explores the issue of parallel jurisdiction over investment facilitation disputes.

We quantify the impacts of a potential Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement under negotiation at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The analysis is based on an innovative multiregion general equilibrium simulation model including bilateral representative firms. Consideration is given to foreign direct investment (FDI) and monopolistic competition. The model shows empirically relevant gains associated with removal of investment barriers in the form of transaction costs faced by foreign investors. The expected global welfare gains range between 0.56% and 1.74% depending on the depth of a potential IFD Agreement. The benefits are concentrated among the participants of the agreement with the highest welfare increase for the low-income and middle-income countries. Notable spillovers accrue to nonparticipants, which can be further increased by joining the agreement. Our results contribute to the relatively scarce research on investment facilitation and provide policymakers with information on the potential effects of the negotiated IFD Agreement.

This chapter uses the investment facilitation index (IFI) to map the adoption of over 100 investment facilitation measures in more than 140 countries. The study finds a wide variation in investment facilitation frameworks across and within world regions and income groups, with measures related to internal and external cooperation less frequently adopted in low-income countries. Few countries have well-functioning single-window mechanisms, and focal points are either completely missing or lacking many important functions. The study highlights the importance of binding multilateral commitments and support structures for implementing investment facilitation reforms in countries of lower income levels, as foreseen in the nascent Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement. The findings suggest potential for regional and international initiatives through peer-learning and sharing of best practices to improve investment facilitation frameworks worldwide.

This chapter examines how the facilitation of foreign direct investment (FDI) through the World Trade Organization (WTO) can contribute to fulfilling the right to development and achieving UN Sustainable Development Goals. It assesses how the WTO facilitates investment related to sustainable development in developing countries through liberalization of trade in services, restrictions on trade-related investment measures, and promotion of intellectual property rights. The study finds that reform efforts to make these WTO disciplines more conducive to sustainable development have been slow and of limited significance. The chapter also looks at how investment is facilitated through investment treaties and domestic investment legislation, highlighting the importance of domestic investment legislation for promoting investment for sustainable development, particularly for least developed countries. Finally, the chapter discusses whether and how the draft WTO Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement can most effectively achieve its objective in relation to countries most in need of development-related investment, considering the relative roles of the home and host states of FDI.

This chapter examines the politics of the negotiations surrounding the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Historically, developing and emerging economies have opposed multilateral investment rules over concerns that they would favor developed countries and limit policy space. However, proposals for the IFD Agreement have gained momentum, thanks in part to Global South members such as Brazil and China, which have also advanced their preferences through bilateral and regional arrangements outside of the WTO. Despite promises to focus on technical aspects and avoid politically charged topics, negotiations continue to raise objections from other emerging economies such as India and South Africa over extending the WTO’s mandate and preserving policy space. The chapter compares the competing interests and strategies of India, Brazil, and China as they attempt to establish investment facilitation standards inside and outside of the WTO. While the standards they promote are similar, their political motivations may create obstacles to the consolidation of a final multilateral agreement.