Some neo-Aristotelians see a strong link between virtues and eudaimonia or flourishing, but others do not. After acknowledging this difference, the chapter explores some of the possible implications of this link. The view explored in this chapter is that virtues contribute to success in goal and good pursuit, which, in turn, contributes to a flourishing life. The neo-Aristotelian view examined holds that there are things that are good for humans qua humans (e.g., close personal relationships, group belonging). Success in pursuing these goods is hypothesized to be correlated with eudaimonia. It explores several challenges in studying eudaimonia, but concludes that eudaimonia research should continue and be updated as conceptualization and measurement improves. The chapter concludes with a discussion of three well-documented human goods (close personal relationships, group belonging, and meaning) and their hypothesized relationships with specific virtues (e.g., loyalty, forgiveness, honesty).

This chapter explores the nature of the work that researchers in the social and behavioral sciences do through a discussion of the ethical principles that ought to guide their work. Since academic researchers have different perceptions and attitudes regarding what constitutes (un)ethical research, we offer an overview of what is considered best practices in social and behavioral science research. This work focuses primarily on the ethical issues related to the design, development, implementation, and publication of research projects. It concludes with a guide for assisting research teams and research ethics committees in assessing the honesty, authenticity, and accountability of their research programs.

Culture can mean several things when referring to a group: identity, values, goals, principles. Culture can be defined from the inside or outside – how is your group viewed by others, either at your institution or outside? Is your group viewed as “functional,” in which the members get along with each other, work as a team, and accomplish important goals? Or does it carry a reputation of being a “difficult place to work”? Usually a culture is a mix, some elements hardworking and driven, some supportive and nurturing. This chapter talks directly about how to develop a positive culture for your group, and how to be explicit in the process. It starts with recognizing and acknowledging the elements of your core identity as a group – what are your guiding values and behaviors? It dives into the difference between acceptable behaviors that can stimulate the group and be positively provocative, versus those that can be negative, destructive, and unacceptable, and how to deal with them when they occur. It describes the principle of accountability and how all group members are responsible for the overall health of the group. It discusses how to handle difficult interpersonal interactions once they’ve taken place, and how to reset the team after a negative culture event. It reminds the reader of the importance of embracing diversity, that differing opinions are necessary and important, but negativity and destructive behavior is never helpful.

Of all Victorian authors, Trollope comes closest to aspiring to the “degree zero” style that has played such an important role in modern theorizations of prose. Committed to an ideal of stylistic transparency, Trollope sought the unmediated transmission of authorial thought-content, borrowing from the more psychological strains of belletrism. However, Chapter 5 challenges the moralization of Trollope’s “disappearing” style as honest or forthright by cataloguing the acts of formal deception necessary to render such effects. Moreover, Trollope’s writings on style reveal his interest in non-mimetic features of prose such as harmony and rhythm, challenging “ease” and “lucidity” as preeminent realist virtues. The chapter concludes that Trollope’s blend of Attic simplicity with Ciceronian schemes proves his style to be one of the most artfully mannered in Victorian English, creating an impression of aesthetic virtuosity where many critics have seen only functional pedestrianism.

If apathy, risk, and information cannot explain the participation gap in the Muslim world, then what accounts for lower levels of political and economic activity in the region? The alternative theory that is developed here focuses squarely on interpersonal trust. It identifies two key conditions -- interdependence and uncertainty -- that, when met, make cooperation and coordination trust dependent. Different types of interpersonal trust are able to sustain collective action at different scales, with the broadest forms of cooperation and coordination requiring trust that is non-particularized, or not based on direct previous experience with the entrusted. Levels of trust and trustworthiness in the Muslim world are assessed, and the region is found to have high levels of honesty, but significantly less interpersonal trust. In contrast to some existing theories arguing that this distrust is culturally determined and unable to change, I find evidence that low trust expectations can indeed beupdated. This speaks to the potential for collective action in the Muslim world, based on the high levels of trustworthiness there, if only individuals can learn to trust one another.

The conclusion begins by exploring questions of internal and external validity. In the latter case, the concept of religious group identity is applied to faiths other than Islam and is found to extend to other egalitarian faiths, including Judaism and Buddhism. In addition, cross-national data on vote volatility confirm that the trust problem invoter coordination extends beyond the Turkish case. Delving into some out-of-sample predictions, I consider where in the Muslim worldIslamic groups might be particularly successful, based on a combination of low trust and salient Islamic identity. I also explorewhat mightexplain the strange combination of low trust and high honesty in Muslim countries. To address this trust deficit, I suggest that over-bearing institutions may play a key role in not allowing citizens to learn who among them can really be trusted. Finally, I consider what factors from within my theory could explain the eventual decline of Islamic-based groups, in Turkey and elsewhere, before posing some questions for future lines of inquiry.

In this chapter, Alfano explores the Nietzschean virtue of curiosity. Curiosity, in this reading, is a drive to engage in and positively evaluate the process of inquiry, especially challenging inquiry into difficult and problematic questions. If this is right, then curiosity is less about static states (e.g., true belief, settled knowledge) and more about epistemic activity in its own right. Alfano connects his account of Nietzschean curiosity both with a large number of relevant passages from Nietzsche's writings and with contemporary accounts of intellectual virtue and vice. In so doing, he establishes curiosity as an intellectual virtue worthy of the attention of both Nietzsche scholars and contemporary virtue epistemologists.

In this chapter, Alfano explores the Nietzschean virtue of curiosity. Curiosity, in this reading, is a drive to engage in and positively evaluate the process of inquiry, especially challenging inquiry into difficult and problematic questions. If this is right, then curiosity is less about static states (e.g., true belief, settled knowledge) and more about epistemic activity in its own right. Alfano connects his account of Nietzschean curiosity both with a large number of relevant passages from Nietzsche's writings and with contemporary accounts of intellectual virtue and vice. In so doing, he establishes curiosity as an intellectual virtue worthy of the attention of both Nietzsche scholars and contemporary virtue epistemologists.

In this chapter, Alfano argues that when Nietzsche celebrates the virtue of courage, he almost always has in mind intellectual courage. This is the courage one needs to face and face down epistemic challenges. An epistemic challenge could have a social dimension, as when asking certain questions makes one's interlocutors uncomfortable. In Nietzsche's case, it also tends to have an internal dimension, insofar as seeking the answers to some questions makes the inquirer herself uncomfortable, embarrassed, or outright ashamed. Many inquiries face both external and internal challenges of these sorts. In either case, intellectual courage supports the activity of inquiry and integrates well with the virtue of curiosity.