The Constitution of Zambia protects freedom of thought is one of the two components of freedom of conscience, with the other component being freedom of religion or belief. This chapter considers the extent to which the letter of the law comports with the spirit of the law. The analysis suggests that the letter of the law hardly comports with the spirit of the law. First, the letter of the law appears to wrongly conflate three distinct types of freedom insofar as it portrays freedom of conscience is ‘an umbrella freedom’ and freedom of thought and freedom of religion or belief as specific components thereof. Second, the letter of the law does not appear to comport with the spirit of the law insofar as it suggests that it protects a person from being hindered in the enjoyment of his/her freedom of thought or freedom of conscience only where the hindrance occurs without one’s own consent. Third, the letter of the law does not appear to comport with the spirit of the law insofar as it suggests that the state can impose restrictions on, and derogate from, freedom of thought and freedom of conscience. The chapter culminates in a call for reform.

Judges often speak of “freedom of thought” as a liberty central to American constitutional jurisprudence. But why does thought need protection even when it remains unexpressed in speech and hidden? This chapter explores two possible answers. One is that understanding a principle of freedom of thought explains why speech is strongly shielded by the First Amendment of the US Constitution: Our thought, judges and scholars stress, is central to how we define ourselves and speech is the key means of conveying thought and shaping it. Yet a right to freedom of thought might also stand on its own. The Court’s 1969 decision in Stanley v. Georgia provides two possible accounts of how it might do so. The first reaffirms and modestly expands the long-standing principle that officials may not target and punish us solely because of our thoughts. The second reading of Stanley goes further: It protects us not only against state action aimed at controlling thought but also that which interferes with certain environments or resources that allow us to shape our thought. This second account, the chapter explains, is more suited than the first to address certain challenges raised by emerging neurotechnologies.

This chapter explores the status of freedom of thought in Malaysia. It begins with a consideration of certain definitional issues surrounding freedom of thought and it provides a brief overview of the Malaysian legal system. As there is no explicit right to freedom of thought in Malaysia, this chapter considers the limited utility of international human rights treaties in protecting freedom of thought within the Malaysian context and the inherent difficulties in using qualified constitutional provisions on freedom of religion and freedom of expression to safeguard the absolute right to freedom of thought. It also considers the impact of various restrictive legislation upon the right to freedom of thought. The chapter concludes with the pessimistic view that freedom of thought is insufficiently protected within the Malaysian jurisdiction.

The right to freedom of thought occupies a dubious position in Brazil. It completely lacks explicit constitutional or legal protection, despite a strong implicit recognition through derivative freedoms like expression, press and privacy. This research addresses this paradox, examining constitutional and legal frameworks, scholarly jurisprudence, significant court cases, and international treaties to delineate Freedom of Thought’s status in Brazil. It also considers recent legislative initiatives and the challenges that regulating misinformation poses for the right. The findings indicate that the right to Freedom of Thought functions as a vital juris-philosophical criterion in Brazil, underpinning various fundamental rights and playing a key role in the Supreme Court’s legal hermeneutics. Nevertheless, the absence of explicit protection leads to several limitations in its safeguard. First, it lacks a clear definition of its content and a precise delimitation of what it entails. It is also not acknowledged as a standalone right, being often conflated with other rights. Finally, its legal interpretation fluctuates with Brazil’s unstable case law. Remarkably, the internal dimension of Freedom of Thought remains largely unprotected and overlooked. The research underscores the need for explicit constitutional amendments and clearer legislative definitions to safeguard the right comprehensively, ensuring consistent legal recognition and protection in Brazil.

The rapid development in neurotechnology raises significant human rights concerns. A normative analysis of this emerging technology’s ability to interfere with individual’s mental processes, highlights the lack of a clear human rights framework protecting the human mind. In this chapter, we will outline the interplay between neurotechnology and the right to freedom of thought, as well as the plea for new neurorights. First, we will examine how neurotechnology interferes with people’s mental sphere, and how this may put human rights – and the right to freedom of thought in particular – at risk. Second, we analyse how the international community addresses the disruptive impact of neurotechnology and which role the freedom of thought is attributed in these efforts. Third, we explore the impact on this freedom, its capacity to address the challenges emanating from neurotechnology, and how it may be reconceptualised to serve as an effective safeguard. Finally, we offer general remarks on the necessity of new neurorights and explore the current positions of various international and supranational institutions on this issue.

Focusing on the right to FoT in the digital age, this chapter sheds light on the societal dimensions of FoT by drawing on the broader and relational concept of thought. It discusses the societal dimensions in light of the four attributes of the right to FoT – the right not to reveal our thoughts; not to be punished for our thoughts; not to have our thoughts manipulated; and, the state duty to create an enabling environment for the fulfilment of the right. The societal dimensions of FoT are justified based on the necessity to nurture the emergence of a critical, reflective, self-determined and democratic society and for the realisation of social harmony.

The right to freedom of thought is not explicitly mentioned in the German Basic Law. This chapter examines whether and how freedom of thought might be implicitly protected in the Basic Law (GG), focusing on the right to freedom of belief, conscience and religion (Article 4 GG), the right to freedom of expression and information (Article 5 GG), the right to human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) and the general right of personality (Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) GG). Freedom of thought is sometimes mentioned in the literature in connection with freedom of belief, conscience and religion and freedom of expression and information as a necessary precondition for the formation of convictions and opinions. Inner freedom is an inherent aspect of human dignity, but only extreme forms of interference with the inner freedom of the person constitute a violation of this right. The general right of personality protects the prerequisites of personal freedom and self-determination and therefore could provide the most comprehensive protection for a person’s inner freedom. It is therefore argued that while freedom of thought is within the scope of protection of these four rights, it can be rooted in the general right of personality in particular.

Liberty of thought is the first liberty that the Preamble to the Constitution of India aims to secure. Yet, one finds no mention of ‘thought’ as one of the protected freedoms under Part III of the Constitution, which safeguards fundamental rights. This chapter takes the first steps to address this riddle and locating the normative foundations for the right. It argues that while the Preambular ideal itself is insufficient to confer a substantive right, its role in judicial interpretation, along with the interrelationship between fundamental rights, provides a robust normative foundation for the right to freedom of thought in India. Specifically, the chapter discusses the development of the right to mental privacy in the context of brain-reading in Selvi, and later in Puttaswamy. The right to (mental) privacy read into dignity by the Supreme Court of India already takes steps towards constructing a forum internum, and on the other hand, the challenge of the vulnerability of the legal subject becomes evident in the context of the right to freedom of conscience. Regarding the absolute nature of the right, this chapter argues that only as a Preambular ideal is the liberty of thought absolute within the Indian legal framework.

France has been at the forefront of the philosophical reflection on freedom of thought, along with the related freedoms of opinion and of conscience. Today, freedom of thought is constitutionally protected under French law as affirmed in Article 11 which makes the ‘free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man’. However, freedom of thought has received limited attention in French legal scholarship and is seldom considered as a standalone and influential factor in legal disputes, some even suggesting that France may be falling behind other democratic states in terms of the effective affirmation and protection of freedom of conscience in particular. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate how the right to freedom of thought finds expression in French positive law, as well as how it has been used distinctively and practically by the courts, if at all. Following a concise examination of the underlying concept, this chapter considers the legal foundations of freedom of thought and its implementation within the judicial system, with particular focus on the Constitutional Council.

The right to freedom of thought in Africa is governed by three frameworks. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not explicitly recognise this right but includes freedom of conscience and religion in Article 8. This provision covers both forum internum (absolute freedom of conscience) and forum externum (free practice of religion, subject to limitations). However, the African Commission and the African Court often conflate these rights, resulting in limited case law. Some cases suggest a broad interpretation of Article 8 to include various beliefs, implying freedom of thought, supported by related rights like freedom of expression. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child explicitly includes freedom of thought in Article 9, but its scope is unclear due to the lack of case law. This inclusion supports the extension of this right into adulthood under Article 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ensuring individuals retain their freedom of thought beyond childhood. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa does not explicitly mention freedom of thought, but this right can be inferred from the rights to free development of personality and participation in political and decision-making processes.

Digital technologies provide powerful new tools for covert influence strategies. The concept of ‘online manipulation’ has been used to describe a range of different practices, ranging from disinformation campaigns to targeted advertising and dark patterns. There is an emerging view in human rights scholarship that some of these practices may violate our right to freedom of thought. In this chapter, we argue that covert online influences undermine mental autonomy, and that the latter is protected by the right to freedom of thought. We propose that manipulative online practices interfere with freedom of thought when they affect one’s mental autonomy in a sufficiently global manner. We lay out a framework to establish when this threshold is reached, asking whether (1) the attempted influence or its originator was hidden, (2) the targeted person fell within a vulnerable category of individuals, or there existed an information or power asymmetry, (3) the attempted influence targeted a type of thought reaching a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, or mental processes linked with core aspects of external autonomy; and (4) eventually considering the frequency and duration of the attempted influence.

This chapter examines freedom of thought in Colombia. No Constitution of Colombia has stipulated the right to freedom of thought since the country’s independence. However, its existence is currently undisputed in the Colombian legal system due to the Constitutional Court jurisprudence. Since 1997, the Court has defined this freedom as a stand-alone forum internum right and has delineated its content and attributes. However, case-law references to this right have been mainly rhetorical for at least three reasons. First, scepticism about its practical utility given that thoughts have been considered impossible to access. Second, cases related to the right to freedom of thought usually involve interests that also fall under the protective remit of other rights, which are directly stipulated by the Constitution. Third, the Court’s characterization of the relation and differences between the right to freedom of thought and other rights (i.e., freedom of expression and freedom of conscience) is inconsistent, complex, as well as conceptually and practically unclear. We do think it is necessary for the Colombian legal system to make advancements on the conceptual and normative independence of freedom of thought to reinforce the protection of the forum internum.

This chapter explores the right to freedom of thought in Türkiye, focusing on its legal foundations and historical context from the early twentieth-century’s Kemalist reforms to the present day. It examines how Türkiye’s transition from the Ottoman Empire to a modern Republic has shaped its legal protections and political responses to dissent, religion, and political plurality. Highlighting the ongoing tension between constitutional secularism and the rise of Islamist-influenced politics, the chapter reveals how these dynamics continue to shape and restrict freedoms of thought and expression in modern Türkiye. Despite early constitutional recognition of freedom of thought, practical implementation has often been constrained by state control over media, legal and judicial nuances, and societal norms. The chapter concludes by emphasizing the need for stronger legal safeguards and democratic principles to genuinely protect the right to freedom of thought in Türkiye.

Although Vietnam’s current 2013 Constitution does not recognize a specific right to freedom of thought, it does recognize the constituent rights of freedom of thought, including freedom of religion and belief, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association and freedom of peaceful assembly. Since Doi Moi (1986), the implementation of these freedoms has been much improved, but there are still many obstacles and limitations. These include strict control over media, restrictions on political dissent, and limitations on the activities of religious groups. The main reason for these limitations is the Communist Party’s concern that the exercise of these rights will lead to political instability and the changing of the socialist regime in Vietnam today. Vietnam is continuing to integrate more deeply into the world, and this is one of the main driving forces promoting freedom of thought in this country. However, in the short term, there will not be any significant changes because there have been no signs of the Communist Party of Vietnam relaxing civil liberties. Despite this, there is still room for freedom of thought, and it is crucial to advocate for its promotion. The journey towards promoting freedom of thought in Vietnam is undoubtedly a long-term one. It necessitates the active participation and coordination of numerous stakeholders, who must approach the task with patience, persistence, and flexibility.

The right to freedom of thought is protected under Section 11 of the Constitution of Mauritius. It is a fundamental right which at first glance can be read as a qualified right, that is, one which can be limited under certain circumstances as long as the restrictions are lawful, proportionate and reasonably justified in a democratic society. This chapter will provide an overview of the Mauritian legal system followed by an outline of the constitutional protection of civil and political rights in Mauritius. The discussion will then turn to a normative analysis of the right to freedom of thought in Mauritius, with consideration of how it should be construed as an absolute right instead of a qualified right. The chapter will then review the limitation test for qualified rights under the Constitution. Finally, there will be an examination of the few cases relating specifically to freedom of thought. The whole discussion will shed light on how there is in the Mauritian context a poor and declining understanding of the fundamental processes that afford protection for constitutional rights generally and protection for the right to freedom of thought specifically.

The right to freedom of thought is enshrined in Article 32(1) of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution. This right aims to facilitate democratic discourse, critical thinking, and societal progress. However, despite its constitutional protection, the right remains underdeveloped statutorily, in judicial decisions, and in academic literature. Ambiguity persists in defining and qualifying violations of this right, as no court has thus far engaged in a comprehensive analysis to establish its content and scope. Instead, it has been intertwined with discussions on the scope, application, and limitations of freedoms of expression, religion, belief, and opinion, being regarded as the essential inner element necessary for the exercise of these freedoms. This chapter examines the scope of the right to freedom of thought in Kenya and the importance of recognising it as an independent right, despite its interconnectedness with the aforementioned freedoms. Ensuring this recognition allows citizens to develop their own set of ideals and belief systems without facing coercion to disclose their thoughts, punishment for holding certain thoughts, impermissible alteration of their thoughts, or a lack of an enabling environment to hold and express their thoughts. To establish this, the chapter explores the historical and legal framework of the right to freedom of thought in Kenya and examines its interplay with related constitutional rights such as freedom of expression, belief, religion, and opinion. It addresses contemporary issues, including the impact of technology, surveillance, and cancel culture on freedom of thought. Recommendations are then made on its applicability and how courts and academics can navigate the complexities surrounding its scope, content, and limitations.

Although still facing a myriad of social issues, three decades since the abolition of Apartheid have seen South Africa establishing itself as a liberal democracy with a highly respected judiciary. It boasts a progressive constitution with a robust Bill of Rights, which specifically includes the right to freedom of thought albeit as part of the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion in Section 15. Relevant case law indicate that freedom of thought is not yet seen as a fundamental right on its own, but rather understood as part of the right to freedom of religion, or as some prefer, freedom from religion. At first glance it may seem that coercive proselytising, archaic witchcraft and blasphemy legislation comprise the main related issues. The chapter argues that this is too narrow an interpretation, and that the right also forms part and parcel of other fundamental rights such as equality, speech, and privacy. To that end, the chapter uses the four attributes of the right to freedom of thought as formulated by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and considers to what extent, in aggregate, South Africa lives up to the ideal. It concludes that an enabling environment for freedom of thought not only exists, but has the potential to be further developed in South Africa.

Emerging neurotechnology offers increasingly individualised brain information, enabling researchers to identify mental states and content. When accurate and valid, these brain-reading technologies also provide data that could be useful in criminal legal procedures, such as memory detection with EEG and the prediction of recidivism with fMRI. Yet, unlike in medicine, individuals involved in criminal cases will often be reluctant to undergo brain-reading procedures. This raises the question of whether coercive brain-reading could be permissible in criminal law. Coercive Brain-Reading in Criminal Justice examines this question in view of European human rights: the prohibition of ill treatment, the right to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and the privilege against self-incrimination. The book argues that, at present, the established framework of human rights does not exclude coercive brain-reading. It does, however, delimit the permissible use of forensic brain-reading without valid consent. This cautionary, cutting-edge book lays a crucial foundation for understanding the future of criminal legal proceedings in a world of ever-advancing neurotechnology.