Other-regarding preferences or decision errors are the main explanations put forward to justify contributions exceeding the non-cooperative optimum in VCM games. An alternative rationale relies on ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion increases the perceived marginal benefit of own contributions, which in equilibrium will exceed the Nash level. We present a series of experiments testing this hypothesis. To control for other-regarding preferences, we run a two-player game in which a human player plays with a virtual agent. Players are assigned either to a risky setting (known probabilities of opponent's choices) or to an ambiguity setting (probabilities of opponent's contribution are vague). Results show that ambiguity affects contributions. However, attitude to ambiguity appears to be affected by the location of the aggregate Nash optimum inside the decision space.

This essay defends a new account of wrongful benefiting based on the principle of fair play. In particular, I argue that certain structurally-conferred group-based benefits or privileges can ground obligations on the part of innocent beneficiaries to relinquish specific gains for purposes of redistribution regardless of whether their receipt is sourced in wrongdoing or involves the imposition of harm upon relevant others. I call this approach to fair play reasoning externalist insofar as it turns on a novel conception of free-riding that eschews necessary appeal to beneficiaries’ mental states or volition. After presenting an empirical example to help illustrate the sort of benefiting at issue and distinguishing my account from arguments rooted in the notion of structural injustice, I defend it via what I call the extension argument, respond to two salient objections, and close by suggesting its potential political utility in the American context specifically.

Turnout is in decline in established democracies around the world. Where, in the mid-1800s, 70–80 percent of eligible voters regularly participated in US Presidential elections, turnout has averaged just 53.7 percent since 1972. Average turnout in general elections in the UK has fallen from 76.6 percent during the period 1945–92, to 64.7 percent since 1997. Average turnout in Canadian federal elections has fallen from 74.5 percent during the period 1940–79, to 62.5 percent since 2000. For most democrats, these numbers are a cause for alarm. Compulsory voting is amongst the most effective means of raising turnout. However, compulsory voting is also controversial. Most of us think that coercion may only be employed against the citizenry if it is backed by a justification of the right kind. Opponents of compulsory voting charge that no such justification is available. This article resists this line of argument in two ways. First, I offer an argument from free-riding which, though gestured towards by others, and widely criticized, has yet to be defended in any depth. Second, I consider a range of objections to compulsory voting as such, arguing that none succeeds.

While there is a strong theoretical foundation for the relationship between business sectors' political spending and the policy benefits that they receive, the empirical support for it is mixed. We use the logic of this exchange to examine a policy area that directly and significantly affects all businesses, and is thus a most likely case, taxation. Using principally firm-level tax rates of a large random sample of U.S. corporations for the 1998–2005 time period, we determine whether lobbying has measurable effects on firm-level tax rates. Contrary perhaps to popular belief, or at least anecdotal illustration, we find after controlling for firm size and industry-level tax rates, among other controls, that there is no discernible effect of political spending on firm-level taxation: firms that spend more in an effort to affect policy generally or tax policy specifically are no more likely to benefit from lower tax rates. We also examine the possibility that firms in the same industry coordinate efforts to affect tax rates. While we find limited evidence that firms occasionally coordinate within industries – or at least lobby simultaneously – to affect tax rates, perhaps more importantly, we determine that free-riding by smaller firms at the expense of the largest firms is rampant.