We propose a framework for identifying discrete behavioural types in experimental data. We re-analyse data from six previous studies of public goods voluntary contribution games. Using hierarchical clustering analysis, we construct a typology of behaviour based on a similarity measure between strategies. We identify four types with distinct stereotypical behaviours, which together account for about 90% of participants. Compared to the previous approaches, our method produces a classification in which different types are more clearly distinguished in terms of strategic behaviour and the resulting economic implications.

We examine the effects of endogenizing contribution productivity in a repeated public good game. In our experimental treatment, subjects collectively decide (by voting) how much to invest in augmenting the technology for producing the public good, and subsequently make individual voluntary contributions to provision. In the control, contribution productivity is exogenous. Contributions in the two treatments are similar.

We experimentally study how mutual payoff information affects strategic play. Subjects play the Prisoner's Dilemma or Stag Hunt game against randomly re-matched opponents under two information treatments. In our partial-information treatment, subjects are shown only their own payoff structure, while in our full-information treatment they are shown both their own and their opponent's payoff structure. In both treatments, they receive feedback on their opponent's action after each round. We find that mutual payoff information initially facilitates reaching the socially optimal outcome in both games. Play in the Prisoner's Dilemma converges toward the unique Nash equilibrium of the game under both information treatments, while in the Stag Hunt mutual payoff information has a substantial impact on play and equilibrium selection in all rounds of the game. Belief-learning model estimations and simulations suggest these effects are driven by both initial play and the way subjects learn.

The Black Sea is an enclosed sea surrounded by six coastal countries, of which Bulgaria and Romania are EU Member States. The Convention for the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution was ratified in 1994 by all coastal countries. This Convention is the only European regional sea convention to which the EU is not a Party. While Romania and Bulgaria are in favor of EU accession to the Convention, Turkey, Russia and Ukraine thus far have blocked accession. In this paper, we develop a negotiation model with endogenous enforcement and exogenous fraud to analyze the different positions of groups of coastal countries relative to EU accession to the Convention. Our model contributes to defining a proposal that the EU could make to the opposing states such that they accept the EU as a Party to the Convention. In that context we investigate also whether Romania and Bulgaria might be better off delegating their decision power to the EU, rather than retaining their individual voting rights.

We consider an economy in which a central government has to decide on the provision and location of an emergency public service the quality of which diminishes with distance. The emergency service has to attend a group of municipalities geographically located in a star-tree-graph. We derive the optimal location and provision, as well as the Lindahl prices for the emergency service. Also, we determine the minimum quality of service that makes efficient the existence of a unique provider for the whole economy. Conversely, given any level of quality of service we identify the stable and efficient structure of provision.