This is the third in a trilogy of articles for NTQ addressed to the ‘noises off’ supplied by Shakespeare’s earliest co-stars: the baited bears that competed for trade, fame, and patronage for the duration of his career as an actor-playwright. ‘Shakespeare and the Three Bears’ (NTQ 106, May 2011) sketched this context, exposing as a canard, via a mistakenly omitted comma, that there ever was a bear named Harry Hunks. ‘Shakespeare and the Naming of Bears’ (NTQ 135, August 2018) examined the influence of these rival entertainments on the structure and detail of Romeo and Juliet. ‘Shakespeare’s Polar Bears’ now expands that investigation by seeking to offer a long view of the dramatist’s association with, and attention to, such foul animal ‘sports’, and to supply a comprehensive context for the most famous stage direction in theatre history.

Beginning in the seventeenth century, numerous attempts were made to reach a very high latitude or even the North Pole. One of the more successful of these was the Italian Arctic expedition of 1899–1900, led by Luigi Amedeo di Savoia (Duke of the Abruzzi). Using two successively returning support parties, di Savoia’s second-in-command, Captain Umberto Cagni’s party eventually reached 86°34’N north of their base in the Franz Josef Land archipelago before retreating due to lack of supplies. The second support party also returned safely to the base from 83°16’N. However, the first support party, led by Lieutenant Francesco Querini, disappeared without a trace after returning southwards from 82°32’N. Although previous studies have cited starvation from lack of food supplies or accidents as the potential causes of their disappearance, the extant literature does not provide any deeper analyses to explain these events. This study explores the hypothesis that the first support party in fact turned back from a much more westerly position than they thought. This, in combination with an untimely blizzard that prevented travelling for several days, most likely made it impossible for Querini and his two men to return to base before their limited supplies ran out.

Recent research suggests that the members of the 1897 Andrée balloon expedition could have survived if they had marched towards the depot at Seven Islands instead of the Cape Flora depot after the forced landing at 82°56’N 29°52’E, and furthermore, that they reasonably should have done so given what they knew about the ice drift in the area. This paper comprises an analysis of the expedition’s depots based on a review of original sources, and the results elucidate Andrée’s initial decision to march towards Cape Flora. The Seven Island depot was not yet laid when Andrée departed in his balloon, and the information he had at the time indicated that it was highly uncertain that depot could be laid at all. Moreover, he knew it might be difficult to find the depot even if it had been laid since no exact position for it could be determined in advance. If he arrived at the Seven Islands without being able to obtain supplies there, Andrée knew he would have to continue all the way to Nordenskiöld’s old hut in Mossel Bay. Cape Flora, on the other hand, was certain to offer both supplies and shelter.

After making a final landing with their hydrogen balloon on the Arctic pack ice on 14 July 1897 at 82°56′N 29°52′E, expedition members Salomon August Andrée, Nils Strindberg and Knut Frænkel began a slow march with very heavily laden sledges over the ice to try to reach a depot at Cape Flora. Two fundamental errors regarding where to go and what to bring sealed their fate. This note will explore the theory that, given the information they had at the time, the explorers should not have made these mistakes. In fact, the expedition members could have survived if they had instead travelled directly to their other depot at Seven Islands with more lightly laden sledges.