Expectations-based reference dependence has been shown to be important across a variety of contexts in Psychology and Economics. Do expectations play a role in moral judgment? The higher our beliefs are relative to an outcome, do we punish more harshly? This paper reports a series of experiments investigating the hypothesis that expectations as reference points per se affect punishment. The experimental design varies the expectation the Punisher holds just before she learns what actually occurred. In tandem with the manipulation, expectations are shown to vary significantly and substantially. However, punishment does not respond to these exogenous changes in expectations. After 17 sessions, 295 Punishers, and six experimental setups, expectations are shown not to affect punishment in any systematic way.

Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.

We establish whether the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is dependent on the degree of approval motivation within teams. Approval motivation is defined as the desire to produce positive perceptions in others and the incentive to acquire the approval of others as well as the desire to avoid disapproval, (Martin in J Personality Assess 48(5):508–519, 1984). Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the results from the experiment suggest that mutual monitoring was not effective in fostering cooperation in teams. Furthermore, the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation was not correlated with the degree of approval motivation within teams.

The strategy method (SM) is, in practice, subject to a possibly severe economic-theoretical bias. Although many studies utilize SM to examine responses to rare or off-equilibrium behaviors unattainable through direct elicitation (DE), they ignore the fact that the strategic equivalence between SM and DE holds for the monetary payoff game but not the game participants actually play, which is in terms of utilities. We report three results. First, failing to account for estimation bias when decisions at one information set can influence utility at another may result in significant differences in decision-making. Second, the magnitude of this bias can be substantial, comparable to other measured treatment effects. Third, minor interventions targeting salience can amplify these differences similarly, causing treatment effects to differ significantly between SM and DE, even reversing in direction. These findings emphasize the need for reconsideration of the SM’s reliability for economic research.

This article highlights a potential and significant economic–theoretical bias in the widely used strategy method (SM) technique. Although SM is commonly employed to analyze numerous observations per subject regarding rare or off-equilibrium behaviors unattainable through direct elicitation (DE), researchers often overlook a critical distinction. The strategic equivalence between SM and DE is applicable in the context of monetary payoff games, but not in the actual utility-based games played by participants. This oversight may lead to inaccurate conclusions and demand a reevaluation of existing research in the field. We formalize the mapping from the monetary payoff game to this actual game and delineate necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic equivalence to apply.

We systematically investigate prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games with valence framing. We find that give versus take frames influence subjects’ behavior and beliefs in the prisoner’s dilemma games but not in the dictator games. We conclude that valence framing has a stronger impact on behavior in strategic interactions, i.e., in the prisoner’s dilemma game, than in allocation tasks without strategic interaction, i.e., in the dictator game.

We explore gender differences in individuals’ motivations. We focus on guilt aversion and moral commitment. Our experiment supports the idea that men are more guilt-averse than women, while moral motivations drive more women's actions in a random dictator game with pre-play communication.

Economic studies of religion tend to focus on religious affiliation and attendance at religious services to the exclusion of other dimensions of religion, including religious belief. We address this lacuna, using data from the World Values Survey to construct an index of religious beliefs based on whether an individual believes in God, heaven, hell, an immortal soul, and the afterlife. Following the approach in a seminal article, we compare the roles of religious beliefs and attendance in determining economic values related to cooperation, patriarchy, institutional trust, lawfulness, thrift, markets, and market fairness. Controlling for denominational, country and period fixed effects and a set of individual-level characteristics, we find that religious beliefs matter for six of these seven values, relative to five for attendance. In addition, beliefs are more important than attendance for promarket and patriarchal values and less important for thrift, market fairness, lawfulness, and institutional trust. We also consider the relationships between beliefs, attendance, and economic values for eight religious’ affiliations: Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, other religions, and non-religious. Taken together, beliefs and attendance are most important for patriarchal values, promarket attitudes, lawfulness, and institutional trust. Relative to attendance, beliefs matter most for patriarchal attitudes and least for institutional trust. Our results suggest that religious beliefs constitute an important dimension of religious life. An exclusive focus on attendance may understate the role of religion in economic values.

It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? In a companion paper (Voigt (2023). Journal of Institutional Economics, 20), I survey studies showing that geographical conditions can have direct and long-lasting effects on social norms. This paper goes one step further: It surveys studies that show how different geographical conditions affect both religious beliefs as well as traditions of family organization and how these, in turn, affect social norms.

It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? This survey examines research that relies on geography to explain the development of social norms. It turns out that many social norms are either directly or indirectly determined by geography broadly conceived and can, hence, be considered largely time invariant. Given that successful economic development presupposes the congruence between formal institutions and social norms, this insight is highly relevant for all policy interventions designed to foster economic development. In a companion paper, the role of religion and family organization as potential mediators between geography and social norms assumes centre stage.

In response to Stephen Marglin’s call for new economies, the article points to the strong and vibrant tradition of feminist scholarship inside and outside academe, which is exploring alternatives to capitalism. The article takes up the concepts of meshworks, politics of place, feminist political ecology and community economies. It argues that feminist approaches are contributing to a new analytic that goes beyond developmentalism and recognises the importance of building a new economics based on the many progressive alternatives that are being imagined and articulated in local economic practices.

A large and increasing share of economic activity in modern rich economies can be shown to lie outside what mainstream neoclassical economics itself says it can be applied to: according to neoclassical economics, such activities are unsuited to markets. Since World War II rich economies have de-industrialised, shifted to services. Since the 1970s neoclassical economics has come to dominate policy advice. This worldview justifies state interventions when there is remediable market failure, but it ignores irremediable market failure, where its theory says that markets cannot work efficiently (such as where there is joint production or own consumption). Servicisation, this article argues, has increased and is increasing the extent to which neoclassical economics is, in its own terms, ‘knowably ignorant’. This is because, where service provision is subject to irremediable market failure, neoclassical economics, in its own terms, is inapplicable. The GDP [Gross Domestic Product] share of sub-sectors serving diverse human needs, such as aged care and education, is large and rising. Such sub-sectors are dominated by joint production, manifest as diverse outputs (complex and inter-related changes in the welfare of their diverse clients). Setting aside questions of the wider ‘scientific’ validity of neoclassical theory, the article focuses on its assertion that markets cannot generate economically efficient outcomes in such activities. Arguing that the constrained optimisation of its conceptual world cannot happen in the case of joint production and own consumption of service outputs, neoclassical theory reports itself as unable to determine optimal resource allocation, and so by implication cannot fulfil its role as the foundational basis of state economic policy. Yet the literature shows that the coverage of this theoretical result is not publicised – it is ‘knowable’ but not widely known. The article concludes that, as neoclassical economics is foundational to contemporary state policy, both GDP data and neoclassical theory show that it, and markets, are knowably and increasingly inapplicable. Therefore, mainstream policy thinking continues to face an increasing ‘state of ignorance’, and the cognitive foundations of state policy are correspondingly weak.

This article argues that society is not a thing. It is abbreviated and adapted with permission from a public lecture, titled There Is No Such Thing as Society: Margaret Thatcher, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Social Science. The original was presented by Gavin Kitching to the Cuadernos de la Catedra Ludwig Wittgenstein at Universidad Veracruzana, Mexico, in March 2019.

The current unsustainable growth of the world economy is largely a consequence of the crisis of social capital experienced by much of the world’s population. Declining social capital leads economies towards excessive growth, because people seek, in economic affluence, compensation for emotional distress and loss of resources caused by scarce social and affective relationships. To slow down economic growth requires an increase in social capital that is a fundamental contributor to happiness. From a wide range of possible approaches to increasing present happiness, this article suggests policies that would shift the economy to a more sustainable path. It focuses on a more politically sustainable set of proposals for a green ‘new deal’ than some of those currently under discussion.

This article brings together labour relations, sociological and political perspectives on precarious employment in Australia, identifying local contexts of insecurity and setting them within the economics of regional supply chains involving the use of migrant labour. In developing the concept of precarious work-societies, it argues that precarity is a source of individual and social vulnerability and distress, affecting family, housing and communal security. The concept of depoliticisation is used to describe the processes of displacement, whereby the social consequences of precarious work come to be seen as beyond the reach of agency. Using evidence from social attitudes surveys, we explore links between the resulting sense of political marginalisation and hostility to immigrants. Re-politicisation strategies will need to lay bare the common basis of shared experiences of insecurity and explore ways of integrating precarious workers into new community and global alliances.

We are now close to reaching what climate scientists advise is a ‘tipping point’ when the injuries we have visited on the planet will become self-reinforcing and produce an ecosystem that is alien to human life. The mal-distribution of consumption within and between nations is a major reason why there is little agreement on appropriate remedial action. Ensuring planetary survival while reducing inequity is made the more difficult, because the richest one-seventh of the world’s population has already reached consumption levels beyond the capacity of the planetary ecosystem to accommodate it.

The author provides an introductory commentary on six divergent responses to the 2013 ‘Marglin Manifesto’, proposing basic principles that might guide the quest to combine ecological sustainability with equitably redistributive development.

The need for a new economy is great and the obstacles are many: growing inequalities within and between nations and regions, new complicity between corporations and non-democratic political regimes and failure of workers worldwide to make common cause. There are alternative models, indicating that a more egalitarian approach does not necessarily reduce living standards. Environmental degradation cannot be addressed by a technological fix: the threat to our long-term survival is pre-figured in the impact of climate change and corporate rapacity on the land and sea resources of the indigenous minorities who live as humanity has lived for most of its existence. A 10-point plan for a follow-up to the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals is suggested, but it will work only if solidarity networks can be built across divides of ascribed race, religion and nominal income levels, to express the will of the people in place of the government representatives who are prepared to gamble the future of humanity for corporate profit and power.

This article argues that it is a waste of time seeking to treat populists as examples of homo economicus when seeking to persuade them that the conspiracy theories to which they subscribe are big lies. But it does not follow that homo economicus is worthless in this context. He has a role in explaining the evolution of the social norms whose violation is the root cause of the rise of populist movements. Such an approach requires a willingness to entertain both proximate and ultimate explanations of human behaviour simultaneously.

Britain, like many other societies within the OECD, has been facing cumulative and interdependent social, political, and economic crises which came to a head shortly before COVID. The shock of COVID has accentuated these crises, creating a state of policy flux in which all long-established intellectual frameworks have proved inadequate: across the OECD, public policy has largely abandoned them. Fortunately, across the social sciences, history and philosophy there have been important new advances by major scholars which cohere and provide a more sophisticated account of society. While they will ultimately prove inadequate as new complexities emerge, for the present that offer the best guide available for policy. This essay provides an integrated review of this recent literature and relates it to some of the key policy problems.