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The strength of weak leaders: an experiment on social influence and social learning in teams

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Berno Buechel Open the ORCID record for Berno Buechel [Opens in a new window] ,
Stefan Klößner ,
Martin Lochmüller  and
Heiko Rauhut
Berno Buechel*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
Stefan Klößner*
Affiliation:
Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
Martin Lochmüller*
Affiliation:
University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Heiko Rauhut*
Affiliation:
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
*
[email protected], url: http://www.berno.info
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

We investigate how the selection process of a leader affects team performance with respect to social learning. We use a laboratory experiment in which an incentivized guessing task is repeated in a star network with the leader at the center. Leader selection is either based on competence, on self-confidence, or made at random. In our setting, teams with random leaders do not underperform. They even outperform teams with leaders selected on self-confidence. Hence, self-confidence can be a dangerous proxy for competence of a leader. We show that it is the declaration of the selection procedure which makes non-random leaders overly influential. To investigate the opinion dynamics, we set up a horse race between several rational and naïve models of social learning. The prevalent conservatism in updating, together with the strong influence of the team leader, imply an information loss since the other team members’ knowledge is not sufficiently integrated.

Keywords

Social networksConfidenceOverconfidenceBayesian updatingNaïve learningWisdom of crowds

JEL classification

D85: Network Formation and Analysis: Theory C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , June 2020 , pp. 259 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09614-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

We thank Arun Advani, Sandro Ambuehl, Vincent Buskens, Arun Chandrasekhar, Syngjoo Choi, P.J. Healy, Holger Herz, Matt Jackson, Bernhard Kittel, Michael Kosfeld, Jan Lorenz, Friederike Mengel, Claudia Neri, Muriel Niederle, and Tanya Rosenblat for helpful comments. Berno Buechel gratefully acknowledges the hospitality of the Economics Department of Stanford University and the financial support by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. Heiko Rauhut acknowledges support by the SNSF Starting Grant BSSGI0_155981.

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