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Easy come, easy go

The role of windfall money in lab and field experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Fredrik Carlsson ,
Haoran He  and
Peter Martinsson
Fredrik Carlsson*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
Haoran He*
Affiliation:
School of Economics and Business Administration, Beijing Normal University, 100875 Beijing, China
Peter Martinsson*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

A growing number of experimental studies focus on the differences between the lab and the field. One important difference between many lab and field experiments is how the endowment is obtained. By conducting a dictator game experiment, we investigate the influences of windfall and earned endowment on behavior in the laboratory and in the field. We find subjects donate more in both environments if the endowment is a windfall gain. However, although the experimental design was intended to control for all effects other than environment, there are significant differences in behavior between the lab and the field for both windfall and earned endowment. This points to the importance of discussing the context when interpreting both laboratory and field experiment results as well as when conducting replication studies.

Keywords

Charitable givingDictator gameLaboratory experimentField experimentWindfall money

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C93: Field Experiments
Type
Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 2013 , pp. 190 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 Economic Science Association

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