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On the relevance of irrelevant strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ayala Arad ,
Benjamin Bachi  and
Amnon Maltz Open the ORCID record for Amnon Maltz [Opens in a new window]
Ayala Arad*
Affiliation:
Coller School of Managment, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel
Benjamin Bachi*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Amnon Maltz*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

The experimental literature on individual choice has repeatedly documented how seemingly-irrelevant options systematically shift decision-makers’ choices. However, little is known about such effects in strategic interactions. We experimentally examine whether adding seemingly-irrelevant strategies, such as a dominated strategy or a duplicate of an existing strategy, affects players’ behavior in simultaneous games. In coordination games, we find that adding a dominated strategy increases the likelihood that players choose the strategy which dominates it, and duplicating a strategy increases its choice share; The players’ opponents seem to internalize this behavior and best respond to it. In single-equilibrium games, these effects disappear. Consequently, we suggest that irrelevant strategies affect behavior only when they serve a strategic purpose. We discuss different theoretical approaches that accommodate the effect of salience and may explain our findings.

Keywords

CoordinationDominated strategySalienceLevel-kAsymmetric dominance effectExperiment

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D91: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Type
Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 26 , Issue 5 , November 2023 , pp. 1142 - 1184
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2023.

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Footnotes

This study was pre-registered at the AEA RCT Registry. Its registration number is AEARCTR-0004129 and it is available at https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4129-1.0. The replication and supplementary material for the study is available at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/F63ZQ. We acknowledge support from the Israel Science Foundation, Grant Number 664/17.

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