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The external validity of giving in the dictator game

A field experiment using the misdirected letter technique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Axel Franzen  and
Sonja Pointner
Axel Franzen*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Institute of Sociology, University of Bern, Lerchenweg 36, 3012 Bern, Switzerland
Sonja Pointner
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Institute of Sociology, University of Bern, Lerchenweg 36, 3012 Bern, Switzerland
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

We investigate the external validity of giving in the dictator game by using the misdirected letter technique in a within-subject design. First, subjects participated in standard dictator games (double blind) conducted in labs in two different studies. Second, after four to five weeks (study 1) or two years (study 2), we delivered prepared letters to the same subjects. The envelopes and the contents of the letters were designed to create the impression that they were misdirected by the mail delivery service. The letters contained 10 Euros (20 Swiss Francs in study 2) corresponding to the endowment of the in-lab experiments. We observe in both studies that subjects who showed other-regarding behavior in the lab returned the misdirected letters more often than subjects giving nothing, suggesting that in-lab behavior is related to behavior in the field.

Keywords

Other-regarding preferencesFairnessDictator gameBehavioral game theoryExternal validityMisdirected letter techniqueField experiment

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C93: Field Experiments
Type
Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 2013 , pp. 155 - 169
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9337-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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